Volume 102

Number 2

Summer 2016

Journal of the

WASHINGTON

ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

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Conservation of White-tailed Jackrabbit Populations K. Gilcredse. .............cccccceessesteeeeeees 5

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ISSN 0043-0439 Issued Quarterly at Washington DC

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UNIVERSITY

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Washington Academy of Sciences

Founded in 1898

BOARD OF MANAGERS

Elected Officers

President

Mike Coble

President Elect

Sue Cross

Treasurer

Ronald Hietala

Secretary

John Kaufhold

Vice President, Administration

Terry Longstreth

Vice President, Membership

Sethanne Howard

Vice President, Junior Academy

Jerry Dwyer

Vice President, Affiliated Societies

Gene Williams

Members at Large

Paul Arveson

Michael Cohen

Terrell Erickson

Frank Haig, S.J.

Meisam Izadjoo

Mary Snieckus

Past President

Mina Izadjoo

AFFILIATED SOCIETY DELEGATES

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Editor of the Journal

Sethanne Howard

Journal of the Washington Academy of

Sciences (ISSN 0043-0439)

Published by the Washington Academy of

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The Journal of the Washington Academy

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The Journal is the official organ of the

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is published quarterly. The last issue of the

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Journal of the

WASHINGTON ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

Volume 102 Number2 Summer 2016

Contents

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irate as 4: Premise tor Social:Complexity A. Berea. .i22..sse. 222.0 <0s cea taeenenseeee «ncone ry.

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ISSN 0043-0439 Issued Quarterly at Washington DC

HARVARD

UNIVERSITY

Summer 2016

Editor’s comments

The summer issue is a special one because we include the awardees from the

annual meetings and awards banquet. We celebrate their accomplishments

and congratulate each of them on their achievements. Please remember to

nominate candidates for our awards. The nomination form and information

are on our website www.washacadsci.org. In addition this year the Academy

gave a special recognition award to Fr. Frank Haig SJ for his many years of

exemplary service to the Academy. He serves with distinction as a member

at large on the Board of Managers.

There is a special book review in this issue. Andrew Batavia wrote a novel

about his life and career. Ron Hietala reviewed the book. I commend it to

you.

We have two interesting papers to offer. Kelsey Gilcrease continues her

study of the jackrabbit population. Anamaria Berea brings her study of trade

as a premise of social complexity.

This 1s an exciting time for science. Share your excitement with the Journal.

I look for papers to arrive on the exciting results from the mission to Jupiter,

and the new results from LIGO. I heard one scientist describe the LIGO

results as paradigm changing in our understanding of the Universe. And that

is just astronomy. There have been a great deal of new research on PTSD,

its effect on the body, and how resilient our brains are. Even though the

current DSM still classifies PTSD as a mental disorder, there is a rising tide

to move it into the brain injury category. Moving to the environment, we see

climate change remap our Earth; we welcome papers describing these

changes.

One of the strengths of our Journal is its interdisciplinary nature. The

Journal is a perfect place for those papers that are perhaps more general than

a targeted journal would publish.

Sethanne Howard

Washington Academy of Sciences

i

Journal of the Washington Academy of Sciences

Editor Sethanne Howard sethanneh@msn.com

Board of Discipline Editors

The Journal of the Washington Academy of Sciences has a 12-member Board

of Discipline Editors representing many scientific and technical fields. The

members of the Board of Discipline Editors are affiliated with a variety of

scientific institutions in the Washington area and beyond — government

agencies such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST);

universities such as Georgetown; and professional associations such as the

Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE).

Anthropology Emanuela Appetiti eappetiti@hotmail.com

Astronomy Sethanne Howard sethanneh@msn.com

Biology/Biophysics Eugenie Mielczarek mielcezar@physics.gmu.edu

Botany Mark Holland maholland@salisbury.edu

Chemistry Deana Jaber djaber@marymount.edu

Environmental Natural

Sciences Terrell Erickson terrell.erickson] @wde.nsda.gov

Health Robin Stombler rstombler@auburnstrat.com

History of Medicine Alain Touwaide atouwaide@hotmail.com

Operations Research Michael Katehakis mnk@rci.rutgers.edu

Physics Katharine Gebbie katharine.gebbie@nist.gov

Science Education Jim Egenrieder jim@deepwater.org

Systems Science Elizabeth Corona elizabethcorona@gmail.com

Summer 2016

Washington Academy of Sciences

Wisdom from a Chair — Thirty Years of Quadriplegia

By Andrew I. Batavia

Review by Ronald O. Hietala, Ph. D.

Batavia, Drew, as family and friends called him, had an insightful

perspective on things around him. It’s hard to describe, but it was sort of

wry, almost sarcastic without being cynical or offensive. Since he worked

for the U.S. Government in several roles, his observations are useful to

anybody who needs to know how the government works. Batavia’s

experience was especially related to science-based policy.

Curiously, you can read a great many history books about the U. S.

Government and learn very little of practical value about how the

Government works. Such books are usually written by professional

authors, who are mostly high-minded folks. Whether they are too high-

minded to reveal the practical (not to say “dark’”) secrets of how the

government works or they just don’t know, the result is the same. Such

books aren’t much help. This book can help.

Batavia’s perspective was undoubtedly shaped by the accident that

happened when he was 16 years old. Needing to get back to his summer

job from an outing, he hitched a ride. He got into the middle back seat in a

convertible and the driver set out in a rain storm. Seat belts were required

then, but only 1n new cars, and this convertible was not new. There was an

accident; he was flung forward, and his spinal cord was severed in about

the middle of his neck. For the rest of his life, he was paralyzed from the

shoulders down. He retained the ability to breathe on his own.

His powers to affect people and things were different after the

accident. He could not build a house, change a flat tire, play baseball, beat

up his enemies, or many of the things people usually take for granted. He

needed help to go to bed at night and to get up in the morning. His

participation in things was largely limited to observation, analysis,

speaking, and writing. Those powers were, I think, sharpened.

He finished high school. He finished college at the University of

California, Riverside. He completed law school at, | guess, Harvard (the

record is a little unclear) and a Master of Science Program in health

Summer 2016

services research at Stanford Medical School.

He passed up an opportunity to work at a Wall Street law firm and

took instead an offer from the Justice Department. His personal needs

could not be ignored or compromised, and he felt the demands of a Wall

Street law practice could not be met. He also felt he could not “... give all

of myself...,” to the mission of a private law firm, to represent the interests

of the clients. He respected that mission, but he did not feel it was his.

It may seem improbable, but Batavia enjoyed life. He liked the

prestige and the activities of his work. He was actually interested by the

grind of researching legal issues. He knew it was work most people don’t

understand at all, and he was satisfied that he understood it. He apparently

had a kind of compulsiveness that fit well with writing (in government

language, “promulgating”) regulations, where inattention to a single detail

can have enormous consequences.

He said there was, “... no better life than that of a graduate student

....” He had a good time in graduate school. Living conditions were good;

the company was good; the intellectual stimulation was great.

Graduate school was where he developed a respect for the

significance of high quality research. He felt he had a particular advantage

in his combination of legal skills and research skills. He also was a good

writer, and he wrote a great deal of material to promote the development

of ways and means to help the disabled. It was undoubtedly a very good

thing that he did have knowledge of research techniques, because in the

development of laws, regulations, and social programs, a respect for truth

is critical to quality. It is also less common than one might think.

Batavia seemed most proud of two things in his professional life —

that he wrote the regulations required for the Americans with Disabilities

Act and that he wrote many articles about how to improve life for the

disabled. His point of view was well-balanced. He believed the main

purpose of helping the disabled was to help them make their contributions

to the common good.

He valued his associations with certain people. He had a great

appreciation for Attorney General Richard Thornburg, who recruited him

into the Justice Department. Thornburg also recommended him for the

White House Fellows Program, for which he was selected, and which he

Washington Academy of Sciences

valued immensely. Batavia wrote equally admiringly of some of the

academic notables he worked with at Harvard, Stanford, and the

University of California at Riverside. He also wrote admiringly of Ronald

Reagan and Bill Clinton, but with qualifications. Those two he met only

briefly.

He addressed many issues affecting the disabled in his work. On

one of the issues he took up, he took a bold and very controversial position

— he advocated assistance with suicide for disabled persons who chose it.

His position in favor of assisted suicide did not seem to be an

expression of desperation or despair. His writing shows no evidence of

those. Rather, it seems to have resulted from a plain recognition that there

is no limit, for the living, to the pain, difficulty, frustration, and other

problems that nature and circumstances may impose on a person. He gives

several examples of handicapped persons who ended their own lives after

more than one attempt. These examples make it clear that it goes better

with help.

For many people, that kind of consideration is not imposed,

particularly early in life. Batavia faced the possibility of death early; for

months his grip on life was very tenuous. Then he faced another problem,

making his life worthwhile. That, too, was an effort, a very great effort

that ended only when his life ended.

Why did he pose this question only for the disabled? If I had to

guess, it would be for three reasons. First, he believed he had the

credentials to speak for the disabled. Second, he recognized that his

perspective was that of a disabled person, so that was where his ground in

that question was most solid. Third, he probably realized that eventually, it

would not matter. Any decision on such a question will eventually be

applied to the disabled and the able equally.

He was like that — a careful, thorough thinker. We can all learn

from that kind of person.

What I value most in Batavia’s record of his life is this: Despite his

problems, he forged a meaningful, satisfying life. He did that by deliberate

resolve. He learned to live. He got himself educated, employed, and

married. He and his wife adopted two children, from Russia, no less. His

family relationships were solid. He chose carefully what he wanted to

Summer 2016

accomplish; he worked hard to accomplish what he did, and he was

obviously proud to have done so.

