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CONTENTS

RENNETH E MOSSMAN. Ph. D:lntroduetiony & 5.452 aec ces ss:

ARTHUR C. UPTON, M.D.: Health Effects of Nuclear Radiation: Intro-

PCARVaICCHIALKS ANG OVEIVIEW. Gar cern ieee cise. Ae Gate Fac ed oe 4 oie as

NIEL WALD, M.D.: Acute Radiation Injuries and Their Management

ROBERT W. MILLER, M.D., Ph.D.: Prenatal Effects of Exposure to Ion-

PEMA BERANE se tis cc nc a Roane eatin) Sos Aces dose Bay eens tee Nt oa

GILBERT W. BEEBE, Ph.D.: Carcinogenic Effects of Nuclear Radiation

SEYMOUR ABRAHAMSON, Ph.D.: Genetic Effects of Nuclear Radia-

TRAE enn ae o Pate Rey ela, ep aeba, MMS al ted PSs i MEE Bey cae

BOUND TABLE DISCUSSION: BIOMEDICAL ISSUES. .............

HERBERT KOUTS: Nuclear Power: How Safe Is It? How Safe Should It

Beri hors k Be gras BF SL th aes POR UA ERE ED Mw | Me ore eS eat e) Ma Oe

TieCiAM KERR: Chernobyl— lessons Leamed ...205. 1c ee es hese

PETER A. BRADFORD: Somewhere Between Ecstasy, Euphoria and the

SHEcdderRetlections,Onyuhe Penm jae FO-NUGIEAal jon)... 65.5 cts ceo lat j.<

BYRON LEE: Jr: Industry Evaluation and’ Response <...::....:-.- 2...

ROUND TABLE DISCUSSION: ENVIRONMENT AND ENGINEER-

Ge ee ee i eee ca Rea acl lane PEC cl oye, <a

KEYNOTE ADDRESS: JOHN F. AHEARNE: Fear and Trembling and

the Popul hat Didn't Bark-\Rolicy:and science | {0 see eee). Saas Lee

DAVID M. RUBIN: The Media’s Coverage of Radiation Risks ..........

RICHARD D. SMYSER: Covering Radiation Risks and Benefits ........

KARL ABRAHAM: Non-Media Communications .....................

FRANK E. TOOPER: Policy Perspective on Communications Issues .....

ROUND TABLE’ DISCUSSION: COMMUNICATIONS. 00.2020. ons.

WILLIAM R. HENDEE, Ph.D.: Physicians, Physicists, and Radiation Acci-

CRIES ee i i cy tn et Me a ee a Ba Mn Mle te cts

JOHN H. SORENSEN and BARBARA M. VOGT: Emergency Planning

fom Nuclear Accidents: Contentions, and ‘ssuesi 2. fie. ccs cee cot. Et

RICHARD J. BORD: Reactor and Nuclear Waste Siting: Problems and

EEOSPCE Sere et ier ma ee rN ee ite heats Da aise Roemer ere oe

ROUND TABLE DISCUSSION: POLICY CONSIDERATIONS .......

iil

101

117

122

125

s(83ih

139

143

148

158

167

173

178

186

190

205

210

Nuclear Radiation and Public Health:

Practices and Policies in the

Post-Chernobyl World

Introduction

Under normal operating conditions, activities in the nuclear fuel cycle (including

nuclear power plant operations) pose little hazard to public health. In fact, despite

the large uncertainties in risk estimates, coal fuel power plants result in a greater cost

of life and health than nuclear plants. However, unlike accidents which may occur in

fossil fuel cycle activities, accidents in the nuclear fuel cycle, especially nuclear power

plants, can have significant public health and environmental consequences. The ac-

cident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station in April 1986 has served as a stark

reminder of the potentially disastrous consequences resulting from the uncontrolled

release of nuclear radiation into the environment. This issue of The Journal of the

Washington Academy of Sciences is devoted to a discussion of several important issues

surrounding nuclear power technology which were of considerable concern in the

aftermath of the Chernobyl accident. The papers presented in this issue are a result

of a symposium held at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., on September

18 and 19, 1987. The purpose of the symposium was to bring together noted experts

to discuss various aspects of nuclear energy technology with Chernobyl as a spring-

board for discussion. The meeting was divided into four sessions, each concerned with

a specific issue of nuclear power technology. Following each session there was a round

table discussion among session speakers with questions and comments from the floor.

These discussions are presented in their entirety, with a minimum of editorial changes,

in order to represent fairly the spirited exchange of ideas and opinions which occurred

at the meeting.

The first session was devoted to a discussion of the biomedical effects of nuclear

radiation. At Chernobyl, 31 people were killed as a result of the accident and tens

of thousands of others received radiation doses that may increase the risk of genetic

effects and cancer. In this session, four distinguished scientists provide their views

concerning what is presently known about the biological effects of nuclear radiation.

The second session focused on environmental and engineering issues. Following

the reactor accident, significant concern surfaced about the reactor facility itself, what

particular design characteristics were responsible for the accident, comparisons with

American reactor designs and the possibility of a similar accident occurring in the

United States. The environmental impact of the accident became almost immediately

apparent with reports of contaminated milk and contaminated pasture lands in western

iv INTRODUCTION

Russia and in several neighboring countries. The Chernobyl accident clearly showed

that a major reactor accident cannot be expected to be confined to the “‘host” country

but may have significant environmental, social, and economic impact on neighboring

countries as well. In this session five nuclear technology experts discuss various en-

vironmental and engineering issues, including nuclear power safety and specific lessons

learned in the Chernobyl accident.

The third session was devoted to communications. Following the Chernobyl acci-

dent, as in the case of the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, the print and broadcast

media provided numerous technical reports and human interest stories. Did the print

and broadcast media present technical issues fairly and accurately? Have the risks of

radiations been overstated? These and other questions served as the basis for dis-

cussion of communications of nuclear technologies by noted authorities in the com-

munications field.

The final session was devoted to public policy considerations. The Chernobyl ac-

cident clearly emphasized the potential difficulties in implementing effective medical

management programs and emergency evacuation plans following nuclear accidents.

These and other public policy concerns were discussed by leaders in the medical and

nuclear technology fields.

This symposium was supported by the Departments of Biology and Radiation Sci-

ence and the Office of the Dean, College of Arts and Sciences, Georgetown Uni-

versity, by the Institute for Health Policy Analysis, Georgetown University, and by

grants from the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Department

of Energy. The planning committee also gratefully acknowledges the assistance of

Ms. Alexandra Bernstein for her time and effort in editing and preparing the discussion

sections.

Kenneth L. Mossman, Ph.D.

Georgetown University

Planning Committee

Laurel Anderson

Research Associate

Institute for Health Policy Analysis

Georgetown University

Alexandra Bernstein

Symposium Coordinator

Institute for Health Policy Analysis

Georgetown University

Irving Gray

Professor, Department of Biology

Georgetown University

This symposium was supported in part by:

Stephen Klaidman

Associate

Institute for Health Policy Analysis

Georgetown University

David McCallum

Senior Fellow |

Institute for Health Policy Analysis

Georgetown University

Kenneth Mossman

Chair, Dept. of Radiation Science

Georgetown University

Office of the Dean, College of Arts and Sciences, Georgetown University

Department of Biology, Georgetown University

Department of Radiation Science, Georgetown University

Institute for Health Policy Analysis, Georgetown University

Washington Academy of Sciences

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, grant No. NRC-04-87-422

United States Department of Energy

Journal of the Washington Academy of Sciences,

Volume 78, Number 2, Pages 87-88, June 1988

Health Effects of

Nuclear Radiation:

Introductory Remarks

and Overview*

Arthur C. Upton, M.D.

New York University Medical Center

550 1 Avenue

New York, New York 10016

The recent events at Chernobyl have

demonstrated how catastrophic and far-

reaching the consequences of a major

nuclear reactor accident can be. The oc-

currence of early fatalities from radia-

tion sickness among those on the scene,

the necessity to evacuate entire com-

munities in the surrounding area, and

the increase in the risk of cancer and

other late-occurring diseases posed to

those residing many miles downwind ex-

emplify the kinds and diversity of health

impacts that may result from such an

accident.

Because the health effects of ionizing

radiation have been studied extensively

for nearly a century and are better

known than those of most other envi-

ronmental agents, the potential impacts

* Preparation of this report was supported in part

by Grants ES 00260 and CA 13343 from the U.S.

Public Health Service and Grant SIG-009 from the

American Cancer Society.

of reactor accidents have been estimated

in detail. The public, however, is largely

unfamiliar with reactor technology and

radiation. Its views of nuclear energy in-

clude misconceptions about the perti-

nent risks and an exaggerated

perception of the levels of uncertainty,

confusion, and disagreement about the

risks that exist among experts. Prevail-

ing knowledge of the relevant issues

within the health profession is substan-

tially better, but few localities are

equipped to cope with a major nuclear

reactor accident. It is fitting, therefore

to begin a symposium on “Nuclear Ra-

diation and Public Health: Practices and

Policies in the Post-Chernobyl World’”’

with a review of the cogent biomedical

issues.

Since the health effects resulting from

a reactor accident can vary widely, de-

pending on the amounts of radioactivity

released, the numbers and ages of per-

sons exposed, the doses of radiation that

they receive, and other variables, the

public health strategies that are called for

vary accordingly. Each of the major types

of biomedical effects that are relevant,

their dose-effect relationships, and their

Journal of the Washington Academy of Sciences,

Volume 78, Number 2, Pages 88-93, June 1988

public health implications thus deserve to

be considered in some detail. To sum-

marize the cogent information, this ses-

sion is devoted to presentations by four

noted authorities, whose discussions of

the different issues follow.

Acute Radiation Injuries and

Their Management

Niel Wald, M.D.

Dapartment of Radiation Health, Graduate School of Public Health,

University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15261

ABSTRACT

The biological basis for injury produced by radiation lies primarily in its ability to kill

cells or to inhibit their reproduction, leading to cell depletion and resultant malfunction

of various organs, and, at supra-lethal exposure levels, to impairment of key organs

directly. This leads to clinical manifestations of the acute radiation syndrome or to local

tissue damage, usually from external irradiation sources. Radionuclide contamination may

also produce acute local tissue and internal organ damage. Complicating factors include

coexistent trauma or burns as well as manifestations of radiation-related psychological

stress.

The Chernobyl accident provided useful information and raised new questions con-

cerning mass triage, bone marrow transplantation indications, and our medical response

capabilities in the unlikely event of a major accidental radiation release in the United

States. Appropriate responses include an assessment of our current national medical

radiation accident response resources of experienced personnel and pertinent facilities.

Also, inclusion of the medical aspects of radiation accident management is proposed in

the training and continuing education of medical specialists in occupational medicine,

emergency medicine, hematology/oncology and nuclear medicine. With necessary federal

support, this could provide a continuing cadre of physicians to maintain competences and

facilities for a national medical response capability for radiation emergencies.

I. Introduction

The purpose of this presentation is to

review briefly some key pertinent facts

about the effects of radiation on cells and

tissues, and to consider the resultant

forms of clinical acute radiation injury

and their medical care. Then, in keeping

with the orientation of this symposium,

ACUTE RADIATION INJURIES AND THEIR MANAGEMENT 89

attention will be focused on some expo-

sure situations involving the general pub-

lic, including the most recent one at

Chernoby] in particular, to see what per-

tinent lessons have been or may be

learned concerning radiation injuries and

their management.

II. Biological Basis for Radiation Injury

Although radiation absorption in tissue

produces many significant effects at the

atomic and molecular level, time con-

straints require that we confine ourselves

to its general effects on tissue cells. This

can be a direct lethal effect on the cell or,

at lower exposures, an impairment in the

mechanism of normal cell division and

replication. Although at supralethal lev-

els of exposure there may be prompt func-

tional failure of key organ systems, such

as the neurovascular system, the usual ef-

fect is damage to the process of cell re-

production with resultant shortages of

cells, particularly in organs that require

high cell production rates. The clinical

manifestations then depend on the tem-

porary loss of key organ functions, with

treatment being directed at supportive or

more definitive replacement measures to

enhance the likelihood of survival of such

patients until cell repair and recovery of

the damaged organs takes place.

A. Acute Radiation Syndrome

Three clinical forms of the acute radia-

tion syndrome have been recognized as

the result of the injury of certain key or-

gans or systems, usually produced by

whole body irradiation from an external

source. These are the hematologic, the

gastrointestinal and the neurovascular

forms of the acute radiation syndrome.

The magnitude of exposure determines

the time of onset and the duration of the

syndrome as well as the possibility of a

successful therapeutic response. The

syndrome can be diagnosed by some

relatively simple nonspecific clinical in-

dicators when the possibility of radiation

overexposure is borne in mind.’ An even

simpler triage scheme based entirely on

the time of onset of symptoms and the

changes in the routine white blood cell

analysis can be used to identify and pre-

dict the severity of radiation injury.’

B. Partial Body Exposure

Partial body exposure to external ra-

diation sources causes a much more fre-

quent type of radiation injury. This is seen

in industrial radiographers in particular,

with the hand being the injured tissue

most often.’ A sequence of changes which

are rather similar to those of thermal in-

jury or burns evolves over a time period

usually of several weeks. Again, the time

of onset and duration are related to the

magnitude of the exposure and the depth

of penetration of the particular type of

radiation involved.

C. Radionuclide Contamination

The second major class of radiation ac-

cidents involves the deposition of the ra-

dioactive material itself on the surface of

the body as well as its incorporation into

the body by breathing or swallowing the

material or having it deposited in an open

wound. It is difficult to generalize about

this form of potential or actual injury

since each radioactive isotope has a dif-

ferent duration of activity, penetrating

power in tissue, mechanism by which the

body metabolizes the material in the spe-

cific compound in which it is present, and

other variables. As a generalization, how-

ever, the effects can range from produc-

tion of the acute radiation syndrome to

only the slight enhancement of the statis-

tical likelihood of developing a radiation

related cancer decades later. As another

generalization, the early management of

such contamination is the separation of

the individual from the radioactive ma-

terial.

In the simplest case the separation is

90 NIEL WALD

effected by removal of the contaminant

from the skin. A number of different

methods are available for this purpose.*

When the material has been inhaled there

is a paucity of definitive measures for its

removal. Lung lavage has been employed

to wash radioactive material out of the

lung when the material is large in quantity

and is considered highly toxic.°

The passage of ingested or swallowed

material through the gastrointestinal tract

can be enhanced by the judicious use of

cathartics, thereby minimizing the radia-

tion exposure. In dealing with wound con-

tamination it is necessary to perform the

maximum removal of radioactivity feasi-

ble prior to conventional treatment of the

wound. Of course, life-threatening bleed-

ing or interference with breathing must

receive the initial prompt attention be-

cause these are a greater threat to survival

than radionuclide contamination.

Once the decontamination effort has

been concluded, techniques are available

for measuring the amount of residual ra-

dioactivity incorporated into the body of

the injured person. These require the use

of a highly sensitive low background ra-

diation counting facility which can make

measurements over part or all of the en-

tire individual. The radioactivity excreted

can be measured to determine the amount

incorporated. If the radioactive material

is sufficient in quantity and activity to pro-

duce a potential health hazard, there are

a number of agents which are effective

for one or another of the radionuclides

which may be involved.* These can pro-

duce a marked reduction in the amount

of residual radioactivity in many in-

stances.

Ili. Complicating Factors

A. Multiple Injuries

The information presented thus far was

derived primarily from situations in which

radiation exposure was the only stressful

agent. Unfortunately, in the real world

there also exists the potential for events

in which more than one injurious agent is

involved. The mechanisms involved in

such problems are less obvious and their

management is clearly more complex. For

example, in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Ja-

pan, the atomic bombs produced not only

radiation effects but also those of heat and

blast. This resulted in patients with ther-

mal burns and multiple traumatic wounds

in addition to radiation injury.° Although

the combined injury problem was recog-

nized early in the use of radiation’ and

has been studied in experimental animal

research® with the development of pro-

posed approaches to its medical manage-

ment,’!° it remains a difficult clinical

situation, complicating diagnosis and

prognosis as well as treatment.

B. Psychological Stress

At the Three Mile Island Nuclear

Power Plant accident in Pennsylvania in

1979, another complicating factor became

apparent in the occurence of the effects

of perceived, but not actual medically sig-

nificant radiation exposure. This is the

problem of psychological stress and as-

sociated symptomatology in a population

which, within 50 miles of the plant, re-

ceived an average exposure of one or two

millirems, or one hundredth of the annual

natural background exposure which they

continually receive. Due in part to the

intense media coverage and the evidences

of unfamiliarity with this type of accident

on the part of government, industrial and

regulatory personnel as well as health care

personnel in the area, a significant pro-

portion of the area’s inhabitants devel-

oped the perception that enough

radioactivity had actually escaped the

containment of the power reactor to pro-

duce prompt harmful health effects. Psy-

chological studies carried out early after

the accident and thereafter have shown

increased depression and anxiety lasting

more than a year later in a portion of the

population,'' and occurring again at the

ACUTE RADIATION INJURIES AND THEIR MANAGEMENT 91

time of the start-up of the adjacent re-

actor in 1985.”

Several considerations to reduce psy-

chological stress in the management of

patients or the public with actual or per-

ceived significant radiation overexposure

were suggested by these events. They in-

cluded the need for one responsible in-

dividual to deal with communication with

the exposed; a requirement of clear and

open communication; the need for a cred-

ible and tested emergency plan to be in

place in advance of such occurrences; and

the necessity of adequate education con-

cerning radioactivity and its effects for all

of those who might become involved with

this agent. This includes the general pub-

lic whose education about radioactivity

should be a part of the primary and higher

education system.

IV. Biomedical Lessons

From Chernobyl!

A. Triage

The Chernobyl! accident has taught us

some new lessons. From the diagnostic

standpoint, the validity of the type of

triage scheme discussed earlier was borne

out by its effectiveness in sorting out 203

individuals from the 135,000 living within

a five-mile area as those in need of hos-

pitalization and supportive or intensive

treatment. In the absence of detailed

physical dosimetric observations, it was

the use of symptomatology, lymphocyte

and neutrophil levels and chromosome

damage that served to make these iden-

tifications which then were used as the

basis for the treatment decisions.

The clinical courses reported for the

various patients in the four level classifi-

cation used by the physicians in Moscow

and Kiev’ reinforced what earlier had

been noted in Hiroshima and Nagasaki

A-bomb patients;° that is, that combined

injuries alter and increase the severity of

the clinical manifestations expected from

radiation overexposure alone. In partic-

ular, the occurrence of both thermal and

radiation-induced skin burns over large

portions of the body in the worker per-

sonnel was an important feature in all of

the fatal cases.

B. Bone Marrow Transplantation

Since bone marrow transplantation was

used rather unsuccessfully in 13 Cherno-

byl patients (11 deaths),'* and fetal liver

cells in 6 (6 deaths), we are left in uncer-

tainty about the efficacy of this form of

treatment for patients with equivalent ra-

diation overexposure in the absence of the

complicating injuries. In view of the only

previous timely and successful application

of this technique in an accidentally over-

exposed worker, who was fortunate

enough to have an identical twin donor,”

and in view of the 60-day radiation-re-

lated fatality rate of only 10% in several

thousand leukemic patients treated with

whole body irradiation of 1000 to 1500

rads in a brief exposure period followed

by bone marrow transplantation,’ it

would be premature to discard this ther-

apeutic approach on the basis of the com-

plex exposure experience at Chernobyl.

C. U.S. Radiation Accident

Response Capabilities

A third important issue raised by the

management of acute radiation injuries

that was performed so efficiently and ef-

fectively on the Chernobyl accident pa-

tients, is whether such rapid triage and

treatment could be made available to a

similar sized population with real or per-

ceived radiation overexposures of the

same magnitude in the United States.

How quickly could the resources be mo-

bilized to carry out all of the hematologic

and other evaluation studies on 350 pa-

tients in a few days, including chromo-

some analyses in 154 of them?!’ How

readily could we deploy 450 medical

teams using local personnel augmented to

a total of 5,960 health personnel (includ-

92 NIEL WALD

ing 1,240 physicians, 920 nurses, 720 med-

ical students, 360 physicians’ assistants,

and 2,720 aides) to carry out a screening

examination of some 135,000 people

evacuated from the 30 kilometer radius

around a malfunctioning radiation facil-

ity?'°

In the absence of federal support pro-

grams for the training and operational

support of medical and other health per-

sonnel as well as for related facilities for

the evaluation of acute radiation injury,

combined with the paucity of actual pa-

tients due to the success of preventive ef-

forts, are we prepared to manage a large

number of people who are, or think they

may be suffering from acute radiation in-

jury?

V. Considerations for the Future

Most of the medical personnel with ra-

diation accident training and experience

obtained them under military and Atomic

Energy Commission auspices in the pe-

riod from 1940 until the moratorium on

above ground nuclear weapons tests in

1960. This cohort is now rapidly being

diminished by ageing, as one can observe

in any current gathering of such person-

nel. The environmental movement of the

1960’s, the cessation of successful mar-

keting of nuclear power plants in the

United States since the 1970’s, the lack of

federal training support in this area for

more than a decade and the high fre-

quency of civil litigation in cases involving

allegations of radiation exposure have all

discouraged new physicians from entering

the field. Although the 108 nuclear power

plants in this country with NRC operating

licenses have all presumably identified the

medical personnel and facilities that they

would utilize in an emergency in order to

meet NRC licensing requirements, and a

list of nine definitive care centers was

published by Linnemann in 1983,’ the

reality of these resources and their ability

to deal with a problem in patient care

approaching the magnitude of the one

generated by the Chernobyl accident is

not clear.

Although the design of reactors in this

country and the preventive measures built

into the NRC’s regulatory requirements

make the probability of needing such re-

sources extremely low, it would be reas-

suring to have a better assessment of our

state of preparedness. An initial measure

to consider in this regard is the collection

and analysis of data about the present per-

sonnel and resources committed to the

maintenance of a capability to deal with

patients with possible acute radiation

injury stemming from organizations

operating under Nuclear Regulatory

Commission licensing.

Consideration should also be given to

the incorporation of medical radiation ac-

cident management into the training of

physicians preparing for medical special-

ties related to this problem. Specifically,

this would mean that physicians in resi-

dency training in occupational medicine,

emergency medicine, hematology-oncol-

ogy, and nuclear medicine would be in-

troduced to this subject because of

similarities with the medical care of the

patients in their chosen professional

areas. This would provide a cadre of per-

sonnel familiar with the problems and

treatment of radiation accident patients.

With federal support, the development of

the necessary teaching program, the

maintenance of a roster of the resultant

cadre and the provision for updated train-

ing as part of a continuing education pro-

gram would be feasible. Federal support

for the maintenance of appropriate spe-

cialized equipment, such as whole body

radiation counters and wound radioactiv-

ity probes, would also serve to give reality

to a necessary national resource for the

clinical management of radiation emer-

gencies.

VI. Summary

Some of the manifestations of acute ra-

diation injury have been reviewed along

ACUTE RADIATION INJURIES AND THEIR MANAGEMENT 93

with the radiobiological bases for their oc-

curence. The impact and implications of

the lessons learned from the medical man-

agement problems of such injuries, per-

ceived or real, in large numbers of people

have been considered with particular ref-

erence to the recent Chernobyl accident.

Suggestions for maintaining the contin-

ued national availability of a cadre of

medical personnel and facilities capable

of participating in the competent and ef-

ficient management of such population

exposures, however unlikely they may be,

were provided.

VII. References Cited

1. Wald, N. 1983. Diagnosis and therapy of radia-

tion injuries. Bul. N.Y. Acad. Med., 59: 1129-

1138.

2. Thoma, G. E. and N. Wald. 1959. The diagnosis

and management of accidental radiation injury.

J. Occup. Med., 1: 421-447.

3. Saenger, E. L., J. G. Kereiakes, N. Wald, and

G. E. Thoma. 1980. Clinical courses and do-

simetry of acute hand injuries to industrial

radiographers. In: The Medical Basis for

Radiation Accident Preparedness. K. F. Hub-

ner and S. A. Fry, eds., Elsevier/North Hol-

land, New York, pp. 169-178.

4. NCRP Report No. 65. 1980. Management of

Persons Accidentally Contaminated with

Radionuclides. National Council of Radiation

Protection and Measurement, Washington,

BC.

5. Muggenburg, B. A., S. A. Felicetti and S. A.

Silbaugh. 1977. Removal of inhaled particles by

lung lavage—a review. Health Physics, 33: 213-

220.

6. Lewis, J. J., and H. A. Patterson. 1959. Orig-

inal signs and symptoms in patients surviving

five years after atomic bomb exposure under

1,000 meters. Tech. Report 17-59. Atomic

Bomb Casualty Commission, Hiroshima, Ja-

pan.

7. Wintz, H. 1923. Die vor- und nachbehandlung

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York, pp. 191-217.

Walker, R. I. and J. J. Conklin. 1987. Mech-

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230.

Bromet, E. J., D. K. Parkinson, H. C. Schul-

berg, et al. 1982. Mental health of residents near

the Three Mile Island reactor: a comparative

study of selected groups. J. Preventive Psychia-

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Dew, M. A., E. J. Bromet, H. C. Schulberg et

al. 1987. Mental health effects of the Three Mile

Island nuclear reactor restart. Am. J. Psychia-

try, 144: 1074-1077.

Linnemann, R. E. 1987. Soviet medical re-

sponse to the Chernobyl nuclear accident.

J.A.M.A. 258: 637-643.

Gilberti, M. V. 1980. The 1967 radiation acci-

dent near Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and a fol-

low-up report. In: The Medical Basis for

Radiation Accident Preparedness. K. F. Hub-

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land Inc., New York, pp. 131-140.

Hahn, F., B. R. Scott, Wald, N., et al. 1987.

Early occurring and continuing effects. In:

Health effects model for nuclear power plant

accident consequence analysis (NUREG/CR-

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Cooper. eds., U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Com-

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Atomic Energy. 1986. The accident at the Cher-

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the initial management of radiation injuries. In:

Systems Approach to Emergency Medical Care.

D. R. Boyd, R. F. Edlich, and S. H. Micik,

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625-628.

Journal of the Washington Academy of Sciences,

Volume 78, Number 2, Pages 94-100, June 1988

Prenatal Effects of Exposure to

Ionizing Radiation

Robert W. Miller, M.D., Dr.P.H.

Chief, Clinical Epidemiology Branch

National Cancer Institute

400 Executive Plaza

Bethesda, MD 20892

The Effects of Prenatal Exposure to

Ionizing Radiation

Wilhelm Roentgen discovered x-rays in

1895. It was about 25 years later that a

serious effect on the fetus was first rec-

ognized. Initially there were case-reports

of mental retardation and microcephaly

in children whose mothers had received

therapeutic radiation early in pregnancy.

Ionizing radiation was, in fact, the first

environmental teratogen known to affect

the human. Certain chemicals and viruses

have since been identified as human ter-

atogens. Ionizing radiation was also the

first known human leukemogen. Interest

began to develop in this relationship as a

result of a review of case-reports in the

literature in 1942.' A few chemicals and

certain retroviruses have since been found

to induce human leukemia. The first re-

port suggesting the induction of leukemia

and other forms of childhood cancer by

in utero exposure to diagnostic x-rays was

published in 1956.7

As laboratory techniques were devel-

oped for studying the number and mor-

phology of human chromosomes in

somatic cells, the effects of radiation as a

clastogen were defined. How early in pre-

natal life this effect can be induced has

been studied in the Japanese survivors of

the atomic bombs.

Exposure to I-131 during intrauterine

life has caused cretinism due to ablation

of the thyroid gland.° Other findings from

exposure of the fetus to ionizing radiation

have been similar to those at other ages.

Additional studies are needed as the in

utero a-bomb survivors, now 42 years old,

reach the age when the risk of cancer

mounts rapidly.

Sources of Exposure

Knowledge of the effects of ionizing ra-

diation on the embryo or fetus comes

from studies of the atomic-bomb survi-

vors, Marshall-islanders exposed to fall-

out from nuclear weapons tests and from

persons exposed to radiologic proce-

dures, therapeutic or diagnostic, from

sources that were external or internal.

There is no information from occupa-

tional exposures of pregnant women.

PRENATAL EFFECTS 55

Embryotoxicity

Data on the group exposed in utero in

Hiroshima and Nagasaki show a defi-

ciency in the number of persons exposed

who were under 4 weeks of gestational

age. The only study* that has been made

of perinatal loss was conducted in Naga-

saki six years after the exposure, so the

information depended on the accuracy of

delayed reporting of miscarriages, still-

births and neonatal or infant deaths. The

study concerned exposure at any time

during pregnancy. The results showed

43% of 30 cases had adverse outcomes

among those exposed within 2000 meters

of the bomb whose mothers had major

radiation signs as compared with 8.8% of

68 cases in the same distance category

whose mothers did not have major radia-

tion signs. Another comparison group

which was 4000-5000 meters from the

bomb (ie, no radiation exposure) had ad-

verse outcomes in 6.2% of 113 cases.

The deficiency in the number of people

known who were exposed under 4 weeks

of gestational age is relevant to current

law suits in which it is claimed that birth

defects were due to exposures at a time

during pregnancy when the effect, if any,

on the embryo is likely to be catastrophic.

The stage of development is so early that

damage to a single cell will affect all of

the cells to which it gives rise as growth

and differentiation progress. In accord

with this reasoning are the results of a

study not related to radiation exposure,

in which human embryos from the general

Japanese population showed no birth de-

fects under 15-17 days of gestational age.”

Teratogenesis

A wide array of congenital malforma-

tions has been found in animal experi-

mentation after intrauterine exposure to

ionizing radiation. In the human the only

excess in frequency has been in small head

size and mental retardation. The first re-

port of the Hiroshima group exposed in

utero was by Plummer in 1952.° Since

then improvements in scientific design or

dosimetry have led to further reports.”"!

Until 1984 it was thought that ionizing

radiation depleted the cells of the brain,

which caused small head size, and when

depletion was severe enough, caused

mental retardation. Small head size oc-

curred after exposure at 4-17 weeks of

age. Severe mental retardation was de-

fined as the inability to form simple sen-

tences or to care for oneself. In 1984” it

was pointed out that severe mental retar-

dation occurred primarily after exposures

at 8-15 weeks of gestational age, with a

small excess at 16—25 weeks of age. The

explanation, based on recent experimen-

tal studies was that at 8—15 weeks cortical

neurons proliferate or migrate from areas

near the ventricles to the cortex, and ex-

posure to ionizing radiation impairs this

cell proliferation or migration. Cells

killed before this time apparently cause

small head size without severe mental re-

tardation, because cerebral histogenesis is

absent then. Similar histogenesis occurs

later in the cerebellum, but no dysfunc-

tions such as incoordination, ataxia or

abnormal eye movements have been

observed among those at highest risk;

namely those exposed between the 20th

week of pregnancy and 1 year of age.

Small head size (2 or more standard

deviations below the mean) is not so much

a late effect of radiation as an immediate

effect, recognition of which is delayed un-

til it can be measured when the child is

born. When it is said that as little as

1 cGy can double the frequency of severe

mental retardation, it is not meant that a

fetus destined to have an I.Q. of, say, 110,

can be severely retarded by this exposure,

but that a fetus destined to have a bor-

derline IQ will fall just below this cut-off

after such a small exposure.

Among atom-bomb survivors, the low-

est dose at which small head size occurred

in Hiroshima was 10-19 cGy in air in Hi-

roshima,'! ie, before the dose was atten-

uated by passing through the mother’s

96 ROBERT W. MILLER

body. This estimate was based on the old

dosimetry (T65), which has since been re-

vised (DS86),'° but with little change at

this dose-level. According to the DS86

estimates, 82 percent of prompt gamma

radiation would be transmitted through

the unshielded mother’s body to the fetus.

The estimate for delayed gamma rays is

85 percent, and for prompt and delayed

neutrons the estimates are 14 and 6 per-

cent respectively.’

The lowest dose that might increase the

frequency of severe mental retardation

has been estimated by downward extrap-

olation to 1 cGy from intermediate and

high doses at 8-15 weeks of gestational

age. However, the numbers of cases by

radiation exposure category were exces-

sive only after 50+ cGy in Hiroshima and

200+ cGy in Nagasaki, where only 2

cases were observed.’ Several persons ex-

posed at 8-15 weeks of gestational in

either of the two cities had mental retar-

dation attributable to causes other than

radiation exposure. Two of 4 exposed to

10—49 cGy had Down’s syndrome, and 1

of 3 exposed to 1-9 cGy had had enceph-

alitis.\* Exclusion of these cases did not

substantially change the _ regression

coefficients in the analysis by Otake and

Schull described above.”

Intelligence tests were performed at the

Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission in

Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1955-56. For

an analysis published in 1985,'° Schull and

Otake used the Koga intelligence test

scores, and found a dose-related reduc-

tion in the mean IQ scores for the groups

exposed at 8-15 or 16—25 weeks of ges-

tational age. These findings are consistent

with the occurrence of severe mental re-

tardation (as a more extreme effect). In

the report of a Task Group of the Inter-

national Commission on Radiological

Protection concerning the effects of ra-

diation on the brain of the embryo and

fetus,'* it is said that ‘‘the statistical un-

certainties in the data, and the known

problems of obtaining a high consistency

in intelligence testing, prevent quantita-

tive statistical analysis of these data from

refining these qualitative conclusions.”

Sixty percent of children with severe

mental retardation had small head size.

Thus a substantial proportion were nor-

mocephalic. Conversely, 10 percent of

those with small head size had severe

mental retardation. It was thought that

small head size which occurred without

mental retardation after exposure at 4—6

weeks of gestational age was due to loss

of glial (support) cells, which does not

seriously affect intelligence, as interfer-

ence with the development of neurons

does.

Head size was not standardized against

body size, and indeed stature tended to

be less than normal in the severely re-

tarded, but not enough to be proportion-

ate to the small head size.

The simplest most sensitive measure of

a human radiation effect is small head size

after in utero exposure. In Hiroshima 11

percent of those exposed under 18 weeks

of gestational age to a dose of 10-19 cGy

free in air were affected, as were 30 per-

cent of those who were exposed to 20—49

cGy.’ Small head size is detectable at birth

and at any age thereafter. So it should

have been sought among newborns ex-

posed close to Chernobyl, in proportion

to dose. All that is needed 1s a tape-mea-

sure. During a visit to Kiev almost a year

after the reactor accident at Chernobyl,

we learned that measurements had been

made,'° but apparently a relationship to

dose had not yet been sought. The Soviets

seemed to have looked instead for an ex-

cess of diagnoses, such as severe mental

retardation, which did not occur (and

would not be expected, given the number

of conceptuses exposed). We hoped that

after our questions, small head size with-

out mental retardation would be evalu-

ated, but have not heard that it was.

An extra dividend, should this infor-

mation be available from the studies of

those exposed at Chernobyl, would be to

settle a lingering question about the pos-

sibility that radiation alone was not re-

PRENATAL EFFECTS 97

sponsible for the in utero effects among

atomic-bomb survivors. The possibility of

an additive effect has been raised with

regard to infections, the trauma of the

bomb to the mother, nutritional depri-

vation and other stresses of war. If the

same effect were found in the population

at Chernobyl, one could be sure that the

standards for radiologic protection, based

on data from the in utero exposures at

Hiroshima and Nagasaki, are appropri-

ate.

Although a wide array of other con-

genital malformations has been induced

by x-irradiation of experimental animals,

none has occurred excessively in the hu-

man. Brent’’ believes that the interval of

susceptibility in the human, from the 20th

to the 32nd day of gestation, may be so

short that not enough embryos were ex-

posed to revea! the excesses. By contrast,

the interval for inducing severe mental

retardation lasts 8 weeks, and for small

head size lasts 14 weeks. The situation is

different in experimental animals: their

susceptibility to radiation-induced small

head size is of similar duration to that for

the induction of other deformities.

Carcinogenesis: In 1958 Stewart and

her associates’® published the results of a

comprehensive survey of childhood can-

cer deaths in relation to histories obtained

from the parents concerning radiation ex-

posure and other events during preg-

nancy. The radiation exposures were

mostly late in pregnancy, for pelvimetry.

Subsequent studies by Stewart showed

that the number of x-ray films taken were

related to the frequency of cancer, and

that the relative risk of each form of can-

cer was increased 1.5-fold on the average.

No concomitant variable could be found

to account for the increase. At first the

findings were supported in a study by

MacMahon,” who linked records of child-

hood cancer patients with obstetric rec-

ords in New England, but upon extending

the study in time and geographically, the

excess of cancers other than leukemia dis-

appeared.”” Other studies have not con-

firmed Stewart's work—in particular,

studies of the Japanese atomic-bomb sur-

vivors exposed in utero.” In one large-

scale U.S. survey, known as the Tri-State

Study, an increase was found in the fre-

quency of childhood cancer if the mother

or the father was exposed before concep-

tion of the child.” This implies that a ge-

netic effect due to very low doses was

responsible, although no genetic effects

have been detected by much more so-

phisticated studies of the progeny of

atomic-bomb survivors.~ When a recent

study of cancer in twins was related to

radiation exposures during gestation,”

MacMahon wrote in an accompanying ed-

itorial, “‘It seems likely that the question

of the association between fetal irradia-

tion and childhood cancer will fade into

medical history unresolved and remain a

source of more confusion than enlight-

enment.’”

Biologic plausibility is still another

consideration. The data of Stewart and

her co-workers show that each form of

childhood cancer is equally increased

by diagnostic prenatal exposures to x-ir-

radiation, but why should this be when

these neoplasms differ epidemiologically,

etiologically and with regard to patho-

genesis?*°*? Also one wonders why the

fetus, just before birth, should be so sen-

sitive to radiation-induced cancer, when

no such sensitivity is known in the infant?

Persons exposed in utero are now 42

years old, and are beginning to face a

mounting risk of cancer with age. In par-

ticular the frequency of breast cancer in

relation to in utero exposure to radiation

will be of interest, because the rates are

moderately higher in girls exposed to 50

cGy or more under 10 years of age (10

cases observed as compared with 2 ex-

pected) than in females who were older.*®

Breast cancer thus may have a long latent

period after exposure early in life, and an

effect after in utero exposure may be de-

tectable.

Radioactive iodine has long been

known to cause cretinism in children of

98 ROBERT W. MILLER

women given this radioisotope therapeu-

tically during pregnancy.’ A similar effect

was caused among infants in the Marshall

Islands exposed to fallout from a nuclear

weapons test in 1954, but not among the

three children in utero on Rongelap,

where the doses were heaviest. Two of

the children were in the first trimester,

before thyroid function is active. The

third was in the twenty-second week of

gestation, but did not suffer ablation of

the thyroid, although the gland ‘‘was

probably functioning sufficiently to have

absorbed a significant amount of ra-

dioiodines from the mother.’’”’ This child

and one of the two exposed in the first

trimester have developed benign nodules

of the thyroid, the latter presumably due

to the external radiation exposure, esti-

mated to have been 175 cGy.

Cytogenetics

Complex chromosomal aberrations

were seen at about 20 years of age in pe-

ripheral lymphocytes in 15 of 38 persons

who had been exposed in utero in Hiro-

shima or Nagasaki.*? Three were in the

first trimester. The estimated dose in air

was 104-477 cGy. The complex aberra-

tions included rings, dicentrics, fragments

and translocations. The authors pre-

sumed that in the first trimester stem-cells

for immunologically competent lympho-

cytes were present, and that the popula-

tion resulting from the divisions of these

stem cells apparently maintained the

chromosomal aberrations through many

cell divisions. A re-evaluation of the cy-

togenetics of in utero survivors at 40 years

of age has been made at the Radiation

Effects Research Foundation, but the re-

sults have not yet been published.

Sterility

Animal experimentation has suggested

that exposure of male fetuses to ionizing

radiation induces sterility,*’ but no such

effect has been observed among the Jap-

anese exposed in utero in Hiroshima or

Nagasaki.”

Lens Abnormalities

Polychromatic granular plaques have

occurred on the posterior capsule of the

lens of the eye among those exposed in

utero to the atomic bomb, as in other sur-

vivors.*> Examination at the age of 17-18

years showed that the frequency of

plaques among the in utero group in-

creased as the dose increased. Uncer-

tainty about the dosimetry when the study

was made in 1968 prevented a comparison

between Hiroshima and Nagasaki from

being made. None of the subjects had im-

paired vision due to the plaques, and none

had true cataracts.

The Future

The effects of exposure on the health

of persons exposed in utero are continu-

ously in need of reevaluation. The fre-

quency of neoplasia will be of primary

interest. Presumably the same cancers

that have occurred with increased fre-

quency in older cohorts of atomic-bomb

survivors will occur excessively among

those exposed in utero. Rates similar to

those of older cohorts, will not support

the claim that intrauterine exposure to di-

agnostic radiation increases the frequency

of cancer in childhood.

Effects on intelligence of the group ex-

posed at 8-15 weeks of gestational age

need to be evaluated to determine if

deficiencies less than severe mental re-

tardation can be defined. The Koga

intelligence test results from 1955 need

follow-up by more sophisticated contem-

porary test procedures. If possible, new

diagnostic imaging techniques should be

performed on persons with severe mental

PRENATAL EFFECTS 99

retardation to determine if abnormalities

occurred in accord with the current ex-

planation for radiation-induced mental

deficiency based on animal experimen-

tation.

Head circumference, a most sensitive

measure of an intrauterine radiation ef-

fect, is of great interest with regard to the

exposure at Chernobyl. As yet the Sovi-

ets, who presumably made these mea-

surements, have not made public their

findings. If the dose was large enough

(10-19 cGy) to compare with the findings

in Hiroshima, and no effect was found in

the Soviet Union, current standards for

radiological exposure of the embryo or

fetus will have to be reconsidered. A pos-

sible implication of a difference between

the two studies is that other environmen-

tal circumstances in Hiroshima from the

bomb or war combine with radiation ex-

posure to produce an effect different from

that in a medical radiology unit.

The study made in 1968* that showed

chromosomal abnormalities even after

first trimester exposure to the atomic

bomb needs to be reevaluated using con-

temporary techniques. A wide array of

other observations, too numerous to men-

tion here, would also be informative as

the in utero cohort moves through its full

life-span.

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Journal of the Washington Academy of Sciences,

Volume 78, Number 2, Pages 101-116, June 1988

Carcinogenic Effects of

Nuclear Radiation

Gilbert W. Beebe, Ph.D.

Clinical Epidemiology Branch, National Cancer Institute,

Bethesda, MD 20892

ABSTRACT

The expanding knowledge base for radiation carcinogenesis derives from an extensive

experimental effort and increasing attention to the importance of human epidemiologic

studies. The relation between dose and carcinogenic risk is described by means of math-

ematical models without which low-dose estimates would be impractical. Aspects of the

exposure situation that influence the dose-specific risk of cancer include dose-rate and

fractionation, and the quality of the radiation. Organs and tissues vary widely in their

susceptibility to the carcinogenic force of ionizing radiation, apparently without relation

to natural incidence. The carcinogenic risk per unit of exposure also depends on a variety

of host factors of which age at exposure is the most influential. Others include sex, race,

genetic characteristics and, for breast cancer, reproductive history. Time after exposure

dominates expression of radiogenic cancers. Typically there is a minimal latent period for

a given type of radiation and site of cancer and a period of expression that may be modelled

as a wave function for leukemia and as some multiple of natural incidence for most solid

tumors. Although the evidence is limited there are a number of environmental influences

and characteristics of lifestyle that may also affect the likelihood of cancer following

exposure to ionizing radiation.

Introduction

Although ionizing radiation is capable

of producing many, if not most, forms of

cancer in man, there is no unique type

of cancer so produced, and radiogenic

cancers cannot be distinguished from

normally occurring cancer of different

etiology. The absence of a marker iden-

tifying the cancer as radiogenic forces in-

vestigators to employ statistical methods

to determine whether a particular expe-

rience may have given rise to an excess

that may be considered radiogenic.

Information on the carcinogenic effects

101

of exposures to ionizing radiation is ob-

tained from both experimental and ob-

servational studies. Experimental work

involves chiefly mice, rats, dogs, and

mammalian cells. Although the quanti-

tative aspects obtained through animal

experimentation may not be directly

transferable to man, there is so much sim-

ilarity between man and other mammals

with respect to cancer that experimental

research has made a great contribution to

the understanding of radiation carcino-

genesis in man.

The necessarily observational human

studies are built on diagnostic and ther-

102 GILBERT W. BEEBE

apeutic exposures, occupational expo-

sures, the bombing of Hiroshima and Na-

gasaki, fallout from nuclear weapons

tests, and differences in natural back-

ground levels. Although the methods

used in these studies may mimic those em-

ployed in experimental work, there is a

vast difference between them in the de-

gree of control exercised by the investi-

gator over the material. In consequence,

no single study of radiation carcinogenesis

in man can be taken as definitive, and

knowledge in the field grows only as dif-

ferent investigators gradually reach the

same or similar conclusions.

The literature on radiation carcinogen-

esis is continually being reviewed by

expert committees, especially those of

the United Nations, the International

Commission on Radiological Protection

(ICRP), the U.S. National Academy of

Sciences (NAS), the National Council on

Radiation Protection and Measurements

of the U.S. (NCRP), as well as other na-

tional and international bodies. The ma-

jor reports that are current, and major

updates in process, include:

UN, Scientific Committee on the Ef-

fects of Atomic Radiation, 1977 (up-

date expected in 1988)

ICRP, Recommendations, ICRP 26,

1977

NAS, Committee on the Biological Ef-

fects of Ionizing Radiation: 1980

BEIR Il report on low-dose expo-

sure (update in work); 1987 BEIR IV

report on alpha radiation

NCRP, Recommendations, Report 91,

1987 and other more specialized re-

ports, e.g., Report 88 on radon, 1986

The relationship between exposure to

ionizing radiation and cancer is not simply

that the risk depends on dose. It also de-

pends on other characteristics of the ex-

posure, e.g., the dose-rate and the type

of radiation, on various characteristics of

the exposed subjects, on the organs ex-

posed, on time after exposure, and on

Other risk factors that may be present in

the environment or in the lifestyle of

those exposed.

Characteristics of Exposure

How the carcinogenic response de-

pends on dose is fundamental for predic-

tion, and thus for radiation protection,

and of some theoretical interest in regard

to the nature of the carcinogenic process.

Dose-response models have been pro-

posed on the basis of microdosimetric

considerations, but the response is prob-

ably determined by far more than the in-

itial biophysical events.' Nevertheless,

biophysical considerations have served to

rationalize the use of linear and linear-

quadratic equations that do fit much of

both the experimental and the human

data on dose-response. In addition, the

frequent observation in mammalian ex-

periments of a downturn in the dose-re-

sponse curve at high doses has led to a

general belief that cell-killing may be re-

sponsible. Figure 1, taken from the BEIR

III report,’ displays in the upper left-hand

panel a general linear-quadratic model of

dose-response modified by an exponen-

tial term to bring the curve down in the

high-dose region. The other panels con-

tain curves formed by dropping one or

more terms from the general model.

These models are especially important for

low linear-energy-transfer (LET), low-

dose risk estimation because low-dose

risks are usually too small to be observed

directly and must be estimated from an

equation fitted to the relevant human

data.

A crucial issue, not yet fully resolved,

is whether there may not be a threshold

dose below which the risk of at least some

forms of cancer disappears. For some ef-

fects, e.g., sterility and cataracts, thresh-

olds seem well established, but for cancer

this is not the case and it is generally as-

sumed, especially for purposes of radia-

tion protection, that there is no threshold

for cancer. Human data that suggest the

possibility of thresholds for certain forms

of cancer following particular types of ra-

diation include the absence of skin cancer

in heavily pigmented skin? and the ab-

sence of bone cancer following exposure

RADIATION CARCINOGENESIS 103

general form

cell killing

attenuates F(D)

Incidence

Dose, D

= 2

F(D) = a + a,D

quadratic

Incidence

Dose, D

F(D) = (a, +a,D +a,D7)exp(-6, D -6,07)

1S)

eS)

ne)

rs)

Dose, D

a3 2

F(D) =Q +a,D +a,D

linear - quadratic

i: 5)

ne)

cE,

Dose, D

Fig. 1. Alternative Dose-response Curves. Source: BEIR III Report

to low-LET radiation except in the high-

dose range.* There must be negligibly

small doses in the sense than any risk they

may entail is quite small in relation to

everyday risks assumed by most people

without a second thought but, because

both cancer and nuclear weapons are

greatly feared, it is difficult for many to

calibrate the risks from exposure to ion-

izing radiation. Many people fail to un-

derstand that they are exposed to ionizing

radiation throughout life from cosmic and

terrestrial sources, and even from radio-

isotopes within the body. The average ex-

posure of about 0.002 Sv (0.2 rem) per

year, or 0.15 Sv (15 rem) per lifetime is

well within the range that many people

anguish over and for which damage suits

are brought against the Federal Govern-

ment by people with cancer.