It is a fun read. Andrew I. Batavia wrote it as a memoir shortly

before his death.

Washington Academy of Sciences

Conservation of White-tailed Jackrabbit Populations:

What Impact Does Farm Size Have?

Kelsey Gilcrease

South Dakota School of Mines and Technology

Abstract

It has been put forth that a state with larger landholding size will be less likely

to have incentives to protect a species (Lueck 1991, 1995). White-tailed

jackrabbit populations in the United States have been declining, and in response

a few states have ceased jackrabbit hunting. Five other states that contain white-

tailed jackrabbit populations have no closed hunting seasons. This study

investigates the relationship between farm size and jackrabbit population size

in states that do (X=1603 acres, X=44) and do not allow hunting (X=344 acres,

X=0.76). A linear regression analysis was used to determine the probability that

a state would alter the jackrabbit’s conservation status to a species of

conservation concern. This study found a significant difference between farm

size in states that do and do not allow jackrabbit hunting. Consistent with

Lueck’s (1995) findings, states with larger landholding size appear to have less

invested in protection of wildlife. Negative relationships were found between

protecting the jackrabbit and farm size, jackalope income, and fur prices,

whereas there was a positive relationship between protecting the jackrabbit,

farm value, and pasture value. Implications for conservation of the jackrabbit,

including ways to decrease contracting costs for the management of white-tailed

jackrabbit populations are discussed.

Introduction

BECAUSE POPULATIONS OF WILDLIFE often occupy or migrate through an

amalgam of public and privately owned land uses (e.g. farming, pasture),

the size of the land is often overlooked when considering the needs/values

of public and private parties alongside the needs of the native wildlife to

the area, especially for the white-tailed jackrabbit (Lepus townsendii). For

example, Dumke (1973) found the jackrabbit to be more abundant on large

expanses of cropland and pasture; Bailey (1926) found that jackrabbits

were located on plowed fields during the winter; and Kline (1963) found

that jackrabbits prefer wide expanses of pasture and cropland; however,

the size of land which white-tailed jackrabbits inhabit had not been

considered. In fact, property size can impact wildlife conservation efforts

in the following ways. One, the size of the land can impinge on how easily

people can manage habitat across boundaries (Lueck 1991). Next, the size

Summer 2016

of the land can dictate how much land is used for wildlife habitat. Lueck

(1995) suggested that states with larger landholdings have fewer

regulations, place more control with the landholder (as the cost of contracts

would be lower), have longer hunting seasons, and more lenient rules on

bag limits because landowner control is a substitute for state regulations.

Provided with this more hands off approach, one would predict that state

governments with larger landholdings would be less likely to intervene to

protect a species. Therefore, landholding size (i.e. farm size), farm value,

and potential income from wildlife are important variables in conservation

because each of these provides various emphases towards conservation in

that the use of the land (7.e. what crops are grown), the habitat surrounding

the land, spatial distribution of the species, contribute how likely people

would want to conserve a species. Landowners can heavily influence

outcomes for conservation and primary uses of land.

The white-tailed jackrabbit 1s one of the larger hare species on the

North American continent with populations ranging from one to several

hundred individuals (Lim 1987). The range of the species extends from the

central and north-western United States to southern portions of Canada

such as Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba (Lim 1987). White-tailed

jackrabbits can inhabit a variety of habitats, but are particularly suited to

colder climates, including alpine zones (Braun and Streeter 1968, Carter

1939, Grayson 1977). They prefer short-grass prairie, pasture,

meadowland, and a mix of cultivated grain habitat (Lim 1987, Beaudoin

and Beaudoin 2012). Historically, this species was abundant and used for

fur and meat. However, white-tailed jackrabbit populations in the United

States have been declining in recent years, and in response, several states

(lowa, Missouri, Wisconsin, Oregon, and Washington) have ceased

allowing jackrabbit hunting. Five other states contain white-tailed

jackrabbit populations (Wyoming, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota,

and Utah) but have no closed hunting season. The white-tailed jackrabbit

is currently classified as “least concern” in the United States (Smith and

Johnson 2008), but there has been a shift in their conservation status to

“species of concern” in Washington and “sensitive species” in Oregon.

The cause of the general decadal downward population trend is unclear

(Brown 1940, Brown 1947, Lim 1987). Nonetheless, it is important to

conserve the Jackrabbit, as it is a species of great importance to the prairie

ecosystem (Fry 1924, Dieter and Schaible 2012). The population decline

Washington Academy of Sciences

may also be a sign of other environmental problems or problems with other

species.

The aims of this study are to determine if average farm size differs

significantly between states that protect the jackrabbit and states that do

not and if jackrabbit population size differs between states that protect the

jackrabbit versus states that do not. Another aim of this study is to

investigate the relationship between protecting/not protecting and other

variables such as farm size, farm value, pasture value, jackalope price, and

fur prices. To “protect” a species can mean many methods of management,

including fire and grazing regimes, but it can also mean the regulation of

hunting, which has been regulated for the white-tailed jackrabbit in states

such as Iowa, Washington, and Oregon. Note that a state protecting the

jackrabbit means there is no hunting throughout the year, and states that

do not protect jackrabbits allow hunting at all times of the year. It 1s

predicted that increasing the prices of jackalope and fur will increase the

chance that a state will protect the jackrabbit (i.e. encouraging healthier

jackrabbit populations for conservation and harvest). Costs of contracting

include costs of “negotiating, measuring, and monitoring agreements

among owners of assets combined in the production process (Anderson

1998: 260).” Because there are a wide variety of uses for land that wildlife

inhabit, contracting between landowners with regard to monitoring and

managing wildlife and wildlife habitat is important to aid in the success of

conservation of wildlife in an area. Thus, keeping contracting costs low

facilitates more wildlife management among landowners. I conclude with

implications to reduce contracting costs to conserve the white-tailed

jackrabbit with respect to farm size.

Materials and Methods

First, I sought to determine if there was a significant difference

between farm size in states that protect the jackrabbit (lowa, Missouri,

Washington, Wisconsin, and Oregon) and states that allow hunting of the

jackrabbit (Wyoming, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Utah).

Second, I assessed whether there was a significant difference between the

jackrabbit counts data from protected and unprotected states. The null

hypothesis is that there is no statistical difference between average farm

size and jackrabbit population size in protected versus unprotected states.

Summer 2016

Statistics

The data were evaluated for normality and then equal variances using the

F test. If these assumptions held, the t-test was used. Where assumptions

were not held, the Mann-Whitney U test was used. Alpha values were set

at (0.05).

Data

Data on the farm size by state were collected from the USDA (2015).

Data on white-tailed jackrabbit population counts were obtained

from Kline (1963), Watkins and Nowak (1973), Leopold (1945),

Wisniewski ef al. (2010), Schleder and Welch (2009), Rogowitz and

Wolfe (1991), Montana Field Guide (2015), Voth and James (1965), and

Kietzmann and Hugghins (1986). These data were obtained from various

years because of a scarcity of population estimates on the white-tailed

jackrabbit; however, the data were collected in comparable ways with

point counts.

Pasture values and farm values were derived from USDA (2014).

Jackalope and fur prices were obtained from Trapper Association

websites.

Mann Whitney U test

This non-parametric test calculates the difference between medians

(Fowler ef al. 2004). This test can be used when data are few in number

and when sample sizes are unequal (Fowler ef a/. 2004).

Linear regression

Linear regression was used because it was assumed that there

would be a linear relationship between the dependent and independent

variables that could be functional or causal (Fowler ef al. 2004). A logistic

regression function was followed similar to Lueck (1991) where farm size,

farm value, pasture value, jackalope price, and fur prices were analyzed

with the state conservation status of the white-tailed jackrabbit (denoted

by a | 1f there is no hunting season or 0 if there is a hunting season). Note

that the jackalope is referred to as the stuffed and mounted jackrabbit with

fabricated antlers and the jackalope price is the price that people pay to

purchase the jackalope. An inverse relationship was predicted that

increases in farm size, farm values, and pasture values would decrease the

Washington Academy of Sciences

9

chances that a state would protect the white-tailed jackrabbit, because there

would be less incentive to protect jackrabbits as they would most likely

not be as profitable as would another use for land. Microsoft Excel was

used for data analysis.

Results

Average state farm size

The data were normally distributed. The average farm size for

Iowa, Missouri, Washington, Wisconsin, and Oregon was X=344.4 acres,

SD=90.58, SE=45.29, and the average farm size for Wyoming, Montana,

North Dakota, South Dakota, and Utah was X=1603.2 acres, SD=696.5,

SE=348.2 (Table 1). The calculated value was below the critical F value

where the variances were similar; therefore, I completed a t-test. There was

a significant difference in the amount of average farmland size between

the states that protect the jackrabbit and the states that do not. The states

that protect the jackrabbit have a smaller farm size.

An F test was used to compare the variances amongst farm size,

and the variances were not significantly different. A t test was undertaken

with the result that the t stat was larger than t critical. Therefore, the null

hypothesis was rejected. The P value was 0.011, df=4.

Jackrabbit count results

There was a significant relationship between the jackrabbit

population and states that do (X=44, SD=44.2, SE=22) and do not allow

jackrabbit hunting (X=0.76, SD=0.96, SE=0.43) (Table 1).

The data were found to be normally distributed. However, an F test was

calculated to assess the differences in variance. The variance was too high,

and thus, a parametric test was invalid. Therefore, a Mann-Whitney U test

for unmatched samples was completed where U=0 and P<0.05 (ni=5,

n2=4), so the null hypothesis that the medians for jackrabbit counts were

similar between protected and unprotected states was rejected.

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10

Table 1. Population size (from point count surveys), farm size, pasture

value, jackalope price, fur price, and conservation status between states

that do and do not allow hunting on the white-tailed jackrabbit.

Ayg. Pasture | Jackalope Conservation Conservation

farm value price ($) status Status

size ($) Reference

(acres)

(lowa GAP

Analysis

2007)

(Missouri

Department of

Conservation

2015)

(Washington

Department of

Fish and

Wildlife

dele heh -

“od Sib) ,

Conservation

0.2 347

2 290

Washington 401 810 NA NA

2015)

Wisconsin 210 2150 NA NA Species of (Wisconsin

conservation Department of

need Natural

Resources

2011)

Oregon 474 630 NA NA Sensitive species (Oregon

Department of

Fish and

Wildlife

2008)

2598 490 179.95 Predators (Wyoming

35

Game, Fish

and Parks

Species of

conservation

concern

State Candidate

Predator/Varmint

Game and

Fish

South 1366 860 99.98 2.06

Dakota

2015)

2147 640 NA NA Apparently (Montana

secure Animal Field

Guide 2015)

Department

1297 750 NA 0.98 Hunting open (North Dakota

year-round; no Game and

daily bag limit Fish

Department

2012)

2013)

North

Washington Academy of Sciences

(South Dakota

Dakota

Linear regression

The equation (below) developed from the linear regression

represents the effect that farm size, farm value, average pasture (value per

acre), jackalope market, and fur prices have on the probability that a state

will classify jackrabbits as a species of conservation concern.

y=0.9320—(—00047fampize) —(.00033famvalue) —(.00049pasture) +(—0037 jackalope) +(—3234fuur)

Negative relationships were identified with farm size, jackalope

price, and fur price whereas cropland farm value and pasture value were

positive. Approximately 79% of the variation in the protection of

jackrabbits was explained by farm size, average cropland land farm value,

pasture value, jackalope commodities, and fur price.

Discussion

This study finds that there is a significant relationship between

farm size and states that protect and do not protect the jackrabbit.

Consistent with Lueck (1995), this research found that states lacking

protections for white-tailed jackrabbits have larger farm sizes on average

than states that protect this species with the assumption that the landowners

control the protection status and thus the likelihood decreases that the

conservation status will be altered towards protection. However, larger

land parcel sizes are easier to contract with others for means of

conservation (Lueck 1995). The average farm size increased three acres

from 2013 to 2014 (USDA 2015), and if average farm size continues to

increase, the likelihood that conservation status will alter towards

protection will decrease. In addition, this study identifies positive

relationships with farm value and prairie value (i.e. as the farm value

increases, so will the chances of the jackrabbit being protected). Farm

values increased in the Northern Plains region (USDA 2014), and if this

trend continues, the likelihood that the conservation status will alter

towards protection will increase.

This study also finds negative relationships between jackalope

prices and fur prices. It was predicted that the market of jackalopes and

furs would be incentives for landowners to have healthy jackrabbit

populations. In addition, a positive relationship was predicted such that

increasing the prices of jackalope and fur will increase the chance that a

Summer 2016

12

state will protect the jackrabbit. Because jackrabbit fur was popular there

would be a chance for profit, especially if the fur was as popular as it was

in the mid-20" century (South Dakota Conservation Digest 1957);

however, recent jackrabbit fur prices and jackalope sales were not

available in lowa, Wisconsin, and Missouri; and there are sales and profits

on jackalopes in states such as Wyoming and South Dakota. Overall, these

results seem sensible because the states that do protect the jackrabbit have

smaller farm sizes, higher farm values, and little fur or jackalope market

to be found. According to this analysis, Utah would be the next state not

to allow hunting of the white-tailed jackrabbit.

This study suggested that states that allow hunting have higher

jackrabbit densities than states that have lower jackrabbit densities do not

allow hunting. From a conservation standpoint, contracting between

landowners with regard to monitoring and managing wildlife and wildlife

habitat is important to aid in the success of conservation of wildlife in an

area; therefore, keeping contracting costs low facilitates additional wildlife

management between landowners. The following paragraphs list

mechanisms to reduce contracting costs for the white-tailed jackrabbit

(under the assumption that owning the wildlife and obtaining profits are

incentives to protect wildlife) (Smith 1981). Lueck (1989) suggested that

private parties or local governments are more likely to regulate wildlife

with smaller territories. With a home range of about 2-3 kilometers for the

white-tailed jackrabbit (Lim 1987), this can be done:

e A landowner can sell access fees to hunt, trap, or photograph the

wildlife/resource of interest (Smith 1981, Lueck 1991, Lueck and

Yoder 1997, Anderson 1998). This idea could be applied to

jackrabbits, and harvest could be limited to months when the

value of furs is higher (Lueck 1995).

e An organization can raise money, and the proceeds can contribute

toward damage to trees or crops, 1f proven that wildlife or in this

case, Jackrabbits damaged the crop (Anderson 1998).

e Use parcels of land where wildlife has the highest value for the

land (Lueck and Yoder 1997), and switch to land that jackrabbits

prefer, such as a short-grass prairie, pasture, mix of cultivated

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grain habitat (Beaudoin and Beaudoin 2012). Existing state land

where wildlife has the highest value can do the same.

e Smith (1981) suggested that wildlife can be conserved from areas

such as hunting preserves, animal farms, or game ranches, which

were created to obtain profits from private hunting initiatives.

This idea could be applied to the jackrabbit, because leporids are

a great way for young hunters to learn how to hunt, and people

could pay an entrance fee with the creation and development of a

private hunting or trapping ground (Anderson 1998). In addition,

if the value of wildlife is high and if the landowner owned the

game (Leopold 1933, Smith 1981, Lueck 1991), this can be

applied to help protect jackrabbits against trespassers or predators

because there 1s incentive to protect the jackrabbit as profit. In

addition, other species could be considered for the hunt and

habitat can be maintained (Anderson 1998).

e If contracting between landowners 1s necessary, contract with

others who have homogenous landscaping units or plant similar

crops, and contract with large farm sizes as much as possible to

reduce contracting costs (Lueck and Yoder 1997). Maintaining

habitat or managing populations 1s less costly when landscaping

units are more homogenous. Also, the interaction of white-tailed

jackrabbits and black-tailed jackrabbits (Lepus californicus) must

be examined in states where the two species coexist (Lim 1987).

There are some limitations of the research that must be discussed. First,

there are many factors when it comes to the conservation of wildlife, and

farm size is just one factor; however, for this relationship (farm size,

jackrabbit population size, and protecting the jackrabbit) a linear

regression equation had not been developed for the white-tailed jackrabbit.

A second limitation is that data on white-tailed jackrabbit population

numbers were obtained from various years because of a scarcity of

population data on the white-tailed jackrabbit; however, the data were

collected in comparable ways with point counts. Because there was a lack

of contemporary jackrabbit population numbers, the next most current

population data were sought; however, more current population estimates

are needed so that better correlations can be determined.

Summer 2016

For future analyses one might research the prices that a hunter

would receive for turning in a white-tailed jackrabbit for jackalope mounts.

It would also be interesting to determine if there are significant

relationships in land use between states that protect the jackrabbit and

states that do not protect the jackrabbit. This would indicate whether the

land uses conserve and sustain the more affable jackrabbit population.

LITURATURE

Anderson TL. 1998. Viewing Wildlife through Coase-colored glasses. In PJ Hill, RE.

Meiners (Editors), Who Owns the Environment?, pp. 259-282. (Lanham Maryland:

Rowman and Littlefield Publishers).

Beaudoin AB and Beaudoin Y. 2012. Urban white-tailed jackrabbits (Lepus townsendii)

eat spike plants (Cordyline australis) in winter. Canadian Field-Naturalist 126:

157-159.

Bailey V. 1926. A biological survey of North Dakota. North American Fauna 49: |-

226.

Braun CE and Streeter RG. 1968. Observations on the occurrence of white-tailed

jackrabbits in the alpine zone. Journal of Mammalogy 49: 160-161.

Brown HL. 1940. The distribution of the white-tailed jackrabbit (Lepus townsendi1

campanius Hollister) in Kansas. Transactions of the Kansas Academy of Science

43: 385-389.

Brown HL. 1947. Why has the white-tailed jackrabbit (Lepus townsendi1 campanius

Hollister) become scarce in Kansas? Transactions of the Kansas Academy of

Science 49: 455-456.

Carter FL. 1939. A study of jackrabbit shifts in range in western Kansas. Transactions

of the Kansas Academy of Science 42: 431-435.

Dieter C and Schaible D. 2012. Reproduction and population characteristics of white-

tailed jackrabbits in South Dakota. Great Plains Research 22: 79-86.

Dumke RT. 1973. The White-tailed jackrabbit in Wisconsin. Wisconsin Conservation

Bulletin 38 (5): 16-18.

Fowler J, Cohen L, and Jarvis P. 2004. Practical Statistics for Field Biology. Second

Edition. (San Francisco: John Wiley & Sons).

Fry W. 1924. The Sierra white-tailed jackrabbit. California Fish and Game 10:172-175

Grayson DK. 1977. On the Holocene history of some northern Great Basin lagomorphs.

Journal of Mammalogy 58: 287-291.