The lowest doses at which radiogenic

cancers have been demonstrated statisti-

cally are 0.09 Gy (9 rad) to the thyroid

gland in the Israeli tinea capitis series,*

under 0.15 Gy (15 rad) to the breast in

the Japanese A-bomb survivors? and, al-

though this is less certain, a few rad to

the fetus in large studies of x-ray exposure

of the fetus during pelvimetry.*’ Upton

has recently summarized the experimen-

tal evidence against the existence of a

threshold dose for radiation carcinogen-

esis.* }

There are many studies of the effects

104 GILBERT W. BEEBE

of exposure in the low-dose range, studies

undertaken for scientific, public health,

or even political, reasons but, apart from

the exceptions noted above, they have all

failed to provide any firm basis for direct

estimates of the risk at low doses.’~”

Their necessarily inconclusive nature has,

however, fueled the considerable contro-

versy over the magnitude of that risk.

The most recent systematic compilation

of risk estimates for radiogenic cancer ap-

pears in the NIH report on the probability

of causation,’ from which Table 1 is an

excerpt for cancers of particular concern.

Note that these are linear absolute risk

coefficients per 100,000 persons per year

per 0.01 Gy (1 rad) suitable for calcula-

tions of cancer incidence following low-

dose exposure. The rates that were ex-

cerpted all happen to have been up-dated

from the 1980 NAS BEIR III report but

others, not shown, were taken directly

from that report.’ All are linear coeffi-

cients; even when the linear-quadratic

dose response model is considered more

suitable than the linear model, it is only

the linear coefficient of the linear-quad-

ratic equation that is used for low doses.

For some sites and ages at exposure

within sites the NIH Working Group was

unable to provide estimates. Note that it

is only for the breast and the thyroid gland

that the linear model was used in Table 1

and in the source table.

To the extent that risk coefficients have

been based on the experience of the A-

bomb survivors they will change as a re-

sult of the joint US-Japan effort to revise

the applicable dosimetry.*’ The magni-

tude of the changes has become evident

in recent months for leukemia and for all

cancers combined except leukemia.”

Figure 2 presents dose-response curves

for leukemia contrasting the old (T-65D)

and the new (DS86) dosimetries. The sec-

ond T-65D curve for the DS86 cohort is

included to show that the reduction in the

original cohort necessitated by the lack of

Table 1.—Absolute Excess Cancer Incidence per 100,000 Persons per Year per Rad (Organ Dose), at

Low Levels of Low-LET Radiation, by Site, Sex and Exposure Age, Averaged over the Specified Follow-

up Period.

Exposure Years*

Site Age Follow-up

Leukemia 0-9 5-26

(all types 10-19 5-26

except CLL) 20-34 5-26

35-49 5-26

50+ 5-26

Lung 10-19 10=—33

20-34 10-33

35-49 10-33

50+ 10-33

Breast 0-9 10-35

10-19 10-35

20-29 10-35

30-39 10-35

40-49 10-35

50+ 10-35

Thyroid 0-9 10-34

10-19 10-34

20-34 10-34

35-49 10-34

50+ 10-34

Sex

Dose-response Model M FE

Linear-Quadratic MS .110

.0854 .0543

.0846 .0538

105 .0670

.156 .0990

Linear-Quadratic .030 .030

056 .056

086 .086

120 .120

Linear —_ 38

— .76

— .49

— HL)

— .08

Linear lS 50

tS) 50

105 15

05 15

.05 tS

“Observed years over which risk was averaged to produce the risk coefficients shown.

Source: Rall et al.”°

RADIATION CARCINOGENESIS 105

20.

Excess Deaths/10% py

Die esn va rs

Dose Equivalent (RBE=10) to Bone Marrow (Sv)

—S

3 4. 5. 6.

Fig. 2. Excess Leukemia Deaths per 10* Person- Years (PY), A-bomb Survivors, 1950-1985, by Dose-

Equivalent, DS86 vs. T-65D.

Source: Preston and Pierce.”

DS86 estimates for some members of the

cohort has little effect on the dose-re-

sponse curve. These curves are based on

the dose equivalent to bone marrow with

the quality factor for fast neutrons set at

10. The overall effect of the adoption of

DS86 doses is to increase the linear ab-

solute risk estimate for leukemia by an

average of 80 percent. Figure 3 provides

parallel curves for all cancers except leu-

kemia, but on a relative risk scale. Be-

cause individual doses had not yet been

re-calculated for all organs under the

DS86 system, the dose to the large intes-

tine was used as a surrogate for the others.

The average increase in risk on this basis

is about 30 percent. If the quality factor

for fast neutrons were set at 20, a value

now recommended by the NCRP,”™ the

average increases in linear risk coeffi-

cients above the T-65D estimates would

be 136 percent for leukemia and 72 per-

cent for all solid tumors combined. Those

who may have been using risk estimates

from the A-Bomb experience expressed

in terms of rads, 1.e., with an implicit

RBE of 1, will see less change in the risk

coefficients, the increase for leukemia

being about 18 percent and that for all

other cancers combined, —3 percent (22).

In experimental work the rate at which

radiation is delivered to target tissue has

a major effect on the resulting yield of

tumor.” The 1980 NCRP report on the

effects of dose-rate on the carcinogenic

effect of low-LET radiation recommends

that low-dose estimates based on linear

dose-response equations fitted to largely

high-dose observations be divided by a

factor between 2 and 10.” The carcino-

106 GILBERT W. BEEBE

Tele

2 1.

(oS)

(S)

Ww Os

0. 1. 2.

= DS&6

=o =.1650

----- T650, OS86 Subcohort

3. 4, 5.

Dose Equivalert (RBE=10) to Large Intestine (Sv)

Fig. 3. Excess Relative Risk of Death from All Cancers except Leukemia, A-bomb Survivors, 1950-

1985, by Dose-Equivalent, DS86 vs. T-65D.

Source: Preston and Pierce.”

genic effect of exposure to high-LET ra-

diation is generally thought to be less

dependent on dose-rate than exposure to

low-LET radiation. Ullrich et al. have

shown, however, that the influence of

dose-rate on the effect of neutrons is

mixed, depending on the target tissue and

the size of the dose.*” Human data pro-

vide little evidence of a dose-rate effect,

although most non-medical exposure is of

the low dose-rate variety and some of the

medical exposure is fractionated. The

data on female breast cancer provide the

only substantial human evidence on the

dose-rate effect, for similar absolute risk

coefficients derive from the high dose-

rate experience of the A-bomb survivors,

the highly fractionated exposure of tu-

berculosis patients on collapsed lung ther-

apy monitored by an average of about 100

fluoroscopic examinations, and the lightly

fractionated exposure of mastitis patients

treated by x ray.*® Since the large differ-

ence in degree of fractionation of dose

between the latter two U.S. series is ac-

companied by little or no difference in

either absolute or relative risk, the fact

that the relative risk is very much higher

for the A-bomb survivors is of consider-

able interest but does not invalidate the

conclusion that the absolute risk of breast

cancer is insensitive to variation in dose-

rate. The high relative risk among A-

bomb survivors reflects the very much

lower breast cancer incidence of Japanese

women.

The apparently greater effect, per unit

of absorbed dose, of high-LET in com-

parison with low-LET radiation has been

amply demonstrated experimentally.”

RADIATION CARCINOGENESIS 107

Relative biological effectiveness (RBE)

ratios not uncommonly range well above

10 in experimental studies. Also, since

high-LET dose-response curves tend to-

ward linearity, while low-LET tend to-

ward curvilinearity, RBE ratios often

increase with decreasing dose. Human

data for estimating RBEs for neutrons are

lacking, now that the new DS86 dosimetry

for the A-bomb survivors has so down-

graded the neutron component of dose in

Hiroshima as to have effectively removed

the possibility of any realistic estimation

of the RBEs for neutrons on the basis of

Hiroshima-Nagasaki contrasts.” There

are both low-LET and high-LET data on

lung cancer, but the high-LET risk esti-

mates are in terms of Working-Level-

Months (WLM) and it is doubtful that

their conversion to estimates per rad of

alpha radiation to lung tissue is reliable

enough to produce trustworthy RBE es-

timates. Prevalent ideas about relative bi-

ological effectiveness ratios are illustrated

by the quality factors (Q) recommended

by the International Commission on Ra-

diological Protection (ICRP) in 1977:

X rayS, gamma rays and electrons 1

neutrons, protons 10

alpha particles 20

Further, as noted above, the Q factor for

neutrons is being reconsidered at the

present time and the NCRP has published

a recommendation that it be increased to

2074

Tissue Susceptibility

As was seen in Table 1, the absolute

risk coefficients for even the organs most

affected by radiation vary greatly. The

reasons for this apparent differential sen-

sitivity are not known and are little in-

vestigated. It is of more than passing

interest that the variation among the sites

for which estimates exist in no way par-

allels that for their normal incidence. Ta-

ble 2 contrasts BEIR III average sex- and

site-specific risk coefficients and average

U.S. incidence taken from the Third Na-

tional Survey by the National Cancer

Institute.*! Only for male lung cancer

and female breast cancer are high risk

coefficients matched by high incidence

rates.

Differentials in tissue _ sensitivity

can be demonstrated in comparisons of

absolute risk, as in Table 1, where the

risk coefficients for both breast and

thyroid cancer are well in excess of those

for leukemia, or in comparisons of rela-

tive risk where the risk coefficient for

leukemia is well above those for breast

and thyroid cancer. Thus the judgment

as to differential sensitivity will some-

times depend on the definition of the

measure of risk.

Omitted from the usual lists of sus-

ceptible organs are brain and ovary

for both of which there is now evidence

of some sensitivity to the carcinogenic

action of ionizing radiation. Multiple

myeloma occupies an uncertain posi-

tion among the radiogenic cancers,”

as do the lymphomas for which the

NIH Working Group found insufficient

data upon which to base risk estimates.

Skin cancer has long been known to be

radiogenic but the NIH Group also

found insufficient quantitative data for

risk estimation. If skin cancer could

have been included in Table 2 it also would

have been a marked deviant, with a

high natural incidence and a low risk

coefficient.

Cancers of a given organ are gen-

erally described in terms of their cellular

origin. Only for leukemia are there

reasonably adequate data on the risk

by cell type, and it is notable that one

form of leukemia, common at older

ages, seems definitely not to be respon-

sive to radiation, namely, chronic

lymphocytic leukemia. Other forms of can-

cer that have not been found to be asso-

ciated with radiation exposure include

prostate, uterus, and small intestine.

Nevertheless, it is generally suspected

that, given sufficient dose, any form of

108

GILBERT W. BEEBE

Table 2.— Average Linear Risk Coefficients for Various Forms of Cancer Induced by Low-LET Radiation

and Average U.S. Incidence Rates, by Sex.

Male Female

Type of Cancer Coefficient* Incidencet Coefficient* Incidence+

Leukemia** Syl Bil 2.0 sh

Thyroid 2 i 5.8 .50

Breast — — 5.8 7.4

Lung 3.6 2 39 1.4

Esophagus eS) “oi/ 3 .16

Stomach 5) MS) Llei/ .70

Intestine 1.0 S22 a 4.0

Liver 1) 133 a 14

Pancreas s) 12 1.0 7S

Urinary organs 8 372 BS) 1.0

Lymphoma 65) Iba 3 AE

Other Ms) 32 1.6 OG

All sites 1529 4.7 Dat 27.0

*Excess incident cases per million persons per rad per year, age adjusted, from BEIR III report.’

+Cases per 10,000 per year, age adjusted, from NCI survey.”

**Except chronic lymphocytic leukemia.

human cancer might be produced by ir-

radiation.

Host Characteristics

Age at exposure and sex are both

associated with differentials in risk esti-

mates, but there is a paucity of infor-

mation on the influence of other host fac-

tors, e.g., genetic constitution, immune

competence, and hormone status, that

might be expected to affect the risk of

radiogenic cancer. Age at exposure exerts

a particularly strong influence on average

risk coefficients, as may be seen in Table

1. Those coefficients were calculated after

excluding the first 5 or 10 years after ex-

posure in recognition of the length of the

minimal latent period. Since age at ex-

posure apparently determines the mini-

mal latent period before the radiogenic

cancers first appear (Figure 4), generally

at about the age when cancers normally

begin to appear, the age-specific coeffi-

cients in Table 1 carry both the influence

of the length of the minimal latent period

and the intrinsic effect of age at exposure

on risk. At a given age at death, as in

Table 3, groups exposed at younger ages

tend to have higher risk coefficients than

older groups once the age is reached at

which cancer normally appears.

For both leukemia and thyroid cancer

there are significant sex differences in ab-

solute measures of risk, males having the

higher risk for leukemia and females for

thyroid cancer. These sex differences tend

to disappear, however, when relative

measures of risk are calculated.

Race has not seemed to be an impor-

tant factor in the carcinogenic response

to radiation. The fact that Blacks in the

New York University tinea capitis series

did not suffer from skin cancer, while

those with fair skin had a marked excess,

especially in areas of the skin exposed to

sunlight, suggests that ionizing radiation

and ultra violet radiation interact to pro-

duce skin cancer in those whose skin is

sensitive to ultra violet radiation.* The

failure to find excess skin cancer among

Japanese A-bomb survivors in the careful

dermatologic survey in 1964-1966 may

not depend on degree of pigmentation of

the skin, for skin cancer has been re-

ported following medical irradiation in Ja-

RADIATION CARCINOGENESIS 109

| AGE ATBO9

ie)

| 10-19 |

ie)

20-34

30 35-49

50 +

CUMULATIVE DEATH RATE / 1000

60 0-9 RAD

100+ RAD

1960

1970 1978

YEAR OF DEATH

Fig. 4. Cumulative Deaths from Lung Cancer per 1,000 A-bomb Survivors 1950-1978, by Age in

1945 (ATB), Year of Death, and T-65 Dose.

Source: Kato and Schull.*

pan.** It may be explained in part by the

apparently long minimal latent period for

radiogenic skin cancer or, perhaps, by a

higher threshold for radiogenic skin can-

cer among the Japanese.

Certain genetic diseases, especially the

nevoid basal cell carcinoma syndrome and

hereditary retinoblastoma, are known to

predispose to radiation-induced cancer.

According to the two-stage model of

Knudson it is possible for the first, initi-

ating, event to be an inherited defect and

the second, promoting step, exposure to

radiation.»

Maternal history of breast cancer and

numerous inter-related characteristics of

the reproductive history have been shown

to influence the risk of breast cancer.

110

GILBERT W. BEEBE

Table 3.—Absolute Risk* by Age in 1945, A-bomb Survivors, 1950-1978 by Type of Cancer and Age

at Death.

Age at Death

Age in 1945 <30 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70+

(a) All cancer except leukemia

<10 1:22 4.35 13.41 — — os

10-19 — NZ 4.62 20.69 — —

20-34 — — 1.01 VS 10.25 —

35-49 — — — — 0.96 2.09 12.67

50+ — — — — JNehailh

(b) Stomach cancer

<10 0.18 0.40 13.84 — — —

10-19 — 0.57 0.47 5.05 —- —

20-34 — — eS 2.06 TEST

35-49 — — — = 12 — 0.08 6.15

50+ — = = = 8.82

<10 — —0.02 — — —_ —

10-19 — 0.80 1.16 —a _ —

20-34 —- — = (OL ls) gal) 4.49 a=

35-49 a — — — 0.08 — 0.10 — 0.34

50+ — — — — 0.38

(d) Lung cancer

<10 — —0.01 — 0.45 — — —

10-19 -— — 0.02 0.96 7.48 — —

20-34 a — = (0,23 Noe} 3.34 —

35-49 — — — 0.59 oll) 4.72

50+ 0.29

*Excess deaths per million persons per year per rad.

Source: Kato & Schull.*!

Although these factors have not been

extensively studied in relation to the

risk of radiogenic breast cancer, in at

least two independent studies there are

indications that nulliparous women and

those with delayed parity have a higher

risk of radiogenic cancer per unit of

exposure than do other women.”

That hormonal factors influence the risk

of radiogenic mammary cancer in exper-

imental animals has been shown in a num-

ber of studies.°’

Time-Response

The temporal distribution of radiogenic

cancers is a matter of considerable prac-

tical interest and possible significance for

a deeper understanding of the mecha-

nisms of radiation carcinogenesis. There

is, first, a latent period following exposure

before expression begins. This has been

reasonably well determined for leukemia

following low-LET irradiation, and for

bone cancer induced by Ra-224, as two

to four years.””? Following alpha irradia-

tion from the administration of Thoro-

trast, however, the minimal latent period

for leukemia is longer, 5—8 years.*®“? For

hepatic angiosarcoma following the ad-

ministration of Thorotrast the minimal

latent period, based on a compilation of

several series, is about 16 years in com-

parison with 9 years following initial

exposure to vinyl chloride.“” The NIH

Working Group modelled the latent pe-

riod for solid tumors on the assumption

that excess cancer begins 5 years after ex-

posure and in terms of relative risk is fully

expressed by 10 years after.

RADIATION CARCINOGENESIS 111

The duration of expression is clearly

much shorter for leukemia than for the

solid tumors. Although it is difficult to

specify the point in time at which the ex-

cess reaches zero, observations on A-

bomb survivors indicate that the duration

of the leukemogenic response depends on

age at exposure, with younger members

of the study cohort showing no excess

after about 20 years after the bombing,

and older survivors showing a slight ex-

cess even 30-35 years after exposure.”

Since no large cohort has been followed

to extinction there is some uncertainty

about the length of the period of expres-

sion for solid tumors other than bone. The

latest report on the British ankylosing

spondylitis series has a substantial expe-

rience more than 35 years after treatment,

75 deaths having been observed for all

causes vs. 66 expected at average national

rates, but for all neoplasms combined

there is no indication of an excess (14 ob-

served vs. 17.4 expected). In the previous

5 years there were 68 observed vs. 57.6

expected, an_ insignificant excess.”

Among the A-bomb survivors, on the

other hand, survivors exposed to 100 or

more rad (T-65D kerma) had 102 deaths

from cancers other than leukemia vs. 63.8

expected in the 30-33 year interval after

1945, a highly significant excess.*! For the

34—37 year follow-up interval parallel fig-

ures are not provided in the latest report,

but it is clear that the excess continued to

be a statistically significant one.* In the

large international study of second can-

cers among women treated for cervical

cancer the radiogenic excess is stronger

at 30+ years after treatment than ever

before.”

At present the investigation of time-

response centers on the overall pattern of

expression. The early experience of both

the A-bomb survivors and the British an-

kylosing spondylitis patients revealed that

radiogenic leukemia is expressed in a

wave pattern, with a peak 6-8 years after

exposure of the A-bomb survivors and

2.5—5 years for the ankylosing spondylitis

patients. The NIH Working Group mod-

elled the combined experience of the two

series for chronic granulocytic leukemia,

acute leukemias of all types, and all leu-

kemias combined except chronic lympho-

cytic leukemia. Figure 5 exhibits its time-

response model for acute leukemia by age

at exposure.

In an early paper on breast cancer

among A-bomb survivors McGregor et al.

showed that the radiogenic excess is dis-

tributed over time in accordance with the

age-specific pattern usual for this tumor

in Japan.* This was followed by a paper

by Land and Norman in which it was

shown that radiogenic tumors of both

breast and lung track natural incidence

over time.* These developments led to

the use of the “relative risk projection

model” of the BEIR III Committee and

its use of both an absolute and a relative

risk model to predict the radiogenic ex-

cess beyond the period of actual obser-

vation, as in making lifetime estimates.’

In the 1950-1978 report on the mor-

tality of A-bomb survivors Kato and

Schull compared absolute vs. relative risk

estimates over time within age-at-expo-

sure groups (Table 4). This material has

given considerable support to the hypoth-

esis of a constant relative risk time-re-

sponse function, 1.e., a multiplicative risk

model. It is by no means established,

however, that a relative risk model need

employ a constant ratio of radiogenic risk

to natural risk. In the 1950-1982 report

on the mortality of A-bomb survivors it

is observed that relative risks have de-

clined over the interval 1959-1982, but

not to a significant extent.* More impor-

tant is the conclusion of the BEIR IV

Committee that the data from the various

series of underground miners fit best a

relative risk model that declines with ad-

vancing attained age, first at age 55 and

again at age 65.*’

Other Risk Modifiers

Epidemiologists have not wanted to

overlook important interactions between

112 GILBERT W. BEEBE

.15

)

.1125

< .075 | 20

.0375

SS z

- LS

O') er) 10

15 20 25 30 35 40 45 &

Time Y in Years Following Exposure

Fig. 5. Fitted Time to Tumor Model for Acute Leukemia Induced by Brief Exposure to Ionizing

Radiation at Age A,. T(A,,Y) is the probability of diagnosis within one year after time T. Lines within

the graph represent the indicated ages at exposure.

Source: Rall et al.”°

radiation and other risk factors for cancer

but have mainly focused on smoking in

relation to lung cancer, perhaps prompted

by the example of asbestos and smoking

and by the high prevalence of cigarette-

smoking. Unfortunately the human data

are not yet sufficiently robust to deter-

mine the role of even smoking when com-

bined with exposure to radiation. Studies

of lung cancer among the A-bomb sur-

vivors suggest that the risks may be addi-

tive** but those on underground miners

have been interpreted as supportive of a

multiplicative interaction.*””

There may in time be a great deal more

information about interactions between

radiation therapy and chemotherapy for

cancer from the follow-up studies de-

signed to estimate the risk of second

primary tumors, but at present such in-

formation is very fragmentary and pro-

vides little insight into the way in which

chemotherapeutic agents and radiation

therapy combine to enhance the risk of

second tumors.

Investigators at the Radiation Effects

Research Foundation (formerly the

Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission)

RADIATION CARCINOGENESIS 113

Table 4.—Comparison of Absolute* and Relative+ Risk Estimates by Age at Exposure and Age at

Death, All Cancer except Leukemia, A-bomb Survivors, 1950-1978.

Age, in Type of

1945 Coefficient <30 30-39

0-9 Relative 1 Kya 5.0

Absolute 1.2 4.4

10-19 Relative 1.0 25

Absolute 1:7

20-34 Relative — 1.8

Absolute —

35-49 Relative oo —

Absolute — a

50+ Relative — —

Absolute — =

*Excess deaths per million per year per rad.

7100+ rad vs. 0 rad.

Source: Kato and Schull.*!

have collected a great deal of information

on variables of epidemiologic interest in

addition to radiation and the obvious

demographic characteristics, e.g., on diet

and socioeconomic factors, but thus far

no environmental or lifestyle factor has

appeared to interact with radiation so as

to yield a risk greater than the sum of the

risks normally attributed to the two fac-

tors acting independently. For example,

Kato, in a recent review, reported that,

although the risk of breast cancer in-

creased with increasing socioeconomic

status, there was no evidence of interac-

tion.”

The most significant data in the epi-

demiology literature concern the relation

between ultra-violet radiation (UVR) and

ionizing radiation in inducing skin cancer.

The New York University tinea capitis se-

ries not only has an excess of skin cancer

among Whites and not in Blacks, but its

distribution over the scalp, face, and neck

is clearly related to the intensity of ex-

posure to UVR.’ The investigators be-

lieve their findings suggest that UVR

exposure levels, or sensitivity to such ex-

posure, interact with ionizing radiation in

causing skin cancer among Whites. Anal-

ysis of the number of tumors per person

suggested that there were subgroups of

more and less susceptible individuals.’

Age at Death

40-49 50-59 60-69 70+

6.8 = — —

13.4 — — —

2.4 8.2 — —

4.6 20.7 — —

2) 2.0 1.6 —

1.0 8.0 10.2

Iba | ES) 1.4

= Aled) 21 12.7

— 2.2 1.0 1.4

= == == 18.3

Experimental investigators have paid

considerable attention to the combined

effects of ionizing radiation and other

agents, especially chemicals, and have

identified agents that may reduce, as well

as agents that may enhance, the carcin-

Ogenic potential of ionizing radiation.*’

Summary

An extensive experimental effort, cou-

pled with growing epidemiological at-

tention to radiation carcinogenesis, has

created a large body of mainly descriptive

information on the risk of cancer follow-

ing exposure to ionizing radiation. A

general outline of the relationship of ra-

diation dose to the likelihood of cancer is

well established, but empirical informa-

tion is weak at the low-dose levels because

the risks themselves are evidently so low;

in general, estimates for the low-dose re-

gion can be made only by fitting simple

mathematical models to data covering a

range of dose that reaches into its higher

levels.

In addition to dose other major factors

influencing the magnitude of the risk of

cancer include the target organ, age at

exposure, and time after exposure. This

114

is an area of active investigation that ex-

tends to host factors, elements of lifestyle,

and environmental factors. The biologic

basis for the highly variable sensitivity of

various organs and tissues, apparently un-

correlated with natural incidence, awaits

explication through more fundamental

biologic knowledge.

There are several notable gaps and un-

certainties in present knowledge:

@ the magnitude of risk from low doses

@ the effect of I-131 on the thyroid

gland

® the RBE for fast neutrons

@ whether fetal bone marrow is much

more sensitive than that of infants

and young children

Major problems impeding the accu-

mulation of knowledge on radiation car-

cinogenesis include:

® limitations on the application of ex-

perimental findings to man

@ lack of any specific marker identi-

fying the cancer of an individual as

radiogenic

® paucity of human radiogenic cancers

in even the largest series, in the light

of the complex relationships requir-

ing exploration

@ practical difficulties of combining da-

tasets from different studies

Finally, there are powerful influences

in the scientific community attempting to

achieve consensus as the information on

radiation carcinogenesis expands. Na-

tional and international bodies of experts,

stimulated in part by concerns about ra-

diation protection, periodically synthesize

the literature and, on occasion, re-analyse

the larger series in combined fashion so

as to achieve new integrations of existing

data.

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Journal of the Washington Academy of Sciences,

Volume 78, Number 2, Pages 117-121, June 1988

Genetic Effects of

Nuclear Radiation

Seymour Abrahamson

Dept. of Zoology

University of Wisconsin,

Madison, WI 53706

When we consider genetic disorders,

our concern lies specifically with the off-

spring of the exposed parents and their

descendants. Once a newly introduced ge-

netic change enters the germline of either

parent it is subject to various selective

forces such that the germ cell itself may

be killed, or be less able to produce prog-

eny cells or complete the maturation di-

visions required to transform it into a

functional sperm or egg. Given that a suc-

cessful fertilization has occurred the

newly formed zygote is again subject to

selective forces that may prevent success-

ful gestation, usually the genetic imbal-

ance leading to early abortion has caused

such severe physical and or physiological

abnormality that embryological or fetal

development could not be sustained. Such

disorders may well occur in at least 15%

and probably closer to 35—40% of all con-

ceptions normally. In other words nearly

one out of every two conceptions are be-

lieved to be spontaneously aborted, most

of these in the early stages of pregnancy

and many go unrecognized. The next

stage at which selection occurs is in the

new born, and as the major infectious dis-

ease have been successfully eliminated we

117

learn that the residue of neonatal deaths,

about 1% of all live births, die from pre-

dominantly genetic or developmental ab-

normalities. Recent studies carried out in

Canada have shown that genetic disorders

account for the major portion of pediatric

hospital stays through the first five years

of life.

What is not generally realized by the

public is that the current incidence of ge-

netic disease in the live born population

is estimated to be about 10% and is prob-

ably likely to rise as modern diagnostic

tools continue to elaborate the previously

unsuspected genetic involvement in a va-

riety of diseases. We have used the Na-

tional Academy of Sciences report on the

effects of low level radiation on popu-

lations as one of the major reference

sources. In addition The Nuclear Regu-

latory Commission report Nureg/cr-4214

Health Effects Model for Nuclear Power

Plant Accident Consequence Analysis

and the Department of Energy report on

Health and Environmental Consequences

of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant

Accident, 1987 served as major sources

of information for the estimates pre-

sented.

118 S. ABRAHAMSON

Table 1—Numbers of Naturally Occuring and Radiation-Induced Genetic Disorders In a Population of

One Million, According to the BEIR III Report Analysis to the Present Analysis, Assumes a 0.01 GY

dose.

This Study

BEIR III Report? (Central Estimates)°

Type of Normal’ First All First All

Disorder Incidence Generation Generations Generation Generations

Single-gene 4800 3-30 20-100

Autosomal 15 70

Dominant

X-Linked 4 20

Irregularly 43200 — 10-400 70

Inherited

Chromosome 2880 <5) 5

Aberrations

Aneuploidy 4 5

Unbalanced 6 8

Translocations

TOTALS 50900 — — 30 175

“For a total population of 10° persons (16,000 live births per year) for 30 years (480,000 live births).

’ Cases expected in each generation of children from a population of 10° persons each receiving a dose

of 0.01 Gy. Assume 30 year intergenerational interval and birthrate of 16,000 per year per 10° persons,

or 480,000 children per generation.

Broadly speaking we may classify ge-

netic diseases into three bins; (Table 1)

the first or monogenic disease, contains

those resulting from the action of a de-

fective gene as in the case of the dominant

gene disorders, Huntington’s chorea is an

example, and the sex-linked disorders for

example muscular dystrophy; or when

both members of a pair of genes are de-

fective in the case of recessive disorders

such as sickle cell anemia. About 1% of

all liveborn will suffer from these forms

of diseases.

The second broad class of diseases in-

volve changes in chromosome structure or

number. In the former case the organi-

zation of one or more chromosomes of

the set (23 chromosomes from each par-

ent) may be altered such that large seg-

ments involving blocks of genes may be

deleted, inverted, or reshuffled, so to

speak, either within the same chromo-

some or between two different chromo-

somes (this is known as a translocation).

All of these chromosomes derangements

can lead to a wide range of genetic ab-

normalities in liveborn and may constitute

a substantial portion of the abortus class.

Numerical changes are more commonly

known to the public. Down syndrome ts

the most famous example of this group,

in which the child suffers both physical

and mental deficiencies resulting from 47

instead of the normal 46 chromosomes.

In this case chromosome number 21 is

present three times. This particular dis-

ease is among the most common genetic

disorders in the human population, about

one in seven hundred live births are

Down’s children; and as is well known the

frequency of the disease increases with

the age of the mother, quite markedly

after age 30. Some of the disorders as-

sociated with trisomies of other chromo-

somes are even more devastating to the

health of the newborn and usually cause

death within the first years of life. Many

of the trisomies and the flip side, mono-

GENETIC EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR RADIATION 119

somies, where a complete chromosome is

missing, however, are so severe that they

contribute perhaps the largest component

to the abortus class. Collectively chro-

mosome aberrations of the types just

mentioned constitute about 0.6% of all

live births, based on the cytological anal-

yses of consecutive births in major re-

search centers in the world, with well over

50,000 newborns screened.

Finally the last category of genetic dis-

order is collectively known as the multi-

factorial class. As the name indicates

these diseases result from a complex in-

teraction of several to many different

genes and environmental factors. This un-

fortunately to date is the poorest under-

stood class with respect to mechanism.

And since this category is also the largest

class making up about 90% of all the ge-

netic ill health we presently document and

some will suggest even more, we are hard

pressed to make sound estimates of risk

with respect to mutagenic agents. Perhaps

the only bright spot in this vale of igno-

rance is the likelihood that the induction

of these events proceeds at a much lower

rate and apparently will have less impact

on offspring of the first several genera-

tions after parental exposure than do sin-

gle gene mutations and chromosome

aberrations, possibly providing the sci-

entific breathing room necessary to un-

ravel the host of factors involved in each

of these many disorders.

It may not have been apparent from

that which I have already said that not

all genetic diseases become apparent at

birth, in fact probably the majority begin

to phase in after childhood and some only

well after adulthood is reached. Though

there is still more thorough work to be

carried out I think it is fair to suggest that

the impact of genetic disease is such that

on average about 30 years of life expect-

ancy is lost per genetic disease, this esti-

mate also includes a component of disease

severity and years so impaired. I recog-

nize that years of life lost is a crude index

of personal pain, family anguish and so-

cietal cost; however, it does permit a

means of collectively weighing the diverse

health effects of cancer, teratology and

genetics. In terms of health effects it pro-

vides a better measure of the impact of

the diseases than does simply a listing of

cancer cases versus genetic disease cases

or developmental abnormalities resulting

from in utero injury.

When dealing with newly induced cases

of genetic disease it is customary to es-

tablish a baseline population, for example

one million people and a unit dose such

as one rem (.01 Sievert) and describe the

expected number of cases of each class.

For example a population of one million

persons composed of all age groups would

be expected to produce about 480,000 off-

spring in a thirty year period (one gen-

eration). About ten per cent of these

children would be expected to be genet-

ically abnormal from natural causes and

if this population had received an addi-

tional one rem exposure from a radiation

source such as a Chernoby] accident, then

among these 480,000 children in addition

to the approximately 48,000 naturally af-

fected children there would be approxi-

mately 20 children affected with dominant

or sex-linked disorders such as hypercho-

lesteremia, Huntington’s chorea, hemo-

philia, muscular dystrophy the latter two

are sex-linked and therefore would ap-

pear only in the male offspring of exposed

mothers. Some additional 10—12 children

might be affected with chromosomal de-

fects about one-half from numerical

changes and the remaining from struc-

tural unbalanced rearrangements. Thus

about 30 cases would be expected in the

first generation after an additional one

rem exposure to one million people. Since

the majority of the newly induced cases

will persist for no more than five to six

generations, calculations we have devel-

oped for the Nureg report suggest that

somewhat less than four times the cases

1.e. 120 additional cases will be distributed

over those five generations.

The frequencies of these diseases are

derived from experimental studies pri-

marily on mice and then extrapolated

120

S. ABRAHAMSON

Table 2.—Collective Dose Projections External Exposure

Population Ave. Individ.

Distance Size Dose Equiv. (Gy)

Pripyat 45 x 10° .033

3-15 km 24.2 x 10° 45

15-30 km 65.7 x 103 .053

Total 15 3< NC? x12. = 1.62 <0 2P-Gy

W. USSR 75 > 1e Tee MOR

E. USSR 400 x 10° 4.5, % 0s

Asia 2,350 x 10° 3 Xr lOse

Europe 450 x 10° 2 xs

USA DON xO? Biotec WJ

Total N. Hemisphere SHS) x 10? 4.92 xi 10a

using theoretical models based on_ be possible to refine our estimates even

experiments in a wide variety of animal,

plant material and human cell cultures. In

experimental test systems doses covering

a wide range of exposures delivered at

very low to very high dose rates have al-

lowed us to demonstrate the shape of the

dose response curve is a general phenom-

enon applicable to all animal and plant

forms studied to date.

Clearly there must be uncertainty in ex-

trapolating to humans in these situations,

we however believe that the central es-

timates as presented are probably accu-

rate to within a factor of three, that is to

say the true values are likely to be no

more than three times smaller or larger

than those we present. Of course as newer

information becomes available it should

further. It will be undoubtedly surprising

for the lay public to learn that the Japa-

nese A-bomb studies have to date pro-

vided no evidence for an increased

frequency of genetic disorders in the

offpsring of the exposed survivors who

compose the ongoing study group. I do

not mean to say that nothing was induced

but that the size of the studied group some

17,000 children in the exposed parents

sample and 35,000 in the unexposed

group and their respective received doses

were such that no more than 50-60 ad-

ditional cases of disorder was to be ex-

pected and therefore they would remain

undetectable relative to the natural oc-

curring level.

With respect to Chernobyl we have de-

Table 3.—Estimated Increase in Genetic Disorders Approximately 1st Generation

P-Gy x 10°

1986 Dose No.

Region Commitment Induced

Chernobyl 16 60

W. USSR 220 660

E. USSR 76 230

Asia 22 70

Europe 330 nt 1,000

USA 0.37 ~Il

Total N. Hemisphere 640 1,900 vs. 180 x 10° Spont.

Future Dose

Commitment <1000 <3200

Natural incidence assumed to be 10.7% of live births. Expect = 1.7 x 10° live births in next 30 years.

GENETIC EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR RADIATION 121

veloped global estimates on the impact of

the radiation release from the Russian re-

actor (Table 2) for the three major health

end points of concern namely cancer ge-

netics and teratological effects. As can be

seen in the (Table 3) the estimated num-

ber of induced genetic events will be lit-

erally swamped by the naturally occurring

ones such that it will be highly unlikely

that they can ever be detected. The ex-

ception to this statement may be a portion

of the Chernobyl population which re-

ceived an appreciable exposure of ap-

proximately 45 rem before evacuation.

This group of 22,400 people of the

135,000 in the region is the most likely

cohort to be followed for epidemiological

studies. With respect to other populations

the distribution of cases will be largest in

European Russia and Western Europe

but as shown in the table the number of

cases expected relative to the population

size is so small that it should go unde-

tected. Let me express this statement in

another way. Given that a child is born

over the next generation with any form

of newly arising genetic disease described

in the preceding discussion we can ask the

question: How likely was the radiation

from Chernobyl to have been a contrib-

utory cause? The answer for all popula-

tions outside of the Soviet Union is much

much less than one percent. Spontaneous

mutation or other events will contribute

over 99% the likely causation. Since for

Western Europe the exposure generally

amounts to an additional 100 millirem (.1

rem) it is equivalent to postponing repro-

duction by one year. For other parts of

the western hemisphere the probability of

causation from Chernobyl will be still

smaller than for Europe.

Summary

We have presented the major genetic

effects expected to be induced by high

energy radiation exposure over the next

five generations as well as the current nat-

ural incidence of those diseases. The es-

timated global distribution of doses were

given with the expected number of genetic

disorders resulting from the Chernobyl

nuclear accident. These estimates suggest

that it is extremely unlikely that the mi-

nute increases anticipated will be recog-

nized by any epidemiological studies

because they will be overwhelmed by the

natural incidence cases. The only excep-

tion to this may be in the high dose subset

of the Chernobyl population. We have

also presented calculations regarding the

probability of causation that radiation was

responsible for any genetically diseased

individual born subsequent to parental

exposure.

References Cited

NAS/NRC. 1980. “The Effects on Populations of

Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation.”

Report of the Committee on the Biological Ef-

fects of Ionizing Radiations (BEIR) Nat. Acad.

Sci, Nat. Acad. Press, Washington, DC.

NRC. 1985. Health Effects Model for Nuclear

Power Plant Accident Consequences Analysis.

NUREG/CR 4214. U.S. NRC Contractor Report

(SAND.85-7185). U.S. Gov't Print. Office,

Washington, DC.

1987. Health and Environmental Consequences of

the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Accident.

DOE/ER-0332. NTIS. US Dept. of Commerce,

Virginia.

Journal of the Washington Academy of Sciences,

Volume 78, Number 2, Pages 122-124, June 1988

Round Table Discussion

Biomedical Issues

ELKIND: Mortimer Elkind, Colorado

State University. I have a question for Dr.

Beebe. I believe I understood correctly

that the new dosimetry at Hiroshima/

Nagasaki showed a marked departure

in incidence of leukemia as compared

to the old dosimetry, in particular a peak

ing at 300 rad, and for all other cancers

a similar effect, but perhaps not as dra-

matic.

Do you have any comments about the

change in the character of the curve, at

least for leukemia with dose, which ap-

pears to be coming out; secondly, if in

fact the quality factor for neutrons were

20 instead of 10, would that have any

bearing on the character of the curve and

in what way it would it be changed?

BEEBE: I think the full answer to that

is, I don’t know. I wished I did, but I

really don’t know.

PETERSON: Harold Peterson, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission. I no-

ticed one of the things Dr. Abrahamson

showed as typical is that genetic effects

are depicted as per unit live birth. That,

of course, raises the possibility that there

is a component there that is lost and ob-

viously cannot be measured, which is the

transformations that are fatal in utero.

Has the reproductive capacity or the

fertility of the Japanese shown any in-

dication, perhaps of. a drop, because I

would suspect that was the only visible evi-

dence, that the birth rate might drop a

little.

ABRAHAMSON: In a sense, I am

122

going to shift that over to Bob Miller in

a moment, because Bob gave you some

data that showed earlier on that there

seemed to be a higher incidence in those

who were exposed early in gestation for

a drop in successful pregnancy. I know of

no data from Hiroshima/Nagasaki that

shows a signifcant increase in miscarriages

or stillbirths, having been looked at for

the multiple years.

My memory, if it is correct, says that

in a Neal and Shull publication back in

the early 1950s, there was, at first, an in-

dication of an increase in stillbirths, and

that disappeared with time.

Gil, you have much greater access to

the Hiroshima data than I do.

BEEBE: You remember that in the

early days, there was a difference in the

sex ratio, and that disappeared. But there

were Six or seven or eight measures of

genetic effects in the survivors of the

atomic bombs. It began with simple ob-

servations of the frequency of malfor-

mations or stillbirths, neonatal deaths,

body measurements, sex ratio, mortality

after birth, and finally biochemical ge-

netic studies. None of them show a de-

monstrable genetic effect among that

population.

ABRAHAMSON: Another phase of

the question I thought you were asking

is, since I have only been concerned about

genetic disorders among live born, you

might ask me whether or not I would pre-

dict there were induced abortis-type sit-

uations occurring, and clearly yes, there

ROUND TABLE DISCUSSION 123

can be quantitation for that as well. But

since you do not know when they are

dying within the first two, three, or four

weeks of gestation, most of them would

be in that first period, and they would go

unrecognized to a great extent.

MOSSMAN: Ken Mossman, George-

town University. Dr. Beebe alluded to

several studies, purportedly showing that

at low doses of radiation, one can dem-

onstrate cancer in the Israeli children and

in Alice Stewart’s studies. I am addressing

this to Dr. Puskin and the panel. In view

of the concern about Radon exposure, are

there similar studies which exist in which

environmental levels of radon are also as-

sociated primarily with lung cancer?

BEEBE: As far as I know, our data

line, the effect of radon in its quantitative

adequacy is coming from the studies of

underground miners, primarily uranium

miners. Others may know of information

I am not aware of, but I don’t know of

any environmental radon studies. Arthur,

do you?

UPTON: Dr. Puskin, do you want to

make a comment?

PUSKIN: There are a few studies that

have been done, but they are certainly not

definitive. In Sweden, there is an Island

which has fairly high radon levels in one

part of the island and not the other. A

comparison of the groups living in the

high-radon area and low-radon areas did

show an excess of lung cancer, which to

the first approximation is what you would

expect based on the uranium miner ex-

perience.

There has been a lot of concern about

the high levels in the Reading prong area

in Pennsylvania, and people have looked

for an excess of lung cancers in that area.

In fact, you do not see a high rate of lung

cancers in those counties as compared to

the country nationwide.

Very recently, Dr. Archer has looked

at this again, comparing the Reading

prong counties with neighboring counties

which had similar demographics and sim-

ilar age structure. He found that there was

an excess in the radon prong area. There

are all kinds of potential confounders, but

again to a first approximation, the excess

is about what you would expect. This is

still not shown definitively.

The biggest study underway is the one

being conducted under the auspices of the

Department of Energy, with Dr. Steb-

bings from Oregon as the principal in-

vestigator. He is going to look at lung

cancers in eastern Pennsylvania, outside

of Philadelphia. They are going to do a

case controlled study, comparing radon

levels in houses of people who have lung

cancer against the control group. They are

going to go back to try to measure radon

levels in people’s houses, going back in

time, to try to get a lifetime exposure es-

timate.

EPA also has a study underway in the

State of Maine to look at it. It’s another

case controlled study. I think there is also

one in New Jersey. There are some things

going on, and so far the evidence is just

not there yet.

UPTON: Did you have a comment, Dr.

Wald?

WALD: Yes. I was going to comment

that the estimate I heard is that it will be

about five years before we have any de-

finitive results from the studies that are

ongoing. So we really are not in a position

at this point to make any conclusions.

MOSSMAN: I have another question

for Dr. Abrahamson. I am not a geneti-

cist, by any means, but I get a feeling from

the genetics literature I have read that

genetic effects, unlike carcinogenesis, are

very wide-ranging. You can go from very

subtle changes, which are by no means

detrimental to the quality of life, all the

way up to lethal changes. Is there research

now underway to detect biochemical

markers, so it would be easier for a ge-

neticist to be able to identify genetic

changes which would ultimately result in

some alteration that phenotypically

would be unrecognized but would allow

you to make some type of risk estimate?

ABRAHAMSON: As you know, most

of the early mouse radiation studies, or

even chemical studies for mutagenesis,

124 BIOMEDICAL ISSUES

dealt with phenotypic markers—coat

color, tail, hair shape, and things like

that.

Over the last 15 years, extensive work

has gone into developing both enzyme

markers and other biochemical end-

points, and these are being used widely

at major laboratories that are doing mam-

malian studies. They are also being done

in cell culture work as well. The National

Institutes of Environmental Health

Sciences have a big project on contract

with other people at Research Triangle

Park, developing these biochemical

markers. Oak Ridge is dealing with them.

The large mouse research laboratory in

Germany is also extending the number of

locii that can be studied with biochem-

ical markers. I think we are up to about

75 now.

WALD: Can I add, your question re-

lates to the previous one that you asked,

in that biochemical markers are also being

used in epidemiologic studies for the early

detection of precancerous changes. In

fact, Dr. Luke Culler at the University of

Pittsburgh is looking at bronchial cells’

DNA content in high and low radon

homes.

PUSHKIN: It may be noteworthy in

this connetion to comment that at the ra-

diation effects research foundation in Ja-

pan, efforts have been made to exploit

biochemical markers to amplify what has

not been found using phenotypic changes.

As has been brought out, there really has

been no definitive evidence for the trans-

mission of inheritable damage to the chil-

dren of A-bomb survivors.

The biochemical genetic studies uti-

lized blood proteins as measures of mu-

tational change, and as many as a million

gene products have been examined with-

out detection of a significant excess of

phenotype variance among the children

of irradiated survivors. The effort is now

going into the use of recombinant DNA

methodology to look for changes at the

level of the genome itself, but I think this

is an area that is developing.

There has been evidence for mutational

change in the bone marrow cells of sur-

vivors, using another set of protein end-

points, glycoforin proteins, and the excess

incidence of glycoforin mutants as a func-

tion of those seems to correlate very well

with the excess of cytogenetic abnormal-

ities.

WALD: Could I just add one thing? I

think that many of the studies that just

use simple, “Is the enzyme altered in its

effectiveness by electrophoretic type

studies?” with radiation may be doomed

to failure. You need to have plus-minus

markers. Is the enzyme product there, or

is it not there. My bias is that most of the

x-ray induced genetic events we call gene

mutational and probably deletional, and

therefore, if you delete a gene or a major

part of it, you are not going to see a subtle

change in electrophoretic markers. You

are going to see the loss of the protein.

That may be part of the reason we haven’t

been able to detect it in the past.

Journal of the Washington Academy of Sciences,

Volume 78, Number 2, Pages 125-130, June 1988

How Safe Are Nuclear Plants?

How Safe Should They Be?

Herbert Kouts

Department of Nuclear Energy

Brookhaven National Laboratory

Upton, Long Island, New York 11973

We are becoming so accustomed to

thinking about safety of nuclear plants in

terms of risk as defined by the WASH-

1400 study that some of the implications

for the non-specialist escape out atten-

tion.

Even putting the question in these

terms upsets many people. Many do not

like to be reminded of their mortality, and

they become frightened when it is sug-

gested that some one thing can be singled

out as possibly having a chance of ending

their lives. This is especially true if that

something is unfamiliar to them.

It gets worse when we start to discuss

nuclear plant safety in probabilistic terms.

Probabilities are not widely appreciated.

Perceptions of probability are clouded by

widespread belief in good luck and bad

luck as an attribute of people or circum-

stances. It is usually not helpful to people

who believe that big shifts in luck are com-

monplace to be told that some event has

only a very low probability.