Iowa Gap Analysis. 2007. Checklist of lowa Mammals with Atlas Links. Retrieved

from the Internet 10 July 2015:

http://www.gis.iastate.edu/gap/terra/atlas/mammals.htm.

Kietzmann GE and Hugghins EJ. 1986. Helminths of Lagomorphs in South Dakota.

Journal of Wildlife Diseases 22: 276-278.

Kline P.D. 1963. Notes on the biology of the jackrabbit in lowa. The Proceedings of the

lowa Academy of Science 70:196-204.

Washington Academy of Sciences

Leopold A. 1933. Game Management. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press).

Leopold A. 1945. The Distribution of Wisconsin Hares. Wisconsin Academy of

Sciences, Arts and Letters. 37: 1-14.

Lim BK. 1987. Lepus townsendii. Mammalian Species 288: 1-6.

Lueck D. 1989. The Economic Nature of Wildlife Law. The Journal of Legal Studies

18: 291-324.

Lueck D. 1991. Ownership and the Regulation of Wildlife. Economic Inquiry 31: 249-

260.

Lueck, D. 1995. Property rights and the economic logic of wildlife institutions. Natural

Resources Journal 35: 625-670.

Lueck D and Yoder J. 1997. Federalism and wildlife conservation in the west. In TL

Anderson and PJ Hill (Editors), Environmental Federalism, pp. 89-131. (New

York: Rowman & Littlefield).

Missouri Department of Conservation. 2015. Cottontail Rabbit Control. Retrieved from

the Internet 10 July 2015: http://mdc.mo.gov/your-property/problem-plants-and-

animals/nuisance-native-wildlife/cottontail-rabbit-control .

Montana Natural Heritage Program and Montana Fish, Wildlife, and Parks. 2015.

White-tailed jackrabbit — Lepus townsendii. Montana Field Guide. Retrieved from

the Internet 9 May 2015:

http://fieldguide.mt.gov/species Detail.aspx?elcode=AMAEBO03040.

Montana Animal Field Guide. 2015. Species Status Codes. Retrieved from the Internet

10 July 2015: http://fieldguide.mt.gov/statusCodes.aspx#msre:rank.

North Dakota Game and Fish Department. 2012. Other Species. Retrieved from the

Internet 10 July 2015: http://gfnd.gov/hunting/other-species/other-species.

Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife. 2015. Oregon Department of Fish and

Wildlife Sensitive Species. Retrieved from the Internet 10 July 2015:

http://www.dfw.state.or.us/wildlife/diversity/species/docs/SSL_by_taxon.pdf.

Rogowitz GL and Wolfe ML. 1991. Intraspecific Variation in Life-History Traits of the

White-Tailed Jackrabbit (Lepus townsendi1). Journal of Mammalogy 72: 796-806.

Schleder L and Welch R. 2009. Saddle Butte Wind Park Surveys for special Status

Species: Washington Ground Squirrels and Burrowing Owls. Retrieved from the

Internet 14 Aug 2014:

http://www.oregon.gov/energy/Siting/docs/SBW/ASC/P_att2.pdf.

Smith AT and Johnson CH. 2008. Lepus townsendil. In IUCN 2014, Retrieved from

the Internet 10 Oct 2014: www.iucnredlist.org .

Smith RJ. 1981. Resolving the tragedy of the commons by creating private property

rights in wildlife. Cato Journal 1: 439-468.

South Dakota Conservation Digest. 1957. Rabbit Furbearer King for 1956-57 Season.

South Dakota Conservation Digest 24:6-7.

South Dakota Game, Fish and Parks. 2015. Predator and Varmint Hunting. Retrieved

from the Internet 10 July 2015: http://gfp.sd.gov/hunting/predator-varmint-

furbearer/.

U.S. Department of Agriculture. 2015. Farms and Land in Farms 2014 Summary.

Retrieved from the Internet 14 Mar 2015:

Summer 2016

http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/usda/current/FarmLandIn/FarmLandIn-02-19-

2015.pdf .

U.S. Department of Agriculture. 2014. Land Values 2014 Summary. Retrieved from the

Internet 14 Mar 2015:

http://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/Todays_Reports/reports/land08 14.pdf.

Voth DR and James TR. 1965. Parasites of the white-tailed in southeastern North

Dakota. Proceedings of the North Dakota Academy of Science 19: 15-18.

Watkins LC and Nowak RM. 1973. The white-tailed jackrabbit in Missouri. The

Southwestern Naturalist 18: 352-354.

Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife Conservation. 2015. Washington State

Species of Concern Lists. Retrieved from the Internet 10 July 2015:

http://wdfw.wa.gov/conservation/endangered/All/.

Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources. 2011. Current Scientific and Standard

Common Names of Wisconsin Mammals. Retrieved from the Internet 10 July

2015: http://dnr.wi.gov/files/pdf/pubs/ss/ss1089.pdf.

Wisniewski J, Finger RS, Hoenes B. 2010. Odessa Subarea Special Study: Wildlife

Survey Final Report. Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife. Retrieved

from the Internet 13 Aug 2014:

http://www.usbr.gov/pn/programs/eis/odessa/reports/wildlifesurvey.pdf.

Wyoming Game and Fish Department. 2013. Frequently Asked Questions Small Game.

Retrived from the Internet 10 July 2015: https:/Awgfd.wyo.gov/web201 1/wgfd-

1000492.aspx.

Bio

Kelsey Gilcrease is an Instructor of undergraduate Biology and Ecology

courses at South Dakota School of Mines and Technology in Rapid

City. Kelsey completed her MPhil at the University of Queensland in

Brisbane studying koalas (Phascolarctos cinereus). Conservation

of leporids (rabbits and hares) are her main interests with a wide variety of

species including the white-tailed jackrabbit (Lepus townsendii), the desert

cottontail (Sylvilagus audubonii), and the antelope jackrabbit (Lepus

alleni).

Washington Academy of Sciences

Trade as a Premise for Social Complexity

Anamaria Berea

Center for Complexity in Business

University of Maryland

Abstract

The argument of this paper is that trade is an important causal factor for

the origins of social complexity, not just a co-evolutionary process.

Ancient trade played a crucial role in the origins of the first state level

society (Early Uruk) and was a primary premise for social complexity

between 9000 and 3000 BC. Due to the advantages of clay harvesting and

reliable water transportation and due to a series of innovations (e.g.,

pottery wheel and the tokens system), there emerged a series of

institutions, such as money, redistribution, and wage payments during the

first state level polity. These institutions subsequently increased the level

of social complexity and economic development of the Early Uruk society

from a city to the status of the first political economy. A secondary

hypothesis of this paper is concerned with the type of organization of this

first political economy. The argument is that Uruk was more an

entrepreneurial organization that paid wages according to the division of

labor and less a central governance for the redistribution of the public

goods. It was a “political enterprise” with both entrepreneurial and

political attributes.

Introduction

THE PURPOSE OF THIS RESEARCH PAPER is to investigate a seemingly

simple question: What role has trade played in the origins of social

complexity, when history tells us the first polities were formed thousands of

years ago? In order to answer this question this research focuses on the

formation of the first state, Uruk. Uruk was not only the first state level

society (early Uruk — 5500-4000 BC), but also the first empire and the first

international political system (Middle Uruk - 3700 BC) (Cioffi-Revilla,

2001). The archeological evidence that supports this analysis comes

particularly from the transition period between the Ubaid IV and the Early

Uruk. Social complexity is defined as a form of organization for groups and

individuals that behave given a complex set of rules and have developed

some forms of institutions; that have developed rules of behavior,

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organization and interaction that are more than just about survival and

adaptation (Cioffi-Revilla, 2010). In other words, the group has developed

some exogenous rules of living, and is not just an endogenous, informal

collection of individuals. For example, a clan is not a complex society, but

a chiefdom 1s.

Scrutinizing the most primitive polities (or political economies)

known to date is very exciting and one of them is the Fertile Crescent around

8000 BC (Fernandez-Armesto, 2001). The insights from my analysis are

shedding light into some causal processes for the emergence of a complex

society and complex political relationships. The motivation for this research

is to answer the question of what role trade played in the origins of such

social complexity or political systems. Currently, trade has been considered

more or less intertwined with the economic development of the early

societies, but the emphasis has been on trade as a consequential process

associated with the development of civilizations (Fernandez-Armesto,

2001), rather than a causal, pre-determining factor for the formation of

societies and polities. The “co-evolutionary” hypothesis seems implicit

throughout historical and anthropological writings; but what about a causal

hypothesis?

My argument tests two hypotheses: the principal hypothesis states

that trade is a predetermining factor for social complexity (1 will refer to this

as the “causal hypothesis’’); the subsequent hypothesis states that the early

complex social forms of organization resemble the organization of firms or

small polycentric systems of governance (Ostrom, 1997) (I will refer to this

as “the entrepreneurial hypothesis”). If both these hypotheses are true, then

the first polity or political system would prove to be a “transformative

complex adaptive system” (diZerega, 2009), that changed both the

ecosystem and the human organization mainly due to the expansion of trade.

Social complexity, according to Simon’s Hypothesis, is produced by

the social environment and not by human behavior (Simon, 1996). Other

authors have an understanding of social complexity that is closer to the

emergence of civilizations (Fernandez-Armesto, 2001), others with the

emergence of states (Marcus, 1998).

In a restrictive definition political complexity implies a specialized

development of institutions. Administrative specialization and geographic

control require a certain degree of institutional diversity themselves (North,

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1981; 1990; 2005). My paper focuses on the emergence of the first

specialized institutions in the polity of Early Uruk. I will argue that these

institutions are money, labor management, merchant colonies, and

systems of redistribution of imported goods, institutions unknown before

in history.