Yet we know that a rational program

to understand safety, to identify unsafe

events, and to use this kind of information

or analysis to improve safety, requires us

to use the methods of quantitative risk

125

assessment. How can we make this pro-

cess more understandable to a broader

group of nontechnical people? And how

can we develop a wider acceptance of the

results of the process?

These are questions that have been

struggled with for some time in the world

of nuclear plant safety. The Nuclear Reg-

ulatory Commission examined them for

several years as it moved toward devel-

oping a position on safety goals for nu-

clear plants, a requirement that had been

assigned it by Congress. Opinion was

sought from a broad spectrum of individ-

uals, within the field of nuclear power and

outside it, on the topic that was popularly

called, ““How safe is safe enough?” Views

were solicited on the answer to the ques-

tion and also on the way the answer

should be framed when it was adopted.

A first workshop led to a coalescence

of opinion that quantitative safety goals

should be developed. Simplistically, these

could be in the form that a nuclear plant

should be so safe that the risk from ac-

cidents should not exceed x early fatalities

and y late fatalities each year. Following

these conclusions, it was pointed out that

this would be interpreted by the public at

126 HERBERT KOUTS

large and even by political circles such as

Congress that the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission thought it would be all right

if a nuclear plant killed x people outright

and caused y fatal cancers each year. That

spelled the end of strictly quantitative

safety goals for nuclear power plants.

A second workshop was held. The con-

clusions changed. There was now a rea-

sonably broad consensus that safety goals

had to be qualitative; that they had to

ensure safety of nuclear plants in the con-

text of nothing being absolutely safe in

this world, but nuclear plants being better

than the rest.

After some deliberation, the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission adopted this

course last year. It adopted two qualita-

tive goals. The first was that nuclear

plants should not entail any significant ad-

ditional risk to life and health. This goal

limits the risk from nuclear plants relative

to the risks from ordinary living.

The second safety goals states that the

risk from a nuclear plant should be

comparable to or less than the risks

from viable competing technologies for

generating electricity, and should not be

a significant addition to other societal

risk.

The goals when stated in these forms

should be understandable to nontechnical

people, though they do include a potential

problem in that they use the word “‘risk”’

in its WASH-1400 technical meaning

while seeming to substitute it for a word

like “danger” for purposes of public inter-

pretation.

Though the intention to state under-

standable goals was probably accom-

plished by this adoption, the goals were

not very useful in this form for the reg-

ulatory staff. They were not a clear yard-

stick that could be used in determining

when they were met or were not met. So

the Commission also settled on what were

called quantitative objectives, that re-

stored some of the features of the quan-

titative goals that had been discussed in

the workshops.

One of these referred to the early ef-

fects of potential accidents on people liv-

ing near nuclear plants. It said that the

risk to an individual living in the vicinity

of a nuclear plant of being killed as the

result of a reactor accident should not ex-

ceed one-tenth of one percent of the sum

of prompt fatality risks resulting from

other accidents to which members of the

U.S. population are normally exposed.

The second said that the risk to the pop-

ulation near a nuclear plant of dying from

cancer caused by a nuclear accident

should not exceed one-tenth of one per-

cent of the sum of cancer fatality risks

resulting from all other causes.

These quantitative objectives were aug-

mented by what was called a “‘general per-

formance guideline” to the effect that the

chance of a reactor accident leading to a

large release should be less than one in

one million per year of reactor operation.

In adopting these goals, objectives, and

the guideline, the NRC quietly over-

turned a position it had taken several

years earlier when it attacked the concept

of risk assessment generally and WASH-

1400 in particular, and said that these

methods should not be used in regulatory

applications. This new policy on safety

goals could not be implemented other

than through use of risk assessment meth-

ods. In fact, the safety goals policy simply

gave formal recognition to the reality that

risk assessment by the best available

means has turned out to be a powerful

and even a necessary tool for ensuring and

improving the safety of nuclear plants. It

has put important new meaing into such

time-honored phrases in nuclear safety as,

“without undue risk to the health and

safety of the public.”

Let’s now examine the implications of

these positions taken by the Nuclear Reg-

ulatory Commission. The Center for Dis-

ease Control of the U.S. Public Health

Service issues statistics on the causes of

death in the United States. In the Decem-

ber 19, 1986 issue of the Morbidity and

Mortality Weekly Report can be found sta-

tistics for the year 1984. Injuries or ac-

cidents accounted for 4.6% of all deaths.

HOW SAFE ARE NUCLEAR PLANTS 127

According to the first quantitative safety

objective, nuclear plant safety would

therefore require that nuclear plants meet

the criterion that nuclear plant accidents

will not lead to a probability of accidental

death greater than 4.6 x 10~° for individ-

uals at risk.

The same publication states the relative

mortality rate from malignant neoplasms

as 22.1%. The second quantitative safety

objective therefore implies that for the

population living near nuclear plants,

these plants should not contribute more

than a probability of 2.2 x 10~* of inci-

dence of fatal cancer over lifetime.

These are cold-sounding statistics, of

the kind that have a tendency to disturb

most people. They give an impression that

nuclear power safety advocates first de-

termine that there is a hazard attached to

a nuclear plant, and then they say—go

right ahead with it after all. There are

plenty of unprincipled politicians ready to

take advantage of this kind of public gut

reaction, and the country is plentifully

supplied with other individuals who are

eager to take advantage of public fears to

further their private objectives.

But I do not see how we could avoid

use of such statistical methods if we are

to improve safety of nuclear power plants,

any more than we could avoid use of

similar statistical methods to determine

where to find the most urgent areas for

research against mortality from disease,

or to locate the region of the country most

in need of improved measures for com-

mercial air safety.

Other safety goals and safety criteria

than the ones adopted by the NRC have

sometimes been proposed, and some are

incorporated in more or less obscure

forms in some standards and regulations.

One of the oldest is that nuclear power

plants should not directly contribute to a

time-averaged increase in radiation level

by more than some factor times the nat-

ural rate. This has been the basis for some

ICRP and NCRP standards and recom-

mendations regarding radiation levels

from normal operation of nuclear facili-

ties. Another concept has been proposed

to the effect that nuclear plant activities

should contribute a time-averaged radia-

tion level not exceeding the variability in

radiation dose absorbed in connection

with variability of choice by individuals.

This is apparently the basis for the EPA

regulation 40CFR190.

The former of the two criteria would

lead to an annual average radiation level

to an individual from all causes attached

to operation of nuclear plants of no more

than about 140 mR/year. A direct com-

parison between this and the NRC’s

safety objectives is not possible. For one

thing, interpretation and use of the NRC

objectives requires use of a dose response

curve with inherent difficulties as to wide-

spread acceptance and as to how to add

long-term and one-time doses. For an-

other, the annual dose limit of 140 mR/

year would have to be added up over a

lifetime to determine statistics. Naive use

of the BEIR-3 value of LET dose per can-

cer at low dose, low dose rate implies that

the 140 mR/yr value exactly coincides

with the NRC delayed fatality safety goal

for an individual exposed at this level for

ten years of his life. The latter criterion

based on the effect of variability in choice

would be comparable to the NRC delayed

fatality objective for an individual who

spent his full lifetime at the 140 mR/yr

annual radiation level.

I summarize all of this by noting that

all of the objectives and criteria that have

been discussed are in aproximate agree-

ment. They are in much better agreement

numerically than the uncertainties in the

numbers themselves. Risk assessment is

still an inaccurate science.

There are other interesting aspects to

the question of how safe nuclear plants

should be. Analysis of the source term of

fission product release from postulated

severe accidents to nuclear power plants

of the type used in the United States now

makes it clear that the off-site conse-

quences of a severe accident would de-

pend very strongly on the length of time

the containment remained intact, holding

128 HERBERT KOUTS

in any fission products released from the

reactor’s primary system into the contain-

ment. If an accident were to lead to melt-

ing of the core of a reactor, if the fission

products escaped from the primary sys-

tem into the containment, and if the con-

tainment remained intact for a few hours

longer, say more than three or four hours,

the effects of plateout and of agglomer-

ation and settling of aerosol particles

would dramatically lower the amount of

fission products available for release to

the environment. It is found that almost

all the contribution to risk is the result of

severe accidents that could lead to early

containment failure. Mechanisms for this

have been identified, and recent NRC-

sponsored research has addressed the

probability of early containment failure

and the effect on consequences of severe

accidents.

It is found that the NRC safety goals

and the numerical safety objectives are

met if the probability of a severe accident

with early containment failure is less than

approximately 10~° for an average nu-

clear plant. This finding has considerable

uncertainty associated with it, much being

the result of variation in meteorology,

population distribution, design of the

plant, and general difficulty in accurate

analysis of risk.

This raises an important problem which

will be solved only very slowly in the fu-

ture. I referred a few moments ago to risk

assessment as an inexact science. This

leads to lack of ability to be absolutely

sure if the goals and objectives are met.

We are using a yardstick whose length is

somewhere between one foot and ten

feet:

This means that for the time being, at

any rate, the ability to meet the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission’s safety goals can

be only one index to the safety of nuclear

power plants. It is widely accepted that

these methods cannot be used to settle

absolutely the question of adequate safety

of a particular nuclear power plant. Prob-

abilistic analysis has to be added to other

methods to reach an overall conclusion

based on many perspectives. Other kinds

of questions that need addressing are:

How well is the plant managed? What is

its operating record? What is the char-

acter of the operating staff—how expe-

rienced are they? How well-trained? How

well do they know their plant? How well

do design and operation of the plant avoid

potential problem areas that have come

to be recognized over the years?

From answers to all of these questions

can be developed a profile that can be

used to identify weaknesses that might

undermine the safety of a specific plant.

The safety goal structure of the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission is more usable to

assess the safety of the nuclear power in-

dustry, where the inputs from many risk

assessment analyses should lead to some

improvement of the statistical results and

where an accumulation of historical in-

formation begins to be useful.

This leads us into the second of the two

questions I want to explore. This is, how

safe are nuclear plants? I want to consider

this point from the standpoint of how well

nuclear plants have measured up histor-

ically to the NRC’s safety goals. This

aspect of the question is especially

important in view of the emphasis on

Chernobyl in the title of this symposium.

But before we consider the implications

and impacts of Chernobyl, let’s concen-

trate on the United States, where nuclear

plants very different from Chernobyl’s

RBMK design are used.

The United Staes has specialized in nu-

clear power plants with water-moderated

and water-cooled reactors. All but two

U.S. nuclear plants are of this general

class; one of the exceptions is a small,

demonstration size plant in Colorado us-

ing a gas-cooled reactor, and the other is

a government-owned plant at Richland,

Washington which produces plutonium

for nuclear weapons and also supplies

steam to turbine-generators operated by

the Washington Public Power System.

As is well-known, the one substantial

nuclear plant accident in the United

States occurred in 1979 at the Three Mile

HOW SAFE ARE NUCLEAR PLANTS 129

Island Unit 2 nuclear plant in Pennsyl-

vania. This accident destroyed the reactor

and led to permanent shutdown of Unit

Number 2. Though hydrogen was gen-

erated as a result of extensive oxidation

of the zirconium-based nuclear fuel clad-

ding during the accident, and the hydro-

gen was released into the containment

building where it burned, the integrity of

the containment structure was preserved,

and it was apparently not threatened. The

only radioactive material released from

the plant because of the accident con-

sisted of the noble gas inventory and

about 18 Ci of active iodine. Radiation

levels outside the plant were far below

life-threatening values and the total pop-

ulation dose was about 5000 man-REM.

According to the BEIR-3 model this is

assumed to be productive of a probable

0.8 cancers over the period of 30-50 years

following the accident.

About 1000 reactor years of U.S. com-

mercial water reactor experience have

now been accumulated. A similar number

of reactor years has been accumulated in

other countries with nuclear plants of the

same type. This is not enough for an ad-

equate statistical basis for a test of meet-

ing of the safety goals and objectives, but

it is close. So far there have been no early

fatalities in the U.S. or elsewhere as a

result of accidents to water reactors, and

an upper limit to the rate at which light

water nuclear plants may have induced

cancer is about 4x10~* per operating

year (we use the full 2000 reactor years

of experience in deriving this number).

There are now almost 400 light water nu-

clear plants in the world, so another 1000

reactor years of experience will be accu-

mulated every 2-1/2 to 3 years. Thus ac-

curate historical tests of the safety goals

and objectives are almost at hand.

Let me recall that the second NRC

safety goal compares electrical generation

by nuclear plants against viable compet-

ing technologies. The principal compe-

tition is coal. To make a comparison

between the two, I draw on some analyses

made four years ago by Hamilton and co-

workers. The comparison is made for the

full fuel cycle, including not only electrical

generation but also mining and transpor-

tation. It is seen that in all categories

the risk from the nuclear option is lower

than that for coal. The comparison is,

however, not as reliable as one would

like it to be. The range of the estimate

of mortality from air pollution reflects

the great uncertainty in use of a linear

hypothesis for the effects of pollution

at low doses. If anything, the use of

this sort of hypothesis for organic

pollutants and other components of

smoke from a coal plant is more ques-

tionable than it is for effects of nuclear

radiation.

To summarize, the safety goals and ob-

jectives estalished by the Nuclear Regu-

latory Commission seem to be met for

nuclear plants in this country, for the in-

dustry as a whole. The statistical evidence

supporting this conclusion is not yet ad-

equate in some respects, but the statistical

situation is improving rapidly.

These conclusions also seem to apply

to other countries using water cooled and

moderated nuclear plants of the western

type.

What is the effect of Chernobyl on all

of this? In the averaging process that

tells the historical story of safety of nu-

clear plants, there is some temptation to

add to the effects of TMI those from

Chernobyl. I have thought about this

possibility, and believe that for any in-

ternational objectives that consider the

effect of nuclear power world-wide, and

that contemplate improvement of nuclear

safety world-wide, there is some merit to

this. But in doing so one should realize

that any averages formed this way are

taken over two very disparate distribu-

tions. The RBMK’s in the Soviet Union

are so different in their design and their

safety features, and their mode of oper-

ation has been so singular, that averaging

over the two sets loses a great deal of

meaning. Certainly to form such an av-

erage would not improve our understand-

ing of how safe U.S. types of nuclear

130 HERBERT KOUTS

plants are, when operated by U.S. prac-

tices.

The Soviet government gives all signs

of believing that the past characteristics

of RBMK’s and their mode of operation

at Chernobyl are not acceptable accord-

ing to safety objectives of the Soviet

Union. A number of physical changes are

being made to RBMK reactors. New op-

erational practices have been substituted

for old discredited ones. Management

personnel from Chernobyl have been sub-

jected to criminal trials, found guilty, and

are undergoing punishment. I believe that

it would be wrong under the circumstan-

ces to use the historical record of RBMK’s

including the Chernobyl! accident in eval-

uating the safety of these plants under

present circumstances, and it would be

even more wrong to apply such results to

U.S. nuclear plants.

At the end of an analysis such as that

preceding, I am left still unsatisfied as to

the way the conclusions would be received

by a broad public. The case for nuclear

plant safety will probably have to become

so clear that the analyst is obviously in-

nocent of any charge of using numbers to

obscure reality. Nuclear plants will have

to show in real life a level of safety that

reassures the public through pervasive

excellence. I believe that it is not the

function of the Nuclear Regulatory Com-

mission to achieve this. They have de-

veloped a set of safety goals that I believe

are rational and laudable, and which are

suited to the responsibility of a regulatory

body of this type. There should be no

tightening of the screws by the NRC sim-

ply to reassure the public.

Achieving a level of excellence beyond

that required by the regulators should

be the responsibility of the nuclear in-

dustry. They are the only group able to

do this, and they should do so as an act

of social responsibility. If they are to

have any sponsors and helpers in the

Federal establishment in their enter-

prise, it should probably be the Depart-

ment of Energy, which still has such a

responsibility according to the Atomic

Energy Act.

Journal of the Washington Academy of Sciences,

Volume 78, Number 2, Pages 131-138, June 1988

Chernobyl—Lessons Learned

William Kerr

Professor of Nuclear Engineering

The University of Michigan

Ann Arbor, MI 48109

ABSTRACT

Although the significant differences in design and in operating philosophy of the No.

4 reactor at the Chernobyl Nuclear Plant preclude the possibility of an identical accident

at an operating US reactor there are lessons, applicable to US reactors, to be learned.

The Soviet reactor had identifiable design weaknesses. Some US reactors have design

features which, if improved, could eliminate or make less serious hypothesized accidents.

The Soviets appeared to have become complacent because of a good operating record.

There is evidence that some US reactor owners should be more aware of the potential

for and methods for avoiding low probability severe accidents. It appears that Soviet

operators found it easy to defeat a number of safety systems in the course of performing

an unusual operation. We must continue to emphasize the importance of careful exami-

nation of possible consequences of abnormal operating modees. The Soviets had emer-

gency plans which could not be followed in the actual accident. There is evidence that

some of our own emergency planning needs reexamination in light of experience gained

in emergency drills. Finally, since it is to be expected that severe accidents will occur

infrequently, it is imperative that we continue to study this accident carefully in an effort

to make serious accidents in operating US nuclear power plants less likely.

Prologue

Apprehension about the use of nuclear

energy to generate electricity has a pos-

sible parallel in the fear associated with

the application of steam power to trans-

portation in the eighteenth century. Ex-

plosion of boilers on boats used in river

transportation became frequent enough

that several cities, including Cincinnatti,

where one explosion took 150 lives, set

up special committees to investigate the

hazards of steam boilers, and to ask for

legislation restricting their use. In 1832 a

Select Committee of the twenty second

131

Congress of the United States was con-

vened to investigate the dangers. The

opening passages of the committee’s re-

port bear a striking resemblance to some

of the public concerns expressed today

about nuclear power.

“The distressing calamities which have

resulted from the explosion and collap-

sion of the boilers of steam boats, the

increasing dangers to which the lives

and property of so many of our fellow

citizens are daily and hourly exposed

from this cause, unite in their demands

upon that Government, possessing the

competent power and authority, to

132 WILLIAM KERR

throw around the lives and fortunes of

those thus exposed, all the safeguards

which a wise and prudent legislation

can give.”’

The Select Committee gathered a wide

variety of testimony by distributing ques-

tionnaires and by advertising for infor-

mation in newspapers. After considering

the collected testimony, the committee

reported ‘“‘A Bill to provide for the better

security of the lives of Passengers on

board of vessels propelled in whole or in

part by steam.” The bill required periodic

inspection of steamship boilers to ascer-

tain that the boilers could withstand three

times the pressure to be expected in nor-

mal operation. Passed in 1838, it did not

prevent the further occurrence of boiler

explosions. However it did set a prece-

dent for government regulation of ship-

ping in the interests of public safety.’

Today, the application of nuclear

power is more closely regulated than any

other energy source, and the excellent

safety record is, to some extent, a reflec-

tion of this regulation. But, in spite of

both public and private efforts to ensure

safety, we cannot guarantee that serious

accidents will not occur. In the US we

have been able to accumulate a significant

amount of operating experience with no

accidents that have caused physical dam-

age to the public. On the other hand,

studies indicate that improvements in

both design and in operation which should

be achievable with an expenditure of

modest resources, can decrease further

the likelihood that serious accidents will

occur.

The accident at the Chernobyl] nuclear

power plant has heightened public con-

cern over reactors operating in this coun-

try. However after extensive studies by

the nuclear industry, by the Nuclear Reg-

ulatory Commission, and by the Depart-

ment of Energy, it has generally been

concluded that, because of the differences

in the design and of the operating char-

acteristics of the RBMK 1000, and of the

reactor power plants in operation in the

United States, an accident of the kind that

occurred at the Chernobyl plant cannot

happen here. Nevertheless there are les-

sons to be learned from this accident, and

since it is unlikely that many serious ac-

cidents will occur, it is important that we

study this one carefully in order to make

subsequent ones even less likely.

Introduction

Almost 18 months ago, the Soviet

Union experienced, in one unit of a large

nuclear power station, north of Kiev, the

most serious power reactor accident that

has yet occurred. Before the accident, de-

tails of the design of the RBMK 1000 re-

actor, and information on its operating

experience, were not readily available in

the West. Since the accident, the Soviets

have been very open in making infor-

mation available in both areas. Because

of the wide dissemination of information

on the causes and of the course of the

accident, no effort will be made to du-

plicate that information in this paper.*°“

However there are certain key elements

of the accident from which useful infor-

mation can be adduced.

Brief Comments on and Key Points in

the Accident Sequence

In retrospect a number of factors ap-

pear to have contributed to the occur-

rence of and to the serious damage

produced by the accident. Some of those

considered most important are listed and

discussed below:

a) Design Weaknesses—lIt is generally

agreed that a major contributor to the

onset of the accident, and to the se-

riousness of its consequences, was the

existence of a positive coolant void

coefficient of reactivity. It appears

that the designers of the RBMK-1000

were fully aware of the positive void

coefficient, and of its potential con-

CHERNOBYL—LESSONS LEARNED 133

tribution to reactor instabilities. How-

ever because of economics (a lower

fuel enrichment results in a larger pos-

itive void coefficient; greater enrich-

ment increases fuel cost), because the

technology for producing large pres-

sure vessels was not available in the

Soviet Union when the design was

made some 25 years ago (the use of

the pressure tube design requires a

large amount of graphite in the core,

and produces an over moderated sys-

tem), and because they already had

experience with this design (although

this was not made explicit, this expe-

rience was probably gained with re-

actors whose principal purpose was

plutonium production) they decided

to use it for all of their early power

producing reactors. The designers

concluded that careful attention to op-

erating procedures could ensure that

the reactors operated safely.

Further, the design of the reactor control

system reflects a different balancing of on-

line availability and safety than is char-

acteristic of US designs. Because of the

importance of maintaining a reliable

source of electric power, great emphasis

is placed on high availability. In US re-

actors, rather small deviations from nor-

mal operating conditions produce rapid

and complete shutdown (scram) of the re-

actor. The same set of conditions in this

reactor would normally lead to a gradual

control rod insertion, lowering power, in

the expectation that whatever caused the

transient could be corrected without tak-

ing the reactor off line. Automatic scrams

for these reactors are extremely rare, and

the reactivity control system is not de-

signed for automatic rapid insertion of

negative reactivity. Thus when operating

conditions arose that produced a large,

rapid insertion of positive reactivity,

there was no mechanism for automatic

insertion of negative reactivity to prevent

the huge power surge that resulted.

b) “If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix It’ Syn-

drome—Significant successful opera-

tion of these reactors over an extended

period had given those responsible for

their operation an undeserved sense of

security. The Soviet spokesman in Vi-

enna commented that this power sta-

tion had an unusually good operating

record. Because of this the operating

organization may have grown compla-

cent. The Soviet team stated that after

the TMI 2 accident they conducted a

thorough review of the designs and op-

erating procedures of their power re-

actors. For whatever reason, they

missed some important accident pre-

cursors. One can hope that this acci-

dent has convinced them that a

continuing careful search for other

possible precursors of severe accidents

is necessary if we are to avoid addi-

tional accidents.

There is evidence that before TMI 2 some

US organizations had concluded that

since no serious accidents had happened

none could happen. Indeed there is evi-

dence that a few organizations still retain

this misapprehension. It is to be hoped

that a third serious accident will not be

required to bring them face to face with

reality.

c) Planning for the Unusual—lIt is signif-

icant that this accident occurred in the

course of an experiment, performed

on a midnight shift, on a weekend, and

after some twelve hours of delay (dur-

ing which time a shift change oc-

curred) in the planned schedule,

caused by a load dispatcher’s request

for continuing power production dur-

ing the daytime hours. To complicate

things further, this experiment had

been tried once before, with unsatis-

factory results, and there was pressure

to complete it during this planned out-

age. If this try was unsuccessful, the

next opportunity was not to occur for

more than a year.

One cannot identify any one of these fac-

tors as the major contributor to the ac-

cident. Nevertheless it is clear that each

134 WILLIAM KERR

contributed to an unusual situation for the

operating staff, and thus each deserved

special care both in the planning and in

the performance of a set of unusual op-

erations. Available evidence indicates

that a number of these contributors was

not given adequate consideration in the

planning and in the performance of the

experiment.

d) Adequate Safety Analysis of Unusual

Operations—US regulations require a

detailed safety analysis, reviewed and

approved by the NRC, before an ex-

periment of the kind performed at

Chernobyl, is undertaken. The Soviets

reported that the station manager was

responsible for the performance of

such an analysis, and that one was

performed. No additional detail was

given, but it was implied that the anal-

ysis was inadequate, perhaps perfunc-

tory. Remembering that this was the

second time for this experiment, and

that the first time the experiment was

run the reactor was shut down when

the turbine was tripped, it is plausible

to suppose that, having performed a

safety analysis for the first experiment,

little attention was given to the addi-

tional risk associated with keeping the

reactor operating after turbine trip

had occurred. Indeed it is possible

that, since the planned standby power

was about 1000 Mwth, little or no con-

sideration was given to the possibility

of having the power go as low as it

did (recall that it dropped as low as

30 Mwth, and was eventually stabi-

lized at about 200 Mwth before the

turbine was tripped). In any event

the evidence available suggests that

an inadequate safety analysis was

performed.

It is worth noting that current practice of

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission calls

for a stepped ascent to full power oper-

ation for new plants coming on line, the

philosophy apparently being that there is

less risk in operating at low power than

at full power. However there does not

appear to have been any careful study of

this question by either the NRC staff or

by licensees. It would appear, in the light

of the Chernobyl experience, that this

question deserves some attention. Al-

though the RBMK reactors have signifi-

cantly different operating characteristics

than US water reactors, the US reactors

are designed and are analyzed primarily

for full power operation. If they are to be

operated for extended periods at low

power, it would appear prudent to make

a careful search for any unanticipated risk

that might be produced thereby.

e) Those Responsible for Plant Operation

Were Not Aware of the Plant’s Off-

Normal Characteristics—Even though

the plant designers were aware of the

instabilities that could occur at low

power, those responsible for plant op-

eration almost certainly were not.

They surely did not understand the

likelihood of a large rapid insertion of

positive reactivity given the operating

conditions that existed at the begin-

ning of the experiment. Nor could they

have been aware of the possible con-

sequences. They also must have been

unaware that with the control rod ar-

rangement that existed at that time,

not only was it impossible to achieve

a rapid insertion of negative reactivity,

but to make matters worse, the initial

control rod insertion actually intro-

duced positive reactivity! US experi-

ence, however, suggests that lack of

communication between those who

design reactor systems and those re-

sponsible for their operation is not

unique to the Soviet system.

f) It Was Surprisingly Easy for the Plant

Operators to Defeat a Variety of Safety

Systems and Operating Restrictions—

It appears that the planned experi-

ment called for some of the normally

operable safety systems to be made

inoperable, and we assume, from the

Soviet report, that there had been an

analysis of the risk associated with this

CHERNOBYL—LESSONS LEARNED

configuration. However, for unex-

plained reasons, during the entire 11

hours from the time when the exper-

iment had been scheduled, to the time

at which it actually began, the ECCS

was disabled. Further, although some

of the unusual safety system configu-

rations may have been analyzed, the

final configuration of control rods that

existed at the time of experiment ini-

tiation almost certainly had not been,

since it was arrived at during the

course of attempting to reach a stable

power level for the reactor during re-

duction from the 50 percent power at

which it had been operating since early

the previous afternoon to the planned

level for the experiment. The Soviet

spokesman commented that the nor-

mal complement of inserted rods was

30. That with specific approval of the

station manager, this could be re-

duced, but to no less than 15. At that

point, he said, “not even the prime

minister could authorize any further

reduction”. (The number still in-core

when the experiment began was re-

ported to be as low as six!) During the

Vienna meeting the Soviet spokesmen

gave the impression that they could

not understand how a decision could

have been reached to go to that con-

figuration. The implication was that

the decision was made by the opera-

tors. Since then there are indications

that the local plant manager is being

blamed more than one might have

expected from the reports made in

Vienna.° A question was raised during

the Vienna meeting about the ad-

visability of automatic ‘‘stops” that

would have prevented withdrawal of

control rods beyond a certain point.

The answer of the Soviets was that

when this reactor system was designed

it was concluded that humans were

more reliable than the hardware avail-

able at that time!

Emergency Plans Existed, but the

Plans Had to be Revised Once the

Accident Had Occurred—Although

135

emergency plans for accidents at the

Chernobyl plant existed, they had to

be revised once the accident occurred.

For example, initial measurements in

Pripyat indicated that evacuation

would likely not be required. A day

later, when the release mechanism

had changed, and atmospheric con-

ditions were different, measurements

convinced those responsible that evac-

uation was required. However at this

point, because local deposition of

fission products had occurred, the

original evacuation plans had to be

modified significantly. The evacua-

tion, when it did occur, apparently

proceeded with dispatch. Further, the

treatment of those injured during the

accident, and the monitoring of those

in the zone near the reactor, appears

to have been carried on with remark-

able efficiency. Several of those who

listened to the description of how

evacuation and treatment were con-

ducted concluded that the Soviets

must have had previous experience

with some similar accident. (Indeed

Dr. Sakharov is reported as having

stated at a meeting in Moscow in Feb-

ruary of 1987, that several hundred of

those involved in an accident in the

Urals about 1970 experienced ex-

treme radiation sickness.°)

The Soviets Claim to Have Learned

from TMI 2—The Soviet team re-

ported that after TMI 2 they reviewed

their own reactor power plants and

their operational program extensively

and applied the lessons learned. Ob-

viously they overlooked some impor-

tant contributors to the TMI 2 accident

that were clearly identified by several

reviewers of that accident. Of special

relevance to the Chernobyl accident

were the recommendations of several

of the various TMI 2 review groups

that operational personnel be better

trained to deal with the characteristics

of the reactor systems in off-normal

situations, and that more attention be

given to risk produced by operating

136 WILLIAM KERR

personnel in contrast to the emphasis

that had been placed, up to that time,

on risk produced by equipment mal-

functions.

What Can We Learn From The

Chernobyl Accident?

The philosopher Santayana is reported

to have said that those who do not learn

from history are doomed to repeat its mis-

takes. What can we learn from Cherno-

byl?

a) We Cannot Have a Chernobyl Type

Accident—Many US commentators

have assured us that a Chernobyl type

accident cannot happen in US reactors

because of the significant differences

between the RBMK-1000 and US light

water reactors. This is true. Neverthe-

less it is possible that US power re-

actors may be subject to some as yet

not thoroughly evaluated abnormal

situations that could cause serious dif-

ficulties. We should continue to look

for them.

For example although the issue of Antic-

ipated Transients Without Scram has

been studied at length, and is now con-

sidered a resolved safety issue by the

NRC, we nevertheless still depend heav-

ily on a remarkably high estimated scram

system reliability in our calculations of

risk attributable to this transient. For ex-

isting reactors this situation may be tol-

erable because of the difficulty of making

significant changes in reactors systems al-

ready in operation, but for reactors not

yet constructed there are changes in de-

sign for both PWRs and BWRs that

could, with modest cost, make this tran-

sient a much smaller source of risk, even

if the scram system failed completely.

Should we continue to use the same de-

signs for future reactors just because our

experience to date has been acceptable?

The consequences of an unmitigated

ATWS in some power plant systems could

be very severe.°

b) We Should Not Accept the Limited

Positive Experience That We Have

Had With Operating Plants as Ade-

quate Assurance That no Further Se-

rious Accidents Can Occur.—Such

accidents are not expected to occur

very frequently. Furthermore experi-

ence on the part of those who have

examined plant systems in detail (us-

ing, in most cases, Probabilistic Risk

Assessment) has indicated that such a

plant-wide examination, done system-

atically, frequently reveals weaknesses

that are obvious enough when discov-

ered that they are corrected without

any formal action on the part of reg-

ulators. All nuclear power plant op-

erators should perform at least a Class

1 PRA using, for the most part, their

own staff. A similar thorough evalu-

ation of containment system perform-

ance in severe accident situations

should be performed. The results will

be useful not primarily as a numerical

indication of expected risk, but be-

cause of a better understanding of in-

tegrated system performance to be

expected in both normal and abnormal

situations. This understanding is most

useful if it becomes part of the back-

ground of the permanent operating

staff.

c) Someone, Very Near the Operations

Level, Should Have a Thorough

Knowledge of the Off-Normal Behav-

ior That Has Been Observed in US

Nuclear Power Plants.—Experiences,

good and bad, should be shared freely.

If the present regulatory system makes

it difficult to be frank about some of

the incidents that have occurred, as

some have claimed, those responsible

for plant operation should work to

correct this situation. It appears, in

retrospect, that if information, that al-

ready existed, on observed and ex-

pected behavior of B&W reactors had

been available to the operators at TMI

CHERNOBYL—LESSONS LEARNED

2 this accident could have been

avoided. But those responsible for

safety should go beyond what has oc-

curred. For example what instrumen-

tation, not then available, might have

either prevented or ameliorated the

consequences of the TMI 2 accident?

What would have been the conse-

quences if the TMI 2 accident had

been accompanied by loss of off-site

power? What emergency measures

could have been devised under those

circumstances?

Further Attention Should be Given to

the US Practice of Testing Reactor

Power Plant Systems While the Plant

Is In Operation.—Testing at power is

now done presumably because such

testing enhances system and plant re-

liability. Little or no attention is given

to the possibility that such tests

may introduce severe transients or

accidents. Although no serious acci-

dents have been initiated in the US

by testing during operation, numer-

ous examples exist of automatic

shutdowns that have been caused

by mistakes made during a test. The

results of a recent study reported by

the MITRE Corporation indicate that

in the period 1984-1985 about 20 per-

cent of the reactor trips, for which a

cause could be identified, were due

to errors made during testing and

maintenance carried out during

plant operation.’ The Japanese, it ap-

pears, do not test plant systems during

operation, but rather test during down

time. The Chernobyl accident empha-

sizes the need for additional exami-

nation of this issue.

Emphasis on Severe Accidents—Since

TMI 2 there has been a significant em-

phasis on dealing with severe core

damage accidents. Further, most in-

vestigations of severe accident sce-

narios have assumed that once the

capability to cool the core has been

lost, the core will, in a very short time,

become completely molten; and that

all of the molten core, plus some frac-

137

tion of the core supporting structure

will penetrate the vessel and reach the

containment floor (or alternatively

will be sprayed into the containment

atmosphere). Although such studies

provide useful information, we may

have, as a result of this emphasis,

failed to place enough emphasis on

prevention of core melt, and on the

possibility of arresting, in-vessel, the

progression of a core melt once it has

begun. Experience at TMI 2 demon-

strates that partial core melt does not

necessarily lead to complete core melt,

or to vessel penetration. Chernobyl

has produced considerable discussion

of containment performance. While

there is general agreement in the US

that existing power reactors should

have containments, it is not clear that

all of the existing US containments

would have contained the Chernobyl

accident. In any event it is clear that

prevention needs continuing empha-

sis. What avenues should be explored?

Studies should be made to determine

which normal operations, and which

emergency Operations, now per-

formed manually, should be auto-

matic. Those that are now automatic

should also be examined. (Incidentally

whatever decision is reached must be

carefully explained to the plant oper-

ators, since operators are ingenious in

disabling or ignoring systems in which

they have no confidence.) Some Jap-

anese companies have already made

progress in automating both opera-

tions and testing.®

There Should Be Further Examination

of Emergency Planning—Much of the

emergency planning in the US is based

on the assumption that there will be

evacuation beginning perhaps as much

as two hours before any major release

of radioactive material occurs. The ex-

perience at Chernobyl indicates that

releases may occur without this warn-

ing time. The Soviets report that their

plans for evacuation could not be used

in a situation in which significant re-

138 WILLIAM KERR

leases had occurred before evacuation

began.

It is interesting that there have been re-

cent studies in the US, making use of in-

formation collected from a number of

evacuation drills held in connection with

NRC requirements, which indicate that

US officials are likely to be reluctant to

order evacuation until a release begins.

The studies indicate that under these cir-

cumstances immediate evacuation may

not be the most effective method of pro-

tection of the local population. Under

some circumstances sheltering, followed

by later evacuation of selected fractions

of the population, may be more benefi-

cial.’ Furthermore, our present emer-

gency planning is not geared to an

emergency of the magnitude encountered

at Chernobyl. The formalized parts of the

plans, the detailed planning and the drills

do not consider such an emergency be-

cause of its small likelihood. The ability

of the Russians to marshal the resources

of material and manpower needed to cope

with the Chernobyl accident is impres-

sive. Some preliminary thinking about

how we might approach recovery from

such a disaster would be worthwhile. The

disaster for which such planning might

prove useful is unlikely to be a nuclear

plant. But it would be worthwhile for

some agency, probably FEMA, to give

further thought to coping with large-scale

emergencies. The Soviets apparently

made considerable use of military per-

sonnel. In any event their ability to co-

ordinate such a large effort rapidly and

efficiently deserves serious study on our

part.

Conclusions

Although it is generally agreed that an

accident similar to that which occurred at

Chernobyl cannot happen to a US reac-

tor, there are features of the accident

from which US plant operators can learn.

Since serious nuclear power plant acci-

dents occur infrequently, it is incumbent

upon us to learn as much as possible from

those that do occur in order that the

likelihood of future accidents be made

low. Lessons learned can contribute not

only to public safety, but also to a more

reliable source of electric power, and to

the financial stability of utilities which op-

erate nuclear power plants.

References Cited

1. Editorial Comment from ‘“‘Nuclear Powered

Ships”, Phoenix, University of Michigan Mem-

orial Phoenix Project, 1962.

2. “The Accident at the Chernobyl’ Nuclear Power

Plant and Its Consequences”, USSR State Com-

mittee on the Utilization of Atomic Energy, Vi-

enna, Austria; August, 1986.

3. “Report on the Accident at the Chernobyl Nu-

clear Power Station”, NUREG-1250, US Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, 1987.

4. “Report of the US Department of Energy’s Team

Analyses of the Chernobyl-4 Atomic Energy Sta-

tion Accident Sequence”, DOE/NE-0076, US

Department of Energy, 1986.

. R. Wilson, Private Communication.

. See, for example, M. K. De and W. Kerr,

“ATWS: A Retrospective”; Proceedings of ANS

Topical Conference on Anticipated and Abnormal

Transients in Nuclear Power Plants; Atlanta;

April, 1987.

7. S. Seth, R. Lay, G. Malone; “‘Balance-of-Plant

Transients: A Review of Recent Experience’;

Proceedings of ANS Topical Conference on An-

ticipated and Abnormal Transients in Nuclear

Power Plants; Atlanta, Ga.; April, 1987.

8. M. Makimo and T. Watanabe; “Operational Ex-

perience of Human-Friendly Control and Instru-

mentation Systems for TOSHIBA BWR Nuclear

Power Plants”; Proceedings of ANS Topical Con-

ference on Anticipated and Abnormal Transients

in Nuclear Power Plants; Atlanta, Ga; April,

1987.

9. Frank R. Rowsome, ‘‘Assessment of the Effect

of Evacuation on Risk for Indian Point’’, enclo-

sure in a letter dated July 28, 1987, Rowsome to

Thomas E. Murley, Director Nuclear Reactor

Regulation, USNRC.

Journal of the Washington Academy of Sciences,

Volume 78, Number 2, Pages 139-142, June 1988

Somewhere Between Ecstasy,

Euphoria and the Shredder:

Reflections on The Term

**Pro-Nuclear”’

Peter A. Bradford

Chairman, New York State Public Service Commission

Albany, NY 12223

In devising sensible nuclear regulatory

policies for a post-Chernobyl world, it is

important to try to identify the signifi-

cance of Chernobyl. You are hearing from

others better qualified than I am on the

subjects of radiation effects and accident

sequences. I will address the regulatory

environment and, with some hesitancy,

the broader political and governmental

environment.

In these contexts, Chernobyl acceler-

ated forces that were already in motion,

and it may have made irreversible some

trends that were dominant in any case. It

has certainly made life more difficult for

those who would license Seabrook,

Shoreham or the other plants remaining

under construction, but I don’t think that

it has produced a fundamental realign-

ment of forces in this country. Let me

explain.

Nuclear power in this country has never

stood lower in public esteem. The polls

are clear on this point, and Maine voters

may well this November vote to close a

nuclear power plant that they have twice

139

in this decade voted to keep open. Sea-

brook and Shoreham together have $10

billion invested in them, and I have yet

to hear even one among the dozen pres-

idential candidates urge that they be op-

erated. Nor do any urge that more plants

be built.

The nuclear industry in the late 1970’s

blamed its declining fortunes in substan-

tial part on an “antinuclear” president

and on “antinuclear activists” at the Nu-

clear Regulatory Commission. Indeed,

the President of the Atomic Industrial

Forum said that the nuclear industry’s re-

action to President Reagan’s 1980 victory

was ‘‘somewhere between ecstacy and eu-

phoria.”’

Well, we are now seven years into the

most ‘“‘pro-nuclear”’ presidency in our his-

tory. Yet the nuclear achievement of the

1980’s is closer to Ralph Nader’s agenda

than to Ronald Reagan’s.

—The Clinch River Breeder is gone.

—So is reprocessing.

—The waste repository program is

stalled and mired in nationwide con-

140 PETER A. BRADFORD

troversy. The target date has slipped

a year for each year of the program’s

existence.

—No new plants have been ordered

since 1977.

—Every plant ordered since 1975 has

been cancelled.

—Legislation to “‘streamline”’ the licen-

sing process for new plants has gone

nowhere in twelve straight Congres-

sional sessions.

At the bottom of this collapse is a de-

cline in public trust almost without par-

allel in industrial history. I suppose that

one could argue that the Hindenburg was

to dirigibles what Three Mile Island and

Chernobyl were to nuclear power, but air

travel has seen worse accidents since,

and—in recent months at least—highly

publicized near misses and ineptitude.

Yet many people opposed to nuclear

power still fly; a lot of them sit in the

smoking section.

To judge from the operating record in

the U.S. to date, nuclear power is a rel-

atively low risk public health proposition.

It’s impact on public health has almost

certainly been better than coal to say

nothing of the automobile.

Still, the public does not trust it— and

endorsements of all sorts from scientists

and public health officials through the

years haven’t changed that situation. Nor

has the enthusiasm of a popular president

or the adoption of reasonable safety

goals.

Unlike most NRC commissioners, I

have lived for most of the last 15 years

within a fairly short distance of an oper-

ating nuclear power plant, one whose op-

erating history and economics have been

favorable, one that may well not obtain

majority support this November in a state

where 95% of the electorate lives beyond

the 10 mile zone.

I have friends who are long term op-

ponents of the plant and friends who have

come recently to that view, as well as

some who still support keeping it open,

as I did in the two earlier referenda. I can

tell you with some confidence that the

concerns of those who oppose it will not

be met by some new way of presenting

the data or by a public relations cam-

paign. The matters that dismay them

about nuclear power do not reach them

on that level. They include the following:

First, Three Mile Island and Chernobyl

caused a massive discrediting of the ‘“‘ex-

perts,” a discrediting that has in any case

been going on throughout our society

since Vietnam and that has recently been

embodied by the Challenger, by the Iran/

Contra affair, by Bhopal, by disillusion-

ing conduct among Fundamentalist min-

isters and by Gary Hart. For each of these

events you can find many people saying,

‘“T used to believe in [fill in the blank],

but I don’t any more.”’

This destruction of misplaced faith is

basically healthy, but a craving for faith

remains. If that craving is filled by the

casual embracing of yet another unrelia-

ble creed, the inevitable cycle of betrayal

can only lead to levels of cynicism and

apathy that threaten democracy itself.

The alternative of a more active and in-

formed citizenship is one about which nu-

clear proponents have at best been

schizophrenic, and their tolerance for

those among them who would frustrate or

dismiss public inquiry has bred wide dis-

trust among people who know little about

man rems or defense-in-depth or safety

goals.

Second, the failure to achieve a waste

program concensus is deeply perplexing

to anyone inclined to believe that nuclear

power is in good hands. To state that the

waste problem is largely political is not to

discredit those concerned about it. Indeed

their concerns, nontechnical though they

may be, are not an irrational response

either to the general decline of faith in

expertise or to the specific self-destruc-

tion of the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-

sion’s public position.

Of that, more later. I cannot leave the

nuclear waste issue without remarking on

the devastating counterproductivity of

last year’s maneuverings regarding the

REFLECTIONS ON THE TERM “PRO-NUCLEAR” 141

second round repository sites. If the De-

partment of Energy had set out to un-

dermine its own position, it could not

have done so more effectively.

The choice of several of the second

round sites was ill-considered. One of the

two in Maine was relatively highly pop-

ulated, an area heavily dependent on

tourism, an area dominated by Sebago

Lake, which is the City of Portland’s

water supply. DOE’s effort to defend the

choice only made things worse. It is this

venture even more than Chernobyl that

has put the Maine Yankee referendum in

doubt.

To make matters worse, the Adminis-

tration then, for political purposes, with-

drew the entire second round process,

infuriating the first round states without

improving its position in the second round

states, who were further dismayed when

DOE moved gingerly to reinstate the pro-

gram after the 1986 elections, which went

against Administration candidates in

every state in which the wastes were a

serious issue. So transparent were the po-

litical motives in these wrenching changes

of course that those in charge lost all claim

to being in pursuit of the technically op-

timal solution.

Now the intractability of the waste

problem is cited to explain the political

opposition while the political opposition

is cited to explain the intractability of the

waste situation.

Those who urged a decade ago that we

pay more attention to the wastes and less

to the breeder, to reprocessing and to ac-

celerated power plant licensing were re-

garded (and disparaged) by the industry

as being antinuclear. In hindsight, the sin-

cere ones appear to have been among nu-

clear power’s last real friends.

Meanwhile what of the NRC? Given

the source of my invitation, it would be

impolite for me to dwell on that subject

at length. The recent Union of Concerned

Scientist book Safety Second says about

what I would (or, in some cases, did) in

any case.

I will, however, spend a moment on

lessons that I think the Administration,

the NRC and the industry need to learn

about the consequences of excessive zeal

in the setting of public policy. These les-

sons are not unique to nuclear power; in-

deed they emerge just as clearly from our

recent exposure to Iran/Contra policy-

making, with which our nuclear experi-

ence shares the following:

First, both sets of policies have lavished

discredit on their intended beneficiaries

and goals, beneficiaries and goals that

may at one time have deserved better

fates.

Second, both sets of policies have been

driven by obsession and ideology in di-

rections directly contradictory to funda-

mental and bi-partisan American

principles.

Third, the label “‘national security” has

been so abused in both contexts that its

repetition has come to warn of skuldug-

gery rather than justify the policy.

Fourth, funds have been channeled—

publicly when possible, clandestinely

when necessary—in ways inconsistent

with professed policies (‘‘no dealing with

terrorists’ in the one case, “‘noninterfer-

ence in the free market” in the other).

Fifth, in both cases we have assisted

foreigners in travelling roads that the

Congress, public opinion or other forces

constrain the U.S. government from trav-

elling itself (reprocessing and breeder re-

actors in the one case; grants of money

for arms through Switzerland and Costa

Rica to the Contras in the other).

Sixth, both sets of policies have been

promoted in the U.S. by private groups

spending large amounts of privately

raised money but coordinating closely

with the relevant agencies of the federal

government.

Seventh, in both programs lack of ac-

countability, easy access to too much

money and a pervasive mistrust of the

American public has furthered interests

inclined in any case toward arrogance and

self-enrichment.

Finally, in a bizarre irony, both sets of

policies have benefitted the Ayatollah im-

142 PETER A. BRADFORD

measurably. In the one case we have un-

dermined our domestic energy policy in

ways that have tended to support the price

of his oil; in the other we allowed his

agents to ensnare us in a vat of global

humiliation whose bottom is not in sight.

So what does it really mean to be “‘pro-

nuclear” or “‘pro-Contra?” If one believes

that the answer to Harold Denton’s ear-

lier question is that reactors are a “‘good

bet,’ what to do about their manifest un-

popularity?

At the very least, a pro-nuclear policy

would have the following characteristics:

First, it would take the public and our

democratic and federal/state systems of

government as a given, not something

that can be manipulated to private ends.

Engineers who know perfectly well that

the boiling point of water at given pres-

sures cannot be manipulated much seem

unwilling to learn that the public also

inevitably boils over (granted that the

precise moment cannot be predicted) in

the face of accumulated disillusionment

on a threatening topic.

Obvious or gauzy though this first prin-

ciple may sound, it cannot be said to un-

derlie the preemptive features of the

Atomic Energy Act or the NRC’s pro-

posed rule on emergency planning, to

name two examples.