In a less restrictive understanding Hayek’s theory of spontaneous

order says that the emergence of social complexity comes from the

unintended, non-designed outcomes of individual, purposeful actions

(Hayek, 1945). In one of his seminal papers, “The Use of Knowledge in

Society”, Hayek showed how the price system emerged - not by design - as

the most efficient way of conveying the relevant information in the market.

In the earliest political economy of Uruk the first historical records show

that different types of money circulated simultaneously with barter. Money

was used for complex transactions — cheap money for cheaper transactions

(i.e. barely was reportedly used as a form of currency), while more

expensive money (i.e. c/ay) for more complicated exchanges.

While the transition from spontaneous order to social complexity or

to a fully formed political economy is not very well understood and

represents one of the big questions in the science of collective behavior today

(NAKFI, 2014), several public choice or institutional economists have

published work on the idea that spontaneous order leads to norms,

endogenous institutions and polycentric communities (Hayek, 1964; North,

1981; Ostrom, 1997; Ostrom, 1990; Wagner 2007) In the political economy

framework the “market square” and the “political square” are intertwined

and the political square “lives” more like a symbiont out of the market square

(Wagner, 2007). These “political enterprises” (Wagner, 2007) in the early

political economy of Uruk were primarily formed of what anthropologists

call “the elite” (Algaze, 2001) - the group of people who had a monopoly

over the imported goods and over the temple granaries where these goods

were stored. The monopolistic nature of the political enterprise of Uruk is

exerted through the control over the produced and imported goods and over

the redistribution of these goods; thus, they were controlling trade.

In modern times one of the known important consequences of trade

is the spread of languages, culture, and recorded economic history (e.g., Silk

Road, spice routes) (UNESCO, 2008). And the spread of languages, as

Vincent Ostrom showed, is a defining factor for the emergence of

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polycentric communities (Ostrom, 1997). The process of trade implies not

only the exchange of goods, but also an exchange of information that

implicates learning. Ostrom views language as medium of exchange - a

currency for non-monetized relationships. After repeated trade — and the

evidence shows repeated trade with the people living in the Zargos

Mountains, in Susa, in Egypt and in the Northern Levant — the people of

Uruk might have developed a “common language” as the basis for the newly

formed networks that sometimes became complex enough to form

polycentric communities. Such polycentric communities emerging out of

trade were the merchant colonies from Tepe Gawra, East Iran, and Tell

Habuba Kabira. According to Owen the people from late Ubaid period and

late Uruk did not think of themselves as being part of a single culture or

group, but rather they identified with a single larger town they lived in or

nearby (Owen, 2007). They thought of their world as “‘a patchwork of rival

groups” — polycentric — and not as the “Sumerian” or “Mesopotamian”

society, as we understand it today.

Currently there is a lack of research in the economics literature on

the origins of trade and the origins of political economies. Trade is a

fundamental social phenomenon that can be found anywhere around the

world and any time in the history of human complex systems, but there is a

lack of theoretical and empirical work that would improve its understanding

and emergence in a robust! way. One reason there is still a gap in the research

concerning the origins and emergence and formalization is the difficulty in

obtaining and tracking relevant data.

Vernon Smith argued in his Nobel Prize Lecture that cultures which

have evolved markets have enormously expanded resource specialization

(Smith, 2003). But, as with any fundamental emergent social phenomenon,

entrepreneurship (as it relates to resource specialization) must exhibit robust

evolutionary traits of self-adaptation and growth on the very long term and

at large scales.

My analysis starts with the theoretical background laid down by

some of the most prominent economists mentioned above (and others) on

the theory of trade and markets and on the emergence of institutions within

' “Robustness” refers to the property of complex adaptive systems to persist under

perturbations (Felix & Wagner, 2006)

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“a

a political economy. Then, | pursue a methodological analysis that attempts

to clarify the distinctions between the causal and co-evolutionary processes.

Using this theoretical and methodological framework, | match the existing

historical, archeological, and anthropological findings and thus I construct

my argument for the two hypotheses that I am testing: the principal

hypothesis on trade as a premise for social complexity and the subsequent

hypothesis on the early polity organization into firms (the entrepreneurial

hypothesis).

Methodological background

In order to construct my argument I reviewed the current, most

widely accepted theoretical literature in entrepreneurship (Shane, Kirzenr

and Schumpeter), institutional (Douglas North), and political economy

(Vincent Ostrom), and overlaid the archeological evidence from the Uruk

sites as published by historians and anthropologists (Algaze, Owen,

Schmandt-Basserat, Niessen) in order to understand how the ancient

evidence fits the current theories and how together these can be tied into a

causal argument, as shown in Figure 1.

Trade more

complex

Human nature Tokens Division of

propensity to truck, labor

barter and exchange Pottery Wheel

Mass | Trade ata

Comparative Emergence of production of | greater

advantage of clay Money pottery distance

Merchant | _ Institutions for Entrepreneur | Increased

colonies redistribution and ial polities =| social

control complexity

Temple granaries |

| Institutions for First political

_ labor management economy

Figure 1. The Line of argument for the causal and co-evolutionary processes in the first

political economy

The causal hypothesis

Trade is a process, a human behavior inherent to human action and

social interaction (Mises, 1949). “The propensity to truck, barter and

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exchange” is a propensity inherent to human nature, as stated by the father

of economics in “The Wealth of Nations” (Smith, 1776). Thus there 1s a

humanly intrinsic and aprioristic element in trade that would instantaneously

place it at the “origins” of some processes and human behaviors. But my

argument here is not that trade is an aprioristic human expression of social

relationships and thus, by direct deduction, a premise for social complexity.

My attempt is to emphasize the role of trade as a basic human social

interaction with a degree of universality that would have characterized the

people from tens of thousands of years ago as well as it characterizes the

people of today.

Axtell and Florida (2001) make an important argument about cities

and firms as clusters of social organization that follow a Zipf distribution of

their size. The Zipf distribution follows the mathematical law that the

number of entities or events is inversely proportional to their rank, and it

was observed in the distribution of words on a corpus, the city or firm sizes,

the magnitude of earthquakes, or the occurrence of deadly events (Zipf,

1949). Their empirical and modeling findings show that people and firms

(i.e., human organizations) have a tendency to co-locate geographically. As

historical evidence shows, in the first political economy traders started to

organize and co-locate in merchant colonies.

The Greek word for exchange, “‘catallactics’”’, designates a complex

phenomenon that involves not only the exchange of goods, but also the

exchange of personal relationships. In the political economy framework the

catallactic space is not confined just to the “market square’, but belongs as

well to the co-evolution of the market and political squares where people

interact and exchange goods, services, and relationships that can be

monetized or non-monetized or both (Wagner, 2007). Thus, the catallactical

nature of trade supports the co-evolution hypothesis of trade and social

complexity - the more complex the trade, the more complex the society.

As previously said, the argument for the causal hypothesis comes not

from the nature or the characteristics (attributes) of trade, but from the

emergence of institutions specific for a political economy. There are two sets

of conditions that imply the causality argument: the necessary and the

sufficient. The necessary conditions for complex trade are the comparative

advantages in the Ricardian sense (Ricardo, 1817) offered by the society and

the technological innovations of the society. In the case of Uruk, the physical

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environment promotes the harvesting of clay to make pottery. This is an

advantage when compared to other incipient civilizations or societies at the

time. The ease of water transportation on the Euphrates is also another

comparative advantage. The innovation in the use of tokens and the pottery

wheel also offer advantages for this incipient society. The sufficient

conditions would therefore be new, emergent institutions such as money,

wages, redistribution, and merchant colonies. None of these conditions or

the equivalent of these institutions was known before this time in history, at

least based on the evidence we have to date (Fernandez-Armesto, 2001).

The entrepreneurial hypothesis

Entrepreneurial alertness is the innate ability of the entrepreneurs to

coordinate their own future expectations and present actions (Kirzner, 1973),

in the context of the market process and their network of competitive

entrepreneurs. The entrepreneurs are able to do this at the micro-level,

internal type of coordination by becoming creators of relevant knowledge

for their actions. The historical evidence from the Uruk period (and

described later in this paper) shows that the traders 1n stone and clay and the

maritime travelers looking for new trade opportunities are such

entrepreneurs.

There is an ongoing theoretical debate about entrepreneurs as causal

(Schumpeter, 1942) or consequential (Kirzner, 1973) actors with respect to

market disequilibria. If knowledge is imperfect and actors are only

optimizing based on that imperfect knowledge, then coordination and

learning can never be achieved. With the discovery of new territories and

new products available in the early Uruk maritime expansion, trade had

become a learning process that led to the formation of the first merchant

colonies known in history to date.

Entrepreneurs are not necessarily single individuals who create and

disseminate or diffuse knowledge at the individual level. Entrepreneurial

action can be a collective action guided towards a single goal. But this

collective action is preceded by a unified decision that led to entrepreneurial

action. The maritime expeditions of Uruk were organized collective actions

to trade clay for stone, wood, or precious stones. The traders of Uruk proved

to be more successful than the traders of the Zargos Mountains due to their

ability to invent and innovate institutions such as money and merchant

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colonies. These would make both information (Hayek, 1945) and

geographical distance (Axtell and Florida, 2001) much more efficient.

The space for simultaneous discovery (consequential actors) and

creation (causal actors) of entrepreneurial action can be achieved in

asymmetric information networks, where one entrepreneur has more

information than another (Venkataraman, 1997). Moreover, one of the

unintended consequences was the transformation (diZerega, 2009) of their

geographical and social space, resulting in building cities, starting

agriculture, and inventing institutions. In this sense, the early people of Uruk

are procedural actors (Simon, 1996) who transformed newly discovered

opportunities into productive returns within the bounded environment

provided by the asymmetric information networks in which they were

embedded (Fortunato & Alter, 2011).

The emergence of entrepreneurship in Early Uruk also depended on

preserving and extending such information networks. Archeological

evidence shows that the “creative destruction” type of entrepreneurship (e.g.

mass-production of pottery is transformative at a very large scale in the

economy) is intimately related to the emergence of recorded information (i.e.

tokens for accounting) (Owen, 2007; Algaze, 2001). In addition, the

evidence” of the first maritime traders and merchant colonies between

Ancient Babylon (6000 BC) and the hunter-gatherers of the Zargos

Mountains shows that adverse selection markets do not unravel (Akerlof,

1970) in the presence of entrepreneurial discovery.

Hidalgo et.al (2007) showed that the product space and economic

growth are interdependent at the level of a country; similarly, the co-

evolution of entrepreneurs and opportunity space in the earliest state level

society can explain why the tokens and the pottery wheel were technological

shocks (Kydland and Prescott, 1982) that boosted this early economy into

economic and urban growth.

Busenitz laid down a framework (Busenitz, 2003) for researching

entrepreneurship as a process emerging out of multiple interactions (both

social and ecological in nature); this is an important methodological

framework because it changes the focus on the organization as the unit of

* Oldest archeological and historical evidence known to date

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ps)

analysis and shifts it towards a framework that takes processes and

interactions of multiple stakeholders in a complex environment as the

subject of analysis. This brings into light entrepreneurship as a

transformative complex adaptive system as well.

Entrepreneurial outcomes can therefore be viewed as (at least

partially) depending on the interactions of individuals with each other and

within their social and natural ecology (Smith, 2003); thus, formal and

informal institutions are regarded as sources of opportunity. This interaction

framework is a departure from the mainstream theories of the firm that are

focused on the traits and behaviors of individuals, as well as from network

theories that examine the incidence and location of inter-firm networks

irrespective of where these contacts are oriented (i.e. the exploitation of

opportunity that is bounded by geographic or institutional space).

Equally important in this approach 1s the development of skills

among local producers and traders, in order to identify and exploit those

opportunities (Shane, 2003). Both producers and traders are entrepreneurs

who not only barter, but also exchange relevant knowledge. Their goal 1s to

coordinate their future expectations with their present actions. The

emergence of entrepreneurship can thus be looked for in the behavior of

actors who create and discover information.

Historical Evidence — The Necessary Conditions

As stated in the introduction, the premise for conducting this research

is the attempt to test two hypotheses: trade as a cause for social complexity

and the emergence of a political economy from entrepreneurial processes.

The following historical evidence, although non-exclusive, is sufficient to

construct an argument in favor of these claims.

Clay and water transportation. As Algaze showed, the advantage of

Southern Mesopotamia in terms of geography and lowland for agriculture is

very important for the organization of the early polities in the area (Algaze,

2001). The Ricardian comparative advantage of the people in Mesopotamia,

both the Ubaid and the later Uruk people, has been as a source of clay and

the use of water transportation on the Euphrates. But they lacked stones,

precious materials, wood, and metals, for which they had to trade.

Comparative advantage theory is one of the earliest and widest accepted

theories in economics that proves how economies may create growth and

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prosperity by specializing in one skill or resource and engaging in mutually

beneficial trade with other economies (Ricardo, 1817), and the story of trade

between Uruk and Zargos is evidence of how this played out in the early

creation of polities and societies.

Algaze provides a comprehensive anthropological study of the Early

Uruk (Algaze, 2001). He explains the development of the initial complexity

through the unique ecological and geographical framework of the early

Mesopotamian civilization. Indeed, the abundance of clay and the demand

for stone that was not within the reach of a hunter-gatherer society have led

to the emergence of trade and of the trade routes to more distant geographical

places. Also, the Euphrates was easily navigable and thus, although the early

people of Uruk did not know about the horse, they were able to travel by

water to find places with which to trade. The early trade routes were done

almost exclusively by water on the Euphrates. The Tigris, according to

Owen, is less navigable and much steeper, and thus there was not a network

of canals on the Tigris to the same extent as there was on the Euphrates

(Owen, 2007). These routes could go over 800 miles away.

Tokens. Denise Schmandt-Basserat has published a very elaborate

study on the system of tokens as precursor to cuneiform writing. These

tokens were used for accounting, recording economic data such as labor and

product quantities, and also for communication and writing. This first object

oriented system (Schmandt-Basserat, 1997) played a crucial role for the

emergence of institutions and for the entrepreneurial actions of the political

enterprise of Uruk (see Figure 2).

> & eC . 4

& be aly

oi) ie

de) \e

Figure 2. Examples of early tokens excavated from Uruk (courtesy Oriental Institute,

University of Chicago (left) and Craig Carey, Asst. Prof. of English at University of

Southern Mississippi (right))..

Tokens are not the same as writing. As Niessen showed, writing was

important for the development of civilizations, but it was not a causal factor.

Washington Academy of Sciences

Zi

Rather, just as with the tokens, writing was a consequence of economic

interactions and development and a major phase in the evolution of social

complexity (Niessen, 1988).

He argues in favor of the idea that writing, although one of the most

important inventions for the development of civilizations, does not fully

explain the actual process of development. He deemphasizes the invention

of writing as a turning point, viewing it as simply one more phase in the

evolution of social complexity (a co-evolutionary process in the terms of this

paper) and as the result of specific social, economic, and political factors.

Tokens were such a consequence of specific economic conditions of the

primitive households.

Accounting and labor bookkeeping existed at the origin of the

cuneiform writing, as Schmandt-Basserat suggests, and writing enabled

letters of political propaganda and the organization of long-distance

exchange (Schmandt-Basserat, 1996). A token would incorporate the shape

of the concrete object, the word for the object and the number of the object

to be counted. The token system was a consequence of the need to trade and

do accounting in the primitive early economy and the system and was a

major factor for settling the first merchant colonies thousands of miles away

— tokens were found at Tell Habuba Kabira, where they were very small

(Schmandt-Basserat, 1996).

The early Uruk people had not yet domesticated horses, but invented

this object oriented system for accounting, economic records, and an

organized complex, distant trade, not just a barter economy. This was also

before the invention of abstract counting and mathematics, which came

around 3000BC.

The tokens were also used to count time. The need to count time and

record time was a consequence of the division of labor - people producing

different products recorded their labor time for producing a certain good on

the token designated for the good. This was also the cause of the emergence

of cuneiform writing. Tokens came before cuneiform writing and thus

writing emerged from an object-oriented system used for accounting in the

economy and not from pictographs or art or cultural needs, as initially

thought.

Summer 2016

“The foremost function of tokens was to count goods. Plain tokens

occurred concurrently with farming and served to count such

agricultural products as animals and quantities of cereal. Complex

tokens coincided with industry, keeping track of products for which

Mesopotamia was famous: textiles and garments; luxury goods,

such as perfume, metal, and jewelry; manufactured goods, such as

bread, oil, or trussed ducks. [...] The shift from plain to complex

tokens implies that the evolution of the system was closely tied to

economic change. In turn, the counters can disclose the resources

of past communities. Plain tokens can be clues to the domestication

of plants and animals. [...] Complex tokens can identify the

development of workshops.” (Schmandt-Besserat, 1997)

Complex tokens played an essential role in the collection of the dues

and tributes that sustained the first Mesopotamian city-states. They signal

state formation in southern Mesopotamia. Furthermore, the geographic

distribution of complex tokens in strategic administrative centers outlines

the area controlled by the South Mesopotamian bureaucracy and tells us

about its organization.

The clay tokens were used to represent commodities, and perhaps

even units of time spent in labor, and their number and type became more

complex as civilization advanced. A degree of complexity was reached when

over a hundred different kinds of tokens had to be accounted for, and tokens

were wrapped and fired in clay, with markings to indicate the kind of tokens

inside. These markings soon replaced the tokens themselves, and the clay

envelopes were demonstrably the prototype for clay writing tablets.

Thus, the token system coincided with agriculture, the storage of

goods, and an economy of redistribution.

Fast pottery wheel. Another very important piece of evidence for

trade and social complexity is the invention of the pottery wheel. The fast

pottery wheel was crucial for the division of labor and for the mass

production of pottery that would undoubtedly lead to complex trade.

The society previous to Uruk, the Ubaid people, plentifully used clay

from the Mesopotamian Alluvium and also used the turnette (the slow

wheel) to make pottery. If initially the pottery was decorated, with time it

Washington Academy of Sciences

29

became simpler, shifting its usage from decorative objects to utilitarian

objects of a more common use.

The invention of the fast pottery wheel enabled the mass production

of pottery and the division of labor, two very important conditions for the

emergence of labor management-like institutions. According to Owen

(2007) the fast pottery wheel might have been invented in the late Ubaid

period, but came into wide use during the Uruk period. On the tokens the

picture of a bowl and a head would indicate a ration of food, or what I would

call a wage. Owen (2007) calls the Uruk economy a “managed economy”,

where the temples provided rations or “paid” people for the labor to build

and maintain the buildings and to produce the goods that would afterwards

be traded by the temple.

In Early Uruk ceramics production started to concentrate at large

centers, implying the mass scale specialization that resulted from the fast

pottery wheel.