Second, a truly “pro-nuclear’’ policy

would accept “‘no”’ for an answer at some

sites. It is one thing to preempt on-site

safety findings to the federal level. It is

another to require states to operate the

plants in the face of their own adverse off-

site emergency planning conclusions. The

issues of fairness to investors and impact

on rates are much more familiar to the

states and to the courts than they are to

the NRC, and they should be left there.

Third, the next few years must be ac-

cepted as a time of consolidation. Expe-

dited licensing should be explicitly

disavowed. The operating plants and the

wastes should be the sole focus of atten-

tion. Public opinion should be allowed to

follow performance.

Fourth, the industry must realize that

it can only lose public trust when it de-

mands that Jim Asselstine not be reap-

pointed to the NRC while maintaining a

dignified silence about conduct—and I

have in mind shredding or other loss of

documents relating to an investigation—

elsewhere on the NRC, an event for

which any utility would have to sack its own

vice president for nuclear operations.

This is, I know, superficially impolite to

say, but no safety goal, no statement of

good intent can transcend a lack of

public confidence in those who must

enforce it. For the industry to accept

such conduct because it comes from

someone whom they have labeled “‘pro-

nuclear” is, in fact, profoundly anti-

nuclear conduct.

Finally, to decompress a bit, nuclear

plants in the future must expect to com-

pete on a levelized per kilowatt hour and

per kilowatt basis with other sources of

electricity. Otherwise no state commis-

sion will certify them.

I don’t know that the public will ever

be willing to accept more nuclear units.

What I have tried to outline are some of

the conditions under which they might,

though not soon. If these conditions are

unacceptable to the industry, if the in-

dustry response continues to be—as it was

in the 1970s—that such conditions would

mean an end to new nuclear units, then

I do know the outcome after all.

It is not necessarily the wisest public

health outcome measured in terms of en-

vironmental impact, but an energy source

that has as a precondition the belief that

the public’s concerns must be “‘stream-

lined” away will not be judged on envi-

ronmental impact alone.

More importantly, the fortress mental-

ity that goes with such conduct will ulti-

mately encourage unsafe practices that

will vitiate safety goals, safe designs and

years of safe operations. That is the cycle

that led to Three Mile Island, if not Cher-

nobyl. In this cycle, Chernobyl has deep-

ened a downswing that it did not initiate.

Journal of the Washington Academy of Sciences,

Volume 78, Number 2, Pages 143-147, June 1988

Industry Evaluation and Response

Byron Lee, Jr.

President and Chief Executive Officer, Nuclear Management and

Resources Council, Inc. Washington, DC 20036

I am pleased to be a participant in this

important symposium. It is clear that the

speakers include some of the top radiation

health experts in the country. My inten-

tion this afternoon is to summarize the

results from the U.S. nuclear power in-

dustry evaluation of the Chernobyl acci-

dent, and to describe to you the manner

in which we responded and how we com-

municated our conclusions. I will share

some thoughts on my favorite (and now

well rehearsed) topic, the near term

future of nuclear power and how

NUMARC will help shape that future. I

will then close with some thoughts on ra-

diation health—not as a scientific expert,

but as an individual representing the cor-

porate executives in this country who are

entrusted with the safe operation of nu-

clear power plants, and who must apply

the research and wisdom of radiation

physics and medical experts to the public

health aspects of safe nuclear operations

in and around our plants.

This afternoon’s session speakers are

well qualified to discuss the environmen-

tal, engineering and political implications

of the Chernobyl accident. All have been

deeply involved in assessing Chernobyl or

in leading teams of experts charged with

responsibilities for evaluating the acci-

dent. I was asked by the Utility Nuclear

Power Oversight Committee (UNPOC)

143

to chair the Industry Technical Review

Group on Chernobyl in May 1986. The

Group consisted of thirty industry leaders

who shared the tremendous resources

they represented to study the accident.

They represented nuclear utilities, nu-

clear steam supply vendors, architect en-

gineer firms, universities, and industry

Organizations such as the Institute of

Nuclear Power Operations (INPO),

the Electric Power Research Institute

(EPRI), the Atomic Industrial Forum

(AIF), the American Nuclear Society

(ANS), and Edison Electric Institute

(EEI). Our Group had three objectives:

. To learn as much as possible of the

causes of the accident as well as the

post-accident response and recovery

experience;

. To identify whatever lessons there may

be for U.S. reactor design, construc-

tion and operation; and

. To give direction to the response from

the legitimate questions raised by this

event.

In my opinion, the industry responded

quickly and effectively to the Chernobyl

accident. We conducted extensive reviews

of Soviet documents to understand the

design and operation of RBMK reactors.

144 BYRON LEE, JR.

A number of U.S. industry representa-

tives participated in the post-accident re-

view meeting held in late August 1986 to

receive and analyze the Soviet written

report of the Chernobyl accident. We

conducted a significant amount of inde-

pendent analyses of the Chernobyl acci-

dent, which generally agreed with

analyses by our U.S. government agen-

cies and by foreign countries. We helped

write the U.S. “Report on the Accident

at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station”

(NUREG-1250) which was a joint report

prepared by the NRC, DOE, FEMA,

EPA, and two industry-sponsored organ-

izations, EPRI and INPO. Hundreds of

industry personnel have conducted brief-

ings for local, state, and federal officials,

as well as the general public, on the Cher-

nobyl accident.

The Industry Review Group on Cher-

nobyl prepared two documents: The U.S.

Nuclear Industry Position Paper on the

Chernobyl Nuclear Plant Accident in the

Soviet Union, and The U.S. Nuclear In-

dustry Plan of Response to the Soviet Nu-

clear Plant accident at Chernobyl, both

dated February 2, 1987. The “Position

Paper” reviewed the Group’s assessment

of the accident, including the conse-

quences and the causes of the accident,

and has been given wide distribution. Our

general conclusion was that the accident

was the result of significant design weak-

nesses coupled with several human factor

breakdowns by management and the op-

erators of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power

Plant. It was the consensus of the Group

that one cannot be separated from the

other, but that the ‘root cause’’ of the

event was design weaknesses.

As we became more familiar with the

Soviet RBMK reactor design, we recog-

nized how difficult it is to make direct

comparisons between the Soviet RBMK

and the U.S. LWR. The differences were

so great that a strong consensus began to

emerge from the technical experts in the

industry that this accident had little direct

relevance to U.S. light water reactors.

Nevertheless, we were committed to a

thorough search for any possible lessons

or insights. Our conclusions compared

well with the conclusions drawn by the

NRC, DOE, Congress, the national lab-

oratories, and the mainstream of the U.S.

scientific and academic communities. The

Industry Position Paper presented three

major conclusions that emerged from our

analysis:

1. The design and institutional differ-

ences between the Chernobyl-type,

water-cooled graphite reactor and

U.S. light water nuclear power plants

are so fundamental that the Soviet ac-

cident should not impact the processes

of design and regulation of U.S. nu-

clear reactors. The accident does point

up the importance of the emphasis that

the U.S. plants place on high quality

training and procedures, and strict ad-

herence to administrative controls.

2. The Chernobyl accident confirms U.S.

choices in nuclear technology, sup-

ported by our public regulatory pro-

gram. A very deliberate determination

was made at the foundation of the U.S.

nuclear industry that we could not

tolerate the same risks as other indus-

tries. From the beginning, conserva-

tive reactor plant and containment

designs, high safety standards, de-

fense-in-depth, and operating disci-

pline were imposed. Our record of

protecting the public is an affirmation

of our safety philosophy.

3. Comparisons made between the Soviet

accident and the less severe Three Mile

Island accident led to very important

observations. The TMI-2 accident

caused no physical harm to the public

or the plant’s workers, primarily due

to defense-in-depth design features in-

cluding a full containment. However,

the TMI-2 accident identified weak-

nesses in U.S. reactors and their meth-

ods of operation. Major industry-

initiated self-improvement efforts

were made as a result, which are con-

tinuing to this day.

As I mentioned, our group also pre-

INDUSTRY EVALUATION AND RESPONSE 145

pared a ‘Plan of Response”’ to Cherno-

byl. This document covered efforts

already taken and those that we believed

needed to be considered more thoroughly

by the industry for future action. You

should all recognize that the plan is a

roadmap for a comprehensive search for

lessons to be learned from Chernobyl.

Even though many of us had high confi-

dence in our own technology and stan-

dards of operation, we felt that as a

responsible industry we must undertake

our Own review to satisfy ourselves that

potential lessons were learned and ap-

plied.

The Plan is broken into three levels of

response. Level I covers the evaluation of

the accident and the identification of find-

ings. Many different industry organiza-

tions were asked to help complete the

reviews called for by the industry plan.

These efforts are proceeding well and are

essentially complete. ©

Level Ii addresses the challenges to

U.S. nuclear safety in light of the Cher-

nobyl experience. Most are not a result

of any specific findings from Chernobyl,

but more a result of issues raised by public

concerns, NRC, and the media following

Chernobyl. In addressing these chal-

lenges, the industry has conducted, and

will continue to conduct, a thorough

search as more information becomes

available for potential applications of the

Chernobyl experience to our reactors.

Our level II efforts are leading to con-

clusions that generally dovetail with ex-

isting safety initiatives. We are finding

that the lessons of Chernobyl either con-

firm actions already taken or add further

confirmation that ongoing efforts are ap-

propriate. No situation has been found

that indicates a blind spot in our own de-

signs, regulations, or operational prac-

tices. Rather, we are finding a few areas

that need to be reemphasized, repriori-

tized, and in some cases expanded to take

advantage of new insights.

These results appear to be completely

consistent with my reading of the NRC’s

recently released draft NUREG-1251:

“Implications of the Accident at Cher-

nobyl for Safety Regulation of Commer-

cial Nuclear Power Plants’’.

The NRC has concluded in their report

that ““No immediate changes are needed

in the NRC’s regulations regarding the

design or operation of U.S. commercial

reactors.”’ The NRC has also determined

that: ‘““The most important lesson is that

[Chernobyl] reminds us of the continuing

importance of safe design in both concept

and implementation; of operational con-

trols, of competence and motivation of

plant management and operating staff to

operate in strict compliance with controls;

and of backup features of defense in

depth against potential accidents.”

I agree wholeheartedly with those

statements and am confident that the en-

tire leadership of the nuclear industry

supports them also.

Level III of the Plan suggests an in-

creased participation by the U.S. industry

on the international nuclear scene. The

industry has been involved in interna-

tional activities through EPRI, INPO,

AIF, ANS, and individual company con-

tacts, but has had no comprehensive or

coordinated international program. It was

the consensus of our group that a more

coordinated and involved industry pres-

ence is required.

The Chernobyl accident has provided

this industry with a vivid case study in the

results of complacency in reactor opera-

tions and a reason to continually strive to

improve our operational performance. I

would like to briefly review for you some

of our actions to demonstrate our own

commitment to operational excellence.

To fully appreciate industry actions to im-

prove operational safety, we need to con-

sider briefly what has happened since the

TMI accident.

In the early days after TMI, the In-

stitute of Nuclear Power Operations

(INPO) and the Nuclear Safety Analysis

Center (NSAC) were created. The Sig-

nificant Event Evaluation and Informa-

tion Network (SEE-IN) program was

developed, and operating experience and

146 BYRON LEE, JR.

safety information was shared on the

‘Nuclear Network” electronic mail sys-

tem. INPO began setting standards of ex-

cellence in nuclear operations through a

variety of assistance, evaluation, and

monitoring programs.

The National Academy for Nuclear

Training was formed in September 1985.

Over 600 nuclear training programs were

completed at our operating nuclear plants

and made ready for accreditation by the

end of 1986.

The industry, through INPO, devel-

oped a set of performance indicators over

four years ago. The program was refined

in 1985, and ten overall indicators now

provide an important management tool

for monitoring plant performance. Trends

over that four year period show significant

progress by the industry in most of these

areas.

The utility industry has not rested on

its record and is looking to the future. It

has developed, with the help of EPRI,

nuclear suppliers and architect-engineers,

an advanced light water reactor program

drawing on our experiences that should

provide extremely safe standardized re-

actor designs available to meet the in-

creased base load demands of the mid and

late 1990’s. These designs emphasize op-

erational simplicity and human factors en-

gineering.

A detailed study of the industry’s ac-

tivities was initiated by the utility lead-

ership which resulted in the publication

in August 1986 of a report entitled ‘“‘Lead-

ership in Achieving Operational Excel-

lence: The Challenge for All Nuclear

Utilities,” better known as the “‘Sillin Re-

port.”’ The authors were three gentlemen

with vast experience in nuclear power—

Lee Sillin, Marcus Rowden, and Dennis

Wilkinson. The report proposed recom-

mendations in three. major areas:

1. Improving operational performance of

nuclear power facilities.

2. Improving the nuclear utility interface

with the NRC.

3. Establishing a unified nuclear utility

industry organization.

When the Sillin Report recommended

the establishment of a unified nuclear util-

ity industry organization that would in-

terface with the NRC, many in the

industry felt we already had the basic ele-

ment that was needed in the Nuclear

Utility Management and Resources Com-

mittee formed in 1984. For three years the

NUMARC executives had been interfac-

ing frequently with the NRC staff to iden-

tify areas in our industry where

improvements could be made. A positive

course of action had been taken on a num-

ber of issues. We believe that through this

process an increased sense of cooperation

and trust has developed between the NRC

and the industry. We view our new or-

ganization, the Nuclear Management and

Resources Council, as an opportunity to

build further upon the successes this pro-

cess has achieved.

The Nuclear Management and Re-

sources Council, retaining the acronym

“NUMARC,” was established to provide

a unified nuclear power industry ap-

proach on generic regulatory and tech-

nical issues. Our responsibilities include

coordinating the combined efforts of

licensee utilities, and other industry or-

ganizations that are NUMARC partici-

pants, in all matters involving regulatory

policy issues, and on the regulatory as-

pects of operational and technical safety

issues.

NUMARC serves as the industry’s

principal mechanism for conveying our

views, concerns, and policies to the NRC

and other government agencies as appro-

priate. We will also initiate industry self-

improvement efforts when deemed nec-

essary, and direct attention to and act on

regulatory issues the NRC considers im-

portant.

We carry out our responsibilities by

drawing upon the knowledge, operational

and technical experience, and safe oper-

ational responsibility of the entire nuclear

INDUSTRY EVALUATION AND RESPONSE 147

industry. We seek to improve the indus-

try’s effectiveness in developing and ana-

lyzing information concerning generic

regulatory technical and operational is-

sues and to improve the quality and con-

structive character of contributions made

by the industry to the evolution of regu-

latory analyses and decisions.

NUMARC must work closely with the

industry and with the NRC—the two ma-

jor repositories of nuclear operational

safety expertise—to further enhance the

industry’s pursuit of operational excel-

lence. NUMARC is dedicated to improv-

ing communications between the industry

and NRC. We believe very strongly in the

publicly controlled regulatory process.

We believe that process best serves the

public if the regulator and the regulated

industry treat each other with openness

and respect, and always exercise technical

objectivity. This formula has worked in

other U.S. industries and in the nuclear

industries of other nations such as France,

Japan and Canada. Here in Washington

this professional approach is periodically

branded as ‘“‘Coziness.”’ A few real or per-

ceived abuses of open communications

have preoccupied the thinking on the

NRC/industry interface to the exclusion

of the thousands of sound technical in-

terfaces that occur each year. They also

cause us to forget the overwhelmingly

positive safety and economic benefits to

the American people from a less adver-

sarial approach.

It is the same spirit of cooperation and

professional exchange that I wish to offer

to the medical and health physics com-

munity. Our industry respects the re-

sponsiveness and technical objectivity of

the U.S. experts on radiation health ef-

fects who have contributed to the body of

knowledge and public awareness since

Chernobyl. I would encourage you to

continue to help in the important effort

of educating the public and the media on

radiation health effects. The public needs

sound scientific estimates of the real risk

associated with radiation exposure. They

have become confused by bounding or

conservative upper limits. The public par-

ticularly needs help understanding the un-

certainty in health effects predictions for

very low doses of radioactivity to large

populations.

Much of the confusion and debate on

nuclear issues are not based on legitimate

technical arguments. In many cases, these

situations have been exacerbated by false

claims in the media that a Chernobyl-type

accident could happen at these reactors.

These situations have been exacerbated

by a lack of public understanding of the

nature and relative importance of radia-

tion health risks, and the level of emer-

gency planning in place in the U.S. in the

unlikely event of nuclear accident. The

future of the nuclear option will depend

on educating the non-technical policy

makers and the majority of the public on

the benefits and risks.

I think it is important that we focus our

educational efforts toward three groups:

first the broad medical community, par-

ticularly the younger generation of med-

ical students and professionals; second,

our public and private schools as they are

gearing up with renewed interest in the

sciences; and finally the media, who des-

perately need more expertise in this field.

I am optimistic about the future role of

nuclear power in this country. I believe

the nuclear option can be improved sig-

nificantly by improving the credibility of

the regulatory environment. That is one

of NUMARC’s objectives.

In closing, I would like to stress that

our industry has made a substantial in-

vestment in reviewing and assessing the

implications of the Chernobyl accident.

We have determined the responses

needed and are taking action toward im-

proving our operational performance. We

at NUMARC are dedicated to doing our

share. We must all work together to en-

sure the continued viability of nuclear

power in the energy needs of our nation.

Journal of the Washington Academy of Sciences,

Volume 78, Number 2, Pages 148-157, June 1988

Round Table Discussion:

Environment and Engineering

DENTON: Getting back to the new

dosimetry estimates from Hiroshima/Na-

gasaki, I was at the ICRP (International

Committee on Radiation Protection)

meetings in Lake Como last week, and

the new papers by Preston and Pierce

would indicate that the cancer risk from

that radiation probably will go up by at

least a factor of five. It may go up less.

It may go up more, but right now the

factor of five increase in cancer risk seems

to be where it is going. This would then

mean that the health effects to workers

in the field may have to be adjusted by

that factor of five; it may or may not be

that.

The last speaker, Mr. Lee, was saying

that in fact you now have excluded work-

ers from having in excess of 5 rem per

year, but there is still a reasonably large

group, I would think, perhaps 8 or 10 per-

cent of the tail of your population of ex-

posures, that may be getting between 1

and 5 percent. I think about 90 to 95 per-

cent get under 1 rem, if I’m not mistaken,

in the point of .6 or 600 mg.

These points may in fact require in-

creasing the safety components to still

lower than 1 to 5 rem exposure. Will in-

dustry be prepared to do so?

LEE: After all the technical experts in

the world analyze that information, and

if the conclusion is indeed that is a fact

and that the risk is considerably higher, I

think we will work on trying to reduce the

exposure limits at our facilities. As you

point out, for the vast majority of our

148

employees, the levels are extremely low

in comparison to the standards.

We have been working with the efforts

here to keep moving that down, and that

will continue to be our goal. But again,

this is where we have to rely on the ex-

perts. We have to avoid jumping into

doing things hastily before we have some

kind of a conclusion from the experts, but

I’m sure if that’s the fact, we will respond

accordingly.

DENTON: Dr. Wald, how do you see

that data? Would you like to comment?

WALD: I haven't really seen the data

either. I think it’s probably premature to

say what it will do.

KERR: Refresh my memory. I

thought I remembered that the BEIR III

reports (Committee on Biological Effects

of Ionizing Radiation of the National

Academy of Sciences) that we are still not

certain that a one-time exposure of 10 rem

has any significant harmful effects. Isn’t

that the case?

SPEAKER: BEIR III says the epide-

miological data cannot prove below 10

rem whether or not there is a cancer effect

because you don’t have a population size

large enough to make that study. BEIR

III also says there are three potential ways

of doing risk estimates: the linear, the lin-

ear quadratic, and the quadratic. BEIR

III chose the linear quadratic as its most

reasonable way of recommending risk es-

timates.

I think the present NCRP/ICRP risk

estimates—and I’m not sure now whether

ENVIRONMENT AND ENGINEERING 149

EPA adopts this—generally internation-

ally suggested that 1 rem of exposure had

a probability of inducing one cancer per

10,000 people, one rem exposure to a

population. What I’m saying now is—and

BEIR probably adopted a number of

about 1.7—that number is up by a factor

of five, if you look at the new dosimetry

data and recalculate the cancer incidence

in Hiroshima/Nagasaki. That is essen-

tially what Gil Beebe was referring to this

morning, but he didn’t have the final data.

KERR: It seems to me what you were

referring to is not really calculating the

risk estimates for large populations but,

rather, dealing with fairly small popula-

tions of people who work in nuclear

power plants. My next question was going

to be, if my memory was correct, and I

wasn’t sure it was, Is the next edition of

BEIR III going to make about that same

statement?

SPEAKER: BEIR V is now in prep-

aration. In fact, Arthur Upton is chairing

the BEIR V committee. It expects to have

its report completed, I believe, by Sep-

tember of 1989. So both BEIR V and the

newest UNSCR will be coming out within

six months of each other. They will have

this new data. But neither the BEIR com-

mittee nor the UNSCR Committee make

recommendations with respect to risk lim-

its. All they do is provide the risk esti-

mates that are used.

KERR: I recognize that, but it seems

to me, it’s one thing to predict estimates

of populations, which one does in deter-

mining risks to large populations, and it’s

another thing to deal with a fairly small

population of people in nuclear plants in

a situation in which, if I interpret the

BEIR III report correctly—and I may

not; I’m certainly not a radiation biolo-

gist—there is uncertainty as to whether

low levels of radiation have any significant

effect, which is what I am interpreting

that statement to mean.

SPEAKER: That is one interpreta-

tion. It is not the one that would be used

by most radiobiologists. I think we would

argue that the linear quadratic model best

fits the data, although we do not have a

population size that would permit an ep-

idemiological study at the levels of 10 rem

or below at this point.

KERR: I do not know what radiation

biologists use or what they use it for, but

when they tell me, as a possible user, ““We

don’t know whether 10 rems of exposure

to an individual has any harmful effect,”’

I guess I do not know what they mean if

they don’t mean that this has some sig-

nificance.

SPEAKER: I think you took that out

of context. They gave you a risk estimate

down below 10 rem. They give you a risk

estimate per rem, but say they cannot ac-

curately—which is obviously true—make

an estimate below 10 rem that they have

great confidence in. It could be zero. The

report that was just quoted by Marv Gold-

man on the DOE report says that the

number of cancers induced by Chernobyl

could equally be zero or 28,000. That

number now could go from zero to 85,000

with the new risk estimates, but very few

radiobiologists would accept the value of

zero, although it is not impossible.

YANIV: Shlomo Yaniv, Nuclear Reg-

ulatory Commission. As far as BEIR III

is concerned, BEIR III did not give risk

coefficients for single exposures below 10

rem or 20 exposures below 1 rem per year.

They made a statement which was in

BEIR I, repeated in BEIR III, that they

do not know whether the level of expo-

sure of those that are 100 mg per year are

detrimental or not.

With regard to Hiroshima/Nagasaki, I

have seen the Preston paper, and as far

as the dosimetry impact itself, it is de-

pending upon the RBE chosen for neu-

trone. It is on the order of two, not five,

based on the paper. That does not imply

that the risk coefficient that might come

out of the deliberation and combination

of the new radioepidemiological data and

the dosimetry might not be higher, the

reason being that it has to do with tem-

poral projection of risk beyond the period

of observation.

ICRP-26, which has a risk coefficient

150 ROUND TABLE DISCUSSION

of 1.25 times 10 to the minus 4 per rad in

little cancers is based upon absolute risk

projection UNSCR-77. A new UNSCR

already has come out, which basically en-

dorses a relative risk projection model.

The new radioepidemiological data sup-

port a relative risk projection model for

most of the solid tumors, and that, in com-

bination with a much higher relative risk

observed dose irradiated young in life,

will lead to a higher risk coefficient than

presently is given in ICRP-26.

HERN: John Hern. I have a question

for Byron Lee. I have read the Sillen

report. You talked a little bit about out-

liers, and as I recall the report, one of

the recommendations was that the

nuclear industry identified publicly

those outliers, those companies or plants

that really were not performing well.

What is the industry doing about that

recommendation?

LEE: That was one of the recommen-

dations of the report. That was considered

by the INPO Board, which I am not a

part of, and the INPO organization has

been re-reviewed several times. Their de-

cision is that at the present time, they

don’t think that is in the best interest of

the effort to achieve excellence.

We kind of beat ourselves very badly

in this country in the media as it is. The

old saying of taking somebody to the

woodshed and beating them works on a

rare occasion and in a really extreme case,

but I don’t think, the industry does not

think, INPO (Industrial Nuclear Power

Organization) does not believe, that is the

way to solve our problems; to expose to

the public who happens to be the worst

case.

Georgetown is a good example. The

worst student in the class obviously is

above the level to get in here, but he is

still the worst student. So you have to put

it in perspective, and it’s like this radia-

tion issue. The public does not read that

situation. The headline will be, this is a

plant that the industry thinks is bad. If

the industry thought it was bad, they

would take some dramatic actions, and

you would know about it if they thought

it was an unsafe plant.

DENTON: Perhaps some other panel-

ist would like to comment?

KERR: I cannot speak for the indus-

try, obviously, but one of the concerns I

have had about INPO—and I have asked

this question of INPO people on a num-

ber of occasions—is that I think they have

a good mechanism for identifying prob-

lems, but I have not been able to discover

a mechanism for dealing with recalcitrant

organizations. There may be one, and if

there is, I would feel better about INPO’s

influence.

SPEAKER: I don’t want to speak here

for INPO, but I will have Zach Peyton or

somebody else give you a contact on it. I

think there are mechanisms that are in

place to deal with it.

BRODSKY: Allan Brodsky, George-

town University. I would like to get back

to talking about something like prepara-

tions for something like Chernobyl or

TMI, along the line of what Neal Wald

alluded to this morning a little bit. In a

moment, I am going to introduce another

young friend, Dr. Ken Inn from the Na-

tional Bureau of Standards to say some-

thing along these lines because he wants

to talk.

Going back to the days of Three

Mile Island, and we have seen some of

the things after Chernobyl, there was a

clamor to find out how much radiation

exposure these people got, not only the

workers but the public. I have heard a lot

about, ‘“We don’t know what the doses to

the workers were at Chernobyl.” I think

we have a better handle on what the doses

to workers were at Three Mile Island, in

terms of the external exposures, because

they wear badges.

But I happen to know that in terms of

estimating internal exposures, we were

not prepared very well to examine what

happened to some of those people im-

mediately after the accident. You know

that Three Mile Island called in a whole

body count, two of them, about seven or

eight days after the accident, and it took

ENVIRONMENT AND ENGINEERING 151

them a little while to set up. One of them

got contaminated and had various cali-

bration difficulties.

This shows, in the event of this rare

incident of an accident in a nuclear power

plant, that people do clamor to know

what the exposures are in the first place,

before you estimate what the risk are. In

fact, how low are some of the exposures?

This is something we have to be able to

prove also.

Neal Wald alluded to the fact that you

have to do some planning for the internal

exposures months and years in advance.

I think he has to be given some credit for

that kind of insight 20 some years ago,

when he built a whole body count without

any funds from the nuclear industry. Be-

cause it was there, a number of very 1m-

portant radiation incidents were handled

without too much information in the news

media, among non-nuclear, but materials

facilities.

Although these things were rare, we

realize that they were important in con-

text, because each individual who gets

20,000 or 50,000 rem becomes a very im-

portant case. It’s important from both as-

pects, both to take care of the individual

and from the standpoint of the govern-

ment officials who were very interested

at that moment—they were all over the

place after each one of these accidents—

to be able to show that they were not only

concerned about the individual, but they

have been prepared to take care of that

individual and follow up appropriately on

each one of these cases.

] don’t want to over-emphasise this

matter because I also believe that the

probability of further accidents at nuclear

power plants injuring any member of the

public is extremely rare. But of course,

we believed that before Three Mile Is-

land, and it occurred. It turns out that

after Three Mile Island, one of our col-

leagues published articles saying that Dr.

Allen Brodsky, an expert from the Nu-

clear Regulatory Commission, has said

that the internal exposures of people

around Three Mile Island were 130 times

what they have reported. They were tell-

ing false information. I have copies of this

headline: The government may be lying.

Friends of mine called me up all over

the country and said, ‘‘Brodsky, are you

crazy, supporting that?’’ I said, ‘“‘He

didn’t even consult me before he pub-

lished that.”’ He pulled something out of

context from the literature, where I cal-

culated something for a full fission prod-

uct release. Seven or eight articles came

to me around the country about that. I

couldn’t refute it. First of all, the media

were not interested in publishing what I

said at the time. I had gotten on a couple

of programs, but that wasn’t adequate.

But more importantly, when I ran into

my colleague one day, he pulled out the

item he found, but there were no specific

measurements of the public that I could

use, if I had to, to show how low some of

these claims were. So it leads to a question

for Byron Lee.

In looking at the emergency planning

again, from the lessons learned at Cher-

nobyl, from the lessons learned at TMI,

did you look at the possibility that for a

relatively small sum of money compared

to what we have been spending on emer-

gency evacuation and planning and what

else, did you look at the possibility that

one could fund the training and the setup

of some centers, such as Neal Wald did

on his own, in at least a few places around

the country so they would be ready in case

another accident occurs?

LEE: That is one of the things that

Roger Linneman has been talking to the

industry about; some increased capabili-

ties to respond not to the public situation

but to the internal situation. I think there

is a possibility: We have all had in our

plans, the capability to respond to one,

two, or three individuals who were over-

exposed.

The question becomes, When you get

a combination of an accident—steam

burn situation is the most likely thing that

would occur in the plants, we think—and

low-level contamination, possibly, are we

capable of handling that? We are. The

152 ROUND TABLE DISCUSSION

industry has been taking a look at that. I

know he has looked at the possibility of

developing some major centers. But I

think the conclusion they came to is that

the capabilities already exist. There are

some major medical centers that are ca-

pable. You may disagree with that, but

the feeling was that there are.

In fact, I think Commonwealth Edison

was one of the first, with Dr. Bud Main,

to have a whole body counter at all of our

plants, probably way back in 1970 or

something like that.

SPEAKER: Neal, I think, was correct

in asserting that an accident the size of

Chernobyl would tax our medical system.

It’s remarkable how the Soviets were able

to assemble so many resources so quickly,

and he has made a number of proposals

to the government that, so far, have not

been acted upon, but that whole area is

always worth considering.

WALD: [’m Neal Wald, University of

Pittsburgh. The question of the medical

preparedness and the emergency prepar-

edness to deal with medical problems is

one that has, as Mr. Denton suggested,

been occupying us for quite awhile. Our

concern really is not with the Chernobyl

size population problem, because we do

agree that it is less likely because of our

reactor designs and our operations.

On the other hand, somewhere be-

tween the individual worker who is in-

jured at the plant and the 135,000 people

that are predicted—even if you follow

WASH 1,400 for some small or moderate

sized accidents. The problem that con-

cerns us is that if 50 people come to a

hospital for attention, and the hospital is

fully occupied, as they are, with their own

problems and their own commitments to

incoming patients, even though you think

you have in your plan, and every one of

the 105 operating reactors has a plan, we

are not quite sure that the reality behind

the plan is what we think it is.

We have been proposing to the NRC,

to FEMA, to the Department of Energy

that the database should be compiled. I’ve

never seen a listing by NRC of the 105

hospitals which are involved. I know you

could probably dig this out in the public

document room, but I don’t think we have

looked behind the paper to any great ex-

tent to see whether this is real.

I point out, hospitals have a liability

which requires them to take care of the

patients in house. The fact that a hospital

says it will handle a problem at a local

plant does not mean that it can, willy nilly,

dispose of the other patients or close

down the emergency room without being

at moral as well as legal risk. So the reality

of some of these things in our medical

system is a little different than it is in the

U.S.S.R.

I am not advocating changing the sys-

tem to accommodate this particular un-

likely problem, but I think we ought to

at least compile a database to see what

resources we really have in hand. I know

of several institutions which come to

everyone’s mind as being available. I also

know that the head of one of these be-

came professor emeritus at the beginning

of this month, and this kind of thing, as

I suggested in my talk, is going on. So

what is listed now as being available on

the basis of a look two or three years ago

may not really be there.

This is something we finally have been

talking to EPRI (the Electric Power Re-

search Institute) about, and I think EPRI

is interested in the possibility of pursuing

it. We will see.

SPEAKER: Dr. Wald is certainly cor-

rect that we don’t have the capability, and

almost heroic measures of this kind will

be necessary to get it to us. I would like

to hark back to the years 1950 to 1955,

when there was a very strong civil defense

effort in this country. It was policy to alert

hospitals to the requirements that radia-

tion cases be dealt with and to inform the

staff at hospitals how to do this and to tell

what facilities had to be acquired at hos-

pitals so as to take care of radiation cases

that might arise as a result of civil defense

requirements.

That was a period when this capability

that we see present in the Soviet Union

ENVIRONMENT AND ENGINEERING 153

now was present in the United States. The

Soviets were able to take care of Cher-

nobyl principally because they have never

relaxed in their civil defense efforts. They

have maintained training of a large corps

of physicians in civil defense activities as-

sociated with radiation injury, and drew

on this to a substantial extent.

Not only was this true in the medical

capability that they drew on, but the ac-

tual physical response to the cleanup pro-

cess took advantage of a great deal of

thinking which had gone into civil de-

fense. The activity that in fact was used

to restore the Chernobyl area to some

accessibility—to the degree that allowed

them to restart Chernobyl I and Cher-

nobyl II and to get ready to restart Cher-

nobyl III later this year—that massive

effort was incredible. It is something that

we, in this country, are not capable of

mustering on short order.

BURLEY: Gordon Burley, the Envi-

ronmental Protection Agency. I would

like to pursue this question of lessons

learned a little bit further. The general

consensus after Chernobyl seemed to be

that this was the type of accident that

just couldn’t happen with our types of

reactors. With the exception of some

Department of Defense reactors, that cer-

tainly seems to be true. However, Dr.

Kerr also indicated that there are some

things that we might want to look at out-

side of the hardware. One thing that

comes to mind is the commonality of hu-

man errors. What I would like to know

is, what has been done, in the light of

Chernobyl and all the other reactor op-

erating errors, to again look at this human

factor from the broader perspective of

preventing these major accidents?

SPEAKER: I guess I’m not so sure

how to respond to that very broad ques-

tion. All I can say is that since Three Mile

Island, that has been our major effort; to

look at improving the operating capabil-

ities, the capabilities of people to respond

to events beyond what we had normally

been training people for, to the emer-

gency cases, maybe not as far as some

people at this point believe we should.

That is still one area that we are looking

at and will have to look at.

When you say the commonality of

cause, I guess I am not sure what you are

talking about. Human error is something

that we understand is going to happen. I

think we don’t give any credit on the other

side for the human intervention. From an

old operating standpoint, I would say that

there are probably five cases where op-

erators have prevented something for

each case where they have caused some-

thing. You never hear about that. There

are all kinds of examples, like Brown’s

Ferry that he referred to, although not

that extreme, where operators have done

things.

People are ingenious, if they under-

stand the plant and the circumstances,

and you give them the ability to respond

and to act on their own, not to follow

prescriptions come Hell or high water. It’s

amazing what good, trained, qualified

people can do. That’s a key, and that’s

what we're trying to do: to get people to

better understand. One of the things they

looked at in one area, and they will look

at others, is symptom-based. It’s kind of

like the physician: don’t just have pre-

scriptive rules to follow; look at symptoms

and have enough knowledge to under-

stand or at least guess where you should

go from that.

INN: Kenneth Inn, National Bureau

of Standards. The Chernobyl incident

has sparked renewed radioactivity mea-

surements in Europe. The Radioactivity

Group at the National Bureau of Stan-

dards is interested in providing standards

which may make a positive contribution

to needs you see as necessary, given the

Chernobyl experience—for example, ra-

dioactivity in foodstuff standards.

I would like to ask the panel and the

audience for suggestions as to what kind

of standards you feel would be nice to

have, good to have, necessary to have, so

that we will be prepared in the future.

PUSKIN: Jerry Puskin, E.P.A. After

the Chernobyl accident, everyone might

154 ROUND TABLE DISCUSSION

recall that in Europe there was a lot of

confusion and inconsistency about levels

that should be allowed in food. Some

countries set their levels practically to

zero and others followed ICRP (Inter-

national Committee on Radiation Protec-

tion) recommendations. That got us to

thinking in this country too, because we

really didn’t have that much of a problem

here with respect to radioactive contam-

ination. The simplest thing to do was to

say, ‘““Let’s follow the FDA Protective

Action Guides,” which allowed, depend-

ing on the situation, one-and-a-half rem

or 15 rem to the thyroid and one-third of

that to the whole body.

That is a nice marker, but these guides

were devised for an accident that was

acute, in terms of it happened immedi-

ately and you don’t have too much time

to respond, and people have to eat. I

think both Chernobyl and TMI point up

the fact that nuclear accidents, and re-

leases particularly, often could be spread

over time and you have plenty of time to

respond. There may be cases where an

area has its milk contaminated to a level

which is lower than allowed by PAGs, but

people could very easily obtain other milk

which was essentially free of radioactive

contamination. It wouldn’t make sense

for them to drink that milk.

The FDA guides actually allow for this,

and the States have the ultimate respon-

sibility for setting these. There are States

like Oregon which recommended you not

drink the rain water at that time. We need

to think about setting levels, to use a dirty

word in some quarters, on a LARA type

of basis: we should set them as “‘low as

reasonably achievable” given the circum-

stances. We need better guidelines, de-

pending on the circumstances and how

acute it is, as to what is an acceptable level

of contamination in food and milk.

LEE: I guess I am not sure how you

apply ‘“‘as low as reasonably achievable”’

to an accident event, if that is what you

were inferring. From an industry stand-

point, again, I think we have to turn to

the experts in the field. We do need some

kind of a number that is a reasonable

number, that allows some safety factor in

it. But again, I think we have the public

confused.

We deal also in the electric utilities

business with PCBs and all of the other

toxic substances. It’s not just radiation.

It’s the same issue: what is a safe level?

I live southwest of Joliet. It’s in a very

high-limestone area. The radiation levels

in the wells there—I remember at our

Dresden II hearings, Meryl Eisenbud

came out and testified that what we ought

to do is spend our money working on the

well water in the town of Joliet, rather

than trying to take the squeal out of the

pig coming out of the plant.

I get a little thing in the mail that says,

‘Your water is above the safe guidelines

for radiation, but don’t be concerned.

We are working on it.” That, to me, is

crazy. I get that about every six months

from my water company because they are

required to do that. That is not the kind

of thing we need to do. I think we

have to do something better than that,

or the public is not going to believe any

of us.

SPEAKER: I would like to comment

a little further on the earlier question

about what is being done about human

contributions to risk, because I personally

think it is an extremely important ques-

tion. Indeed, I would say that perhaps if

we are going to make any significant

improvement in risk, I think the risk

is already clear, we probably should con-

centrate on that area rather than on

equipment.

If you will recall, most of the investi-

gating groups that looked at the TMI-II

accident did recommend that more em-

phasis be placed on human contribution.

The human contribution, as Byron has

said, can be both positive and negative,

and we don’t know very well how to de-

scribe it quantitatively. But experience

certainly does indicate that not only li-

censed operators but people who do

maintenance construction, people who

work throughout the plant can contribute

ENVIRONMENT AND ENGINEERING 155

both positively and negatively to a trou-

ble-free plant operation.

I am trying to speak in terms of the

industry, and I do not represent it very

well, but it seems to me that most of the

people involved in developing the nuclear

industry up to now have been people with

technical backgrounds—engineering, sci-

entific—and they therefore feel more

comfortable working on what one might

call scientific, technical or equipment

problems. They are not trained and do

not understand very well how to deal with

some of the human problems about which

we need to know more than we now know

in order to train people better, select peo-

ple better, motivate them better, manage

them better. All of those things clearly

contribute to not just safer but more

reliable and more economical nuclear

power plants.

Anybody who has seen power plants in

operation, who has observed a number of

them, who has compared them, knows

how important these things are. But very

few people, I think—maybe nobody—

has a good recipe that says, ““This is the

way you produce an organization that

does a good job.” I certainly don’t know

how to solve the problem, but I think we

need to give it continuing attention. It is

receiving some attention, both on the part

of industry and on the part of the regu-

latory agency. But from my view, the re-

sults are still rather sparse and the study

is in its infancy.

SPEAKER: I would say that in all of

these areas, the industry has put a lot of

emphasis in the last few years. It is a grow-

ing area. Human factors, before Three

Mile Island, was a hardly recognizable

term in this country. It has expanded and

grown considerably. EPRI and INPO are

working very diligently in those areas

trying to develop programs to meet the

concerns that Bill just expressed.

We talked about one of the responses,

I think, after Three Mile Island was in the

human factors area. If you had asked at

that point of time of the utilities, ‘““Did

you apply human factors engineering to

your control room?” the answer would

have been yes. That is true. We did. We

applied what was in those days human

factors terms, but we were applying it to-

ward normal operation as such. We had

not really thought about the transience

condition, and that was a major lesson

that was learned at Three Mile Island. A

lot of the instruments were behind the

board and around the corner, and they

weren't in a location that the operator or

the supervisor or some person could

quickly get a glimpse of the critical pa-

rameters that were required. That was a

major change that was made. ,

CONWAY: My name is Kathleen Con-

way. I am a sanitary engineer, and I ex-

pect that, given the illustrious and

experienced company in this room, I am

probably the closest thing you have to the

great unwashed public. I would like to

share a couple of experiences with you

and then address some of the comments

you made today.

In the early 1970s, I went for a tour of

the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant with a

group of engineers. To my great embar-

rassment, one of the engineers in the

group asked why you cooled the water

down after it goes through the blades of

the generator. My embarrassment at his

feeling the need to ask that question was

overwhelmed by my shock when the guy

from the power plant did not know the

answer. That was kind of a surprise to me.

I was sent for a health physics course

this spring. We had a mix in the class of

about one-third Canadians and two-thirds

Americans. Most of the people worked

at nuclear power plants. There were a few

people like myself who were coming in

for crash training. Most of them had been

working for years in your areas. I found

the discussions that the Canadians and the

Americans would have about how their

plants were managed and operated to be

simply fascinating.

The Canadians clearly were far more

interested in training. They would tell sto-

ries of having to go to six weeks of health

physics classes before people were al-

156

lowed to push a broom through the plant,

being five or six deep in the number of

people who could handle a particular job

at a plant. The Americans would tell sto-

ries that, although they had educational

requirements, they did not appear to be

as demanding. It struck me that they were

often only one or two deep for certain

tasks, often had to rely on traveling gypsy

bands of atomic workers. It seemed to be

a different situation.

In my work, I come across other risk

numbers. I don’t find the ones that you

present particularly frightening. I find

your comparison to the coal industry very

interesting. I find your track record as an

occupational group looks pretty good. I

think a lot of people in the public are

capable of looking at numbers, comparing

them, and deciding whether they look big

or not. I think they are also capable of

looking at people and saying, ““Would I

buy a used car from this person?”

I was not impressed at that power plant

when that spokesperson could not answer

a very simple question that really did not

even relate to nuclear operations but just

to the whole business of using steam to

drive a turbine. I was impressed by the

Canadians.

I would have been very impressed, Mr.

Lee, had you given Dr. Kerr’s speech. I

found some of the comments about the

confused public to be insulting. I am not

sure that when the public does not agree

with the position taken by an industry that

it is because the public is ignorant or con-

fused. I found Mr. Bradford’s arguments

very sympathetic. I know that this would

not be the place for you to be supporting

those arguments. I trust that there are

places where you can make some of those

arguments effectively.

I think if you are to restore the credi-

bility in this country of the technology

which actually holds promise—I mean,

the Canadians seem quite happy with it,

and the French seem quite happy with it,

and indeed, as I said, I was impressed by

the Canadians in this group—I think you

are going to have to consider some of the

ROUND TABLE DISCUSSION

things that Mr. Bradford said this morn-

ing and take a slightly different path. I

know this is a little bit off what you were

talking about earlier, but you had men-

tioned the public a number of times, and

I just thought I should give you that feed-

back.

SPEAKER: I was on a team that vis-

ited Canadian plants recently in an at-

tempt to become more international in

our outlook, and they do operate their

plants very well.

SPEAKER: I would be the last person

to try to justify ignorance as a recipe for

operating a nuclear plant or anything else.

Certainly, the accident at Three Mile Is-

land had as one of its major ingredients

a lack of understanding of the physics of

fluids associated with the way things were

going on in that plant. On the other hand,

I would like to point out that this is not

the only thing you have to take into ac-

count, and the Chernobyl] accident I think

was perhaps one of the strongest sources

of recognition of this point.

The Soviet attitude toward operators in

nuclear plants is extremely different from

that in the United States. It’s almost at

the opposite pole. To be an operator in

the Soviet Union, you have to be a li-

censed engineer. You are a graduate en-

gineer from a university. You go into an

apprenticeship program for five years be-

fore you can become a licensed operator

at a nuclear plant, and then you have to

pass the examination on your understand-

ing of the plant. After some additional

period—and I’m not sure what it is; I

think it’s something like three years—you

can advance to the next level of operator

in the nuclear plant, and so on up the

stage until you become a supervisor. It’s

a very strongly structured program to em-

phasize training and understanding of the

way things go on in these plants.

The Soviet scientists in Vienna last year

told us that this was the key to why the

accident actually took place. They said

these individuals thought they were so

good that they could do anything to that

plant and get away with it. They did do

ENVIRONMENT AND ENGINEERING 157

some things, and they didn’t get away

with it.

The only lesson I could draw at the mo-

ment is that you have to balance your

understanding of the plant with this con-

cept that we have pushed in the United

States, that Byron Lee talked so much

about, and that is defense in depth. De-

fense in depth is a management concept.

It is a technical concept. It’s a thing you

draw on to structure your defenses against

mistakes that people make, mistakes that

mechanisms make, and that still provide

you safety back-up when you get failures

of any of these kinds.

The difficulty that occurred at Cher-

nobyl was that there was not a defense in

depth. At least there was not a defense

solidly in depth, so that certain things

could happen and did happen to the

plant that could not be taken care of

by the structure of the plant. This is

the additional ingredient that I think cer-

tainly took care of Three Mile Island and

prevented widespread public disaster at

that place and, I would hope, would do

the same if we ever got into such a fix

again.

SPEAKER: Can I respond to one

comment that was made about the con-

fused public, versus the ones that disagree

with me. I did not consider the people

who disagree with me confused. I was

talking about the masses: people who do

not disagree with me or agree with me. I

was talking about what I think. We dealt,

in my business, with a lot of people. They

were all our customers, the 7 million peo-

ple. We met with them and talked with

them and did a lot trying to educate. That

is what I was basing it on, not the people

who disagreed with me.

STANGLER: Arnold Stangler from

FEMA. I just wanted to comment on the

medical services capability. As a result of

some Atomic Licensing and Safety Board

hearings, some Atomic Safety and Licen-

sing Board Appeal Board hearings, and

I believe a court decision involved U.S.

Guard versus NRC and SONG’s facility,

the San Onofrey Nuclear Generating Sta-

tion, there has been an effort over the last

nine months to reassess and reevaluate

and improve the medical capability at all

the operating plants.

I believe there is a requirement placed

on all utilities to respond roughly a month

ago with their assessment. This included

the requirement for a minimum of a pri-

mary hospital, one backup hospital min-

imum, and minimal medical and nursing

staff to handle radiologically injured as

well as contaminated individuals. All

State plans also have an annex that would

include the medical facilities. There is a

requirement for letters of agreement for

both the hospitals, the transportation ca-

pability with ambulances, et cetera. So I

think it would not be too much trouble to

look these annexes up and assess the num-

ber of facilities.

In the case of the San Onofrey facility,

I believe there is like a dozen hospitals

within 15 miles but outside 10 miles of the

nuclear power plant that have letters of

agreement and have agreed to take care

of injured personnel.

SPEAKER: As part of our program—

I cannot speak for all of the programs—

we did work with those hospitals at least

once a year to review the programs. It

really was a training, drill kind of a pro-

gram that we went through.

STANGLER: Right. There is a re-

quirement for an annual medical drill,

minimum, for each hospital also.