Historical Evidence — The Sufficiency Conditions

All these lines of evidence might support trade and the development

of complex trade, yet they do not explain trade as a premise for social

complexity. This premise relies on the evidence of institutions. The way

trade is linked back (had a causal feedback) to social complexity is through

the emergence of these complex institutions that would characterize an early

political economy or a complex polity (Cioffi-Revilla, 2001). The evidence

of institutions such as money, merchant colonies, redistribution, and wages

would come to suffice the argument in this respect.

Money. The emergence of money was one of the rapid consequences

of the increased economic development and increased trade between the

cities. Money is the first institution of the market process and the first money

took the form of barley, silver, or gold.

“Materials that clearly functioned as money are, to arrange them in

ascending order of value: barley, lead, copper or bronze, tin, silver,

gold. Of these barley, lead, and copper or bronze functioned as

cheaper monies; tin was mid-range; silver and the much rarer gold

were high-range monies. This is not to say that other physical objects

or substances did not occasionally function as money. cows, sheep,

Summer 2016

asses, slaves, household utensils, and everything under the sun

occasionally had a money function.” (Powell, 1996)

Money was not used for cheap transactions, for that one used the

barter system. And grain was not viable for long distance trade, it was used

only as local, cheap money. The emergence of money enabled the

organization of the complex trade and of the long-distance trade almost

immediately, as a very rapid process.

Trade routes and merchant colonies. Evidence of trade from as far

as India and Anatolia was found even for the earlier Ubaid people. They

brought from India amazonite and from Anatolia obsidian. One of the first

outposts, at Tepe Gawra, would evolve into a presumably merchant colony

during early Uruk. Initially, it had three temples that were facing a central

plaza, and if we accept the hypothesis that the temples were conducting trade

and paying wages in goods, this would be a strong support for the idea that

Tepe Gawra was a first merchant colony.

The early Uruk period faced a more complex economy and more

exchange networks than the Ubaid. They imported goods such as copper,

gold, silver, jewelry stones (carnelian, turquoise, amethyst, lapis, quartz),

stone for architecture, probably wood and other perishable goods (textiles,

oils, spices, foods). The organization of long distance exchange was done by

water transportation on the Euphrates and by centralized storage in each

city’s central ceremonial or public precinct (Owen, 2007). Uruk pottery was

found at Susa (Elam), Zagros Mountains, Egypt, Anatolia. From Egypt they

later imported lapis, while from Anatolia they imported timber, olive oil and

silver, while from Afghanistan (Zagros) they imported lapis and gold. The

evidence of these later imports is from early to middle Uruk, which suggests

that trade had indeed expanded both geographically and in diversity of

goods.

Moreover, the Uruk people started to establish settlements at the

places where they traded most — merchant colonies, and after Tepe Gawra,

they settled at Tell Habuba Kabira in Northern Levant and in the far east of

the Zagros Mountains of Iran. This spans geographically an 800-1000 miles

radius away from the center of Uruk. According to Owen (2007), “the

location of many of these settlements made sense for controlling key points

along trade routes or access to certain natural resources.”

Washington Academy of Sciences

31

Tell Habuba Kabira was approximately 8 hectares in size and

contained perhaps around 5000 people. Archeological evidence suggests

that it was occupied for generations without any fortifications, after which a

6 m thick wall with towers was built. This might suggest that the colony had

increased wealth and was afraid of attacks. The cone wall mosaics at this

center might suggest that the individuals here did have considerable wealth.

Some of the tokens and bullae (the envelopes of tokens) suggest some forms

of primitive contracts that kept track of trade.

Increasing trade had also led to the organization of central urban

storage facilities in Uruk — such as temple granaries- that were under the

control of the “elite” and used for redistributing the goods to the people into

the city. Consequently, they invented institutions for the redistribution of

goods into the city and thus the early state level institutions of redistribution

and control rose in Uruk.

Temple granaries as labor management institutions. By 4500 BC,

with the first city like centers established by the Ubaid people (Ubaid I and

Ill), evidence was found of the first temples or central mounds that had a

different, designated role other than the rectangular houses. These mounds

showed a special architecture and later developed into what we know as

“temples”.

The same spot of these central mounds appeared to be used for

temples for a long period of time, from Ubaid until Ur II (approximately for

2500 years, the same consistency in location!) (Owen, 2007). Some of them

have been re-built even up to 17 times, while each temple was used for an

average of 150-200 years. This consistency in architecture-use has not been

found anywhere else, which signals the vital importance of these temples for

the Mesopotamian people. Now the question is what role these temples had.

There is no doubt that the temples had primarily a religious functionality

(the presence of the altars). My concern here is the economic role they might

have played.

The development and complexity of the architecture and size of the

temples follow the same evolutionary path as the cities — from small and

simple to large and complex. Initially, they were a one-room, modest

structure that with each re-building got bigger and more elaborate. This

could be a signal of more elaborate religious thinking, increased

Summer 2016

32

demographics, but could also be an evidence for increased economic

development and complexity.

There is no doubt among archeologists and historians that the

temples were a “shared institution”. But this shared institution 1s the first one

to emerge in Early Uruk, as opposed to the household level rituals from Catal

Huyuk (Owen, 2007). As a public institution, they gathered people not only

from the large city, but also from the smaller polycentric communities

surrounding that did not have their own temple.

“These temples must have been places where labor and goods were

concentrated.” (Owen, 2007)

One reason is that the architecture itself was labor intensive to

maintain and build and the houses of the wealthiest people were built around

the temples. These people, as I argued above, had monopoly over the traded

goods. The different levels of wealth of the people are a strong indicator for

trade and economic development (no evidence of putative control). The

cemeteries show no difference in the wealth status, which presumably show

that the wealth was not a consequence of religious control.

The evidence shows clearly that the temples were used as storage for

both the goods produced and the goods imported. The consistent increase in

the size and complexity of rooms added show that the amount of storage

increased significantly over time. If the temples had solely a religious

function, then only the altars (“cella”) would have changed with each re-

building and there would not have been added multiple smaller rooms

surrounding it.

The concentrically spatial arrangement around the temple is another

indicator of some existing institutions of labor management and goods

redistribution. Around them, besides the houses of the wealthiest, there were

craft. workshops and farmers around the edges.

Discussion

The archeological findings and the theoretical argument described

above, on the whole, show that the simultaneity of some fundamental

innovations and the complex organization for trade led to the emergence of

the first political economy institutions, and that the first state level society

can be viewed as a transformative complex adaptive system.

Washington Academy of Sciences

6

Trade accrued in the level of organization, geography, and

complexity due to these innovations; and subsequently increased trade led

to the increased complexity of the social and political space of Uruk, as well

as the transition between the Ubaid and Early Uruk. Trade has always been

associated, one way or another, with the economic development of

civilizations, but my argument here is that local trade and the barter economy

of the Ubaid people plus their innovations resulted in the complex trade and

political economy institutions that spurred the growth of Early Uruk, thus

crystalizing the first state level society known in history.

The complex trade here can be also viewed as a form of free

international trade. Archeologists themselves often refer to the goods

brought into the cities as “imported” and it is accurate to do so. There is a

difference between local trade, (exchange performed with money or by

barter) and international trade, which was sometimes associated with

contracts (the tokens at Tepe Gawra). The distinction within the early

polities framework is mainly geographical (the distance) and in the nature

of products (heterogeneous) and less political (state-organized trade with

revenue for a central organization, such as the temple). The nature of this

early type of international trade supports the hypothesis of the

entrepreneurial political enterprises. There 1s a monopolistic advantage

given by the imported goods, but there is also no central state-organized

trade yet, that would treat the imported goods as public goods that bring

revenue for the central government that can expand the administrative

specialization.

More organized institutions implicitly mean increased social

complexity. The archeological evidence of the merchant colonies, the

temples with economic functions, and the emergence of money support the

increased level of economic, social, and political complexity, as defined in

the beginning of the paper.

The evidence discussed in the third part of the paper shows that trade

directly supports the “institutional diversity” of the political complexity and

later the “putative control” (as evidenced by the emergence of walls around

the cities), but less the concept of “administrative specialization” (Cioffi-

Revilla, 2001).

The lack of evidence for fiscal institutions of taxation and for

monetary institutions that issue money shows there is less administrative

Summer 2016

34

specialization at this stage. The evidence of labor management and the

emergence of institutions within the polycentric communities show more

entrepreneurial characteristics at the organizational level of collective

action.

When I first started this research, I was expecting to find a lot of

evidence supporting the co-evolutionary hypothesis and very scarce

evidence for a causal hypothesis for the period in history that is under

scrutiny. The abundance of indirect supporting evidence for the emergence

of institutions was a very nice finding and the construction of the argument

based on this evidence followed theoretical and methodological deductions.

This argument, if accepted, undoubtedly has broader implications for

the origins of trade and the origins of economic institutions. The

entrepreneurial character of the early polities does not remove completely

the nature of central governance, 1t only moves it into the background. There

is a lack of evidence of property rights over the traded goods at this stage,

which means that we must treat them as public goods, whether domestically

produced or imported. But the use of these goods as wages for labor and the

use of tokens as means of accounting, as soon as the division of labor

occurred - instead of an equal redistribution as expected within an egalitarian

society - supports the entrepreneurial hypothesis.

The line of argument laid down here can potentially be extended to

other geographical areas of origins of social complexity (i.e. China, Africa,

Central America) that occurred later than Uruk. If some of the earliest

political economies of these areas experienced complex trade following the

discovery of some innovations and also experienced some forms of early

institutions, then the same type of reasoning from Figure | could be applied.