Journal of the Washington Academy of Sciences,

Volume 78, Number 2, Pages 158-166, June 1988

Fear and Trembling and The Dog

That Didn’t Bark:

Policy and Science

Keynote Address

John F. Ahearne

Vice President, Resources for the Future, Washington, DC 20036

I. Introduction

I start by quoting from an economist:

‘. . .Pd just like to offer a few thoughts

about the future, looking ahead. . . .I see

the potential of big changes coming about

in the future. . . .there are smart people

everywhere. And there are people all

over this world that are working very hard

along with their smarts. So that this

spread of capability and capacity is going

to change the structure of the world econ-

omy and the strategic situation, and we

have to try to understand it. There is, I

think, a gigantic amount of change in

technology to go with this. . . .It’s acliche

to say that it’s a small world but it is a

small world. We are a big part of it. There

is no way that we can, once again, as we

did after World War I, sort of remove

ourselves from the world—it is impossi-

ble. The only question is how effectively

are we going to engage. . . .And one of

my fears right now is that somehow as we

look at all of the difficulties and some of

©Resources for the Future, 1987

158

the things that you have brought out that

there will be a tendency for people to

throw up their hands and say, ‘Stop the

world. I want to get off.’ We can’t get off,

we have to be engaged.”

Those are final remarks of Secretary of

State Schultz, at the recently completed

Iran/Contra hearings.’ I think they char-

acterize the view of many people that

technology is here, it is changing our life,

it is changing the world. My comments

address what role will technologists have?

This evening I wish to address a range

of attitudes about technology. I will focus

on what has been called the hazards, or

risks, of technology.

By the phrase “‘policy and science,” you

should suspect that I am concerned

whether policy and science go together. I

believe they can, but often they conflict.

Tonight I will address some problems in

the application of science to policy in gen-

eral, and to radiation safety policy in par-

ticular.

I speak as one who has had the advan-

tage and the disadvantage of spending al-

most twenty years in Washington. This

POLICY AND SCIENCE 159

city has been described as a bottleneck

for information. The government and its

associated support groups produce vol-

umes, tons, of information, much of

which does not seem to pass beyond the

local area (usually described here as “‘in-

side the Beltway’). The other difficulty

is that the vast amount of knowledge,

opinions, concerns, outside the Beltway

seldom seem to penetrate effectively into

Washington. The bottleneck works both

ways.

I will make three principal points to-

night. First, I will remark on a particular

argument in the area of technological risk,

how safe is safe enough. Second, policy

in the area of technology is strongly af-

fected by three major groups. I will de-

scribe at length one of the groups and

some of the concerns I have with them.

And third, how can technologists become

more effective in developing policy, or

affecting policy? My comments are in-

tended to apply more broadly than to ra-

diation safety policy. I intend them to

apply across the spectrum of technologi-

cal safety issues currently being addressed

in the United States.

Before I go much farther, I will identify

the sources of my title. I have taken it

from two literary allusions. Fear and

Trembling is the title of a book by Kier-

kegaard, a Danish philosopher writing

in the mid-nineteenth century.” The book

is based on a subject—appropriate at

Georgetown—from the Bible, the Old

Testament: how far can faith take a be-

liever. The second is from a story by Ar-

thur Conan Doyle, ““The Adventure of

Silver Blaze.’

II. How Safe is Safe Enough?

A debate that has particular signifi-

cance to this conference’s topic is on the

question: How Safe is Safe Enough? In

recent years, the EPA has tried to apply

cost-benefit analysis to answer this ques-

tion for some of the activities regulated

by that agency. This approach has been

criticized on many grounds, including the

inappropriateness of applying economics

to safety, the absence of ethical consid-

erations, and an over reliance upon tech-

nical experts.

However, economics as a conceptual

approach is based on rational analysis.

Economic analysis does use what are

called utility functions. But it is incorrect

to infer that such a definition of utility is

restricted to what can be bought and sold.

Utility can include non-market goods,

such as the value of unsullied mountain

slopes, clean air at the Grand Canyon,

and other environmental amenities. It can

also include what might be called psycho-

logical satisfaction.

Some discussions imply a confusion be-

tween technology and the application of

technology. This leads to the argument

that a technology is unethical. Most tech-

nology is neutral. I grant there are ex-

ceptions: most would grant that poison

gas is ethically negative. But usually, eth-

ical issues are introduced in addressing

how technology is used, under what con-

straints or controls, but not the technol-

ogy per se. The aspect of the debate which

directly involves the role of the technical

expert involves a specific issue, that un-

derlies all Federal safety regulation: What

is an acceptable risk, or, how safe is safe

enough?

This issue has been argued for decades.

In a famous—to those in risk analysis—

series of papers in 1975, published in The

George Washington Law Review, Harold

Green, an eminent jurist, and Philip Han-

dler, a research biologist then president

of the National Academy of Sciences, en-

gaged in a discussion of—in Green’s

term—the risk-benefit calculus used in

safety determinations.* The debate is over

ten years old—but is still fresh.

Green wrote:

‘‘Whether or not something is accept-

ably safe usually requires consideration of

two aspects: an identification of potential

injury and an assessment of the quantum

of injury, and an identification of poten-

tial benefits and an assessment of their

magnitude and importance... .

160 JOHN F. AHEARNE

‘Scientists and engineers have an im-

portant role to play in the making of

safety determinations. Representatives of

these disciplines are obviously better

equipped than others to identify and

quantify potential risks and to identify po-

tential benefits.’’ Here, Green hits on the

sore point for experts. “It is questionable,

however, whether they have special com-

petence to quantify benefits in a manner

that can be regarded as authoritative in

the formulation of public policy. No elite

group of experts, no matter how broadly

constituted, has the ability to make an

objective and valid determination with re-

spect to what benefits people want and

what risk people are willing to assume in

order to have these benefits.”

Handler countered: “The principal dif-

ference between my approach to the sub-

ject of ‘safety’ and ‘risk’ and that of

Professor Green is that I insist on quan-

tification wherever possible whereas Pro-

fessor Green appears more comfortable

with ‘perception,’ ‘values,’ ‘order of

safety,’ ‘judgment,’ etc. This is made ex-

plicit, for example when [Professor

Green] states that ‘safe is rarely defined

in the real world in terms of a one-in-a-

million chance of an accident, except,

perhaps, as a standard for assessment

chosen by experts.’ ’’ Handler then asks:

“What other choice is there?”

“. . .government regulation of techni-

cal products and processes must rest on a

rational and sufficient scientific base.

Everyone has gained heightened aware-

ness of the natural and man-made hazards

to our environment. Governmental reg-

ulations or programs intended to combat

those hazards must, as a minimum, rest

on detailed appraisal of the nature and

magnitude of those risks, of the monetary

and other costs of measures intended to

reduce the severity of each risk, and of

the nature and magnitude of the benefits

involved in the process or product under

consideration. If those in public office

choose to flaunt such data, let that then

bevlear.

Green had a different conclusion:

“Even though a scientist may not regard

a safety determination as incorrect, he

feels uneasy. . .when the decision is not

rooted in an assessment of soundly pre-

sented scientific fact. In this view, where

the ultimate decision turns upon scientific

questions, scientific fact should dictate

the ultimate decision, or, at the very least,

should define the factual predicates on the

bases of which value conflicts are re-

solved. To the lawyer and the politician,

on the other hand, facts (including sci-

entific facts) exist to be used selectively

and with variable weight as tools for fram-

ing positions in an adversary context and

for making decisions of a practical, utili-

tarian nature. To the scientist, truth, ob-

jectivity, and accuracy are the ultimate

desiderata; to the lawyer and the politi-

cian, the ultimate goal of public policy

decision-making is the optimum resolu-

tion of conflict, and achieving this goal

may require the symbolic acceptance of

something as true which in fact is untrue

or only partly true. This is not to say that

truth is or should be cynically sacrificed

at the altar of expediency; it is merely to

recognize that decision-making in a dem-

ocratic society almost always involves

compromising, and temporizing, and

therefore error, and that a democratic so-

ciety can tolerate error in the expectation

that ultimately truth will pre-

vail. . . .Scientists are newcomers to the

area of public policy decisionmak-

ing. . .and [must] develop the capability

of functioning within the institutional

framework in a manner consonant with

the basic principles of our forms of dem-

ocratic society.”’

The Green-Handler debate has not

been resolved, and technologists are

still uncomfortable in public policy

debates.

The groups most influential in deter-

mining public policy in the area of hazard

management are technologists, man-

agers, and concerned citizens. Here I will

address the first.

POLICY AND SCIENCE 161

Ill. Technologists

I will describe weaknesses in the ap-

proach many in this group now take, but

in a short talk I can only sketch the prob-

lems. In my concluding remarks, I will

describe how scientists and engineers can

better affect the policy process.

I want to separate the general body of

scientists, engineers and technologists

into three subgroups:

(1)those who really know science and

technology, (2) those who know a lot but

are not experts, and (3) those who op-

erate high technology systems but do not

really understand the technology they are

using.

A. The first group contains those who

really do know the science or the tech-

nology—the true experts. Unfortunately,

many cannot communicate their knowl-

edge. They are not able to reduce their

discussion to a level that can be translated

by the media or understood by lay people.

In some cases, this lack of communication

is not due to an inability, but rather to a

belief that it is not worth their valuable

time. Perhaps there are none such here

tonight, but I have met scientists who be-

lieve that writing for the general public is

a waste of their time, that it is of little

professional benefit, and that it also does

little good. However, in the area of haz-

ards and management of risks, it is critical

for the experts to take time to commu-

nicate well. Doing so reduces the possi-

bility and, for complex issues, the high

probability, that technical accuracy will

be lost in the translation to lay language.

In addition, there is a point made by Rob-

ert Samuelson: “It is not an onerous re-

quirement that when writing about risk

assessment to make the assessment intel-

ligible to the people who might be ex-

posed to that risk.”’

I grant that many good scientists do try

hard but have difficulties dealing effec-

tively with the media. Many scientists cor-

rectly are reluctant to say more than they

know. Journalists have a tendency to treat

this as equivocation, and so describe it to

the public. Many lay people believe that

when a scientist refuses to be definitive,

it is equivocation, or, at least, indicates

the scientist does not know much about

the area. Many lay people believe that if

you know something, you should be pos-

itive about it. Unfortunately, what a sci-

entist can be positive about is often not

what the lay person is interested in. This

is a difficulty that will face all technolo-

gists who try to deal with the media. I

encourage you to be patient with this

problem, and to work with the media. I

have found that most representatives of

the media are willing to take the time to

try to understand what you are describing,

if it is obvious that you are making an

effort to help them understand.

My hypothesis is that when an expert

is not communicating effectively, that

usually is due to inability or unwillingness.

There are other reasons that I will men-

tion in connection with my second sub-

group.

B. The second sub-group of technol-

ogists are those who are well-informed

about the science and technology, but do

not really have a complete understanding.

They are not what we would call experts.

Unfortunately, they often believe they

are. These take a paternalistic or mater-

nalistic attitude towards the public: ‘“‘Par-

ent Knows Best.”

This subgroup can be split into two fur-

ther subgroups: Those believing the so-

lution is education, and those believing

the solution is trust. I recognize there are

many experts who will also fall into these

categories in the sense that they share the

problems that I will now identify.

(1) Those who believe the problem is

education. Their attitude is that if only

the public were educated, they would

agree with us. Although I do not imply

Chauncey Starr does not fully understand

technology—he is an expert—many of

Starr’s writings have this flavor. They im-

portune the public to understand. Starr

was one of the first to attempt to classify

162 JOHN F. AHEARNE

what he would probably call true risks and

to rank such true risks relative to each

other. This approach has not been aban-

doned, and was recently demonstrated in

an article by Bernard Cohen in which he

criticized what he sees as the irrational

spending on cost per life saved in the

United States. He wrote, “With any rea-

sonable consideration. . .we are spending

the equivalent of innumerable billions of

dollars per life saved in our radioactive

waste management programs.” He also

estimated that “. . .[the] NRC program

of regulatory racheting [has led to] . . .an

average of at least $1.6 billion extra [for

each nuclear plant], for a total cost of

$100 billion in an effort to save. . .fifty

lives.”’ He then commented, ‘“‘Why is this

insanity taking place?. . .the problem is

that public concern is driven by media

coverage rather than by rational scientific

analysis. The media have driven the pub-

lic insane over the fear of radiation and

of nuclear power accidents.’

The attempt to address risk manage-

ment by ranking risks from different haz-

ards has led to an attempt to define

acceptable risk. I can sympathize with this

attitude. For many years, I shared it.

When I was on the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, I tried to get the National

Academies to undertake a study of the

comparative risks of coal and of nuclear

power, believing that the development of

an objective view by a credible organi-

zation would significantly help the debate

on the risks of nuclear power. However,

I am now shifting to agree with the po-

sition of some who have concluded, ‘‘The

acceptable risk formulation has provided

increasingly elaborate and precise an-

swers to the wrong question.’’’ It is the

wrong question because it is not linked to

participation by and dialogue with the

concerned public.

A similar conclusion, that education is

necessary to resolve risk controversies, is

seen in a recent study examining whether

the sources of environmental conflict can

be explained by the characteristics and

views of the participants in the conflict.

The researchers polled a variety of people

as to what are the most important causes

of environmental conflict. Nearly three-

quarters of those polled labeled “‘public

misunderstanding”’ as a major source. But

those polled did not agree on what the

public did not understand. The respon-

dees whose educational background was

in “hard expertise [viewed] environmen-

tal conflict as scientific rather than polit-

ical, while those. . .individuals educated

in the humanities or social sciences reject

knowledge differentials as a major source

of controversy. . . .Physical scientists, as

expected, endorsed knowledge differen-

tials, and reject value differences.’’®

As a technologist, I must admit I do

lean towards what may be a biased in-

terpretation of those results. I read the

results as showing that those who

understand technology see the conflict

being between those who understand

technology and those who do not. How-

ever, those who do not understand tech-

nology, do not see understanding as

important. Unfortunately, this is a weak-

ness, I believe, in many non-technol-

ogists, t.e., they <do’ not +believe

understanding the technology is impor-

tant to understanding risks of technology.

I will return to this point.

These attitudes can also be seen in nu-

clear industry comments on the TMI and

Chernobyl accidents. I ascribe this indus-

try attitude as seeing the accidents as the

“dog that didn’t bark.’ You may recall

that in the Sherlock Holmes’ story,

Holmes commented that the unique fea-

ture that led him to the solution of the

case was that the dog didn’t bark.’

Some of the nuclear industry have

pointed to TMI and Chernobyl in a sim-

ilar way. Three Mile Island destroyed a

major reactor. It nearly bankrupted a

major company. The cleanup has been

underway for nine years, is still not

completed, and the costs of cleanup will

be about a billion dollars. But the health

studies done by the Pennsylvania State

Department of Health and the United

States Health and Human Services De-

POLICY AND SCIENCE 163

partment indicate there were no signifi-

cant adverse physical health effects as-

sociated with that accident and there are

unlikely to be many. The Chernobyl! nu-

clear accident, the worst accident known

at a power plant, led to thirty-two deaths,

several hundred people hospitalized, and

a high radiation exposure to many thou-

sands of the Soviet public. Nevertheless,

the immediate deaths in the surrounding

vicinity were much less than estimated by

some previous studies from such a mas-

sive release of radiation. Consequently,

some members of the nuclear industry

have said TMI showed how well-built re-

actors are and Chernoby] showed that the

worst accident would not be a calamity.

In other words, the dog didn’t bark. This

argument, while perhaps scientifically

correct, should not lead to the conclusion

that nuclear power is now acceptable. The

flaw in the conclusion is that it avoids ad-

dressing the public. And therefore, I in-

cluded this attitude in the category: if the

public were only educated, they would

agree with us.

(ii) The second subgroup are those

whose attitude is “‘trust me, I know best.”

This is characteristic of the approach that

the U.S. Federal government has taken

to deciding the location for nuclear waste

sites, starting with the Atomic Energy

Commission approach in Kansas, contin-

uing with the Energy Research and De-

velopment Administration approach in

the Midwest, and now seen for many

years with the Department of Energy.

This has led the chairman of a mid-West

compact commission to describe the cur-

rent situation for the case of low-level ra-

diation waste siting as “the lines are

clearly drawn: it is a battle between the

technocrats and the public over whose

values the technology will ultimately re-

flect.”’'° “Trust me”’ is still used as the

principal answer to ‘‘why are you doing

that?”

Nuclear power has been afflicted with

this approach. Many early advocates of

nuclear power convinced electric utility

executives of the advantages of nuclear

power. These executives went ahead—

aggressively—with ambitious nuclear

programs. Much to the chagrin of later

executives, who have found public op-

position being reflected in adverse public

utility commission rulings on rates. The

latest trials facing such utility executives

are prudency hearings. Essentially these

are public utility commissions examining

many years after a plant construction be-

gan whether the electric utility was wise

to have built the plant. Frequently, the

commission decides ‘“‘no,’’ and conse-

quently the rate payers do not get charged

for the plant. The President of the Edison

Electric Institute earlier this year said,

“Technology was the Siren who beckoned

us to nuclear power—power that was sup-

posed to be too cheap to meter but turned

out to be too expensive to bill.’’'! Thus it

is not only the general public who are now

skeptical of technologists who present an

argument based on “trust me, I know

best.”

C. The third technology group are

those who are engaged in operating high

technology systems without really under-

standing them. Perhaps these should not

really be characterized as technologists,

but for the purposes of this talk I am

lumping large groups of people into sim-

ple structures. In some cases, people in

this group have had significant technical

training, while in others, part of their

problem is they have had too little. But,

nevertheless, they use and therefore are

strongly associated with high technology

systems. The major weakness repre-

sented in this group is complacency.

Complacency can be reflected in many

ways: a lack of recognition by manage-

ment that increased attention need be

given to technologies which have the po-

tential of serious consequences; inade-

quate attention by operators, based upon

a belief that the technology is so well de-

veloped that monitoring is not really

needed; a belief it is not important to un-

derstand the technology; and a lack of

attention to mundane matters, such as

regular maintenance.

164 JOHN F. AHEARNE

Aircraft accidents and near accidents

have been attributed to complacency in

the cockpit. These include a 1978 crash

of a DC-8 in Portland, Oregon, when the

plane ran out of fuel. The plane circled

the airport while the crew tried to solve

a landing gear problem. The flight engi-

neer mentioned the plane was running out

of fuel, but apparently the captain and

co-captain did not hear, or did not react

to the message, and the plane crashed.

In 1978, a plane crashed three miles short

of landing in Pensacola, Florida. An

automatic warning device for rapid

descent sounded, but was disarmed by

the crew, which continued the descent

to impact. This complacency could also

be seen in the airline pilot who cut all en-

gines during a recent takeoff from Los

Angeles International Airport. The most

recent example, which has not yet been

resolved, is the apparent failure of the

crew in Detroit to extend flaps during

takeoff.”

The Challenger shuttle disaster led to

a major review chaired by William Rog-

ers.'° The report makes interesting read-

ing for those concerned with the effect of

complacency. The complacency problems

surfaced between the lower levels of

NASA and its contractors and the top of

the agency.

The Rogers report described the pres-

sures on NASA which followed the an-

nouncement that the shuttle was fully

operational. The Rogers report states:

“From the inception of the shuttle,

NASA had been advertising a vehicle that

would make space operations ‘routine

and economical.’ The greater the annual

number of flights, the greater degree

of routinization and economy, so heavy

emphasis was placed on the _ sched-

ule???

"’. . .resources were strained to the

limit, strained by the flight rate itself and

by the constant changes it was forced to

respond to in that accelerating sched-

nlese.

‘“. . .arguing in support of the space

station [in September, 1983], [NASA

Administrator] Beggs said, ‘We can

start anytime. . . .the shuttle is now op-

erational.’ ’’'®

However, ‘“‘according to Astronaut

Henry Hartsfield:

‘Had we not had the accident, we

were going to be up against the

wall. . . .somebody was going to have to

stand up and say we have got to slip the

launch because we are not going to have

the crew trained.’!””

‘“As [Shuttle] Program Manager, Ar-

nold Aldridge reported to the Commis-

sion: *. . .intentional decisions were made

to defer the heavy buildup of spare parts

procurement in the program so that the

funds could be devoted to other, more

pressing activities...”

“Those actions resulted in a critical

shortage of serviceable spare compo-

nents. To provide parts required to sup-

port the flight rate, NASA had to resort

to cannibalization. Extensive cannibali-

zation of spares. . .became an essential

modus operandi in order to maintain

flight schedules.”’®

Thus, underlying the problems that

led to the Challenger disaster, was sim-

ply a disbelief that this technology was

really hazardous—complacency by

those who did not really understand

their system. Many reports on the

Three Mile Island accident showed that

a lack of operator understanding was a

precipitator of the accident. With ap-

propriate understanding by the opera-

tors the accident probably would never

have happened.

Similarly, the reviews of the Chernoby]

accident illustrate the complacency which

had afflicted the crew of this plant, be-

cause it had been operating so well. The

judge who recently sentenced the plant

director to ten years in a labor camp said,

“There was an atmosphere of lack of

control and lack of responsibility at the

plant,” adding that “workers on duty

played cards and dominoes or wrote let-

tesa

POLICY AND SCIENCE 165

IV. Conclusion

What can be done if anything to address

these problems. I will only speak to tech-

nologists and scientists, because I believe

they are the heart of the problem. Now,

what can they do:

1. They can understand the technology

that they deal with. They should be

alert to surprises. Anyone growing up

with an understanding of the many sci-

entific discoveries that were the result

of intelligent observation of experi-

mental accidents should not misun-

derstand that lesson.

2. They must be alert for signs of com-

placency.

3. They should listen and discuss with the

public. It is the public’s lives that will

be affected. It is both right and, since

we are in a democracy, the only con-

stitutionally valid approach to use.

And, you may learn something impor-

tant. Uneducated does not mean not in-

sightful.

This listening must be a true dialogue.

Public hearings should be hearings, not,

as was recently mentioned in a description

of a New York City Board of Estimates’

meeting, only “‘public talkings.”’

4. You should push for competence in

government. You understand technol-

ogy. You should not allow superficial

treatments of technology to pass for

understanding on the part of govern-

ment officials. Scientists involved in

making science policy, however, often

have not demanded competence on

the part of government officials.

Worse, they themselves demonstrate a

willingness to use less than their nor-

mal standards of professional behav-

ior. Harvey Brooks pointed out:

“Scientists inexperienced in the polit-

ical arena, and flattered by the unac-

customed attentions of men of power,

are often inveigled into stating their

conclusions with a confidence not war-

ranted by the evidence and. . .not

subject to the same sort of prompt cor-

rective processes that they would be if

confined within the scientific commu-

nity.”’°

5. In the U.S. all controversial issues

seem to end up in court. ““Expert”’ wit-

nesses proliferate—and disagree,

often strongly. I believe that we should

establish a system of “friend of the

court.’’ The professional societies,

American Chemical Society, Ameri-

can Physical Society, etc., should de-

velop pro bono experts. A panel from

the Society could use consensus agree-

ment to address issues that courts need

addressed. These ‘“‘friends of the

court” should be paid through the

court system. Then if in a significant

court hearing a scientist is needed to

address a scientific issue, or an engi-

neer is needed to address a technical

issue, one of these friends of the court

would appear to discuss the scientific

or technical issues. If a scientist or an

engineer wanted to appear for one of

the sides in the case, the technologist

could not appear as an “expert” wit-

ness, but as an ‘‘advocate”’ witness.

This would address a major reason for

a growing disbelief on the part of the

public in what scientists and technol-

ogists say.

The public is not fooled by the disputes

between scientists, or expert witnesses.

Rather they are beginning to become

skeptical of the objectivity of science and

technology. A recent controversy with re-

gard to whether the large funds spent on

cancer research have done much good led

to charges being thrown back and forth,

heating up the pages of Science and the

general press. Daniel Greenberg wrote

about this controversy: ‘““‘When scientists

become abusive, pay attention. The de-

parture from professional decorum means

something important is at stake.’””!

We scientists and technologists have

not been much help in developing rational

166 JOHN F. AHEARNE

policy in the areas of hazards. We share

significant responsibility for what Bill

Clark has described: ‘‘Society’s attitudes

towards risks such as cancer and nuclear

reactors are not readily distinguishable

from its earlier fears of the evil eye.”’”

Each time a technological disaster oc-

curs, TMI, Challenger, Bhopal, Cher-

nobyl, meetings like this one are held.

Unfortunately, the general descriptions

of the problems and the recommended

solutions are uncomfortably similar.

Progress is not our most important

product.

References Cited

1. Schultz, George P., testimony, Iran-Contra

Hearings (pp. 51-1 to 55-1 transcript text). July

24, 1987 (pm).

2. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, Penguin

Books, Ltd., 1985, p. 18.

3. In the Complete Illustrated Sherlock Holmes,

Arthur Conan Doyle, Castle Books, Secaucus,

New Jersey, 1977.

4. Green, H. “The Risk-Benefit Calculus in Safety

Determinations,” 43 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 791,

pp. 796-807 (1975). Handler, P. “A Rebuttal:

The Need for a Sufficient Scientific Base for

Government Regulation,” 43 Geo. Wash. L.

Rev. 791, pp. 808-813 (1975).

5. ““A Reporter’s and Father’s Perception of

Risk,” The Colloquium by and for Regulatory

Analysts,” 24 March 1986, Washington, D.C.

6. “Insanity in Action; Reducing the Hazards of

Nuclear Power,” Bernard L. Cohen, Physics

and Society, Volume 16, No. 3, July 1987.

7. “Beyond Acceptable Risk: On the Social Ac-

ceptability of Technologies,” Harry J. Otway

and Detlof von Winterfeldt, Policy Sciences 14

C1982) Spe 255:

8. “Defining Conflict as a Means of Legitimizing

Resources,” Thomas Dietz, Paul C. Stern, and

Robert W. Rycroft, unpublished manuscript,

July 1987.

9. ‘“‘Inspector: Is there any other point to

which you wish to draw my attention? [ Holmes],

‘‘To the curious incident of the dog in

the nighttime.’’ [Inspector] “‘The dog did

nothing in the nighttime.” “‘That was the

curious incident,” remarked Sherlock Holmes.

(pp. 196-197) ‘‘. . .significance of the

silence of the dog... he had not barked

enough. . .” (p. 199). ‘““The Adventure of Sil-

ver Blaze,” op cit.|

10. “Issues in Radioactive Waste Management,”

Clark W. Bullard, Chairman, Central Midwest

Compact Commission for Low Level Radioac-

tive Waste Management, Oak Ridge National

Laboratory, April 30, 1987, p. 13.

11. Speech by Jerry Geist, 55th Annual EET Con-

vention, June 8, 1987.

12. “Automation, Routine Can Produce Cockpit

Inattentiveness,” Douglas B. Feaver, Washing-

ton Post, 8/23/87, p. Al.

13. Report of the Presidential Commission on the

Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, June 6, 1986,

Washington, D.C.

14. Ibid, p. 164.

15. Ibid, p. 164.

16. Ibid, p. 165.

17: Ibid, *p. 170:

18. Ibid, pp. 173-4.

19. “Chernobyl Officials are Sentenced to Labor

Camp,” The New York Times, July 30, 1987, p.

AS.

20. H. Brooks, “‘Expertise in Politics: Problems and

Tensions,’ Proceedings, American Philosophi-

cal Society, 119: p. 259, 1975.

21. Quoted in The Public Interest, No. 88, Summer,

1987, p-sloke

22. ‘““Witches, Floods, and Wonder Drugs,” Wil-

liam C. Clark, R-22, Institute of Resource Ecol-

ogy, University of British Columbia, January,

19807 pail

Journal of the Washington Academy of Sciences,

Volume 78, Number 2, Pages 167-172, June 1988

The Media’s Coverage of

Radiation Risks

David M. Rubin

Center for War, Peace and the News Media, New York University,

New York, NY 10003

In 1979, I was the head of the Task

Force on the Public’s Right to Know for

the President’s Commission on the Ac-

cident at Three Mile Island. One of the

opportunities of that experience was that

I had a chance, with my group, to practice

journalism with subpoena power. I have

practiced journalism with subpoena

power, and journalism without it. Let me

tell you, having subpoena power is the

only way to go, if you can get it. But it’s

the only time I’ve had it.

As a result of the Three Mile Island

experience, I was able to reach some ten-

tative conclusions about why mistakes

were appearing in the news media during

the first really difficult week of that ac-

cident. We examined what utility officials,

the NRC officials, and state government

officials were saying to the press and the

public, and we identified where the bot-

tlenecks in communications occurred. We

made recommendations in that report to

the utility companies, government offi-

cials, and the press on how better to per-

form their jobs in emergency situations.

Fortunately, there has been no com-

parable test in the United States since

Three Mile Island to determine whether

any of the procedural problems we iden-

167

tified have been solved, or whether any

of the specific recommendations have

been adopted.

The accident at Chernobyl in April and

May of 1986, however, provided the

American press with a second opportu-

nity to report on a serious power plant

accident. As a co-director of the Center

for War, Peace, and the News Media, at

New York University, which looks at how

the media cover U.S.-Soviet relations and

the arms race, I examined American and

European coverage of the Chernobyl ac-

cident during the first three weeks, when

events were quite confused. I was able to

draw some comparisons between cover-

age of the Chernobyl accident and Three

Mile Island.

There are enough similarities in cov-

erage of the two events that I have now

reached some tentative conclusions about

how journalists operate—indeed, must

operate—during events of this type. Be-

cause of the way journalists in the United

States work and the pressures they work

under, and because of the nature of the

events themselves, I fear it is inevitable

that critics of journalism will say that cov-

erage of serious power plant accidents is

“sensational” or “inaccurate,” for lack of

168 DAVID RUBIN

better words. Further, there may be little

that journalists can do to head off these

charges.

Having studied these two accidents, I

am, therefore, going to offer you ““Rub-

in’s Four Rules” that govern media cov-

erage of serious, or seemingly serious,

nuclear power plant accidents. I admit

that concerning the Chernobyl accident,

I was unable to answer many questions

about information flow in the Soviet

Union, so I had to make some educated

guesses about who knew what, and how

much was being communicated by Soviet

officials. I obviously have much more de-

tail about TMI than Chernobyl.

With that caveat, let me offer these four

rules. By the end of the presentation, you

will see that criticism of press perform-

ance is probably inevitable.

Rule No. 1: Big stories demand lots of

space in newspapers and lots of air time

on television and radio, because that is

what signals they are big stories. Once

those who determine news play have com-

mitted to the notion that a story is “a big

story,” then they signal their readership

or viewership that this is a big story, not

just by the positioning of it on the front

page or at the top of the newscast but also

by the amount of space that they choose

to give it. Once editors have committed

all those column inches and all that air

time, they must fill it with words or im-

ages, even if there is little hard, confirmed

information to report.

I wouldn’t quibble with editors who de-

cided that both TMI and Chernobyl were

“big stories.”’ Both clearly fit the defini-

tion of “news.” TMI was a potentially

serious nuclear power plant accident. It

was ongoing; that is, it was not over by

the time the press found out about it,

which meant that journalists could get to

the scene and actually witness it as it was

playing out. There was evacuation poten-

tial, which meant that large numbers of

people might be involved. The location

was near enough to major media cen-

ters—New York, Washington, Phila-

delphia, Pittsburgh—so that many

journalists could get there quickly. It was

not clear how serious this accident was

going to become. All these factors made

it a “big story.”’

Chernobyl evinced some of the same

“big story” features, as well as others.

First, it happened in the Soviet Union.

From an American perspective, that im-

mediately makes it news. The United

States was still very much in the grip of

an “evil empire’ view of the Soviet

Union. The accident was viewed as a test

of ‘“‘glasnost,’’ Soviet Communist Party

leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s policy of

openness; how would it apply to this ac-

cident? This was a test of Soviet secrecy.

It was also unclear how serious the acci-

dent was, although from the beginning it

was correctly viewed as more serious than

TMI, and probably more serious than any

other past accident. And like TMI, it was

ongoing.

The “big story” rule really gets the ball

rolling toward charges of media sensa-

tionalism and inaccuracy. Once the press

is committed to the notion of the big

story, it must fill a lot of space to prove

it.

This leads to Rule No. 2: Newspaper

space and television time will be filled

with something, for better or worse. Ed-

itors cannot signal that TMI or Chernobyl

is a big story and then say, ‘““‘We don’t

know anything else” and provide only two

or three paragraphs. The large news hole

must be filled. The question is, ““How?”’

In reporting such stories, journalists are

essentially captives of their sources. Good

journalists will try to contact those

sources they believe are in the best po-

sition to know what is happening at a par-

ticular point in time. Sources, of course,

vary in quality. Good journalists will

bring to the interviewing process suffi-

cient knowledge of the subject so that

they know what to ask sources, and how

to evaluate the answers by comparing

them to what they are hearing from other

sources.

If journalists cannot interview the

sources they want on a story like this, they

THE MEDIA’S COVERAGE OF RADIATION RISKS 169

do not have the option of saying to their

editors, “I can’t speak to any of the peo-

ple who really know what is going on. I

don’t have a story.” Editors expect sto-

ries. They need to fill space. Journalists

will have to seek alternative sources to

report some sort of story.

If one examines the inaccurate, spec-

ulative or sensational information re-

ported during TMI and Chernobyl, it

almost always appeared because journal-

ists were forced to rely on sources who

were themselves uninformed, specula-

tive, or sensational.

For example, during Chernobyl, some

of the most incendiary information came

from foreign ham radio operators, whose

broadcasts were picked up. In one case,

this resulted in a story that thousands

were dead as a result of the accident, and

that they were being buried in mass

graves.

Should those ham radio operators have

been credible sources? Some media ac-

corded them more credibility than did

other media. Those wild estimates of the

number dead received bigger play in some

media than in others. But at root, it was

the lack of information from key Soviet

sources that permitted those ham radio

operators to gain any credibility at all.

Similarly, many journalists resorted to

interviewing Ukranian Americans about

what they were hearing from relatives liv-

ing close to the accident. Many of these

interviewees were strongly anti-Soviet

and prepared to believe the worst about

what was happening. Much of what they

said appeared in newspapers that serve

large Ukranian-American communities,

such as Chicago or Cleveland, as well as

in New York and Washington.

A lack of sources also produces ‘‘man

in the street” coverage. A reporter may

legitimately want to plumb reactions of

local residents, but there is also pressure

to do that if one is having difficulty getting

information from other sources. Such

‘“‘man in the street” information can often

be wildly inaccurate as to what is hap-

pening, and it can even be an inaccurate

indication of what the community is in

fact thinking.

Citizen activists—in the case of nuclear

power, generally opponents of the tech-

nology—often receive much attention in

the press during an accident, because

journalists know who these people are.

They have their phone numbers. They

know how to reach them. During Three

Mile Island, some came to the plant site

to be available to journalists. These ac-

tivists know how the journalism game is

played. They are aware that they can get

their views into the press at that time. It

is another way for reporters to fill space.

Some citizen activists have technical ex-

pertise and can provide a useful perspec-

tive. Others offer a political perspective

on these questions.

All these groups are alternatives to the

kinds of sources journalists would prefer

to have during such accidents; that is,

sources who are on scene, fighting the

emergency, who can explain why it hap-

pened, what the status of the reactor is,

when it is likely to be under control, and

the amount of radiation released.

Rule No. 3: In any nuclear power plant

accident, there is built-in controversy.

Conflicting charges and counter-charges

are inevitable. A power plant accident is

a disaster like no other. As a news story,

it cannot be compared to a hurricane, an

earthquake, a flood, or any other kind of

disaster. One reason for that is the large

number of groups in the United States

well-organized in opposition to the tech-

nology. There are no strong citizen groups

in opposition to hurricanes, earthquakes

or floods.

In addition, journalists have come to

the conclusion there are no neutral

sources on nuclear power plant accidents.

This is not the case concerning sources of

information on hurricanes, floods, fires,

famines and so on. On nuclear power,

sources are on one side or the other.

Therefore, reporters can and do pit

sources against each other. This creates

conflict in news stories, and conflict is one

important element of journalism. This

170 DAVID RUBIN

also helps to contribute to what appears

to be sensational or inflammatory news

coverage.

Journalists have by now decided on the

likely bias of potential sources in the nu-

clear power area, and they therefore ap-

proach those sources with certain

assumptions. For example, most journal-

ists assume that utility officials are pro-

nuclear power; that they are, in whatever

they say, protecting their own careers and

the technology to which they are com-

mitted; that they are unduly optimistic

about what is happening at the plant dur-

ing an accident; and that whatever they

say needs to be discounted or played

down in light of that. Journalists also as-

sume that most NRC officials share the

bias of utility officials, largely because

NRC officials have the same stake in the

safety of the technology that utility offi-

cials have and, therefore, they would pre-

fer to see the optimistic aspects of an

accident emphasized, as opposed to the

worst-case fears.

On the other side of the ledger, jour-

nalists believe that most citizen activists

are opposed to the technology and are,

therefore, grinding an ax. Academicians

fall on both sides: some are well known

to support the technology, and others are

well known to oppose it. Journalists know

which are which, and they seek them out

precisely to elicit contending, conflicting

views.

One of the few groups that journalists

might concede is neutral or unbiased in

this area is meteorologists, who will dis-

cuss wind currents and possible patterns

of radiation dispersal. A second group

might be persons gathering data about ra-

diation releases. During Chernobyl, for

example, Swedish and Finnish meteor-

Ologists and radiation experts were ac-

corded high credibility with the

worldwide press corps, although I do not

believe Soviet scientists from the same

disciplines would have been believed by

American journalists, just as they mis-

trust utility officials in the United States.

It is still possible that State government

officials—in the case of TMI, Pennsyl-

vania—maintain a reputation for honesty

with the press and are viewed as sources

who have no ax to grind.

It should be added that I do not believe

journalists themselves are objective about

this story, given its emotional content and

history. Journalists have views. They

bring to stories all kinds of baggage. They

are now suspicious of any story that deals

with radiation releases or nuclear power,

in part because of the past history of gov-

ernmental secrecy in this area. The con-

straints on information concerning

matters nuclear have made journalists

rightfully suspicious of whatever is said

about the technology. They are also sus-

picious of utility cover-up, because the

utility has the most to lose during an ac-

cident. Indeed, they are now suspicious

of the entire nuclear power plant program

of the last 35 years because of the manner

in which it was oversold to the public.

Journalists do not like to be used in a

public relations program.

During Chernobyl, American journal-

ists were, of course, also suspicious of the

Soviet government. Almost every Soviet

statement during the first three weeks was

greeted with great skepticism, even

though many turned out to be accurate,

if woefully incomplete and late.

Finally, in reporting any serious acci-

dent, journalists are going to look for

blame. This element is absent in coverage

of a hurricane, earthquake or flood.

Looking for blame automatically injects

controversy and sensationalism into a

story. All of these suspicions and biases

which journalists bring to nuclear acci-

dent stories serve to heighten controversy

and create the appearance of sensation-

alism.

Rule No. 4: Journalists care more

about the future than about the past. One

might even go further to say that they care

more about the future than the present.

Look, for example, at the coverage in

September 1987 of the agreement in prin-

ciple with the Soviet Union to sign a nu-

clear weapons treaty. The most

THE MEDIA’S COVERAGE OF RADIATION RISKS 171

interesting questions are what this will

mean for President Reagan’s influence on

Capitol Hill, for his ability to conclude

future treaties, for Mikhail Gorbachev’s

power in the Soviet Union, for future

agreements between the two countries.

It is amazing how much of the infor-

mation does not deal with what happened

yesterday, or what it says about the re-

lationship between the two countries over

the last six years, but rather is speculative.

This is a key reason journalists write all

the worst-case scenario stories, or ask the

what-if questions that utility and NRC of-

ficials hate and fear. Such questions force

them to lay before the public the worst

possible consequences of an accident,

consequences they feel will not happen

and which they honestly feel are irre-

sponsible to discuss. People read their re-

sponses, become alarmed, and then

blame the press for sensational coverage.

This phenomenon is also related to the

difficulty of discussing risk during an ac-

cident. It is hard to put risk into a proper

perspective when one is asked these what-

if questions. The press asks them, in part,

because they are interested in the future,

but also because the press feels it has a

responsibility to protect the public.

On this score, the American press and

the Soviet press disagree on how best to

protect the public. The American press

does not want to be in the position of

having underestimated the risk. If the

American press were to cover an accident

in a fairly low-key and reassuring manner,

and then something terrible were to hap-

pen, the press would be seen as having

been in league with those who were giving

an optimistic view of the accident and

would be blamed for it. The American

press very much wants to avoid that. In

the Soviet Union, it is just the opposite.

The press does not want to alarm the pub-

lic. It played down the seriousness of the

accident at Chernobyl so as not to alarm

the public. One could debate which

method is more responsible and which

better serves the public. But there is that

difference.

As a result of these four rules, should

another serious power plant accident oc-

cur anywhere in the world, certain aspects

of the coverage can be predicted.

First, a wide variety of sources will be

consulted because of the need to fill

space. Sources will vary widely, and

wildly, in their credibility and in the qual-

ity of information they have. Second, as

a result, there will be many mistakes in

the coverage—some of them big, most of

them small—because the sources them-

selves are incorrect. They have false in-

formation, or they have old information,

or they are shading the truth, or they are

lying. Third, journalists will be under

deadline pressure, and many will be un-

derprepared. They will hear what they

want to hear and see what they want to

see. They will bring some of their own

baggage to the story. Journalists will inev-

itably charge officials with covering up or

lying. Often, these words are an exag-

geration. In most cases, sources simply do

not know. But reporters cannot be in the

position of saying ““We don’t know.”’ They

have to fill that space. As a result, re-

porters press for answers from whoever

can supply them. Often those answers

turn out to be incorrect.

As a result, there will inevitably be pub-

lic confusion. The public will proclaim a

continuing erosion of confidence in the

media. There will be much breast-beating

about press performance. If one goes

back to examine press coverage of both

Three Mile Island and Chernobyl—par-

ticularly Chernobyl—it is surprising how

much of the information reported at the

time was fairly accurate. If one had thor-

oughly read three or four different news-

papers, and watched all three television

networks, it was possible to get a good

picture of what was going on. But then

not many people in the audience do that.

Many in this audience are persons who

function as sources for journalists and

who would like to make this process work

better. There are some things they might

do to improve the situation.

First, the Denton-Blix approach. Har-

172 DAVID RUBIN

old Denton, on the third day of the ac-

cident, was sent to Three Mile Island as

a sort of information czar to bring order

out of the chaos, to provide regular brief-

ings, and to become a central source of

accurate information for the press, so

journalists would not have to keep scur-

rying around to alternate sources collect-

ing misinformation. That system worked

pretty well at Three Mile Island. It finally

worked at Chernobyl, where Hans Blix

of the International Atomic Energy Com-

mission was a much more credible source

than anyone the Soviets could have pro-

vided.

If government and utility together can

designate a Denton or a Blix early in the

accident, and set him up in a place where

the press had gathered, this will reduce

the press’ need to go to alternate sources

to fill space. A Denton or Blix might pro-

vide so much information that reporters

would have little—or less—need to go to

outside sources. While journalists will al-

ways go to some outside sources as a

check on what they are hearing at the site,

the more information the utility and the

government provide to the press, the

more space they will fill. The more space

they fill, the less need journalists will have

to consult other sources.

One risk with a Denton-Blix approach

is that if the press ever catches the infor-

mation czar in a lie, then the game is over.

Reporters will never forgive an informa-

tion czar in whom they have placed that

kind of trust for misleading them. A Den-

ton or Blix must be selected very care-

fully. An examination of Denton’s

performance at Three Mile Island indi-

cates that he did a very good job, partic-

ularly since he did not know he was going

to be playing that role, had never done it

before, and was really improvising when

he did it. While he wasn’t totally candid,

the press didn’t find him out at the time.

That was key. Had he been found out at

the time, even more serious information

problems would have ensued.

Also required is that the information

czar have a support group of other people

available to provide information across a

range of topics right at the site so the press

need not go to other sources. Any source

caught in a situation like TMI should not

lie, and should attempt not to provide old

or outdated information. Journalists, if

they are given outdated information, and

then hear newer information, are likely

to assume a coverup. They are less likely

to assume that a source had old infor-

mation. It is also advisable not to be too

optimistic during an accident, because

journalists are suspicious of such opti-

mism.

In conclusion, however, do not be sur-

prised if coverage of the next TMI or

Chernobyl is just as controversial as it

was in 1979 or 1986. This is a situation be-

yond remedy so long as the press in the

U.S. works under the pressures that it

does.

Journal of the Washington Academy of Sciences,

Volume 78, Number 2, Pages 173-177, June 1988

Covering Radiation Risks

and Benefits

Richard D. Smyser

Editor, The Oak Ridger, Oak Ridge, TN 37831

Preparing for this talk and going

through my large, if not well organized,

accumulation of newspaper and magazine

articles related to nuclear power, I dis-

covered that I have a collection. Well, not

a collection, but at least the start of, an

idea for a collection. Until a better name

occurs, I shall call it my collection of

“Obligatory Skeletons.”

Could I have the first slide please:

(Slide of ad in the Philadelphia Evening

Bulletin promoting a coming series of ar-

ticles on nuclear wastes. Ad features a

large skeleton.)

This is an ad from the Philadelphia Eve-

ning Bulletin, or I should say the late Phil-

adelphia Evening Bulletin. It died in

1982, like so many metropolitan after-

noon newspapers have died.

Next slide, please.

This is an illustration in Deadline, a

publication with which a fellow speaker,

David Rubin, of New York University, is

associated. The skeleton here, you will

note, is digging his own grave while the

Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, I pre-

sume, looms in the background. These

are the only two “obligatory skeletons” I

have now in my collection but I know that

in time Ill locate many others that have

appeared as illustrations with nuclear ar-

173

ticles. I call them “obligatory skeletons”

because, on this subject, it seems they are

expected, required.

Next slide, please.

(Slide of Washington Post special sec-

tion cover showing cooling towers.)

And if not a skeleton, then some men-

acing cooling towers, either conceived by

an artist to suggest something other than

benign energy or taken by a photographer

with a telescopic lens so that they loom,

loom, loom.

Next eight slides please, somewhat

slowly, with pauses between.

(Early man lying in shadow of cooling

tower);

(Cooling tower with ‘“‘What if?’’);

(Cooling tower with question mark);

(Cooling towers presented as grotesque

heads);

(Cooling towers in vivid purple and

pink);

(Russian bear emanating from cooling

tower);

(Wash flapping in foreground, cooling

tower in background);

(Cooling towers belching smoke and

fire).

Now just a few more from my very be-

ginning collection:

Next slide please:

174 RICHARD D. SMYSER

(Slide of vivid yellow radiation hazard

symbol with headline ‘‘Deadly cargo.”’)

Plutonium has inspired many newspa-

per graphic artists too. Next slide please:

(Slide of another page from Anchorage

Daily News.)

Stories on the possible preservation of

foods by radiation still further inspire

both artists and photographers. Next slide

please:

(Slide of page from Charlotte Ob-

server. )

This appeared just two weeks ago in

the Charlotte Observer. It’s a presenta-

tion on the pros and cons of food irradia-

tion, although I tend to doubt the

objectivity of the photo editor at least.

So much for my beginning collection.

Pll welcome contributions.

I have just a few more slides on a some-

what different aspect of my subject. Next

slide please:

(Slide showing nuclear story on inside

page of paper.)

Note that all of the stories I have

marked on these pages are, on any rela-

tive scale, positive stories about nuclear

power. Note also that they all appear on

inside pages of the newspapers—not on

page one. Now all but the last slide please.

(Pause for comments on appropriate

slides.)

And here’s some interesting media risk

analysis: A trace of radiation exposure is

given greater, if not really much greater,

prominence than the evacuation of 5000.

I could, of course, have shown an equal

number of front pages featuring, with

quite large headlines, first reports on the

nuclear accidents concerned here, chiefly

Chernobyl, but you are all well aware of

those.

Let me have the last slide, please, one

that is somewhat out of sequence but I

show it now rather than interrupt again.

(Slide of The Oak Ridger’s weekly

“Radiation Report” included with the

other weather information.)

This is something my paper has been

doing since the summer of 1979, just after

Three Mile Island. We may be unique.

The slides I have shown make it clear

that the emphasis of media coverage on

nuclear power is negative—significantly

more negative than is the emphasis on

most other subjects.

Why? Because nuclear is a terribly

flawed and deadly technology? Or is it

some sort of liberal media or subversive

plot?

I don’t really know why the emphasis

is so negative, although I do know that it

is not a media plot, nor do I think it is a

subversive plot. For myself, in the very

final analysis, I reason that any technol-

ogy that we learn about first in terms of

the deaths of hundreds of thousands of

people, even though they are hundreds

of thousands of people in an enemy coun-

try during a terrible war that has killed

millions—any technology born in the

public consciousness in this context is

going to have a lot of trouble developing

a positive image. Nor do subsequent

events like Three Mile Island or Cher-

nobyl help.

But I don’t really want to talk today

about why nukes get such a bad press. I

want to suggest instead some things that

all of us might consider toward giving the

public, through the press, a fuller, fairer

base of information on which to evolve

future judgments of nuclear technology.

I have separated my suggestions into

three parts:

First, what we of the media might do;

Second, what you of science, technol-

ogy and government might do;

Third, what we all might do together.

I have oversimplified the separation as

I have oversimplified, for the sake of

time, many of my suggestions.

First, the media:

Process reporting: News is not just a

succession of events. Most things don’t

just happen—they evolve. Events are

news, but so are processes and especially

the process of the development of tech-

nologies.

Media suggestion number two: Do we

tend to report so heavily on the potential

dangers of nuclear power plants because

COVERING RADIATION RISKS AND BENEFITS 175

these dangers have been so widely as-

sessed and extrapolated? Are the “‘worst

case scenarios’ that have been developed

for nuclear power plants a weakness or a

strength of the technology?

Joe Kramer, in an article in the March

issue of Quill, writes of the “‘sixth w’—

‘What if?’ Have we done so much “what

if?” reporting of nuclear power because,

other than Three Mile Island and now

Chernobyl, we have had no specific ex-

amples? Have we “what iffed”’ any other

story so constantly, so thoroughly?

Let’s reexamine our use of words. Have

we developed some cliches? Does radia-

tion always spew? Is plutonium always

deadly? Was Darrell Eisenhut, member

of the NRC staff in 1979, really “‘big-

boned, square-jawed, wire-rimmed,

blond—the compleat nuclear man,” as

the Philadelphia Inquirer described him?

Is there no one on the NRC staff who

looks like Woody Allen?

Relatively recent surveys show that 40

percent of the public still believes that a

nuclear power plant can explode like a

nuclear bomb. It is not taking sides in the

nuclear power debate to try to correct that

wrong impression.

We should recognize that on this is-

sue—in fact on most issues in these

times—pro and con is not enough. There

are not just two sides in many of the dis-

agreements. There are, instead, three,

four, five different positions. Let’s make

sure we present them all.

And still more suggestions for us of the

media:

Develop not just a passion for accuracy

per se, but also for context, qualifiers,

perspective, background.

Is nuclear really so “‘Dr. Strangelove’’?

Or it is something very much of nature—

of this earth? How many newspapers have

written about the natural chain reaction

that occurred 2000 years ago in uranium

deposits in Gabon, Africa—a natural re-

actor that, over eons, disposed of its own

nuclear wastes too?

Let’s report the total energy story. Put

nuclear power into the context of the

‘““greenhouse effect’? and the Persian

Gulf.

My suggestions for science, technology

and government:

Help us to do process as well as event

reporting. Be available to explain your

processes as well as your events. Appre-

ciate that the public is capable of under-

standing the uncertain, the incomplete,

the ongoing.

Work to still further eliminate elitism

and clubbiness within science. The value

of peer review notwithstanding, develop

an equal respect for public review.

Stop making lepers out of those injured

in radiation accidents. (And stop calling

those accidents incidents.) Report the

names of victims of these accidents as you

report the names of other accidents—ve-

hicles, falls, fires.

Aside: I suggest that Charley Foust is

a hero of sorts in the cause of public ac-

ceptance of nuclear power. Charley works

at Oak Ridge National Laboratory and

he suffered a small exposure in an acci-

dent there in early 1986. Charley didn’t

actually aggressively announce himself as

a victim, but when he was quoted anon-

ymously and incorrectly in another news-

paper about the accident and then was

contacted by us, because we had learned

his identity unofficially, he did not object

to our use of his name to correct the mis-

quotation. And soon after that, another

of our Oak Ridge nuclear workers, L. D.

Conger, of the Y-12 Plant’s Metal Prep-

aration Division, suffered an exposure

and specifically asked that his name be

used. Nor have either Foust or Conger

been shunned or otherwise abused by the

public.

Still more suggestions for you of sci-

ence, technology and government:

Work to get the NRC to open all of its

hearings, meetings.

Stop comparing nuclear power risks to

highway fatalities and airline crashes. It’s

boring.

Combat the kind of mentality that was

apparent when, after Chernobyl, DOE

slapped a gag rule on its scientists and

176 RICHARD D. SMYSER

engineers—the people most capable of in-

telligent comment and reaction.

Watch your jargon: You know what the

“BEIR report” is, but I had to spend

more time than I should have spent to find

out that it’s the 1972 report of the Com-

mittee on Biological Effects of Ionizing

Radiation of the National Academy of

Science.

And heed this advice from Elizabeth

M. Whelan in her book ‘“‘Toxic Terror,”

as adapted for the December 1985 Quill:

“Obviously, all scientists and health

professionals can’t be expected to ditch

their careers in favor of media tours, but

it seems reasonable to ask some of them,

particularly academic physicians, to make

themselves available to the media from

time to time, and to learn to present their

messages with a proficiency comparable

to that of the average quack.

‘All health professionals, however,

should make a point of keeping track of

the current fads and frauds being pro-

moted by the media. Even if they never

go on the air, health professionals can ex-

ert some social and economic pressure by

praising those stations that are fair and

responsible in their coverage of health

topics. . .

“Physicians and scientists should not

deny or fight the power of the media; they

should join it. If a charlatan is in town, a

qualified professional should be demand-

ing a debate. To stand back is to permit

facts to be distorted—a dangerous error

of omission.”

These are things we need to work at

together:

How can we make the public more

aware that the effects of low level doses

of radiation are simply not yet substan-

tially known and will not be known for

who knows how long?

Can’t we find some way to make the

language of radiation exposure measure-

ments simpler, more consistent—as sim-

ple as temperature and barometer

readings? My own newspaper’s regular

printing of the background radiation

readings in our community is an indirect

effort toward that end. Rads, rems, body

rems, man rems, milirems, person rems,

becquerels, rutherfords, curies, roent-

gens, coulombs: Help! High level scien-

tific committees have been formed to

attack many other problems. Why not a

blue ribbon group from the National

Academy of Sciences to simplify the lan-

guage of radiation exposure: Two dental

X-rays, membership in a Frequent Flyer

club, sleeping with your spouse, sleeping

with your spouse in a masonry building?

Let’s work together toward mutually

agreeable guidelines for check backs,

read backs on sensitive stories. I empha-

size mutually agreeable. There are very

good reasons why we of the media are

cautious about read backs.

Work together also to develop lively,

colorful, but accurate and fair analogies.

Like this one: Fusion scientist describing

problems of dealing with exceedingly high

temperatures: “It’s not something we can

fan with a hat;”’ a nuclear reactor engineer

describing a long since abandoned reactor

concept, the homogeneous reactor: “It’s

a soup instead of a Swiss watch.”’

Work together to make organizations

like Scientists Institute for Public Infor-

mation (SIPI) work better: scientists and

engineers by adding their names to the

tens of thousands already listed for all-

hours availability for media inquiry; me-

dia people by spreading the word about

and using SIPI.

And that NAS committee seeking a

simplified language for radiation expo-

sure measures might do at least beginning

work on developing a scale for measuring

all risks. We tossed this around in the ed-

itorial columns of my paper and got some

interesting suggestions. What about say-

ing that such and such a risk is so many

“cigs —for cigarette—or so many “Na-

ders” for you know who? Or, more spe-

cifically, my Oak Ridge friend John

Haffey suggested: ‘“‘Why not evaluate

risks in relation to their known record and

potential benefits, hazards and conse-

quences on three major areas: Lifespan

(health and mortality), livelihood (jobs

COVERING RADIATION RISKS AND BENEFITS 177

and economics) and lifestyle (environ-

ment and quality of life)?”

Further, let’s agree on what “melt-

down” means—literally.

The word has now entered the language

in the figurative sense. We now have all

sorts of meltdowns—stock market melt-

downs, Chicago Cubs meltdowns (when

they let the Phillies score seven runs in

the seventh inning Wednesday night). But

what does a reactor meltdown really

mean? Now that it has been established

that the core did indeed melt at Three

Mile Island but that all but only infini-

tesimal amounts of radiation were con-

tained, is that a meltdown, or must there

be devastating effects on the public—a

China Syndrome?

And perhaps most important of all, in

conclusion, let us guard against becoming

preoccupied with—hung up on—each

other: Government and scientists vs me-

dia. We need to communicate with each

other, but only because we both need to

communicate with the public—and a very

smart public—a public that, like the late

Raymond Clapper told us many years

ago, “knows only half as much as we think

it knows but is twice as smart as we think

jteiS/7/ |

Journal of the Washington Academy of Sciences,

Volume 78, Number 2, Pages 178-185, June 1988

Non-Media Communications

Karl Abraham

Senior Public Affairs Officer

Office of Governmental and Public Affairs

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

King of Prussia, PA 19406

ABSTRACT

People who are very worried about the effects on themselves of the various uses of

radioactive materials and radiation will tell you they are less interested in statistical or

technical discussions of relative risks than they are in obtaining some practical advice that

recognizes their own desires and fears and that is given in a language with which they are

comfortable.

People will call up a government infor-

mation officer and ask questions that they

feel are too delicate to be asked of their

family physician. They will, in the most

hushed, discreet-sounding tones ask for

financial information that they believe to

be too sensitive to be anything but “‘in-

sider” information. They don’t know that

it is locatable at any time in Standard &

Poors. They will try to get from you a

special dispensation to wear radioactive

jewelry a week after every newspaper in

the country has carried NRC warnings

against it because “‘it’s just so very, very

beautiful. It was the last present my sister

ever gave me. I promised her I’d wear it

always.” We “‘negotiated”’ that she could

wear it to dinner on her late sister’s birth-

day (for about three hours, once a year)

on the theory (altogether lacking any

proof) that the small exposure probably

would do her less harm than feeling guilty

about it all the time by never wearing the

keepsake at all.

178

Many people, most of the time, aren’t

sure how to even ask questions about the

nuclear business. They will begin by ex-

plaining that they have an open mind and

don’t want to be labeled either “‘pro-nu-

clear” or “anti-nuclear.” They don’t want

to sound “ridiculous” or “ignorant” and

often will begin by saying “this may sound

like a dumb question, but. . .” to which

I always reply that there are no dumb

questions, only dumb answers.

In my schooldays, somebody told me

that there were only seven great plots in

all of fiction, and all the others that we

found in literature were variations and

elaborations on these basic seven plots.

When it comes to the asking of questions

about radiation, whether the questions

are asked by members of the news media

or by the non-media public, I think there

are only two basic questions: first, how

much radiation am I going to get from

this [source, procedure, experience, etc. |]

and, second, what will that dose do to me?

NON-MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS 179

All of the questions I get from the pub-

lic boil down to that. Sometimes there is

a reasonable answer to the first part, but

there hardly ever is a good answer to the

second one.

People who aren’t either occupation-

ally involved with large radiation sources,

or getting radiation treatments for ex-

tremely serious illnesses, stand only the

remotest chance of getting a serious ra-

diation exposure—one serious enough so

that the experts can agree, within narrow

limits, on what the consequences will be.

The radiation incidents that most peo-

ple worry about fall between an exposure

from a real or imagined source that is a

small fraction of their annual natural en-

vironmental exposure, on the low end of

the scale, and an exposure that at the high

end is still less than 10 rem.

Even nuclear industry workers very

rarely get exposures of more than 10 rem

in a year. In the NRC’s last published

annual report on such exposures covering

the year 1984,’ out of about 195,000

workers, only 24 had exposures of more

than five rem that year, and only two of

these were more than 10 rem.

It isn’t common experience of individ-

ual radiation exposures that makes most

people so afraid of radiation. It is, rather,

the vivid memory of large-scale events,

like the accident at Three Mile Island, and

the one at Chernobyl. And it is the in-

visibility of radiation. If only we could

give it a bad smell, the way the gas com-

pany does with otherwise equally invisible

natural gas, attitudes would change a

great deal. When people smell gas, they

go make a telephone call, with some ur-

gency, but usually not in panic. It is the

invisible presence in our midst, and the

common knowledge that in large enough

amounts it can kill or make its victims

seriously ill, that makes most people will-

ing to accept some other, potentially

much more imminent, dangers while

wanting to be spared even the slightest

radiation exposures. And, the discovery

that naturally occurring radon gas has

been building in concentration in many

American homes, unsuspected and until

a couple of years ago a matter of academic

interest rather than public health concern,

that has alarmed the public, in this in-

stance for good reasons.

When the National Academy of Sci-

ences published the report popularly

called the ‘“‘BEIR-3,’”? what it said in the

Summary and Conclusions section at the

front of this 524-pager was that the in-

crease in lifetime risk of getting cancer

and dying from it for somebody who had

absorbed a dose of 10 rads at one time

was 0.5 to 1.4 percent of the naturally

occurring rate among people who had not

absorbed such a dose. They estimated

that people who had a continuous lifetime

exposure at a rate of 1 rad per year would

have a 3 to 8 percent higher rate of dying

of cancer. Then the committee said that

it did not know whether getting an ad-

ditional dose of gamma or X-rays com-

parable to what many Americans get as

an annual natural environmental expo-

sure—100 millirads per year—was detri-

mental. I am advised that there is a

“BEIR 4” in preparation, but I don’t

know whether it will help with this prob-

lem of putting low exposure “in perspec-

tive.”’

Of the many hundreds of questions I

get in a year from people who are worried

about a possible radiation exposure, 99

percent, or more, concern exposures that

are a small portion of that 100 millirad.

Everything that passes in our conversa-

tion between the asking of the question

and the giving of the only entirely accu-

rate and honest answer I could give,

which is “I don’t know and I doubt any-

body anywhere else does either”’ is an at-

tempt on my part to figure out if the caller

wants the truth, or a comforting answer.

Put that bluntly it sounds tactless, even

arrogant, and begging for the retort,

“well, if you don’t know send me some-

one who does!” If the caller is quite in-

sistent, I do send them elsewhere. Clearly

there are people with really impressive

expertise in the NRC, and I don’t doubt

for a second that they could give a thor-

180 KARL ABRAHAM

oughly correct answer with very formi-

dable technical rigor. But, a great many

intelligent but technically undereducated

people find the technical discussions quite

emotionally unsatisfying. Sometimes the

people who press hardest for numbers,

end up confessing that they don’t really

understand probabilities couched in dec-

imal fractions amply sprinkled with zer-

oes. The world is filled with people who

elected to take biology in high school or

college in the belief, sometimes true, that

this was the way to avoid having to deal

with scientific notation, also called ex-

ponential numbers. Some of these gen-

erally well educated people think that

writing a number as a single digit followed

by the capital letter ““E”’ and another one

or two-digit number must be some secret

code used only by people who have se-

curity clearances. My most-frequently

asked question is, “what is my chance of

being killed by an accident at the nuclear

plant near me?” Answer: ‘‘Well, it’s

about one in a million, and that estimate

may be as much as ten-to-a-hundred times

too low, or ten-to-a-hundred times too

high.”’ Retort: “what is that supposed to

mean?” I thought you wanted a number.

“Yes, but is there any other way to de-

scribe it? Is there no way you can describe

it in ordinary words?” Well, yes, I can.

Your chance of being killed by a nuclear

power plant accident is a lot less than your

chance of being killed by an automobile

accident but its a lot more than your

chance of being killed by a falling meteo-

rite while engaged in an act of love in a

gondola on a canal in Venice.

There may be a few of you who can tell

right off, at the very beginning of a con-

versation, what kind of a person you have

at the other end of the phone, but I’m not

one of them. I used to think I had de-

veloped a kind of sixth sense about the

credibility of the people I talked to, after

20 years as a newspaper reporter, but I

was cured of that delusion by a grand-

motherly sounding lady in New Jersey.

She had begun by writing me letters, to

express her concern over non-radiological

environmental damage caused by a nu-

clear power plant on her much-beloved

Jersey Shore. The damage was real

enough and so were the steps the NRC

was taking to help bring the problems un-

der control. She enclosed a newspaper

clipping that had triggered her concern. I

sent replies to the street address on her

envelope, and we exchanged about four

letters. Eventually I had a telephone call

from her. Her speech was deliberate,

calm and she asked me a question to

which I didn’t know the answer, so I asked

to call her back. “‘Please give me your

telephone number, and I'll call you some

time tomorrow,” I said. She gave me an

area code and telephone number, and I

ended the call. A little later, I realized

that “tomorrow” was going to be a Sat-

urday. That apparently had not occurred

to her, either. I tried to call her back, but

the phone rang a long time without being

answered, and I gave up. At mid-morning

Monday, I placed the call again. It must

have rung eight or nine times, and then

a young man answered. I asked for her.

He said she was not able to come to the

phone. “When will it be convenient for

me to call her again,” I asked. ““You can

call any- time you like,” he said. “Can I

leave a message to have her call me

back,”’ I asked? ‘“‘No, I don’t think so,”

he said, and then politely said ““goodbye”’

and hung up. I thought that was very odd

and my curiosity led me to exercise some

slightly rusty reporting skills to identify

the location of her telephone number. I

found out that it was a pay phone in one

of New Jersey’s larger mental institutions.

So I called the head of the place and asked

about the name that the woman had

called herself. She had given me her cor-

rect name. She had been institutionalized

for many years, was very old, indeed, had

only rare moments of lucidity, in which

she wrote letters to all kinds of people.

She had money, her relatives brought her

stamps, and she had a telephone credit

card for which the relatives also settled

the bills. I asked why she couldn’t have

her own phone in her room. “We tried

NON-MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS 181

that, but most of the time she would just

sit and listen to it ring, so we finally took

it out. She never complained about that

either,” said the director. A few days later

I decided to write another letter, giving

her the answer to her question. I never

heard from her again. If people who have

the unimpaired use of their mental facul-

ties are sometimes worried, alarmed or

frightened by something they have heard

or seen about radiation and its practical

uses, imagine the terror in those who be-

lieve that extraterrestrial beings are using

nuclear radiation to inflict pain on them,

or that our government is using it to spy

on them, and would it help if they papered

their bedroom walls with aluminum foil?

The Northeastern United States is filled

with lonely people who have discovered

that their local telephone book blue pages

contain government telephone numbers

where collect calls are accepted, and so

they call. I’ve never thought that my ap-

pointment to federal service qualified me

to practice electronic group shrinkery, or

any other kind of shrinkery. But who is

to say that graduate students anxious to

complete a class paper by deadline or

elected officials who want to appear to be

well informed when meeting with their

constituency are entitled to have their

anxieties relieved with a little bit of con-

versation, but people who wear hats fes-

tooned with old radio tubes and Tarot

cards are not?

In the last week of August I had a

phone call from a woman who started

right out by asking me, ‘How dangerous

is it to have a CAT scan?” I explained

that medical X-rays from machines like

CAT scan equipment do not come under

NRC jurisdiction. I suggested she call her

state health department. She appealed,

“Won't you please just try to answer my

questions.” Well, I began, there are three

answers: (1) under some circumstances a

lot less dangerous than not having one;

(2) not very dangerous at all if the ex-

posure is accurately planned and the

administration carefully controlled; (3)

have you asked the doctor who told you

to have one?”’ It isn’t me, it’s my husband.

He has these headaches. How much ra-

diation would he get from a CAT scan?”’

she asked. ‘Let me think about it,” I

stalled. I remembered in the middle

1970’s playing a very minor role in helping

the Philadelphia Food & Drug Adminis-

tration to put a South Jersey practitioner

out of the business of giving people a large

dose of X-rays over a period of many

weeks or months, as treatment for all

kinds of minor complaints for which X-

rays were So inappropriate as to constitute

medical quackery. ““Your husband’s doc-

tor recommended the CAT scan?’’ I

asked. ‘‘Yes.”’ Well, I suggested, if you

have some doubt about the validity of that

recommendation, why not get a second

medical opinion on whether the CAT scan

is really needed for a diagnosis. There

may be a medically sound alternative.

“No,” she said, “I’ve already gone to four

other doctors and they all say he has to

have the CAT scan. Well I said, the

amount of exposure really depends to

some extent on the location they want to

look at. If it is deep beneath bony struc-

tures, they may need to use more radia-

tion than if they are looking just through

soft tissue. One of the basic benefits of

the CAT scan technique, in addition to

giving a clearer picture of a possible prob-

lem area is to distribute the exposure of

the overlying tissues by rotating the beam

around the body. “You're not answering

my question,’ she said. ‘““How does it

compare with a single chest X-ray? How

much radiation do you get from a single

chest X-ray?” “If it is a well calibrated

and well colimated machine, and the

techician has been trained to use the min-

imum exposure for the tissues involved,

probably between 20 and 40 millirem, and

possibly less than that with the latest fast-

est films.” “And how much from a CAT

scan?” Well I finally confessed that I’ve

had three of them, one of my head and

two of my abdominal area, and after the

second one I browbeat the radiation phy-

sicist into calculating my exposure, and it

was in the neighborhood of 2,500 to 3,000

182 KARL ABRAHAM

millirem. ““That sounds like really a lot,”

she said. ““That’s all relative,” I said. I

explained that NRC regulations allow a

nuclear industry worker to receive up to

that much radiation exposure to his whole

body in a 13-week period, but that we try

to get employers to keep worker expo-

sures well below that. I think you might

try to weigh the potential benefit against

the potential risk. For the industry worker

it’s his weekly paycheck. For me it was

the peace of mind that came from finally

knowing, after the CAT scan, that I didn’t

have a tumor.

By now you should have caught on to

the idea that I don’t think it’s right for

people in my position to try to talk the

public into either ignoring their concerns

or ignoring the risks, though they often

are small risks. I think it’s more appro-

priate to try to nudge them along the road

to confronting their fears and recognizing

their doubts, and getting them to make

one more try at getting a medically com-

petent opinion that they will accept as

good advice.

I have read some of the studies that

have been done on the health effects of

exposures to low levels of ionizing radia-

tion, and they all have two things in com-

mon: They make enough points with

statistical analysis to be persuasive, if not

convincing to practitioners of the scien-

tific method, and they are uniformly lousy

in helping the layman understand the rel-

ative risks he assumes in enduring a ra-

diation exposure in any terms other than

numerological. Numerology is what I call

lists of numbers that compare the risk of

dying of cancer from the routine radio-

active emissions of nuclear power plants

to the risks associated with smoking some

trivially few cigarettes per year, or to tak-

ing a few canoe rides, or crossing streets

against the light, ete., etc. Good scientific

statistics do not always make for useful

human communication.

Sometimes people will ask you the

wrong question because they misunder-

stand the real problem. It isn’t because

they are dumb, but most often because

they have become so afraid of one thing,

and are so intensely focused on that con-

cern, that they have altogether over-

looked the real danger, which sometimes

hasn’t much to do with radiation at all.

At the beginning of June, 1979, when

my calls about the consequences of the

accident at Three Mile Island were still

running 20 to 30 a day, I had a call from

a woman who said she lived in a far north-

western suburb of Harrisburg, maybe 25

miles from the cooling towers seen round

the world. “‘Please tell me how dangerous

the radiation from TMI still is?” she

asked. After some preliminary discus-

sion, it boiled down to her being worried

about radiation at her home. I said I

doubted that there would have been any

measurable amount at that distance and

in that direction. The wind was blowing

away from her nearly all the time, not

from TMI toward her, at the times when

significant radiation releases were coming

out of TMI-2. I injected a lot of long si-

lences into the conversation and finally

she got down to her real worry. For many

years, she said, her married sister, who

lived in the Miami area, escaped the broil-

ing Florida summer by visiting her in Har-

risburg. She was scheduled to come up

early in July and stay all summer. But,

she had just called. She had heard about

the TMI accident, and within the past

week had learned she was pregnant. Was

it really safe for her to spend the summer

in Harrisburg, just 25 miles from the ac-

cident. “‘She says she is worried about her

baby.”” Have you ever spent the sum-

mertime in Florida? I asked. ‘“‘No.”’ Well,

this is a very good year to go and be there

with your sister. ““Oh, you think the re-

actor is still that dangerous?” No. Not at

all, but you are worrying about the wrong

thing,” I said. Suppose your sister comes

up here, has a wonderful summer, and

then goes back to Florida and next spring

delivers a baby with a gross birth defect.

There is no way in the world anyone will

ever be able to prove that the defect was

caused by radiation from TMI, nor could

anyone prove that it was not. But just the

NON-MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS 183

suspicion that it could have been avoided

will poison your relationship with your

sister forever. About one out of every

thousand babies is born with a serious

birth defect, even in places where there

have been no nuclear accidents, even

where there are no nuclear reactors, even

in times long before mankind ever dis-

covered radioactivity. Your sister runs

that risk, even in Florida. She might al-

ready be carrying a fetus with a genetic

or environmentally caused birth defect.

She might already be the one-in-a-thou-

sand mother unfortunate enough to de-

liver such a baby. There is nothing much

the mother can do about that risk, after

she’s made up her mind to follow the best

pre-natal care advice any modern obste-

trician would give her. But there is some-

thing you can do about the risk of having

later regrets. Avoid that risk, go to Flor-

ida this summer, wear a big hat when out

in the sun and enjoy the peace of mind.

In the early 1980’s New York City dis-

covered the ionization chamber smoke

detector (ICSD)... I mean DISCOV-

ERED! Between reporters wanting to

know all about how they worked, and

which type was the best, and other people

wanting to know how much radiation they

emitted and how dangerous they were,

and public officials debating the best

places to mount them in a home, and how

many, there was a period of about three

months when, it seemed, all other radia-

tion risks were forgotten. Of course,

many local firemen across the country did

the best job of putting the health prob-

lems into perspective when they advised

parents that their children ran a far

greater risk of death by smoke inhalation

or burning than the risk of death from

smoke detector radiation. That simple

statement, and the many instances of local

government enacting ordinances requir-

ing smoke detectors in new residential

construction, have undoubtedly saved

many, many lives. At the beginning of the

controversy, I sent some copies of

NUREG 1156’ to people in the New York

area. I had skimmed the book, and it all

seemed to be there. Then, one day, a man

from somewhere in Nassau County called

up to ask if I could translate some of it

for him. He had asked me on the phone

a few days earlier how much radiation he

would get from the smoke detector, and

I had told him the answer was in this book

I would send him. Now, he began to read

from the second page of the Executive

Summary of the report. ‘““The use of Am-

241 ICSD’s does result in exposure of

people to low levels of radiation. Analysis

shows that the manufacture, distribution,

normal use, and disposal of 14 million

Am-241 ICSD’s each containing 3 uCi of

Am-241 will result in a collective total

body dose of 1100 person-rem. The useful

life (of the ICSD) is assumed to be ten

years. Disposal is by either sanitary land-

fill or incineration. Fourteen million

ICSD’s will service about 21 million peo-

ple. Analysis also shows the risk to the

exposed population is about 0.1 fatal can-

cer.’’ The report went on to say that in

this same group of 21 million people,

about 35,000 would die each year from

cancers. It is really just an average high

school algebra problem, I said. Let’s see

if I can remember how to do it. If you

have a dose of 1100 person-rem spread

out among 21 million people, the average

dose per person is 1100 divided by 21 mil-

lion, or about one-twentieth of a millirem.

Out on Long Island, you probably get

about 1,500 times more than that a year

from natural background radiation. Since

finding out that you may become the pos-

sessor of a 0.1 fatal cancer is not exactly

a self-explanatory fact, what is one sup-

posed to think that means? I have a lot

of trouble putting *‘0.1 fatal cancer”’ into

meaningful words. It’s sort of like having

a 0.1 pregnancy. Does it mean that after

the fourth week you’re suddenly not preg-

nant anymore ... is a 0.1 cancer death

one that is cured nine times out of ten,

before it kills you? Or does it mean that

if there were ten times as many people at

risk, say 210 million instead of 21 million,

that among the 350,000 yearly cancer

deaths there would be one cancer death

184 KARL ABRAHAM

that could be blamed on exposure to ra-

diation from a smoke detector? Of course

there would be no way of telling whose

cancer death it would be. It reminded me

of the old story of the firing squad com-

mander giving out nine live rounds and

one dummy so that no one soldier would

know for sure if his was the fatal bullet,

but all could believe it was not theirs if

they wished. I doubt that this kind of sta-

tistical blizzardry will cause anyone to be-

lieve or disbelieve in the much publicized

dangers of radiation. NUREG 1156 con-

tains a kind of cost-benefit approach that

might arouse some people’s sense of self-

interest enough to help them manage

their fear of very, very small exposures to

radiation, if they have one. The report

points out, and I read to my caller, that

‘The ratio of potential lives saved to the

possible fatal cancers due to the use of

ICSD’s ranges from 15,000 to 51,000.”

There was some silence, and the man

asked, ‘“‘Based on what statistics?’ So I

read from the first page: “Between 7,500

and 12,000 lives are lost in fires every year

with 70 percent of these occurring in

residential fires .. . Based on theoret-

ical studies and case histories, the esti-

mated percent of residential fire-related

deaths that smoke detectors could save is

between 41 and 89 percent,” and I added,

that’s between 3,075 and 10,680 lives

saved per year, compared to one cancer

death in ten years. There was another

long silence, and then the man said,

‘“That’s all very well, but you still haven’t

told me how much radiation I am going

to get from the smoke detector if I put it

up in my house.” Ah, I said, you should

look on page 3-23. After taking into ac-

count your picking up the smoke detec-

tor, transporting it home, installing it on

the ceiling, testing it with its test-button,

doing periodic dusting or other mainte-

nance, such as changing batteries, and

then letting it operate while you walk un-

der it so many times a day, and making

a few assumptions about how people do

these steps, the study arrived at an av-

erage annual exposure of 9.3 urem (mi-

crorem) per year, which is a figure much

smaller than the earlier one I gave you

because that one included the exposures

of people who handle the radioactive

americium-241 material during its man-

ufacture and during the smoke detectors’

manufacture, and while their exposure is

higher than the average exposure of the

consuming public, it is still a small frac-

tion of the occcupational exposure limits

in NRC regulations.

Now if that all sounded quite reason-

able, and I think it is, then it should also

have sounded quite unsatisfying. There is

another answer, probably more accurate,

and also bordering on rudeness. “‘Mr,” I

could have said, “get a notebook and

count the number of times each day that

you walk under the smoke detector, and

how much time you spend in a chair or a

bed or standing by a telephone, and how

far those locations are from the detector.

Then hire yourself a competent health

physicist to measure the radiation from

the device to wherever you are for how

long you are there, and he will give you

a reasonably close figure of your annual

exposure.’’ At which point my caller

would say, “‘is that what I pay taxes for,

for advice like that?” Actually, in trying

to give him the best approximation to a

precise answer that the documentation

suggested, I had simply exhausted his in-

terest, or his patience, or both. In a quite

flat tone, he said ““Thank you very much”

and hung up.

I don’t think the way that researchers

are accustomed to phrasing applied

research results and publishing them

necessarily lends itself to use in pub-

lic information. I have become quite

shy about quoting studies, setting aside

for now the question of their intrinsic

merit, in the areas of biological effects

of low level radiation and in the area of

nuclear power plant probabilistic risk

assessment.

I am amazed by people I know who

sometimes are so inattentive when driving

that they go through a red light. You

would think that they would become ab-

NON-MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS 185

solutely paralyzed a few blocks down the

road, when they realize what a huge risk

of automobile accident fatality they have

just taken. But, the incident quickly slips

from their mind. Yet they fight bitterly

with their dental hygienist to avoid the

small added risk from having a mouthful

of asymptomatic, probably unnecessary

X-rays. I know there are people like that,

because I’m one of them.

Maybe it isn’t so much that we don’t

know enough about the effects of low-

level radiation exposures as that we just

don’t know enough about human nature

and the perception of risk. I’ve read a

couple of luxuriantly statistical studies on

that also. They didn’t do much for my

perception of perceptions of risk, except

to make me accept their seemingly infinite

variability as a fact of life.

References Cited

1. Brooks, B. G. 1986. Occupational Radiation Ex-

posure at Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors

and Other Facilities 1984. U.S. Nuclear Regu-

latory Commission, Office of Nuclear Regulatory

Research (NUREG-0713, vol. 6) pp. 1-9.

2. Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing

Radiations. National Research Council. 1980.

The Effects on Populations of Exposure to Low

Levels of Ionizing Radiation:1980. National

Academy Press. pp. 2-3.

3. Belanger, R., Buckley, D. W., and Swensen,

J. B. 1979. Environmental Assessment of Ioni-

zation Chamber Smoke Detectors Containing

Am-241. Science Applications, Inc. U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission (NUREG/CR-1156)

Executive Summary.

Journal of the Washington Academy of Sciences,

Volume 78, Number 2, Pages 186-189, June 1988

Policy Perspective on

Communications Issues

Frank E. Tooper

Office of Nuclear Energy

U.S. Department of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

It seems as though whenever two

Or more parties with diverging view-

points need to communicate an issue

arises. That leaves the topic of my talk

open to a wide array of discussion points.

Therefore, today I will offer a com-

munications issues perspective in the con-

text of the future of commercial nuclear

power.

The prospects for nuclear power and

attendant communications issues associ-

ated with the formulation and adoption

of policy in the United States after Cher-

nobyl can best be gauged by examining

the conflict between two competing

forces:

@ The emergence of nuclear energy

as a vital and growing source of

electricity worldwide which is in-

extricably tied to energy security,

and

@ Anti-nuclear strategies which are

focussed on altering the polit-

ical climate.in Western coun-

tries thus making policy deci-

sions regarding the deployment of

nuclear power unrelated to need or

economics.

186

Nuclear Power is Vital to

Energy Security

Since the Atoms for Peace Initiative of

1954, nuclear technology has been trans-

formed from a scientific curiosity to an

economic powerhouse. By any measure

the commercial introduction of nuclear

power has to be one of the great success

stories of this century. Consider the role

of nuclear power in reducing worldwide

dependence on oil. Nuclear power cur-

rently offsets the equivalent of about 8

million barrels a day of oil in the United

States. It has been a potent force to break

the grip of OPEC and restoring energy

security.

Moreover, the transition to an electric-

ity intensive economy powered by nuclear

energy has been a principal element of

national policy in countries such as Japan

and France. In those countries, and oth-

ers, nuclear power continues to be

cheaper and more viable than other forms

of electricity supply. An economic edge

in the price of power production brings

benefits beyond energy security.

Nuclear power construction worldwide

has almost reached the end of its first

phase—that of replacing fossil supplies.

POLICY PERSPECTIVE ON COMMUNICATIONS ISSUES 187

Nuclear power is now entering a phase of

lower growth—competing for a share in

meeting new electricity demand.

The sharp reduction in the rate of elec-

tricity growth that took place in the

United States due to the 1970’s recession

caused an unforeseen shakeout in the

U.S. nuclear industry. What occurred in

the United States presaged the more gen-

eral shakeout that is now taking place

worldwide. The prospects for new orders

are much lower than some projected a

decade ago. Nuclear vendors and sup-

pliers are leaving the scene. In the mean-

time, the shakeout is putting great strain

on the U.S. nuclear industry.

Overlay this reduced demand for new

construction with institutional and polit-

ical forces that tend to further curb the

prospects for new nuclear powerplants

and you have the ingredients for energy

security concerns—even without Cher-

nobyl. :

Opposition to Nuclear as an Effective

Political Tactic

The level of rhetoric concerning any-

thing nuclear is very high. Public officials

have the ability to hold up construction

projects in ways that are qualitatively dif-

ferent for the nuclear option as compared

with coal, oil, natural gas, or doing with-

out. Some Federal officials have regarded

nuclear as an option of last resort. Many

equate civilian nuclear power programs

with concerns about nuclear weapons.

In large measure, the sophistication

and complexity of nuclear technology is

such that public acceptance of nuclear

power involves an act of faith and trust.

Those unalterably opposed to nuclear

power have, over the years, attempted to

undermine confidence in nuclear power.

A host of strategies have been used to

discredit the industry and challenge the

effectiveness of the agency charged with

assuring good industry practice.

The strategies find special fuel in events

such as Chernobyl. When Chernobyl! oc-

curred, some were quick to sound the

theme that nuclear technology is funda-

mentally unsound—claiming that Cher-

nobyl proved their point.

The fact is that nuclear power can and

does come in all shapes and sizes. A de-

signer of a nuclear powerplant can choose

from among several fuel types, coolants,

and nuclear moderators. These choices

can be configured to optimize fuel econ-

omy, power output, assured safety, ease

of construction, or some other set of per-

formance values.

The Soviets, at the Chernobyl] Post-Ac-

cident Review Meeting of August 25-29,

1986, went to some lengths to explain the

rationale for selecting the Chernobyl type

design. Features were selected that re-

flected the particular circumstances of the

Soviet system—such as their inability to

manufacture the large thick-walled ves-

sels needed for light water reactors. The

result was a design that was unstable at

low power, operators who apparently did

not understand the safety weaknesses of

their machine, and a management system

which did not encourage open discussion

of safety issues.

The weaknesses in the Soviet technol-

ogy and the susceptibility to human error

have been used by some to criticize U.S.

technology and practices. The truth is that

the Chernobyl accident has little or no

bearing on the commercial technology de-

ployed in the United States except to the

extent that it reenforces what we already

knew—that these machines should be as

resistant as possible to human error, and

that safety in design, construction, and

Operation are of paramount importance.

Communications Issues

There is an old adage that truth is the

best policy. I firmly believe in this. The

truth, however, sometimes takes some in-

teresting turns between the source and the

receiver. This may result from the receiv-

188

ers level of understanding, preconceived

notions or biases, or the number of in-

termediaries between the source and the

receiver. Viewing the general public as a

receiver it is not surprising how public

perception can become distorted.

History shows that public policy and

public perception ultimately converge.

Therefore, communications issues asso-

ciated with the formulation and adoption

of sound public policy must be addressed,

hand-in-hand, with issues associated with

prevailing public perception.

The ability to communicate effectively

among parties with diverging viewpoints

and the general public will ultimately

shape policy and public perceptions in the

future. As we look to the future, I believe

it is time to leave ideologies such as pro-

nuclear and anti-nuclear behind us. We

need nuclear power for energy security

and economic growth. It is time for re-

sponsible parties truly concerned about

nuclear safety and economics to start ef-

fective and constructive communications

for the benefit of the general public.

I have observed a considerable amount

of counterproductive and wasted effort

between pronuclear and antinuclear

forces in the United States. In the mean-

time, other nations move ahead and we

stagnate. For example, electricity de-

mand in the northeast is growing at a rate

of six to seven percent annually. That re-

gion of the United States needs new cen-

tral generating capacity that can only be

provided from coal or nuclear. However,

the investment risk for these types of

plants is too high for utilities in that region

to entertain new construction requiring

large capital commitments over an un-

certain period of time. Recent experi-

ence, specifically regarding nuclear

powerplants already completed yet not

operational, demonstrates the magnitude

of the investment risk. What is happening

in the Northeast may presage what will

happen in the rest of the country in the

future when new large capacity additions

are required.

Canada, observing these trends, built

FRANK E.

TOOPER

nuclear powerplants near our border with

the specific intent of selling power to the

United States. This is a disturbing situa-

tion, particularly when we have the tech-

nology, and the diverging forces that

come to bear in our system derive the

nation of the benefit of using it appro-

priately. Communication is a key to cor-

recting this situation.

Health, Safety, and Economics

In the past, health and safety are issues

have been discussed apart from consid-

erations of economics. This is consistent

with the philosophy adopted in the United

States long-ago that safety comes first at

any cost. However, in the wake of TMI,

the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

promulgated many additional require-

ments aimed at enhancing the safety of

reactors in operation and those under

construction. The cost of implementing

these requirements was enormous. In ret-

rospect, while most of these requirements

were advantageous from a safety stand-

point, some requirements may not have

been. From a consumer standpoint, some

retrofits may not have been cost/effective.

Thus, it brings into question whether the

regulatory process should enable deter-

minations whether or not a proposed

safety improvement is worth the money.

Generally speaking, experience shows

there is a point of diminishing returns in

increased safety for capital spent.

Pragmatically, it seemed this experi-

ence should lead to the formulation of an

improved regulatory policy that allows

the cost of a safety improvement to be

judged in the context of the benefit de-

rived. While this may sound reasonable

and serve to lend stability to the regula-

tory process, it did not win unanimous

support.

The proposed policy evoked a response

that it was intellectually inconsistent with

regulatory responsibilities. Cost should

not enter into safety considerations, par-

POLICY PERSPECTIVE ON COMMUNICATIONS ISSUES 189

ticularly those which involve backfitting

operating plants or those under construc-

tion. Backfitting, by definition, requires

additional expenditures and contributes

to the cost of the power produced by the

plant in most cases. Thus, the cost of nu-

clear plants is an open question. A utility

never knows when the plant is completed.

The point here is not whether the policy

was right or wrong, but rather that the

process of attempting to develop and

adopt seemingly better policy provided an

arena that resulted in miscommunication

to the public. The intent of the NRC, and

basis for that intent, was never commu-

nicated to the public. Instead, the public

heard that the NRC held industry inter-

ests as a priority over public safety. This

is one example of how the truth takes

many turns.

Relative Risk and the Perception

of Risk

Many ardent supporters of nuclear

power have tried in many ways to com-

municate to the general public the relative

risk of nuclear power. Lists showing the

risks due to smoking, flying in airplanes,

driving automobiles, and many other

every day activities purport to illustrate

how acceptable the risk is from nuclear

power. While many people who already

view nuclear power as essential find these

comparisons convincing or enlightening,

these comparisons are, for the most part,

irrelevant.

Generally individuals can and will ac-

cept almost any risk as long as they are

in control of that choice. However, if an

individual feels they have no control over

a particular risk, real or otherwise, then

it is unacceptable. This response to risk

is true for all electricity generating tech-

nologies. However, perceptions of the

risk from nuclear power appear to be

more acute.

The communication issue at hand is

how to increase public understanding of

relative risk and what constitutes levels of

acceptable risk.

In summary, key communications is-

sues are:

@ How to communicate the need for

nuclear power as a vital and grow-

ing part of our electricity supply mix

for energy security and economic

growth?

@ How to leave the ideologies of pro-

and anti-nuclear behind, and move

toward timely and constructive dia-

logues among responsible parties

having diverging viewpoints regard-

ing the safety and economics of nu-

clear power?

@ How to communicate that societal

risk is unavoidable and, as far as elec-

tricity technologies go, the health

risk from nuclear power is relatively

small—acceptably so.

As I mentioned before, truth is the best

policy. It is a fact that only coal and nu-

clear can provide large central supply ca-

pacity increases for meeting anticipated

electricity demand in the foreseeable fu-

ture. Conservative estimates of electricity

demand to the year 2000 indicate about

100 GWe of additional capacity will be

needed over and above that which 1s cur-

rently planned or under construction. Gas

and renewables will play an important

role in adding relatively small increments

of supply. However, we are going to need

further contributions from nuclear power

if energy security and economic objec-

tives are to be met. Communications is-

sues must be faced squarely and now.

Journal of the Washington Academy of Sciences,

Volume 78, Number 2, Pages 190-204, June 1988

Round Table Discussion:

Communications

RUSSELL: Before we open the panel

to discussion, we are going to have a few

comments from Robert Alvarez, who is

here as a discussant. He is with the En-

vironmental Policy Institute, a Washing-

ton group that is often referred to by the

media as a watchdog group. The Envi-

ronmental Policy Institute has been

around since the early 1970s, and Bob’s

group was among the groups that has

monitored Three Mile Island and other

nuclear problems.

ALVAREZ: I would like to discuss

just two basic issues here: one is, what

has been the impact of media coverage as

a result of the Chernobyl accident and the

issue of risks.

I think that Mr. Smyser has raised a

very important point which I want to ex-

pand upon. I think a lot of public per-

ception of atomic energy does stem from

its birth during World War II and the det-

onation of atomic bombs over Japan. I

think, moreover, the impact of the media

relative to the Chernobyl accident has

been more profoundly felt on our nuclear

weapons program than commercial nu-

clear power, and that this media coverage

has implictly cast the long shadow of the

nuclear weapons program over our com-

mercial nuclear power industry.

About four or five years before Cher-

nobyl, several of the regional dailies—

Oak Ridge, Knoxville, Cincinnati, South

Carolina and Georgia papers, Colorado

papers, Washington State papers—began

190

to publish stories about largely the lega-

cies of the Department of Energy nuclear

weapons industry and certain things that

were coming out. Over the years, these

papers in a sort of mosaic form presented

a picture of a technology or an industry

which has depended very heavily on the

use of air, soil, water, ground waters as

disposal media for some of the world’s

most dangerous pollutants.

For example, at the Hanford Plutonium

Works, before the Three Mile Island oc-

curred—several months before that,

probably about a year before that—it was

reported that approximately 200 billion

gallons of radioactive and hazardous con-

taminated liquids were deliberately

dumped into the soil there, using the soil

as a disposal medium. This is roughly

equivalent of creating a lake the size of

Manhattan to a depth of 40 feet.

By the time Chernobyl came, the re-

gional media were primed. I recall two or

three days after the accident was re-

ported, the first serious reporting in this

country started on Monday, I believe,

from the weekend. A gentleman from

Oak Ridge National Lab was on CBS

Evening News and made the point that

our commercial nuclear power plants are

much different from that of Chernobyl

largely because they contained these con-

tainment shields, these concrete, steel

domes that are there to prevent the es-

cape of radioactivity as a final safety

backup in the case of a severe accident.

ROUND TABLE DISCUSSION 191

However, this gentleman failed to note

that the Department of Energy, who was

his employer, has been running several

reactors without containment shields for

decades. This point was eventually made

known, largely because of the “‘hysterical

environmentalists.”’

What has resulted of this knowledge is

that the regional dailies essentially pro-

vided a groundswell for national media to

draw attention to the most dangerous as-

pects of the nuclear industry in this coun-

try, which are their military applications.

This has resulted in some very significant

impacts.

Ask yourself, How many commercial

nuclear power plants have been shut

down or had their activities curtailed in

direct result of Chernobyl? I cannot think

of one example. However, if you asked

that question in regard to its impact on

the Department of Energy’s nuclear arms

program, the Hanford N-Reactor, which

has general design similarities to that of

Chernobyl—in fact, the Soviets more or

less stole their reactor designs from those

developed at the Hanford Plutonium

Works—is now shut down. The Senate

Armed Services and Appropriations

Committees have just recently voted to

put it on permanent standby status.

The reactors at the Savannah River

plant facility, which also produced nu-

clear explosive materials, are of a differ-

ent design, but it has been discovered that

they have been operating under condi-

tions with inadequate safety systems, and

they are running at much lower capacities.

At the Oak Ridge facility, several “Class

A” reactors, the DOBP’s largest reactors,

have been shut down because of age and

fatigue, and there is some question as to

when or if those reactors are started up.

In essence, the impact of public awareness

about our nuclear weapons program pro-

vided by the media has sharply curtailed

the production of nuclear explosives in

this country and is leading to a reeval-

uation of that.

Also, it has drawn attention to the fact

that the nuclear weapons program is far

more dangerous but yet controls most of

the information upon which we determine

the risks. For example—this is something

that has been reported off and on but

more people are becoming aware of this,

largely because of the media—the De-

partment of Energy funds over 60 percent

of all radiation health effects research,

and most of this research is derived from

activities stemming from the production

or deployment of nuclear weapons. The

baseline epidemiologic information upon

which we determine our radiation risks

are derived from the health and mortality

experience of the Japanese A-bomb sur-

vivors. The other data that are now being

generated are those derived from the

studies of workers who helped make the

nuclear arsenal possible. So there has

been a very prominent role which the nu-

clear weapons program has played in

things concerning nuclear power.

Now in terms of modern times, there

is also the situation of the declining budg-

ets in the Energy Department’s civilian

nuclear R&D program for actual civilian

application and the increased spending

for military uses. What this means is that

the Department of Energy is taking

money away from developing advanced

reactors which could be used for com-

mercial use or to improve the safety of

existing reactors in order to enhance the

use of reactors for military purposes,

mainly for Star Wars. You merely have

to study the Energy Department budget

to figure this out.