And this evidence from these areas would extend the strength of the causal

argument.

The purpose of replicating this exercise would be to observe if the

distant merchant colonies and the temples as institutions of the first political

economies would emerge out of the interplay of producing and trading

agents and several exogenous innovations (wheel and tokens in the Uruk

case, there could be others in the other cases).

Washington Academy of Sciences

Summary

The major finding of this research is the emergence of the institutions

of political economy as a consequence of complex trade. These institutions

spurred the first political economy and first state level society of Early Uruk.

My attempt was to cover both the necessary and the sufficient conditions in

support of trade as a premise for social complexity.

A secondary important finding is the organization of collective

action more as a firm (entrepreneurship) than as a central government, which

only subsequently followed. The state-level society was initially a set of

polycentric communities and lacked any type of fiscal or monetary

institutions that are necessary for a central-governance hypothesis. The state

of Uruk was a consequence, not a premise, of the growth and expansion of

the early political economy.

The major implication of this causal argument tends to a theoretical

reframing of the origins of the social complexity. Social complexity should

include trade in its origins, besides the demographics, geography, war, and

other factors. The label of “economic development” 1s insufficient to explain

the economic processes of the very first polities. Moreover, I believe that

trade should not be just one of the premises, but one of the primary ones.

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Bio

Anamaria Berea is a Research Associate at the Center for Complexity in

Business, University of Maryland and a Research Fellow at The Capital

Institute. She has a dual PhD in economics and computational social science

and her research is focused on the emergence of communication in

biological and social networks, by applying theories and methods from

economics and information science to reinterpret historical, anthropological,

biological and artistic evidence regarding fundamental aspects of

communication.

Washington Academy of Sciences

39

Comments from outgoing President, Mina Izadjoo

We have come a long way since the inception of the Academy in 1898 by

a group of scientists in the Washington area from eight scientific societies.

Today, more than a century later with more than 60 affiliated

organizations, the Academy continues to effectively pursue its original

goal which is to stimulate scientific interest and promote science through

collaboration, membership, and publication.

It is clear that the Academy did not take this journey alone. A special

thanks to our members and sponsors from academia, research

organizations and the industry. The Academy is committed to working

together with all of you to catalyze new initiatives and to promote science.

Science 1s a dynamic and empowering tool and it is upon us to promote

science in our community. Today both the world and the Academy are

much different than 100 years ago and together we will make the Academy

to be the voice of science and scientists in the Washington Area. We are

committed to strengthen and establish new working ties with other

scientists and scientific institutions in the community.

It has been a great pleasure and honor to serve as the president of

Washington Academy of Sciences. A special thanks and gratitude to all the

Board Members who selflessly supported the Academy in the past year. |

am humbled that you placed your faith and trust in me. This is a

responsibility that I did not take lightly and I will continue to work with

the Academy for years to come.

Summer 2016

40

Comments from incoming President, Mike Coble

Dear Friends,

I am honored and excited to become the next President of the Washington

Academy of Sciences. I would first like to thank Mina for her excellent

leadership over the past year. She was very instrumental in helping to find

sponsors willing to donate to the Academy.

I would like to continue many of the programs that we enjoyed this past year

including the “Taste of Diversity” lunches with outstanding guest speakers

organized by Peg Kay and the “Hot Topics in...” lectures that focused on

Astronomy this spring and was organized by Sethanne Howard.

I would like to thank all of the members of the board who helped throughout

the year and especially to everyone who helped with the banquet tonight,

including the awards committee chaired by Sethanne this year. I would like

to also recognize Ron Hietala, John Kaufhold, and Terry Longstreth for their

extra help with the ceremonies tonight.

I would finally like to thank Neal Schmeidler for his service to the Academy

over the years. Neal has decided to complete his term on the board this year,

and we appreciate his assistance.

Finally, to the awardees: Congratulations to all of you for your outstanding

achievements! For those of you that are new to the Academy, we hope you

enjoy the many benefits of membership to the Academy and look forward to

seeing you again at future events.

As the new President of the Washington Academy of Sciences I hereby

declare that this meeting has concluded. Good night and drive safely.

Washington Academy of Sciences

4]

2016 Awardees

Ellen Voorhees — award in Piotr Domansky — award in

Computer Science Engineering

Holly Frost — Leo Shubert award William Goldman — award in Math

Summer 2016

Michael Fasolka — award in Engineering

Washington Academy of Sciences

43

NEW BOARD OF MANAGERS

gf

Z ee

Sue Cross, Mina Izadjoo, Terry Longstreth, Terrell Erickson, Mike Coble,

Sethanne Howard, Fr. Frank Haig, John Kaufhold, Ron Hietala, Mike

Cohen

Summer 2016

44

FR. HAIG CUTTING HIS CAKE

Chl

| een |

|

ey |

Fr. Frank Haig, SJ received a special recognition award for his long,

successful, and most appreciated service to the Academy.

Washington Academy of Sciences

45

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Washington Academy of Sciences

47

Washington Academy of Sciences

Affiliated Institutions

National Institute for Standards & Technology (NIST)

Meadowlark Botanical Gardens

The John W. Kluge Center of the Library of Congress

Potomac Overlook Regional Park

Koshland Science Museum

American Registry of Pathology

Living Oceans Foundation

National Rural Electric Cooperative Association (NRECA)

Summer 2016

48

Delegates to the Washington Academy of Sciences

Representing Affiliated Scientific Societies

Acoustical Society of America, Washington Chapter

American Assoc. of Physics Teachers, Chesapeake Section

American Astronomical Society

American Ceramics Society

American Fisheries Society

American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics

American Meteorological Society, Washington, DC Chapter

American Nuclear Society, Washington DC Section

American Phytopathological Society, Potomac Division

American Society for Cybernetics

American Society for Metals, Washington Chapter

American Society of Civil Engineers, National Capital Sec.

American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Washington Sec.

American Society of Microbiology, Washington Branch

American Society of Plant Biologists, Mid-Atlantic

Anthropological Society of Washington

ASM International

Association for Women in Science, DC Metropolitan Chapter

Association for Computing Machinery, DC Area Chapter

Association for Science, Technology, and Innovation

Association of Information Technology Professionals

Biological Society of Washington .

Botanical Society of Washington

Capital Area Food Protection Association

Chemical Society of Washington

District of Columbia Institute of Chemists

District of Columbia Psychological Association

Eastern Sociological Society

Electrochemical Society, National Capital Section

Entomological Society of Washington

Geological Society of Washington

Historical Society of Washington DC

Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, Potomac Chapter

Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Northern

Virginia Section

(continued on back cover)

Paul Arveson

Frank R. Haig, S. J.

Sethanne Howard

Vacant

Lee Benaka

David W. Brandt

Vacant

Charles Martin

Vacant

Stuart Umpleby

Vacant

Vacant

Daniel J. Vavrick

Vacant

Mark Holland

Vacant

Toni Marechaux

Jodi Wesemann

Alan Ford

F. Douglas

Witherspoon

Chuck Lowe

Stephen Gardiner

Chris Puttock

Keith Lempel

Elise Ann Brown

Vacant

Tony Jimenez

Ronald W.

Mandersheid

Vacant

Vacant

Jeffrey B. Plescia

Jurate Landwehr

Vacant

Gerald P. Krueger

Murty Polavarapu

Washington Academy of Sciences

Delegates to the Washington Academy of Sciences

Representing Affiliated Scientific Societies

(continued from previous page)

Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Washington

Section

Institute of Food Technologies, Washington DC Section

Institute of Industrial Engineers, National Capital Chapter

International Association for Dental Research, American

Section

International Society for the Systems Sciences

International Society of Automation, Baltimore Washington

Section

Instrument Society of America

Marine Technology Society

Maryland Native Plant Society

Mathematical Association of America, Maryland-District of

Columbia-Virginia Section

Medical Society of the District of Columbia

National Capital Area Skeptics

National Capital Astronomers

National Geographic Society

Optical Society of America, National Capital Section

Pest Science Society of America

Philosophical Society of Washington

Society for Experimental Biology and Medicine

Society of American Foresters, National Capital Society

Society of American Military Engineers, Washington DC

Post

Society of Manufacturing Engineers, Washington DC

Chapter

Society of Mining, Metallurgy, and Exploration, Inc.,

Washington DC Section

Soil and Water Conservation Society, National Capital

Chapter

Technology Transfer Society, Washington Area Chapter

Virginia Native Plant Society, Potowmack Chapter

Washington DC Chapter of the Institute for Operations

Research and the Management Sciences (WINFORMS)

Washington Evolutionary Systems Society

Washington History of Science Club

Washington Paint Technology Group

Washington Society of Engineers

Washington Society for the History of Medicine

Washington Statistical Society

World Future Society, National Capital Region Chapter

Richard Hill

Vacant

Neal F. Schmeidler

J. Terrell Hoffeld

Vacant

Vacant

Hank Hegner

Jake Sobin

Vacant

D.S. Joseph

Vacant

Vacant

Jay H. Miller

Vacant

James Cole

Vacant

Eugenie Mielczarek

Vacant

Daina Apple

Vacant

Vacant

. Lee Bray

Terrell Erickson

Richard Leshuk

Vacant

Russell Wooten

Vacant

Albert G. Gluckman

Vacant

Alvin Reiner

Alain Touwaide

Michael P. Cohen

Jim Honig

Washington Academy of Sciences

Room 113

1200 New York Ave. NW

Washington, DC 20005

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