To reiterate what I said before, I think

media coverage has had a more profound

effect on our military program than the

civilian.

Now in terms of the issue of risks, first,

there is the risk of the accident, which has

been characterized in terms of the method

that has been used to portray this risk,

which is probabilistic risk assessment.

This is a method that is widely used by

the chemical and nuclear industries. The

gist of how the method works is that it

compares the probability of failure from

events which occur fairly frequently,

192 COMMUNICATIONS

which have small consequence, to the

probability of a failure of events that are

very infrequent and that have, nonethe-

less, a catastrophic consequence.

This is very much like comparing the

risks of getting AIDS from unscreened

blood from the risk of catching a cold by

going to work in the wintertime. If this

were adopted as a public health policy, it

would be advised that people can receive

unscreened blood because the risk of get-

ting AIDS compared to that of getting a

cold is so small that the screening of blood

is not warranted.

This particular method is shunned by

an industry whose business is risk assess-

ment, which is the insurance industry. No

insurance company will use a method to

provide an insurance policy to an activity

that could ultimately lead to catastrophic

consequences, with a very small proba-

bility that it would bankrupt that insur-

ance company. This is why, historically,

the insurance industry has not been will-

ing to assume full liability for nuclear

power and why the government contrac-

tors who operate nuclear weapons fac-

tories refuse and are fighting adamantly

in the Congress this year to not accept

any form of financial responsibility for

catastrophic accidents which they may

cause from their own negligence and mis-

conduct in the nuclear weapons program.

This is one of the problems. Any risk

assessment where you are involving a cat-

astrophic event, where the potential is

quite severe, there has to be a major ele-

ment of risk assessment, and it has been

basically excluded.

In terms of the biological risks of ra-

diation, as we have been told and as we

probably know, radiation has been one of

the most studied phenomenon in the

world. To the credit of our government

nuclear program, this is the only industry

I am aware of where, since its inception

in World War II, there were conscientious

people who had access to very large re-

sources who were able to set up a system

where, one, the workers in these facilities

are individually monitored, and two, the

environment is monitored. There is no

industry in the world that has ever done

this, or even does this to this day, with

the kind of detailed practice that occurs

in our nuclear program. When you deal

with asbestos, for example, in terms of

estimating doses from asbestos, it is more

of a hand-waving exercise as opposed to

dealing with the radiation risks, because

there is a record there.

But at the same time, the irony of this

is that it’s true we know very little about

the biologic effects of radiation, but we

also realize that there are still very great

uncertainties about the nature of these

risks when you start to get down to the

almost invisible level of the single cell.

What is really going on there? This is

where the debate is going on relative to

the risks of low-level radiation.

You have heard various risks presented

to you, in terms of your risk of getting

cancer versus this. First of all, I have

heard no discussion about fetal risks. The

fetus is considered the most sensitive form

of human life to ionizing radiation.

The fetus, it has been discovered, is

very Sensitive to radiation, and I just draw

your attention to two types of studies, one

dealing with cancer and the other dealing

with teratogenic problems.

The studies dealing with cancer are

those which are derived mainly from the

study of children who were x-rayed in

utero during pregnancy. Those studies

generally suggest that a single x-ray can

initiate a childhood cancer. Now, child-

hood cancer, as some of you may know,

is the single biggest cause of death by dis-

ease in this country for children. Yet, the

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, after 30

years, is finally producing a standard to

protect pregnant working women many

years after these data have been made

known.

The notion of risk, in terms of radia-

tion, is rarely ever presented in terms of

range of risk. It’s always given as a certain

figure. Your risk of developing cancer

versus your risk of cancer from smoking

cigarettes is x, y and z. But I think that

ROUND TABLE DISCUSSION 193

the risk has to be portrayed in the true

reflection of its uncertainties, and I do not

see that happening. This leads me to some

other basic issues.

When you have this kind of uncer-

tainty, upon whom does the burden of

proof rest? For example, the Energy De-

partment is consistently saying that their

practice of dumping large amounts of ra-

dioactive and toxic materials into soils

poses no hazards to people. Well, how do

they know that? They do not even have

standards for soil contamination or

ground water standards. This obviously

puts the burden of proof on the people

who stand to be contaminated by this.

First of all, the way the burden of proof

has been portrayed, for example in the

Three Mile Island accident, there has

been a lot of paper and a lot of infor-

mation generated about Three Mile Is-

land, but empirical evidence? Thirteen

monitors. The stacks went off scale. They

do not know exactly what went out of the

reactor itself. There is a tremendous

amount of uncertainty, despite the reas-

surances of small amounts of radiation re-

leased. There is no empirical evidence to

support that. There is a lot of extrapo-

lation from a small amount of evidence

to that effect.

Let me give you an example of how

extrapolations are used. At the Savannah

River plant and at nuclear power plants,

the way doses are estimated to members

of the public is by extrapolation. In other

words, a number, which represents the

amount of radioactivities being released

from a point source, a stack, is then put

into a rather elaborate computer model,

which takes into account the weather con-

ditions and the distance from people and

other variables. Then a number comes

out.

At the Savannah River Plant, the

model suggests that the radiation being

emitted from their two reprocessing

plants which are in the middle of the site

are so dilute by the time they reach the

plant boundary, they cannot be mea-

sured. Well, according to a study done by

the Energy Department, the Air Force,

and the Weather Service, they tracked a

Krypton-85 plume, just a radioactive gas

that comes out of one of these reprocess-

ing plants, and discovered that it was 10

times more radioactive at several hundred

miles than what the model said it would

be at the plant boundary.

The models that you are looking at, in

terms of these risks, basically have not

been validated by empirical evidence.

The monitoring systems around commer-

cial and civil facilities are not designed to

validate these models. I was told by Dr.

William Mills many years ago in writing,

who was with the EPA and then joined

the NRC and I believe has retired now,

that monitoring around nuclear power

plants are for public reassurance. This is

what we are dealing with, the uncertainty

of risk.

I think that when you are getting into

the uncertainty of risk, there are two basic

principles you have to operate under. One

is conservatism. When you do not really

know what the nature of the risk is with

any precision, you have to assume the

worst can happen. And two, there is a

question of trust. For example, the En-

ergy Department, it has been revealed

over the years, has released very large

amounts of radiation deliberately in order

to produce nuclear weapons and never

told anybody about it. I served as a panel

member for the Centers for Disease Con-

trol, looking into matters concerning

Hanford. The CDC in the State of Wash-

ington estimated infant thyroid doses in

1945 which were on the order of 2,950

rem. Nobody was told about this. Can you

trust the people who are doing the pol-

lution to tell you the truth.

I say that we need better forms of in-

dependent regulation, and we need to be

more conservative.

LIDSKY:;,J°m:, Larry.Lidsky.. .fsom

M.I.T., and that has something to do with

what I am going to say. M.I.T. is in Mas-

sachusetts. We have a State lottery. The

chances of winning the State lottery are

somewhat less than | in a million. Every-

194 COMMUNICATIONS

body in the State buys a ticket, and every-

one is surprised when they do not win the

next week. One in a million to the public,

if you are concerned about the answer is

sort of 50/50. So you have a real problem

with that number.

The other real problem you have in

communicating risk is a point that was just

raised. That is the risk of serious exposure

due to an accident in a nuclear plant is

calculated by the engineers working on

the plant. At the end of that process, they

say, ‘The risk of a serious exposure is 1

in 10’. And I calculated this, doing a very

careful calculation. I am a scientist. Trust

me.” The public says, “I don’t trust you

anymore.”

So you have two problems. One is that

1 in a million is not a real number to the

public. But more to the point, and I think

deservedly so, the public does not trust

you—the scientist or the industry or the

government—to tell them what the risks

really are. I think that is the fundamental

problem in communications we have now.

It may well be that the communications

have been accurate.

ABRAHAM: I think that is an ex-

tremely important issue. I do not think it

is, however, a large mystery. The public

does not trust scientists because some of

them have lent their pedigrees and cre-

dentials to commercial enterprises that

have disillusioned kids who learned in

school that a scientist, like a physician,

was somehow on a higher moral plane. I

do not know how scientists will solve that

problem, but I do know that the public

will not solve it.

The government is not trusted because

some people who have been in the gov-

ernment in the past have shown them-

selves to be underserving of the trust that

was placed in them. There is no point in

my reeling off names. You read them all

in the newspapers. I think the biggest sur-

prise I got when I left the newspaper busi-

ness, where I had a fair amount of

credibility, and I joined the Federal Gov-

ernment in the fall of 1973, was to find

overnight and even more so in the next

couple of years that there was a wide mis-

trust of me that had nothing to do with

my personal reputation. That is another

fact of life that we have to deal with.

I think the mistrust of the industry

comes from the industry using the same

mechanism for product advertising that it

uses for communication with the public

on public interest issues. I do not believe

that the stereotype of the public relations

guy in the movie The China Syndrome

was, until very recently, very widely true.

It is a problem that the industry would

have to solve. I do not think that the so-

lutions to the problems are going to come

from anybody else. I think they are very

serious problems. You cannot help people

if they do not trust you. The physician

cannot help a patient if the patient does

not trust the physician.

SPEAKER: We are talking about pub-

lic perception. I think we tend to inter-

nalize too much about industry having to

do this, to improve public perception, and

the government needing to do this, and

the credibility source.

There was a study that did what I con-

sider to be an interesting survey of TV

programs and how movies and TV pro-

grams treat scientists and engineers versus

the doctor. The large majority, something

like 9 out of 10 programs that dealt with

problems pertaining to scientists and en-

gineers portrayed them as ogres, they do

more harm to the public than they do ben-

efit. However, the same fraction, 9 out of

10, of the medical programs, they were

all doing good. They were all saving peo-

ple and that type of thing.

Now you talk about public perception,

think of the impact the media in that re-

gard has on nuclear power and coal and

the preconceived notions and biases of the

general public. That is what I do not know

how to address, and that is where our

media professionals have to help us.

SMYSER: I would just say something

that I have said many times to my fellow

newspapermen. There has been some

trend in the media in more recent years,

and I am generalizing now, to get away

ROUND TABLE DISCUSSION 195

from old fashioned type of reporting. In

many ways, I think that has been good;

we need some innovations. But I think it

has been bad, particularly to the extent

that there has been some tendency to

think that local government matters are

boring to people and that we shouldn't

report them in the detail that we have in

many years past.

I think public trust only comes—We of

the media only create public trust by this

kind of day-in/day-out coverage. J. Ed

Murray, who was a Knight Ridder editor

and publisher for many years, a very

thoughtful man, speaks of what he calls

a reinforcing redundancy in our coverage.

I think this is really the only way, and this

is what I was trying to say when I referred

to process reporting. I think this is the

way that we of the media can help nuclear

power to become better trusted. Day-in/

day-out, over and over again type of cov-

erage that you can help us do.

HENDEE: I’m Bill Hendee from the

American Medical Association. All the

panelists today have identified the nuclear

power issue as one of the most conten-

tious and polarized technological issues in

our society, and there have been various

reasons for that. Among those reasons are

that it was born of the Hiroshima/Naga-

saki explosions. Therefore, the public has

a certain perception of it that is unlike

any other technology and is something

very hard to overcome. There are many

other reasons for that, too.

But Mr. Abraham brought up an issue

that seems to me to be a more funda-

mental issue that may be very difficult to

deal with, no matter how hard we try to

establish communication between those

who understand radiation, nuclear

power, and the public. And that is the

issue that radiation is something different,

because it is intrinsically mysterious and

difficult to understand. It is subtle; the

senses are not sensitive to it. And there-

fore, it is unlike the other types of tech-

nologies we deal with where we have

more of a sense of their significance.

If that is true, if that is one of the fun-

damental issues that confuses and con-

founds the problem of communicating

with the public about radiation, then my

question is simply, What can we do to try

to provide better public education and un-

derstanding of that issue when it is so mys-

terious and subtle and so intrinsically

difficult to talk about?

SPEAKER: I sometimes think that we

are not aware, we do not think about

gravity until we drop a bottle of milk or

somebody falls out a window. It isn’t the

underlying theory of the law of gravity

that people need to understand in order

to stay away from falls. It isn’t the un-

derlying research or the techniques of re-

search about the effects of radiation that

people need to understand the way sci-

entists and technologists think they un-

derstand it.

I do not know what it is that people

need to understand to take something for

granted, but people take a lot of things

for granted that they do not understand.

They are not willing to take radiation for

granted. They are not willing to take a

doctor’s word for the fact that a casual

contact will not communicate AIDS to

you. If I was going to suggest research, I

think it ought to be on why that is.

ALVAREZ: In following up on why

that is, I think the research could look

very closely at recent history, starting with

World War II. Indeed, the perception of

radiation, in terms of what you would call

the cultural or collective memory, cer-

tainly has its origin from the devastation

it caused in Japan. But also following

that, there was the atmospheric weapons

testing program, and the conduct of the

U.S. Government, the claims made by the

U.S. Government about the insignificant

dangers of testing, which were in effect

repudiated by the signing of a test ban

treaty.

To a large extent, government credi-

bility has never recovered from that and

it has washed over into the nuclear power

debate. We have to live up to these le-

gacies. Now why does this continue? It is

not just a matter of, how do we better

196

educate the public but looking more se-

riously at the roots of this problem. From

my point of view, it has been an historical

isolation of the radiation biological re-

search program from the mainstream of

public health science. This has been a dis-

cipline that has been dominated largely

by the military nuclear bureaucracy until

recent years. It is still funded very heavily

by the military program. You have to un-

derstand that you cannot ignore that

infrastructure.

If you were to transfer the research au-

thority for radiation health effects to pub-

lic health agencies and open that up to

those processes and to deal with that, you

would get more at the root of the prob-

lem.

ABRAHAMSON: I am Seymour

Abrahamson, Professor of Zoology and

Genetics at the University of Wisconsin.

One of the points I wanted to make was

with respect to the last point Mr. Alvarez

made. I have been a radiation geneticist

since 1950, working on just these issues

of health effects. In the 1950s and early

1960s, my research was funded almost ex-

clusively by NSF. By the mid-1960s, the

chairman of that program called me to

say, “I think you ought to go to DOE.

We don’t have enough funds to support

basic research. That’s the organization

that should be supporting your studies.”’

For 10 years, DOE did support the stud-

ies. NIH has picked up some of it. But in

fact, within the interagency government

research funding programs, DOE was the

source of most of the research, and almost

all the basic research in radiation came

out of that set of programs.

I do not know how you can knock it:

if they were the ones giving out the

money, and that is where it came from,

and nobody else wanted to do that fund-

ing. That is the way it was, as far as I am

concerned.

I have a couple of other points. One is

a point of correction to Mr. Abraham,

who said that when he informs people that

1 in 1000 is the chance of a congenital

child defect, you are inaccurate because

COMMUNICATIONS

it is closer to two-and-a-half percent. So

you are giving them wrong information.

I just wanted to correct the communicator

on that. We know that 1 in every 750

kids born is mentally retarded just from

Down’s Syndrome alone, and there are

all sorts of other child defects.

You made the point in your discussion,

Mr. Abraham, that in general only a very

few people at nuclear power plants get

over 5 rem exposure. I have forgotten

what the number was, but it might have

been 24 or something in that range. Are

you using only the numbers of the work-

ers who are employed in the plant exclu-

sively as those who are monitored, or

is that number also including those

who were brought in as contractors

to do cleanup work and then moved

out?

One of the major problems in the es-

timation of what risk is that a large-dose

exposure was possible for those workers,

boilerplate makers, and what have you,

who came in, unbolted some of the units,

got 5 rem, and then were moved out, but

were never part of the monitoring system

of the individual plants. Do you have any

information on that?

ABRAHAM: Yes, I have it with me.

I will show you the book. It is published

annually, I think for the last 17 years.

Brooks at NRC is the author. If my mem-

ory serves me correctly, the table from

which I got the numbers has in it all peo-

ple who are badged. People who come

into nuclear power plants are badged.

Their radiation is tracked. When they

leave, I think the company has—I forget

whether it’s 30 or 90 days—to send them

a letter and tell them what their exposure

was. I occasionally go on tours of plants.

I get letters like that routinely. They al-

ways Say zero.

The system should embrace everybody

who comes to work in a nuclear power

plant that gets a badge. All the plants that

I am familiar with in the Northeast, no-

body walks in without getting a pocket

dosimeter and a badge. So I believe all

that data are reported to us. I will let you

ROUND TABLE DISCUSSION 197

look at the book and find out whether or

not I’m interpreting that correctly.

ABRAHAMSON: This is to Mr.

Tooper. You were lamenting the fact that

we are not putting up nuclear power

plants in the northeast sector of the coun-

try for the future growth and the needs

of the future, and that Canada might be

putting up plants in that area to supply

the future needs of our country. I think

that was the point you were making.

TOOPER: I wasn’t lamenting the

need. We are not doing it. Iam lamenting

the situation, the process that we have in

the United States.

ABRAHAMSON: As a member of

DOE, I guess my question to you would

be, until DOE and the public can get their

act straight on high-level waste reposito-

ries, should we be putting up any more

nuclear power plants when the NIMBY

syndrome exists throughout the entire

United States, and we haven’t really got-

ten a high-level waste repository accept-

ance at this stage of the game?

TOOPER: Clearly, the waste issue,

particularly high-level waste manage-

ment, is an issue that has to be addressed

hand in hand, but I do not tie it with the

deployment of nuclear power plants. For

example, if we did not deploy any more

nuclear power plants, we would still have

the waste issue. By deploying what I call

a robust redeployment or revitalization of

nuclear power with, say, 30 plants, that

is not going to significantly contribute to

our waste management problem.

So, no, I do not tie the deployment of

nuclear power plants in the foreseeable

future to the waste management problem,

albeit it clearly impacts the public per-

ception that we do not have a tangible

solution to waste management at hand,

and that is the subject of another debate.

BRODSKY: I am Allan Brodsky

from Georgetown University. Up until a

year ago, for 11 years, I was back with

the government’s Nuclear Regulatory

Commission. I guess I should point that

out, but my remarks are as an individual.

My question will be, what can be done

to interest the media in seeking further

the truth, plus a true perspective of sci-

entific opinion in their reporting?

RUBIN: What is the truth? You, I

gather, have a notion in your mind as to

what you think the truth is, but as far as

I can tell, this subject is sufficiently com-

plicated that reasonable people will dis-

agree on the truth. To expect the press to

tell the truth, you are going to have to

somehow demonstrate that there is a truth

to be told, and what areas of this subject

need to be told.

Beyond that, the press does not work

that way anyway. The press does not write

stories each morning in which they say,

“Now the truth about this subject,” and

then talk about nuclear power; and ‘““Now

the truth about that subject,” and so on

through the list of various controversial

issues in society. The press in this country

is very much tied to the reporting of spe-

cific events. It is event-pegged. Very

much of what you see in the press is dic-

tated by events that are out of the control

of the press. Either they are like TMI and

Chernobyl, which are out of the control

of everybody, or they are controlled by

government, in that government creates

events that it wants the press to cover.

The time at which the press spends the

most attention on discussing “‘the truth”

about nuclear power is during accidents

like TMI and Chernobyl, which I would

say is probably the worst time to attempt

to discuss the truth. It is the period in

which the truth, whatever it may be, is

most elusive, passions are highest, people

are most confused, and the audience is

most concerned and ready to believe the

worst.

So one really needs to understand bet-

ter how the press works when it is going

to cover events, and also not to expect

that the press is in any way the ultimate

arbiter of truth, although I think the ul-

timate truth of what Three Mile Island

has meant as an accident, slowly and

through the accumulation of stories, as

Dick Smyser points out, is now available.

It was not a very serious accident in public

198 COMMUNICATIONS

health terms, it was a very serious acci-

dent in economic terms for that utility,

and it was a very serious accident in public

relations terms for the industry. So what

is the truth of the importance of that ac-

cident? It depends where you sit?

SMYSER: There is a marvelous quote

by Walter Lippman. The effect of it is that

really the function of the press, the media,

is not so much to presume to give you the

truth as it is to signal some directions for

you in which you, as a reading public,

might seek out the truth yourself. I think

that is a very accurate description.

I have been many times distressed

about something in my paper, maybe

something that I have written and some-

times written under pressure and in a

hurry and without as much research as I

should have. I have been concerned be-

cause maybe there have been some nu-

ances of it that really are not quite correct,

and I worry. But then sometimes I satisfy

myself, ““Well, perhaps it wasn’t precisely

right, but at very least it called to the

attention of our readers some area which

they should know about that they might

not otherwise have known about, even

though maybe I called it to their attention

in a flawed fashion.” I think Lippman’s

quote is helpful.

RUSSELL: Time is very important. In

the accidents that we are talking about,

both Three Mile Island and Chernobyl,

often there was not much time to get a

lot of perspective. Initially, at the time of

the event, what you are really looking for

is information. What has happened in

both of these incidents is, there is often

a lack of information, and therefore you

are forced to get more opinion, and some-

times the opinion is very polarized.

I was very concerned as a reporter and

also as a member of a journalistic orga-

nization with Chernobyl, where not only

were we impeded in getting information

because the accident did not happen here,

and the Soviets were not very informative

about what was happening, but in that

case, again with all the problems we had

in getting accurate information, we had

problems with the government in getting

to the sources of information.

There was an attempt basically to try

to centralize information, which is a good

idea in theory so that everybody is not

making contradictory statements. But in

doing so, there was a sort of strangling of

information that was available. Fortu-

nately, it was a temporary problem. But

there was a lot of concern by journalists

about that because we couldn’t get infor-

mation, and we were forced to get more

opinion. I would be interested in a com-

ment from Mr. Tooper about this ques-

tion of access to information during a

crisis and how we can improve getting in-

formation from the people who really

know.

In that case, at Lawrence Livermore

Lab in California, there was a group very

experienced in tracking radiation that had

information that might have been helpful

and valuable for us to get. Suddenly, they

were precluded from providing that in-

formation. In my own instance, I called

in the morning and was told that I'd get

a call back. I missed the call because I

was on another call. By the time I called

them back, they said, *‘We are not al-

lowed to talk. Call Washington.”

TOOPER: Again, it is a matter of per-

spective. At TMI, there were so many

sources of information, they appeared to

be conflicting; the media journalists un-

fortunately had to go to more and more

sources, and no one really had a straight

story. So therefore, the lesson we learned

from TMI was that we really need a single

source, like a Harold Denton or a Hans

Blix. That works very well.

On the other hand, you are espousing

that the media is not too content just hav-

ing one source of information. They really

want to have several sources of infor-

mation so that they can get an objective

viewpoint. Well, it seems to be a bit con-

tradictory, in terms of objectives and how

to best serve the public. I think that DOE,

viewing the team I experienced, had a

multigovernment agency involvement, in

terms of accumulating all the information,

ROUND TABLE DISCUSSION 199

albeit through DOE contractors, through

EPA contractors. They were all focused

as a single unit, coming through Lee

Thomas of the EPA as the spokesman. It

was our attempt, to the best of my rec-

ollection, to focus all the credible sources

of information into a coherent package

that the media then could take and run

with. We have to move toward the de-

velopment of the credible source, and this

all loops back to DOE trying, in addition

to the other government agencies, to es-

tablish their credible source.

There was an interesting point in the

Kameny Commission report that the me-

dia perhaps failed in some regard because

they did not have the level of technical

engineering expertise unto themselves, or

they did not bring it with them to be able

to interpret the story.

RUSSELL: With all of these things,

it’s a question of time. By the time you

get all organized, it may be several days

after the story has unfolded.

TOOPER: The issue that I have is the

issue to serve the public and convey the

information at hand and the implications

thereof, or is the issue to be able to discuss

implications prematurely before the an-

swer is available.

ABRAHAM: Because of my grim ex-

periences at Three Mile Island, when the

Chernobyl accident happened, I read al-

most all the stories only for that aspect

that Christine talked about: how was the

information being made available, where

was it coming from, and who knew what

they were talking about or appeared to.

I have clipping services and things that

allow me to read a large cross-section of

newspapers every day. It seemed very ob-

vious to me that there were some things

going on that had nothing to do with the

accident or the availability of a spokes-

man per se. There was an enormous re-

luctance on the part of anybody in this

country to get involved in saying some-

thing outrageous that would be construed

as an anti-Soviet opportunistic slap at the

Russians, because everybody on both

sides I think was trying to improve rela-

tions. We can look now in hindsight at

what other things were going on.

I think people who might otherwise

have been willing to speculate, because

they are high enough in the scientific

pecking order or the governmental peck-

ing order, realized that if they really blew

it, the Russians could easily later prove it

was false and accuse us of doing it for

malicious reasons. But a government of-

ficial or a high person in a research center

that gets privileged information, I think

they would recognize immediately it

would be the end of their career to scuttle

a summit or to do any one of a number

of things.

Those were never considerations at the

time of Three Mile Island. I think some

of the news media gradually caught on to

the fact that the Americans were laying

back a little bit in their information be-

cause there were other things at stake. I

just recognized that as a fact of life.

KASPERSON: I’m Roger Kasperson

from CENTED at Clark University. Sev-

eral aspects of the communication prob-

lem have not been dealt with very much

and deserve mention. First, communica-

tion is a two-way process. If there has

been a major failure in this area, it seems

to me to be on the listening side rather

than on the communicating side or on the

portrayal of information. If one goes be-

yond noting that communication ought to

be two-way and really try to address what

those listening problems are, and the

kinds of impediments that exist in insti-

tutions, or the fact indeed that if you do

communicate accurately, risk perceptions

that are often fundamentally different

than the technical assessments, what are

you going to do with the information that

you have gathered? How are you going

to internalize it in the institutional struc-

ture of the way that regulatory agencies

operate? What role, for example, should

it play in definitions of safety goals for

nuclear power, licensing of nuclear power

plants, implementation of the LARA and

so on? That is one problem.

The second problem related to that is

200 COMMUNICATIONS

this: If we are smart enough or clever

enough to find out how to do the com-

munication, the presentation-of-infor-

mation job to the public in a really good

way that would capture the public’s at-

tention, get them to listen, get the right

information to them, that we would get

different kinds of decisions and response

to the public.

There is now a substantial body of ac-

cumulated social science research on why

the public responds to hazards in the way

that they do. Basically, most of that work

suggests that is probably not the case. We

now know that when the public assesses

nuclear hazards, for example, it comes

out to very different kinds of perceptions

than the experts do because they do it in

fundamentally different ways, consider-

ing fundamentally different properties of

the hazards, as well as the risk process

that delivered the hazard.

One of the questions is, When we are

done with the job of conveying all the

information well, and we still have this

major difference in assessment, do you

think that perhaps the problem is in the

inadequacies of the technical assessment

that fails to capture what is of concern to

the public and what is certainly relevant

to the public interest, rather than in the

kinds of responses that are occurring in

the public?

ALVAREZ: In regard to your latter

question about the technical aspects, I

think that the clarification of technical as-

pects again falls on access to information.

In the previous discussion from the pre-

vious question, we were talking about get-

ting access to information in the wake of

an accident, but I think more importantly

is the problem of getting information be-

fore an accident occurs, especially infor-

mation that deals with what if an accident

occurs. That is a very serious problem, in

terms of getting data out of the govern-

ment, both the Nuclear Regulatory Com-

mission and the Energy Department,

from my perspective as a public interest

advocate.

For example, we were very interested

and have been for many years in studying

the nuclear waste management aspects of

the Savannah River Plant in South Car-

olina and were only able to obtain the

safety analysis report that had been class-

ified secret after we went to court and

forced them to give it to us. So we wrote

a report, which we issued last year, and

the Dupont Corporation, with the sanc-

tion of the Energy Department, issued a

reply based on a new Safety analysis re-

port, of which they released the results

but not the method.

By not releasing your method, you can

juggle your stuff in secret, and there is a

definite lack of scientific integrity. You

need to have access to good technical in-

formation on a regular basis, and there

should be an open policy about this. But

that has been a problem. I think is a real

stumbling block in dealing with the thorny

technical problems.

MOSSMAN: Ken Mossman, George-

town University. I wanted to just make a

few comments about the peculiar char-

acteristics of radiation. The panel has al-

ready alluded to the unusual history, the

images of disaster that one thinks of with

atomic bombs and mushroom clouds, and

the history of nuclear testing, and Three

Mile Island and Chernobyl. I just wanted

to bring up a couple of others for possible

comment.

One, of course, is that the public is very

confused about radiations. They are used

in different ways. For instance, 500,000

people per year in this country are treated

for cancer by radiation. So a lot of peo-

ple know or know about either family,

friends, or relatives who have been

treated. Perhaps they have seen some of

the adverse effects that may come about

from the radiation treatment, and they

may incorrectly compare those kinds of

things with what goes on with radiation

accidents such as at Chernobyl and at

Three Mile Island.

Another situation in which I was per-

sonally involved was during Chernobyl. I

was asked a number of times to make the

comparison between the radioactivity re-

ROUND TABLE DISCUSSION 201

leased at Chernobyl with the radioactive

releases which occurred during the nu-

clear testing in this country. Really, that

is not a very fair comparison because, of

course, it implies that Chernobyl was like

a bomb going off. A lot of people have

these kinds of misconceptions, and it is

the kind of thing that I think journalists

ought to address, because it’s one of the

serious problems in the knowledge array

that the general public has.

One last thing. If you look at the radon

problem, where we are talking about pico

curie levels in the environment of radon,

and following Chernobyl, the release of

100 million curies of radioactivity into the

environment, you are talking about a 20

orders of magnitude range of radiations.

To my knowledge, I do not know of any

agent—chemical, physical, or other-

wise—for which one has to deal with the

public in which one has such a very wide

range of concentrations of some particu-

lar kind of agent, trying to explain away

that perhaps at the very low end you do

not have very many effects, but in the

treatment of cancer you may have some

very serious side effects to deal with. So

I think the public is very confused about

it, and it is because of these problems that

I have identified.

SPEAKER: I think something that

certainly adds greatly to public confusion

about radiation is the scattered and frag-

mented nature of regulation itself. I re-

cently had to do some work to look at this

problem and try to quantify just how scat-

tered it is. Really, you have several dif-

ferent players at the federal level. You

have 50 States imposing some form of reg-

ulation. When you get into the Energy

Department, they have site-specific reg-

ulations; there are no uniform standards

whatsoever. And you have double stan-

dards: if you live near a DOE facility,

particularly in terms of soil dumping of

liquids, you are allowed to receive 20

times more radiation than if you are living

near an NRC facility. Then you have the

Food and Drug Administration involved

in the contamination of food and medical

advices. Then you have several different

advisory committees giving different

kinds of advice to the agencies.

This scattered and fragmented program

of radiation protection really encourages

a dangerous form of self-regulation.

Without uniform and conservative stan-

dards that the general public can under-

stand, it is just going to add to confusion.

RUSSELL: I think some of the con-

fusion results from there being so many

different terms and so many different

sources. When you are trying to make

these analogies and you go to different

experts, many of us will go to someone

in nuclear medicine—so there is a natural

tendency to compare it to x-rays.

It is fascinating, on the radon question,

why the public alarm has not been as high

about that as it might be about something

that was nuclear power related. As jour-

nalists, we are always struggling with what

would be the right analogy to really make

people understand it. I think some sim-

plification of terms by professionals and

some attempt to work out some analogies

that might be more apt would be helpful.

I think that professionals have trouble ex-

plaining it to us, and we then have trouble

explaining it to the public. In any case,

none of us is out there holding the hand

of the person reading the newspaper and

helping monitor why they are reacting to

it. That is a whole different question.

SHARP: My name is Daniel Sharp,

and I am a health physicist at the National

Bureau of Standards.

With reference to Karl Abraham’s talk,

I do not work with the public. I work in

a large laboratory with hundreds of peo-

ple. At least half of my work is exactly

like his work. I give psychological coun-

seling to people, even though I am not a

psychologist. A lot of the damage that

radiation does is psychological, and I con-

sider that a real, valid injury. I have never

read anything in any book or heard any

lecture or talk like Karl Abraham’s. To

me, that is about the most meaningful talk

I have ever heard in five years of this

work.

202

The second comment is related to

something that Alvarez said, that the root

of the problem is in the psyche of people.

If there is a root of the problem, it is not

just that people do not understand all the

details. It is that there is a real psycho-

logical problem entrenched in people’s

minds, and there is no communication

that is going to change that.

The next comment is that people do not

evaluate risk-to-benefit, they just con-

sider benefit. So there is no risk so great

that will be ignored if they want to ignore

it, and there is no risk so small that it

would be the biggest thing in the world if

you do not want to accept it. All people

examine is benefit. So there will be a time

when people’s washing machines and

dishwashers and television sets, vacuum

cleaners, and air conditioners will not

work because there is no power, and they

will want nuclear power.

But I do not believe it is the place of

the government or of any big corporations

to try to force people to want things that

they do not want, especially in a democ-

racy. I believe you could have a whole

civilization filled with cheap power and

all the nuclear power plants to supply all

the energy everybody could ever need,

but the quality of life is not going to be

very high if everybody is super neurotic

about the radiation.

ABRAHAM: I will just mention in

passing that one of the issues the federal

court had to deal with in deciding some

compensation cases in connection with

Three Mile Island was the issue of psy-

chological damage. Everybody says there

was some and then finally agreed that the

scientific community that has the exper-

tise in looking at psychological damage

did not have a really good way of mea-

suring it. There was no really good way

of coming to grips with what you would

call damage and what you would say was

happening to people who had a predis-

position to be alarmed. Some very nasty

talk went around in the popular press on

the issue, but it is one area where every-

body who tried to deal with it in connec-

COMMUNICATIONS

tion with those lawsuits realized that we

do not have institutions, either legal or

scientific, that can effectively deal with

psychological stress from being afraid that

you might get a very high radiation dose

and then it turns out there is no really

high radiation dose.

SPEAKER: One quick comment per-

taining to the government and industry

forcing nuclear power. One has to rec-

ognize that government’s concerns are as-

sociated with the fact that you are not

building a nuclear power plant today and

we are probably not going to build any in

the very near future. The industry as in-

dustry is not something you turn on and

turn off. It goes away. People go on to

other activities, other portions of the pri-

vate sector. The concern 1s, if indeed you

are going to need significant additional

amounts of electricity generative capac-

ity, and coal and nuclear are your only

choices, then what do we do in the mean-

time to keep nuclear as a viable choice.

It is not a matter of forcing. It is a matter

of minimizing the risk and being able to

have that capacity available when needed.

FINUCANE: [’m Jim Finucane from

the Department of Energy, but my com-

ments or questions are specifically as an

individual. I observed, as I guess we all

have, that the good news appears on page

46 with the used car ads and the bad news

on the front page. Because of my interest

in the subject, I did watch very carefully

the Chernobyl reporting. I found it rather

uniformly bad, with the exception of pub-

lic television.

Mr. Rubin, to whom my question is

specifically addressed, alluded to the

ham radio operator and the 3,000 deaths

that were reported almost universally

throughout the media the first week after

the accident. By the middle of the second

week, at least the New York Times re-

ported, again on page 46, a fairly detailed

analysis of clues to the credibility of that

source, but I never say in any of the me-

dia, written or electronic, any formal

statement or retraction of the 3,000 im-

mediately dead. The 20,000 in a mass

ROUND TABLE DISCUSSION 203

grave, I think people would dismiss out

of hand from the New York Post, but the

remainder of the media never got up and

said, ““Hey, this was a mistake.”

RUBIN: Iam glad you raised that. We

cannot let the New York Post stand for

American journalism. The way the 20,000

deaths report from the ham operator was

really in fact covered by the elite media

was, I think, with a lot of responsibility.

I do not know what your memory of

this is, but The Washington Post ran that

report in a box, a small box, and made it

clear that it was unconfirmed. It was not

in any headline. It had none of the prom-

inence it had in the New York Post. When

UPI admitted, as they did on their wire,

that they were wrong, the retraction ap-

peared. The New York Times ran it in a

single paragraph within a much larger

story and also indicated that there was no

confirmation for this.

In fact, the New York Post’s running of

it was completely atypical of the way

American journalism handled the 20,000

death figure. It is unfortunate that the

New York Post is in New York. It is un-

fortunate that it exists, period, but that it

is in New York gives it greater promi-

nence. People assume that these kinds of

headlines were typical across the U.S.

The Soviets use the New York Post to

indicate the way in which the capitalist

press was bashing them over the head in-

accurately.

But I simply urge you to remember that

Murdoch is not American journalism.

RUSSELL: I just second that. Often,

even in the discussion today, we use the

word “press” and ‘“‘media”’ as if it is a

monolithic institution with one single

voice. All reporters are not alike, all

newspapers are not alike, all television is

not alike, all scientists are not alike. It is

dangerous to generalize in the same way

about good news and bad news.

MOORE: Scott Moore, U.S. Army.

The title for this discussion, part of it, “In

the Post-Chernobyl World,” indicates an

international flavor to the discussion. This

is directed at the journalists. How would

you characterize relationships between,

say, the Japanese press and the Japanese

general public, the French press and the

French general public? Is there anything

we can learn from these other nations and

their presses?

RUBIN: Let me only speak about the

French press, because that is the only one

that I am slightly competent on. The

French press is much less aggressive in

challenging its government and its policies

than our press is in challenging its gov-

ernment. Since the French government

seems fairly set on this particular course,

the French press does not challenge it. It

has not and is less likely to than is ours.

So that if you are a champion of press/

government cooperation in order to fur-

ther public policy, the French model

would appeal to you.

D’ARRIGO: My name is Diane D’Ar-

rigo. I am with the Nuclear Information

and Resource Service. We are a public

interest group which provides informa-

tion to the public and sometimes to the

media on nuclear power and waste ques-

tions. One of the things that I found dis-

tressing in a lot of the reporting after

accidents is that there can be a short or a

long article, but it always ends with “and

there was no risk to the public.”

It makes me not even want to give any

credibility to almost the rest of the report

because every amount of radiation has

some risk. It may be a very minute risk.

I sympathize with the reporters because

it is very difficult to present that risk to

the public. That is what this whole thing

is about today, how do we explain what

the risk is and how do people perceive it

and so on. But to give a blanket statement

at the end that there is no risk, and a lot

of times it is quoting someone from the

Department of Energy or the company

that had the accident or the release, it is

a real conflict of interest. There is not

going to be trust from that. The Depart-

ment of Energy is an advocate, even

though the people within the agency

themselves are honest and have integrity.

The agency’s mission is to promote nu-

204 COMMUNICATIONS

clear technologies, and people are not

going to believe when the promoter turns

around and says that there is no risk, be-

cause they are the ones that are promot-

ing.

If I was looking back at a lot of the

coverage, I was struck really, a little bit

in contrast to what some of our speakers

have said, that a lot of the stories that I

was reading emphasized uncertainty and

said the risk was unclear and said there

did not appear to be an immediate risk.

Particularly with Chernobyl, there was a

worldwide question of risk. So I think

there is not a single generalization about

how risk was covered, but I think a lot of

the coverage did make a single-bullet

statement.

ALVAREZ: Briefly, I think your point

is a very good one concerning coverage

of the plant before the accident. We found

in our TMI report, we looked at coverage

of the plants while they were being con-

structed, and we found that there had

been lots of little incidents. Typically, the

press release from the utility was that

there was no danger to the public, which

may be true or may not be true, but the

local press printed the press releases as

received. They did no investigation of

their own. They just took it at face value.

The effect of that is that the public is lulled

into thinking that there is no problem and

that there will be no problem. Then when

there is a problem, as there was, you then

have the credibility issue which lingers.

So in the short term, I suppose, it is

smart for the utility to take that position.

In the long term, if you have an accident,

you have real credibility problems.

Journal of the Washington Academy of Sciences,

Volume 78, Number 2, Pages 205-209, June 1988

Physicians, Physicists, and

Radiation Accidents

William R. Hendee, Ph.D.

Vice President for Science & Technology

American Medical Association

Chicago, Illinois 60610

ABSTRACT

Emergency planning for radiation emergencies has been a long-standing activity of

regulatory agencies and medical institutions in the United States. This activity has been

re-evaluated following the Chernobyl accident, with the result that several changes have

been identified as desirable in current emergency planning measures. Among these

changes is the need for closer involvement in emergency planning by physicians and health

physicists available in communities where nuclear facilities are present. This involvement

requires increased education of these individuals on a variety of topics associated with

radiation. One model effort to provide this education has evolved from an International

Conference on Radiation Emergencies sponsored last fall by the American Medical As-

sociation. This effort is designed not only to enhance professional knowledge about ra-

diation accidents, but also to facilitate communication of this information to the public

sector.

The topic of preparing for and respond-

ing to radiation accidents is not a new

issue. Physicians and health physicists

have had a long standing commitment to

emergency preparedness and the design

of plans for responding to radiation ac-

cidents. Ever since the dawn of the nu-

clear age, we have understood that

radiation accidents can happen, and over

the past four decades such accidents have

happened. It would be foolhardy to be-

lieve that they will not continue to hap-

pen, especially with the increased use of

nuclear energy in defense and for pro-

duction of electricity, and with the ever-

growing use of radiation sources in in-

dustry and for diagnostic and therapeutic

205

purposes in medicine. These uses require

that radiation sources are handled by

technicians, transported from one site to

another, and shipped to remote sites for

storage and disposal. Under these circum-

stances, accidents involving nuclear facil-

ities and radiation sources are bound to

occur, and then physicians, health phy-

sicists and representatives of the media

have major responsibilities. Physicians

are responsible for caring for persons in-

jured during the accident and for those

possibly exposed to radiation. Health

physicists are expected to prevent or min-

imize exposures to individuals wherever

possible, and to control the environment

to prevent the spread of radiation and ra-

206

dioactive contamination. And the media

is expected to provide factual information

about the accident that is as objective as

possible and not slanted to either increase

anxiety about the accident or underesti-

mate its possible consequences.

Responsibilities assigned to physicians,

physicists and media representatives dur-

ing a radiation accident are reflected in

emergency plans required of hospitals by

various agencies, including the Joint

Commission on the Accreditation of

Healthcare Organizations, the U.S. Nu-

clear Regulatory Commission, the U.S.

Department of Energy, and the Federal

Emergency Management Agency. They

are also encompassed in plans for radia-

tion accidents developed by state agencies

responsible for radiation safety. In most

communities these plans have been in ef-

fect for some period of time. Occasionally

these plans have been implemented for

events other than radiation accidents, in-

cluding natural disasters and industrial

and transportation accidents involving

hazardous substances other than radia-

tion sources. In fact, there are only two

major differences between radiation ac-

cidents and other types of emergencies for

which accident plans are useful. These

differences are the long-term conse-

quences of radiation sources released to

the environment during a radiation acci-

dent, and the exaggerated perception of

risk whenever radiation is involved.

Today there is renewed interest in

emergency planning for radiation acci-

dents. This interest is a reflection of the

accident at Three Mile Island, and, more

recently, the accident at Chernobyl in the

Ukraine. For example, the present sym-

posium is a direct result of the accident

at Chernobyl.

Although the management and public

information aspects of the Chernobyl

accident left much to be desired, the med-

ical response was excellent as demon-

strated by the fact that only 31 persons

died, and fewer than 200 persons are es-

timated to have been exposed to doses

exceeding 100 rams. It has also been

WILLIAM R. HENDEE

stated by the Soviets that the medical re-

sponse to Chernobyl exhausted the re-

sources of that country to deal with a

radiation accident.

Since the Chernobyl accident, there has

been much soul searching in the United

States about this country’s ability to re-

spond in similar fashion to a radiation ac-

cident, both medically and as a society.

In particular, there has been much dis-

cussion about whether our professional

teams would respond as well, and the

public reaction would be so controlled,

given our free press and delegation of re-

sponsibility of decision making more to

the individual and less to a bureaucracy.

These questions are reflected in the many

phone calls that I and many others re-

ceived immediately after Chernobyl from

physicians and representatives of medical

societies inquiring into their responsibil-

ities following a radiation accident, and

their feelings of inadequacy in meeting

those responsibilities. These phone calls

were part of the stimulus for development

of the International Conference on Non-

Military Radiation Emergencies that was

held last November in Washington, D.C.

The purpose of this conference was to ex-

amine the current status of emergency

planning for radiation accidents, and the

existing and desired roles of the medical

community in planning for such accidents,

educating physicians and the public about

radiation accidents, and responding to

them should they occur.

Several recommendations evolved

from the International Conference on

Non-Military Radiation Emergencies. It

is clear that significant engineering dif-

ferences exist between the RMBK-1000

graphite moderated reactor that caused

the accident at Chernobyl, and the reac-

tors in the United States that are used to

generate electricity. These differences

provide assurance that an accident of sim-

ilar magnitude in this country is unlikely

to occur. Nevertheless, radiation acci-

dents involving nuclear power facilities

can occur, as can accidents involving

other sources of radiation. Adequate pre-

PHYSICIANS, PHYSICISTS, AND RADIATION ACCIDENTS 207

paredness for such accidents, and edu-

cation of professionals including health

physicists and physicians, are absolutely

essential if the likelihood of these acci-

dents is to be minimized, and the conse-

quences are to be controlled when they

do occur.

The planning effort should include ob-

jective risk assessment of environmental

hazards in general and sources of nuclear

energy and radiation in particular. Risk

assessment is especially important with

regard to nuclear energy used to generate

electricity. We have too long tended to

separate this issue into two camps. One

camp, the advocates of nuclear power,

tend to trivialize the risk, saying that

an accident simply can not and will not

occur, and that even if it did the con-

sequences would be minimal. On the

other side are the opponents of nuclear

power who tend to exaggerate the risks

and claim that nuclear energy is the most

hazardous force ever unleashed upon

mankind. At present, the opponents

are ahead in this debate, as evidenced

by the fact that no applications for new

nuclear power stations have been filed

since 1977.

This country needs a renewed effort to

understand, appreciate and expand the

nuclear contribution to electricity gener-

ation and increased attention to ways to

achieve that contribution at minimum risk

to individuals and society. Shortly after

Chernobyl, a Gallup poll showed that

70% of those questioned opposed the sit-

ing of a nuclear power station within five

miles of their residences, in spite of over-

whelming evidence that a nuclear station

in this country does not pose a significant

risk to individuals in the vicinity. A major

public education effort is needed about

the risks and benefits of nuclear energy

applied to the generation of electricity.

This educational effort requires the par-

ticipation not only of representatives of

the print and electronic media, but also

of health physicists and physicians serving

as community resources knowledgeable

about the benefits and hazards of radia-

tion in general and nuclear power in par-

ticular. Similarly, the disposal of

radioactive wastes is an issue that de-

mands understanding leading to resolu-

tion in our society.

Several other issues evolved from the

International Conference on Non-Mili-

tary Radiation Emergencies. An inter-

national notification system for an-

nouncing the occurence of a radiation

accident of substantial proportions is es-

sential, and appropriate response mech-

anisms for addressing the consequences

of a radiation accident are needed. The

international notification system agreed

to recently by the Soviet Union, the

United States, and several other countries

as a result of the September meeting of

the International Atomic Energy Agency

in Vienna is a good beginning to meeting

the first need. Improved engineering and

safety inspections of nuclear power facil-

ities are needed at an international level.

The program on safety inspections and

planning efforts for criticality scenarios

recently made available through the In-

ternational Atomic Energy Agency are a

promising start toward addressing these

needs.

Both Three Mile Island and Chernobyl

have enhanced the appreciation of the

role of human error in radiation acci-

dents. Improved training and testing of

radiation workers are needed to reduce

the potential of human error. Improved

vigilance against complacency and in-

creased attention to education and train-

ing of health physicists and physicians, as

well as the public, about radiation and

radiation accidents are needed. These

needs should be matched with improved

understanding of ways to mobilize the

medical and health physics communities

in the event of an accident, and with im-

proved planning for radiation accidents at

the community level.

The medical community needs to be

better educated about radiation and the

appropriate mechanisms of response in

the event of a radiation accident. Forums

for professional education on issues in-

208 WILLIAM R. HENDEE

volving radiation need to be established,

so that physicians can better understand:

1. Radiation exposure and radioactive

contamination.

2. Pathophysiology of exposure and con-

tamination.

3. Physical and physiologic behaviors of

sources of radiation.

4. Responsibilities of professional groups

in the event of accidents, including

their obligations to respond and the

limitations intrinsic in their response.

5. Role of medical schools and profes-

sional organizations in providing the

necessary education and training.

6. Existing response mechanisms (eg. the

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Radiologic Assistance Plan, and the

Radiation Emergency Assistance Cen-

ter and Training Site (REAC/TS) in

Oak Ridge).

An improved understanding of levels of

risks is needed, together with a greater

recognition of the obligations of physicists

and physicians to respond to a radiation

accident if one should occur. These issues

need to be worked out before, not after,

an accident has occurred. We have as-

sumed for too long that professionals

would respond appropriately in the event

of an accident, without questioning

whether this assumption is reasonable.

We also have to wonder about the re-

sponsibilities of physicists, physicians and

others, whose homes and families are

threatened by a radiation accident and yet

whose professional obligations require

them to be present at the accident scene

or health facility. And, last but not least,

we need to examine carefully the role and

responsibilities of the electronic and print

media in the event of a radiation accident,

and of those individuals who have re-

sponsibility for interfacing with the me-

dia.

Three major actions resulted from the

international conference. The first was a

demand of the participants to publish the

proceedings of the conference. The pro-

ceedings are currently in press, and

should be available in a few weeks. The

second action was a request that com-

munications be established between the

American Medical Association and the

various federal agencies involved in emer-

gency planning and public education

about radiation accidents. These com-

munications were, in part, to express the

willingness of physicians to become more

involved in these issues, both proactively

and reactively. I have communicated this

offer of help to a number of agencies,

including the Environmental Protection

Agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Com-

mission, Department of Energy, Federal

Emergency Management Agency, and

others, and have found a receptivity to

the involvement of physicians and health

physicists in emergency planning. I plan

to continue this effort.

The third major action of the confer-

ence was to establish an improved dia-

logue between representatives of agencies

operating nuclear power plants and con-

tractors for DOE facilities, and physi-

cians, other health providers, health and

medical physicists, and hospital adminis-

trators in communities where such facil-

ities exist. In response to this directive,

we have focused initially on improving the

dialogue in two states, Illinois and Penn-

sylvania. In Illinois, we are developing a

model program for improved dialogue in

communities around nuclear power facil-

ities, starting with a meeting last week

hosted by the Will-Grundy County Med-

ical Society. This meeting focused on

radiation accidents and involved repre-

sentatives from Commonwealth Edison

and physicians, physicists, technologists

and administrators from the community.

We pian to hold similar meetings in other

parts of the state where nuclear facilities

are present, with the intention of devel-

oping a model program that can be ex-

ported to other states. We are pursuing a

similar approach in Pennsylvania, where

Pennsylvania Power and Light is already

involved with the medical community in

PHYSICIANS, PHYSICISTS, AND RADIATION ACCIDENTS 209

a series of public forums about radiation

and radiation accidents.

There is one remaining issue that de-

serves mentioning as part of this presen-

tation. That issue is the current public

perception and misperception of risks,

both individual and societal, and how the

applications of risk assessment and risk

management techniques can be made

more objective and more efficient as

viewed from the public sector. There is

considerable information available about

the processes of risk assessment and risk

management, and more is becoming

available as time goes on. These processes

pertain to, but certainly extend beyond,

the specific issues of radiation, radiation

accidents and nuclear energy. This past

week the American Medical Association

held a teleconference on risk assessment

and risk management that was broadcast

to over 900 hospitals across the country.

We are also attempting to develop edu-

cational materials for school-age children

on risk assessment and management from

both a personal and a community level.

In helping the public gain a more objec-

tive view of risk assessment, factual, suc-

cinct and understandable information

about these processes is needed. In ad-

dition, a mechanism of transfer of this

information from credible sources to the

public needs to be available at the com-

munity level. This latter need is the one

that could be met by health physicists,

physicians and other health providers

working as resources in their community.

These individuals are knowledgeable, or

with education can be made knowledge-

able, about risk and risk assessment. Cer-

tainly they are credible sources of

information, and they are available in

communities around the country. We

need to develop ways to mobilize this re-

source of information providers, and use

it to provide education and guidance at

the community level about environmental

and personal risks.

One mechanism to mobilize this re-

source is through state and county med-

ical societies working in concert with

medical specialty chapters, chapters of

groups like health physicists and medical

physicists, and others. I have discussed

this approach with several federal agen-

cies, and have uncovered a lot of interest.

We are actively pursuing this approach

with the intent of mobilizing health pro-

viders and other knowledgeable indi-

viduals in communities around the coun-

try to help improve public perception of

risks.

Journal of the Washington Academy of Sciences,

Volume 78, Number 2, Pages 210-225, June 1988

Emergency Planning for Nuclear

Accidents: Contentions and Issues

John H. Sorensen

Oak Ridge National Laboratory* Oak Ridge, TN 37832-6206

and

Barbara M. Vogt

University of Tennessee

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to identify and discuss issues that have been raised con-

cerning emergency planning for nuclear power plants. The extent to which these issues

can be eliminated or dismissed on the basis of current physical and social science knowledge

is important for assessing the viability of emergency planning as a form of human pro-

tection. Where an issue is valid, it is important that emergency planning incorporate

knowledge concerning those issues.

The results of the analysis indicate that the critical point for changes made in planning

requirements was the TMI accident. Current plans, as a result of these changes are far

too complex, bureaucratic and rigid to permit flexibility in managing emergencies. Having

an adaptive and flexible organization is a key factor in having effective emergency man-

agement response.

Many of the issues in nuclear power plant emergency planning are derived from be-

havioral intent surveys. Research based on these methods which concludes people will

behave in certain ways in a future emergency is largely invalid and should not be the basis

for developing emergency plans. The basis for plans must be developed on existing knowl-

edge, not on speculative or inaccurate assumptions.

Based on the analysis three recommended actions are proposed:

1. Revise radiological emergency planning frameworks in a manner which promotes more

flexibility in response procedures and which is more responsive to local factors such as

unique topography and population distributions.

2. Develop policy positions on various issues including the validity of various contentions

and the conditions under which the contention are or are not valid.

3. Give local and state governments more legal responsibility for developing emergency

plans for nuclear power plants while placing the burden of proof on all parties.

Introduction

“operated by Martin Marietta Energy Systems, ; : 5 f

Inc. for the U.S. Department of Energy under con- The purpose of this paper is to identify

tract No. DE-AC05-840R21400 and discuss issues that have been raised

210

EMERGENCY PLANNING FOR NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS 211

concerning emergency planning for nu-

clear power plants.* Some issues have

been raised by researchers and the sci-

entific community, others by concerned

publics, and still others by critics using

emergency planning issues as a means to

address other social controversies. Some

have generated significant public concern

and debate while others have been aca-

demic issues. These issues and beliefs are

important because they represent chal-

lenges to the feasibility and efficacy of

emergency planning and some can poten-

tially provide the means to improve emer-

gency plan implementation if properly

addressed.’ The extent to which these is-

sues can be eliminated or dismissed on

the basis of current physical and social

science knowledge is important for both

assessing the viability of emergency plan-

ning as a form of human protection and

eliminating unneeded research.** Where

an issue is valid, it is important that emer-

gency planning incorporate knowledge

concerning those issues.’’ The extent to

which an issue is unresolvable is also im-

portant for establishing agendas for new

research on emergency planning. Where

invalid, examination of the issues is im-

portant to prevent erroneous issues from

interfering with sound decision making or

even from leading to poor emergency

plans.

Contentions and Issues

The issues identified in this paper come

from a variety of sources, including re-

search reports, critiques of emergency

planning, editorials, transcripts of hear-

ings, litigations and newspaper articles.

Issues were initially summarized in a point

form for each hazard. A conceptual ty-

*This paper is drawn from a report prepared for

the Federal Emergency Management Agency: J. So-

rensen, B. Vogt, and D. Mileti. 1987. Evacuation:

An Assessment of Planning and Research, ORNL-

6376. Oak Ridge National Laboratory.—The find-

ings and conclusions are those of the authors and

not of FEMA.

pology of major issues was induced from

these lists and a hierarchy of issues was

specified under these five categories. The

major categories of issues and their def-

initions are as follows:

Physical Hazard: the nature of the

threat including the definition of areas at

risk, lead time, location, magnitude,

probability, and type of hazardous prod-

ucts.

Warning: the nature of the information

dissemination process including the abil-

ity to notify and provide a warning mes-

sage, the quality of the information, and

timing of the message delivery.

Social: the pre-emergency population

attributes including psychological, de-

mographic and social characteristics.

Organizational: the attributes of emer-

gency preparedness and response orga-

nizations.

Response: the behavior of people and

organizations in an emergency.

1. Physical Hazard Issues

Definition of Impacts

The area at risk for a nuclear power

plant accident is a function of source term

and meteorological conditions.' Consid-

erable research has been conducted on

establishing accident risk levels.’?**:*°

There is great controversy at present

about the size, composition and release

characteristics of source terms and the

areas they would effect. Research con-

ducted on the Three Mile Island (TMI)

accident has been interpreted in divergent

ways. The nuclear industry contends that

TMI did not demonstrate the need for

evacuation planning.’’** Research con-

ducted since the accident demonstrated

that source terms were smaller than ex-

pected and thus the emergency planning

zones for detailed evacuation plans

should be lowered to 1 or 2 miles. The

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

maintains, however, that research has not

212 JOHN H. SORENSEN AND BARBARA M. VOGT

reduced the uncertainties sufficiently to

change the Emergency Planning Zone

(EPZ) concept." Intervenors argue for an

expanded plume exposure zone because

accident that exceed the Protective Ac-

tion Guides (PAG’s) beyond 10 miles are

possible.

The accident at the Chernobyl reactor

in the Soviet Union (1986) raised different

issues about areas at risk because the area

impacted was much larger than expected

and the risk from exposure did not decline

in a linear fashion with distance from the

reactor. The Chernobyl accident also

pointed out the critical role that rainfall

plays in particle deposition.

Uncertainty in Ability to Detect

Inability to recognize that a threat ex-

ists makes it more difficult to issue a pro-

tective action warning or prompt people

to move away from the threat. That one

cannot see it, smell it, taste it hear it, or

feel it is a popular “battle cry” of nuclear

power opponents. Critics of nuclear

power hold that because radiation is in-

visible, the public at risk will not see the

approach of the hazard and therefore will

not take protective action. An additional

issue is that people who do evacuate will

not know where radiation exists and may

be exposed during an evacuation.

Physical cues are important determi-

nants of evacuation behavior.*?*! It is eas-

ier to achieve high levels of evacuation

when cues are present to aid detection.

Substitution of visual cues in the warning

process may help overcome this con-

straint but the specific impacts of varia-

tion in the style and content of warnings

on propensity to evacuate is largely un-

known. At TMI attempts to educate the

public to use monitoring equipment met

with mixed results.

Planning Increases the Risk of

an Accident

Critics have argued that planning

changes the likelihood of nuclear power

accidents. It has been reasoned, albeit in

a somewhat tautological fashion, that

emergency planning, because it sanctions

the operation of a plant, and because it

rests on the assumption accidents will oc-

cur, increases the likelihood of an acci-

dent.” A related issue that is more

relevant and of greater importance is

whether emergency plans increase the

threat or consequences of a hazard if it

occurs because it creates a false sense of

protection should the threat actually oc-

cur.

There is no research which proves or

disproves the validity of this issue. Logical

arguments can be formulated to support

Opposite positions or a “no effect” con-

clusion. The motivation for preparing

such arguments is largely ideological or

political in nature and further research is

unlikely to change the arguments.

2. Warning Issues

Uncertainty in the Ability to Alert

The speed of onset of some hazards dic-

tates that warnings be issued in short time

frames. Critics of emergency planing

claim that the warning systems will not

provide timely information and therefore

evacuations are not feasible. According

to federal regulations, 100% of the public

within 5 miles of the plant must be alerted

within 15 minutes following a decision to

warn and the rest of the public, including

those not receiving the initial alert, within

10 miles must be warned in 45 minutes.*°

Nuclear power plants have developed sys-

tems that can theoretically provide quick

alerts, but the systems remain question-

able as to their ability to perform under

emergency conditions and to provide in-

structional information about protective

actions.°® Additional research is needed

on how to improve planning for issuing

warnings within short time frames to sup-

port evacuation efforts as well as other

forms of protective action. The current

EMERGENCY PLANNING FOR NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS 213

methods for evaluating alert systems fail

to provide data for addressing this partic-

ular issue.

Public doubts have surfaced about the

persons and organizations involved in the

warning process withholding information

from the public. Litigation has arisen over

whether or not utilities would try to cover

up an accident instead of reporting it to

local officials or would delay the com-

munication until the problem was cor-

rected. The rationale is that because of

their vested interest in keeping the plant

operating if would be advantageous to un-

der-report risk. Poor abilities to com-

municate also constrain issuing warnings

for protective actions such as evacuation

or sheltering. Public doubts do arise about

persons and organizations involved in the

warning process withholding information

for a variety of reasons. Anecdotal evi-

dence from case studies indicates that, on

occasion, some warning or parts of a

warning to support an evacuation are in-

deed withheld from the public. Often this

is done by rationalizing that the public will

panic, that the evacuation will be expen-

sive or that it will be a false alarm. Re-

search does not indicate how prevalent

the problem of deliberate withholding of

information is in reality. Furthermore,

the conditions under which information is

withheld have never been systematically

identified or analyzed, but doing so is un-

likely to result in improved emergency

planning.

In some cases inadequate organiza-

tional communications have led to poorly

implemented warnings.?°”" Such was

certainly the case at TMI.'”'* Suffi-

cient organizational research exists to

demonstrate that communications are

major determinants of organizational et-

fectiveness in emergencies.'®'*°’ While

poor communication does impede effec-

tive evacuation it does not preclude suc-

cessful evacuation. The conditions that

lead some organizational systems to good

versus poor communications in emergen-

cies are not well understood. Hypotheses

based on organizational theory could be

developed and tested to improve our un-

derstanding of communication failures.

Another issue centers on transient pop-

ulations. Transients are defined as people

in an area at risk that generally live some-

where else. Typically, transients are

people travelling through an area or va-

cationers in an area of risk for a short

period of time. Litigation over nuclear

power plants such as the Seabrook Nu-

clear Power Plant in New Hampshire has

focused on the issue of the difficulty in

warning people in recreational areas as

well as alerting seasonal tourist popula-

tions. Transient populations do present

difficulties in evacuation warnings.

Anecdotal information suggests that

problems have occurred in notifying

vacationers of hurricanes. Warning camp-

ers in recreational areas to evacuate has

been a problem in several flash floods.

Little systematic data exists on the receipt

of warnings and evacuation behavior of

transient populations.*° Research on this

topic could be valuable in developing

evacuation plans in areas with large tran-

sient populations exposed to threats.

Another issue concerns conditions un-

der which sirens would not be heard by

people at risk. At the Shearon Harris Nu-

clear Power Plant intervenors maintained

that sirens cannot be heard at night by

people inside residences when air condi-

tioners are operating. Considerable re-

search has been done on receipt of

warnings in general and some on the re-

ceipt of warnings made with siren sys-

tems.** This research suggests that a

contagion or confirmation process ac-

counts for much of the early notification

in disasters.° In addition much is known

about how people can be warned effec-

tively and the problems involved in issu-

ing warnings.* 4!”

Information Constrains Protective

Action Implementation

People may receive a warning but the

information in that warning may not lead

them to evacuate or go to the best location

214

for safety. One issue is over the adequacy

of messages to get people to evacuate

from hazardous areas. Intervenors charge

that sample messages prepared by plan-

ners for nuclear power accidents are in-

adequate. Inadequate message content

does constrain evacuation. The problem

exists, however, in defining what is ade-

quate. At this point research has outlined

what is believed to be necessary, but that

base of knowledge can be improved.®

Additional research on effectiveness of al-

ternative message content could help to

fine tune warning message content. Im-

plementing what is currently known into

practice is the second issue of great im-

portance. The state of knowledge about

effective warning content is not reflected

in practice in many evacuation situations.

A second issue involves credibility.

This issue questions whether people will

believe warnings from organizations with

low credibility and take the protective re-

sponse needed. It has been argued by in-

tervenors that companies that operate

nuclear power plants are not a credible

source of warning information. If the pub-

lic perceives the information is not cred-

ible then people will ignore it, fail to

follow it, or deliberately engage in a dit-

ferent course of action. It is well known

that credibility of information affects its

use by potential evacuees. Research has

shown that credibility is an important fac-

tor in evacuation decisions and has illus-

trated some of the ways it may constrain

evacuation efforts. Some ideas exist on

how to deal with credibility problems that

have been induced from general knowl-

edge. Knowledge also exists regarding

how emergency warnings can be made

credible.“ The precise ways in which

credibility effects evacuation decisions

have not been sufficiently researched to

understand when credibility specifically

interferes with evacuation behavior.

A third issue concerns the impact of

false alarms on subsequent evacuation be-

havior—the “‘cry-wolf’ syndrome. The

false alarm issue has also been raised for

a number of other hazards including hur-

JOHN H. SORENSEN AND BARBARA M. VOGT

ricanes, earthquakes, tsunamis, and tor-

nados. The basic issue is that people who

keep hearing false alarms due to inad-

vertent warnings will not respond to a real

warning. Contrary to popular belief, false

alarms have not been a constraint in get-

ting people to evacuate in events subse-

quent to the error. This conclusion is

largely based on anecdotal evidence from

recent hurricanes but is also supported by

experimental research. If people under-

stand the uncertainty and basis for the

false alarms, issuing a warning is less

likely to pose problems when a subse-

quent event occurs. Further research on

this topic could be conducted in a field

setting if a series of false alarms do occur.

3. Social Issues

Social Factors Color Risk Perceptions

A major social issue concerns the ef-

fects that pre-emergency risk perceptions

have on human evacuation behavior in an

emergency. Nuclear power evacuation

planning critics feel that radiation is a

unique threat and because of the public’s

great fear of radiation people would be-

have differently when warned to evacuate

in the event of a radiation emer-

gency.*’?!8 The differences cited have

included panic, a psychic numbing ren-

dering people incapable of evacuation,

and, conversely, chaotic flight behavior.

Yet such problems did not occur at TMI

and would not likely occur in a future

accident.”

Social Factors Color the Ability to

Receive Warnings

Another issue is whether social char-

acteristics affect the way in which people

interpret a protective action warning mes-

sage. One major issue is that warnings are

not geared to ethnic, racial, or non-Eng-

lish speaking groups, but to the dominant

population or political groups. As a re-

EMERGENCY PLANNING FOR NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS 215

sult, minority groups are more vulnerable

to the risk because they are less likely to

evacuate or less likely to receive or un-

derstand a warning message. There is suf-

ficient knowledge on the behavior of

ethnic groups in disaster situations that

this should not be an issue in emergency

planning.***’°’ Research shows that mem-

bers of societies with distinct cultural

characteristics are less likely to evacuate

for several reasons including language,

isolation from authority, beliefs and risk

perceptions.

A second issue is that some people dis-

tort or do not understand the nature of

risks from nuclear power plant accidents,

even when told of the risks in a warning

message. A consequence of not under-

standing would be to delay evacuating

and remain at an area of risk. There is

little evidence to suggest that fear of

radiation will constrain evacuations

by causing panic or massive population

based on a limited number of observa-

tions. In a situation where a very large

amount of radiation is released we can

only hypothesize that human behavior

would be similar to those incidents ex-

perienced to date where this did not oc-

cur. Additional research on human

evacuation in radiological accidents

should be conducted following any future

events.

Social Factors Affect the Ability

to Evacuate

The basic issue is that certain popu-

lation characteristics constrain peoples’

ability to evacuate even if they are ade-

quately warned. The major issue centers

around whether special populations and

institutional populations can be effec-

tively evacuated. The key parameters in-

clude identifying the particular problems

of these populations and what the differ-

ent groups or institutions need to be told

to evacuate effectively. The ability to de-

velop and implement plans for institu-

tional facilities and special populations

has been questioned. This issue also con-

cerns whether or not detailed plans are

needed to evacuate individuals within the

general population such as the hearing

impaired or mobility impaired, as well as

institutional populations such as schools,

hospitals, nursing homes, or correctional

facilities. Second, if these plans are lack-

ing, what information the plans need to

cover. The third concern is whether or not

resources will be available to evacuate

these individuals or facilities during an

emergency.

The issue of institutional populations is

a valid and important one in evacuation

planning. There are special populations

and institutional populations that require

specialized warnings and assistance to

evacuate. The key issue is identifying the

particular problems and establishing what

the different groups or institutions need

to evacuate effectively. Some research

has been done on this topic and current

work is addressing some additional

groups.~ Overall, however, the knowl-

edge base to plan for such groups is lack-

ing and needs to be improved.

4. Organizational Issues

Planning Elements Are Inadequate

A series of issues have been raised

about the scope and content of emergency

planning. Planning for evacuations and

other forms of protection is done by sep-

arate jurisdictions and different levels of

government. The overall question is

whether or not these plans are coordi-

nated and, if not, if the absence of

coordination will lead to ineffective

evacuations. The issue of coordination of

plans has developed in nuclear power

plant planning where local governments

have refused to participate in planning ef-

forts for that specific hazard.”

Two shelter issues have emerged for ra-

diological emergency planning. First is

the ability to evacuate people to decon-

216 JOHN H. SORENSEN AND BARBARA M. VOGT

tamination shelters in the event of con-

tamination from radiation. It is known

that people go to a variety of different

destinations in an evacuation—friends,

relatives, motels, hotels and so forth. The

portion of people who would go imme-

diately to a decontamination site largely

depends on how information in warning

messages is distributed at the time of the

event.

The second issue concerns the ade-

quacy of mass care shelters. Sufficient re-

search has been conducted on the

provision of temporary shelters for eva-

cuees.” The problems in operating cen-

ters are largely understood and

documented. Demand for shelters or ex-

pected use by evacuees is also known.

However, it is an issue as to whether this

knowledge is being utilized in evacuation

planning by the agencies responsible for

evacuation planning. The evidence on

that front tends to suggest that shelter

planning for most evacuation situations is

adequate.

Definition of emergency planning

zones has been a hotly debated issue at

nuclear power plants. At issue is whether

the size of the planning zone covers the

true area at risk (see above) and if evac-

uation is feasible outside the detailed

planning zone because of the lack of de-

tailed evacuation studies. The nuclear

power industry maintains that detailed

planning within a ten mile radius provides

the basis for expanding the areal coverage

if protective actions are needed beyond

ten miles. An EPZ is mainly developed

on the basis of the physical impact area

of a hazard, the resources at risk, and the

protective action feasibility. It is beyond

the scope of this research to determine if

the distance of ten miles for a nuclear

power plant EPZ is correct. The research

reviewed does suggest, in a different light,

that the definition of an EPZ is not critical

and may obscure the important point that

evacuation plans must be flexible to han-

dle a range of scenarios. Those scenarios

not only include disasters which extend

beyond the EPZ but emergencies that af-

fect only a small part of an official plan-

ning zone.

Another issue concerns emergency

planning for nuclear power accidents that

occur because of another hazard such as

an earthquake. Opponents of the Diablo

Canyon plant in California argued that

emergency planning needs to factor in the

occurrence of an earthquake that would

disrupt communication capabilities,

hinder evacuation efforts and disrupt

other emergency response functionings.

Anecdotal case studies suggest that evac-

uation plans for secondary hazards are in-

adequate. Notable situations include

volcano-induced mudflows and floods,

ashfall, sunny-day dam failures, flash

floods during tornado episodes and seis-

mic-induced landslides. This points out a

need for research that can better support

the development of flexible emergency

plans for multiple or concurrent hazard-

ous situations.

Training of Workers

Evacuations are supported by a variety

of emergency personnel who often per-

form different tasks than normal during

an emergency including warning, trans-

port, traffic control, and jaw enforce-

ment. The issue has been raised at nuclear

power plants that these types of workers

have not been adequately trained to sup-

port an evacuation effort. Better training

will likely improve evacuation planning

and execution. This is a problem of or-

ganizing existing knowledge into training

courses and then providing all emergency

personnel with training. It is not a re-

search issue because knowledge exists to

do this type of training. It is mainly a

problem of implementation, resource al-

location and political priorities.

The Technical Basis for Planning

Another set of issues regarding plan-

ning is the lack of data or information on

which to base the planning. A major issue

concerns the accuracy of evacuation time

EMERGENCY PLANNING FOR NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS 217

estimates. A variety of models exists to

estimate the time it takes to evacuate geo-

graphical areas.°°849.91.79.71,72.> Different

model types are used for different loca-

tions. Issues have been raised about which

models are appropriate to use and

whether or not the results are valid. Many

of the issues regarding validity are over

the assumptions used in the models. Some

of the major assumptions that have been

challenged include mobilization time, de-

parture time, road capacity estimates, im-

pacts of bottlenecks, number of vehicles

used per household, impacts of accidents,

route selection, and effectiveness of

traffic control. A variety of models exist

to estimate the time it takes to evacuate

specific geographical areas. The models

are definitely useful in evacuation plan-

ning and likely provide better estimates

than seat-of-the-pants guesses. How ac-

curately they predict actual evacuation

times is a valid issue.'* Assumptions in the

models require closer scrutiny. There is

a need to conduct empirical research to

fine tune and validate the models to pro-

vide more accurate and certain estimates

of evacuation times.

5. Response Issues

Physical Factors Constrain Evacuation

Many people have questioned the abil-

ity to evacuate large densely populated

areas such as New York City, Long Island

or other major urban areas near power

plants in a timely or orderly fashion.

Problems cited include lack of transpor-

tation for large numbers of evacuees, in-

adequate road capacity, traffic jams and

the litany of issues associated with large-

scale evacuations. Anecdotal information

exists from case studies regarding the abil-

ity to evacuate some densely populated

areas but not extremely large popula-

tions. Such evidence comes from studies

of war time evacuations, events like

the large-scale Mississuaga evacuation,

or during Gulf and east coast hurri-

canes.’°’°*-’° Additional knowledge has

come from modeling studies but the re-

sults have been questioned regarding

their assumptions. It is unclear, therefore,

how long it would take to evacuate large

and densely populated cities or regions

and further investigation is needed.

The ability to relocate tourist and per-

manent populations in areas with large

seasonal populations has been raised at

several nuclear power plant sites. Ques-

tions have been raised regarding the or-

ganizational ability to warn vacationers,

transients’ knowledge of evacuation

routes, sufficiency of shelters, behavior of

transient evacuees, timing of evacuation,

and traffic congestion. Near Seabrook as

many as 40,000 people may occupy

coastal beaches during peak tourist sea-

son. The ability to evacuate tourist pop-

ulations from areas subject to nuclear

power plant accidents is a valid issue.

Questions regarding knowledge of evac-

uation routes, use of shelters, behavior of

evacuees, timing of evacuation or the po-

tential problems of traffic congestion

should be addressed in emergency plans.

There is not a great deal of research to

support analysis of these issues. Anec-

dotal experience provides some infor-

mation, but even good case studies are

lacking Behavioral research has not fo-

cused on studying tourists as a population

so behavioral knowledge is poor. Traffic

modeling studies provide data on the

length of time to evacuate some areas and

are useful within the bounds of uncer-

tainty governing those studies. Applica-

tion of general knowledge does not

suggest traffic simulation models are not

feasible, but additional knowledge would

improve planning to implement evacua-

tion plans effectively.

Critics of nuclear power evacuation

planning have said that traffic accident

rates will increase in an emergency evac-

uation and this will cause excessive acci-

dents that will tie-up traffic trying to

leave. There is no research to date that

suggests traffic accidents are more likely

218 JOHN H. SORENSEN AND BARBARA M. VOGT

in an evacuation. Limited research and

observation suggests there are lower ac-

cident rates during evacuations.*4”° This

may be due to increased driver vigilance

and lower vehicle speeds.

Public Behavior

These issues relate to people respond-

ing in a way that will jeopardize the ef-

fectiveness of evacuation. Evacuation

shadow is a point of litigation at nuclear

power plant hearings. Based on the ex-

perience at TMI, critics charge that peo-

ple will evacuate from far larger areas

than are officially advised.°!0:19.702133.86

Because plans do not exist to handle this

withdrawal phenomenon, the contention

is that evacuations will fail. The evacua-

tion shadow exists by definition either

spatially or demographically. A shadow

is judged retrospectively and often with

an arbitrary indicator of who or what area

was ordered to evacuate.” As such, the

definition of shadow ignores the social

processes in disaster.'°!* Research has

shown that perceived personal threat or

risk at the time of the disaster is a central

reason for persons evacuating.**® Re-

search also shows that evacuation declines

as the perception of threat decreases and

distance from the threat increases. Even

if one accepts the validity of the shadow

concept, it can be concluded that it has

been poorly studied. Behavioral studies

have either failed to include a variety of

risk areas in investigations or have inad-

equately sampled the alleged areas of

shadows.

Panic is defined as acute fear of en-

trapment coupled with attempted flight

behavior.» Critics maintain that people

will exhibit this type of response to an

earthquake, nuclear power accident or

nuclear crisis warning. This panic behav-

ior will lead to increased traffic accidents

and dysfunctional behavior. The condi-

tions under which panic occurs are well

understood. Panic rarely occurs in evac-

uations because the conditions for panic

are not likely to occur although not im-

possible.***> One problem regarding the

panic issue is that officials and the media

often mislabel some behavior as panic and

thus the myth is perpetuated. No further

research on panic is needed unless a sit-

uation does occur in which panic actually

does take place.

Spontaneous evacuation is commonly

defined as leaving an area before the

warning to evacuate is given as an Official

order.® The claimed impact is increased

congestion on roadways. Another pro-

posed problem of spontaneous evacua-

tion is that it makes zonal or staged

evacuations (eg. evacuating a two mile

radius, then the five mile and so forth)

infeasible. As for shadow, this concept of

spontaneous evacuation exists by defini-

tion. The issuance of an official order is

an arbitrary yardstick by which individual

behavior is judged. Other types of infor-

mation, including messages that an evac-

uation is likely or that an unofficial

evacuation is recommended, will cause

some people to evacuate. The reasons

why are more speculative. Anecdotal in-

formation suggests that it is due to avoid-

ing having to evacuate when officially

ordered and erring on the side of caution.

Aberrant behavior includes looting,

anti-social aggressive acts, or other crim-

inal acts. Some believe that this type of

behavior increases during emergencies

and would be more prevalent in the event

of a nuclear power plant accident or nu-

clear crisis situation. The research evi-

dence against aberrant behavior of

evacuees is fairly overwhelming to the

contrary. Hostile behavior, particularly to

emergency workers does not occur during

evacuations. Looting occurs, but is ex-

tremely rare. Crime rates are believed to

decrease during evacuations and the de-

mand for police services for non-evacu-

ation or emergency functions decrease.

Aberrant behavior is typically a myth that

tends to be perpetuated by the media

which covers isolated instances, misinter-

prets behavior, or falsely associates an un-

related incident with an emergency.

Traffic time estimates and planning as-

EMERGENCY PLANNING FOR NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS 219

sume that people will use certain optimum

traffic routes. Critics content people will

not use those routes and therefore the

evacuation will not be effective. Further-

more, congestion will occur on the routes

that people will try to use or routes will

be used that place evacuees at higher risk.

No one has investigated the actual routes

which people use when evacuating with

any specific detail. Thus it remains a ma-

jor issue with traffic time estimation

models. The most reasonable assumption

is that people will use routes they nor-

mally use except if the routes are blocked

or if evacuees are specifically directed by

law enforcement personnel to use differ-

ent routes.

Another contention is that people

won't obey officials managing an emer-

gency. The issue centers around the belief

that people will disregard traffic control

guides or warning instructions while evac-

uating. Critics also argue that people will

disregard traffic signals or roadblocks.

There is considerable amount of anec-

dotal evidence which suggests that a very

small percentage of the public will disobey

official orders. Part of the problem in ad-

dressing this issue is the definition of an

official order which ranges from recom-

mendations to evacuate to active attempts

to get people to leave designated areas.

In other words, this problem is related to

the strength and perceived credibility of

the official orders. Much is known about

how to increase evacuation rates.” In

high risk situations where door-to-door

evacuations are ordered, 98 to 99 percent

of the population under threat will likely

evacuate. In less forceful situations the

number evacuating can be substantially

lower, but it would be improper in those

situations to define that behavior as being

disobedient.

Another issue raised is that people will

not go to designated host or reception

areas. Evacuation planning at some sites

assumes people will go where they are

told. This issue raises the point that peo-

ple will go to areas other than what the

evacuation plans dictate. By implication

this makes traffic time estimates and re-

source availability analyses inaccurate. In

most evacuations people are usually not

told to go to designated areas. (This is

different from going to assigned shelters. )

When instructions are absent, research

has shown the destinations people choose

when evacuating. Research does not exist

to infer how many people would go to a

designated host area if instructed to do so

by acredible source given adequate warn-

ing. In part, the number of evacuees going

to assigned shelters would be determined

by the information provided and the de-

gree to which transportation movements

are controlled.

Emergency Worker Behavior

This set of issues contend that emer-

gency personnel will engage in behaviors

counter to evacuation goals.*°’? Role

abandonment is conceptualized as emer-

gency workers leaving their jobs to per-

form other roles. The main issue is over

how many workers will engage in this be-

havior. A secondary issue is whether this

will constrain an evacuation. Role aban-

donment has also been a controversial is-

sue for other hazards. Research suggests

that total role abandonment has not been

prevalent in disasters and certainly has

not been dysfunctional in organizational

behavior.*” Some people have hypothe-

sized that role abandonment would be

greater and likely problematic in a nuclear

power plant accident or during a nuclear

war threat. This remains somewhat spec-

ulative. Research suggests that in the for-

mer case there may be an increased

potential for conflict and role strain but

emergency functions would not be threat-

ened. In the latter case the issue is highly

uncertain. Additional research on role

conflict would be confirmatory but is not

of high priority.

Larger Issues

1. TMI And Emergency Planning

The accident at TMI continues to be

the dominant reference for emergency

220 JOHN H. SORENSEN AND BARBARA M. VOGT

planning issues around nuclear power

plants.’-”4’88! Drastic changes were im-

plemented on the basis of that experience.

There is little doubt that if an accident

similar to TMI does occur in the future,

the response will be greatly improved.

Accidents, by definition, include a host

of unanticipated events. There is no guar-

antee that research to date has identified

the next accident sequence or scenario.

Witness the Chernobyl accident. The

U.S. response was that it cannot happen

here. This is probably correct, although

not provable. A more important issue is

that does this country have its Chernobyl

class accidents. The answer is likely yes.

The changes in emergency planning

due to TMI are a prime example of crisis

management. A crisis occurs and changes

are made which will improve response

given that set of historical conditions. Yet

science is not that deterministic. Rarely

do scientists in either the physical and so-

cial fields make conclusions based on one

data point. Yet our current plans are

based on that single point.

The accident at Ginna Nuclear Power

Station in New York involving a steam

tube rupture provides a second data

point. This accident involved a release of

radiation, led to activation of the emer-

gency warning system and caused a pre-

cautionary early dismissal of area schools.

People did not spontaneously evacuate.

There was no shadow, panic, aberrant be-

havior, role abandonment, etc. Several

interpretations exist. First is that the ac-

cident demonstrated that changes in

emergency planning solved the problems

that occurred at TMI. Better, more cer-

tain, and credible information was given

to the public. Second is that the Ginna

utility plays a much different role in the

local community than the one at TMI and

it’s integration into the structure of the

community led to a good community re-

sponse. A third assessment was that a

snowfall on the day of the accident acted

as a constraint against spontaneous evac-

uation. In reality it was a combination of

factors that help explain this different pat-

tern of response. The emergency planning

changes that occurred since TMI cannot

take full credit for the improved manage-

ment nor should the lack of spontaneous

evacuation be attributed to the fact it was

snowing. As a competing hypothesis the

snow explanation, like snow, does not

hold much water.

The critical point is that the dramatic

changes made in planning requirements

because of TMI do not insure good re-

sponses to a future event. Elsewhere we

have argued that the plans are far too

complex, bureaucratic and rigid to permit

flexibility in managing emergencies. At

one reactor site alone we have identified

over one hundred separate plans for the

utility, government and private facilities.

The sheer number makes consistency

among the plans unlikely. Even if the

plans were consistent, the problems of

continued coordination during planning

and in an actual emergency are immense.

Yet having an adaptive and flexible or-

ganization is a key factor in having effec-

tive emergency management response.

The current plans do not promote flexi-

bility. If a future accident does not fall

within the confines of the plans, the abil-

ity to adapt to problems posed by an ac-

cident may be constrained by the

structured plans. If the Chernobyl acci-

dent had occurred in the U.S., current

plans would have been of little utility in

guiding response. The extent to which the

planning process had facilitated inter-or-

ganizational coordination among the ap-

propriate people and the extent to which

organizations could adapt plans to the dif-

fering situation would be critical factors

in determining the effectiveness of re-

sponse.

2. Use of Behavioral Intent Studies

One of the ways suggested to resolve

these contentions involves the use of be-

havioral intent studies for future events.

For many of the contentions the burden

EMERGENCY PLANNING FOR NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS 221

of proof involves the use of behavioral

intent studies. However, most behavioral

intent studies rest on the results of survey

research. For example, several studies

have polled emergency workers and

asked them about role abandonment.” In

a study of school teachers at the Califor-

nia Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant

teachers were asked: “‘Assuming the Dia-

blo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant is li-

censed and begins to operate, we are

interested in knowing what you think you

would do if there was an accident at the

plant on a school day during normal op-

erating hours. Everyone living within ten

miles were advised to evacuate. Teachers

were expected to help evacuate school

children. What do you think you would

do first?

1. Help with the evacuation of school

children outside of the designated dan-

ger zone; or |

2. Go to make sure family members were

safe; or

3. Leave the evacuation zone to make

sure you were in a Safe place; or

4. Do something else.”

The results of the survey, at face value,

indicate that only two-thirds of the teach-

ers would perform their specified emer-

gency roles. Several specific problems

exist with this literal interpretation of the

research. First, the researcher failed to

provide a realistic set of responses to the

teachers that encompassed all possible be-

haviors and categories that were mutually

exclusive. Adding a catch-all category

does not alleviate this problem. No at-

tempt was made to provide a response

category that includes checking on the

safety of family while performing an

emergency role. Secondly, the wording of

the responses were unclear. One may well

interpret the first option as evacuating

children who are located in schools out-

side of the 10 mile radius. Certainly a

teacher inside the ten mile zone would not

choose this option. Third, the question

forces the assumption that all teachers

have emergency roles that last the dura-

tion of an evacuation. This is likely to be

unrealistic. Thus a teacher who does not

have a specified role could legitimately

answer with responses two or three.

Nevertheless, a response of 61% of teach-

ers to perform emergency roles for the

duration of the emergency is likely to be

more than sufficient to effectively evac-

uate the schools. Even this interpretation

of the results were taken at face value, it

is unwise to believe that this estimate is

an accurate predictor of actual behavior.

This research is problematic for several

other general reasons. First, polls are

premised on the notion that statements

about current attitudes or thoughts about

future behavior can be used to predict

actual future behavior. This assumption

is wrong when that behavior concerns a

future emergency situation. Most social

scientists would say that people’s attitudes

and their speculation about future behav-

ior are imperfect predictors of behavior

except when that behavior is frequent and

repetitious. Asking a person to make a

‘cold’ judgement about how he or she

might hypothetically react in a complex

future situation for which they have had

no previous experience, and giving him

or her a few seconds to answer, is not a

good predictor of future behavior. Be-

havior in an emergency is a social process

and is situationally determined. In that

process notions about appropriate ways

to act emerge based on the information

being disseminated at the time.

The factors that influence human re-

sponse to emergencies are relatively well-

known and accepted as valid by most sci-

entists in this area. These factors can be

addressed in an emergency plan to help

achieve the desired response when the

plan is put into operation. An attitude or

opinion profile or a catalogue of behav-

ioral intentions would not appreciably

help address these factors in planning or

upgrade good organizational or public re-

sponse when the plan is activated. In fact,

a compilation of behavior intentions—

which is certain to be wrong when com-

222

pared to actual emergency behavior—

could hurt planning efforts because plans

would be based on incorrect assumptions

about behavior.

Consequently, research which asks

teachers or school bus drivers what they

would do in an emergency is not a good

way of predicting nor understanding role

conflict issues. Research based on these

methods which concludes people will

abandon their roles is largely invalid and

should not be the basis for developing

emergency plans. The basis for plans must

be developed on existing knowledge, not

on speculative or inaccurate assumptions.

Conclusions and Recommendations

In conclusion we make three recom-

mendations for changes in policies re-

garding emergency planning for nuclear

facilities.

1. Revise radiological emergency

planning frameworks in a manner which

promotes more flexibility in response

procedures and which is more responsive

to local factors such as unique

topography and population distributions.

This change would re-orient planning

guidelines to encompass a broader range

of accidents than current plans describe.

Additionally, this concept involves chang-

ing the structure of planning regulations

to encourage a more adaptive and flexible

approach by emergency organizations.

While flexibility can be considered as a

trade-off with the formalization of pro-

cedures, the current planning philosophy

only emphasizes a strict implementation

of narrowly-defined tasks. Therefore, the

policies, and hence planning regulations,

need to encourage a different approach

to emergency planning. The regulations

should be changed to encourage adaptiv-

ity to local situations, while at the same

time giving guidance on how to manage

the hazard in question. The greatest con-

JOHN H. SORENSEN AND BARBARA M. VOGT

sequences of not adopting this approach

is that organizations will not be effective

in an anomalous situation and that local

Organizations will concentrate plans

around the wrong accident scenarios.

2. Develop policy positions on various

issues including the validity of various

contentions and the conditions under

which the contention are or are not

valid.

It is the basic responsibility of the NRC

to license nuclear power plants. As part

of that procedure the NRC should de-

velop consistent positions on common

contentions. At present, the NRC at-

tempts to avoid committing to a position

on many contentions. This stance allows

the process of licensing to be judged on

the basis of a comparison of the ideologies

of experts representing the intervenors

and those of the experts representing the

utility. A set of guidelines based on sci-

entific evidence and previous Atomic

Safety Licensing Board (ASLB) rulings

should be established for all major con-

tentions. This should not exclude litiga-

tion over any issue, but make the

resolution of these contentions more con-

sistent. In time this should decrease the

time spent in resolving generic issues.

3. Give local and state governments

more legal responsibility for developing

emergency plans for nuclear power

plants while placing the burden of proof

on all.

Currently local and state government

can hold hostage utilities seeking a license

for nuclear plant. The local decision about

nuclear power should be made at the sit-

ing stage. Subsequent actions to negate a

poor siting decision should not centrally

involve the procedure of emergency plan-

ning; albeit the contents or effectiveness

should be addressed. If analysis are done

which conclusively demonstrate that

emergency plans cannot mitigate accident

consequences, then a siting decision

EMERGENCY PLANNING FOR

should be reconsidered. If analyses are

done that suggest improvements in the

emergency plan can reduce risk or con-

sequences, those changes should be

adopted. Emergency planning has be-

come a means of fighting other issues.

This is a problem in that it detracts from

the goals of planning. We hope that such

issues are refocused and the legitimate as-

pects of emergency planning are brought

forward instead.

10.

jh i

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Journal of the Washington Academy of Sciences,

Volume 78, Number 2, Pages 226-239, June 1988

Reactor and Nuclear Waste Siting

Problems and Prospects

Richard J. Bord

Associate Professor of Sociology

Department of Sociology

The Pennsylvania State University

University Park, PA 16802

ABSTRACT

It has become virtually impossible to site risky waste disposal facilities or waste treatment

facilities, especially those handling radioactive wastes. A growing army of experts has

joined the fray with suggestions for solving the impasse. Three of the more popular

proposed solutions are: improved risk communication; improved disposal or treatment

technology; and the provision of incentives and assurances to affected communities. This

paper argues that these proposed solutions ignore fundamental realities. The proposed

solutions are juxtaposed with the realities facing those responsible for siting. These include:

the popularization and democratization of risk; a host of problems associated with risk

information and communication; problems with improved technology including its cost,

the inability to create anything foolproof, and the issue of adequate management; the

inability of incentives to address health and safety questions and the legal and practical

limits to assurances. In addition, the fundamental political dimensions of the problem are

addressed and future prospects explored.

Introduction

Effective opposition to risky facilities

has assumed the dimensions of a signifi-

cant social problem. The growing famil-

larity of the neologisms ‘“‘LULU”’

(Locally Undesireable Land Use) and

“NIMBY” (Not In My Back Yard) reflect

the reality of effective pubic opposition

to many types of unwanted facilities. Fa-

cilities bearing the burden of the label

“radioactive” appear to generate even

more intense negative emotions and have

the distinction of being targeted by

professional opposition groups.! This pa-

226

per constitutes an evaluation of the prob-

lems facing those responsible for siting

hazardous facilities, with an emphasis on

radioactive waste treatment and disposal

facilities, and a brief assessment of cur-

rently proposed solutions.

The evolution of the siting problem has

witnessed the co-evolution of a number

of proposed solutions. Experts of many

persuasions have leaped into the fray in

the hope of providing techniques which

will result in successful siting. This paper

examines each of these proposed solu-

tions in light of the network of problems

which presently characterize radioactive

REACTOR AND NUCLEAR WASTE SITING 227

facility siting. It concludes with a discus-

sion of likely paths that future siting at-

tempts may take.

Siting Risky Facilities: The Search

For Solutions

Before discussing specific siting diffi-

culties it is necessary to set the general

problem within its cultural context. There

exists a matrix of common understand-

ings, conditioned by our unique liberal

democracy, which shapes the nature of

the problem and the search for solutions.

It is this culture which makes it highly

unlikely that solutions which are success-

ful in other countries can be transferred

here with similar results.

Public participation is part of our Jef-

fersonian heritage. The American Rev-

olution, the Civil War, and the Westward

expansion have institutionalized a general

lack of respect for constituted authority

and that tendency persists. It is commonly

understood that the citizen should not be

timid in fighting ‘“‘the establishment.” In

the decade of the 1960’s, public partici-

pation in decisions involving the siting of

risky facilities was mandated by law.

These legal innovations have made it pos-

sible for citizens, even small groups and

individuals, to delay or stop the imple-

mentation of many risky technologies.

From this perspective opposition should

be expected because the socio-political

system encourages and reinforces it. Fur-

thermore, since the nuclear industry, both

private and public, depends on capital in-

tensive technology which is managed by

large organizations and regulated by the

Federal government, it is easy to construe

the situation as one of the powerless in-

dividual and/or community against the

mobilized forces of corporate wealth and

political power.

An understanding of this cultural con-

text highlights the limitations of many at-

tempts at solution presently being

pursued. A problem which is inherently

political in nature tends to be treated pri-

marily as a problem in attitude change.’

A basic argument in this paper is that ap-

proaches emphasizing attitude change

have little chance of success because they

fail to address to real issues. Other ap-

proaches have a higher probability of suc-

cess but the magnitude of that probability

is Open to considerable debate.

Various experts have promoted basi-

cally three classes of solutions to the siting

problem:

1. improved risk communication;

2. improved disposal or treatment tech-

nology;

3. and, provision of the opportunity to

negotiate incentives and assurances to

affected communities.

Each of these proposed solutions, and

their limitations, will be discussed in turn.

Improved Risk Communication as

a Solution

Those favoring improved risk commun-

ication as a solution to public intran-

sigence view the problem as one of

correcting errors in perception and judg-

ment. The assumption appears to be that

if the public only understood the problem

as the experts, at least those experts in-

volved in the siting process, understand it

then fear and resistence would diminish.

An excellent example of faith in improved

risk communication is provided by EPA

administrator, William Ruckelshaus in a

speech delivered before the National

Academy of Sciences at the beginning of

his second term. Quoting Jefferson,

Ruckelshaus stated:

“Tf we think (the public) not enlight-

ened enough to exercise their control

with a wholesome discretion, the rem-

edy is not to take it from them, but to

inform their discretion.’

Unfortunately, less than two years later

Ruckelshaus was having second thoughts

about the sentiments expressed in that

quotation.

228 RICHARD J. BORD

Two issues are viewed as keys to un-

derstanding the limitations of improved

risk communication:

1. the popularization and democratiza-

tion of risk;

2. and, problems associated with the risk

information itself.

While there are excellent review articles

detailing problems in risk communica-

tion,*° they do not generally address the

first issue to be discussed.

The Popularization and

Democratization of Risk

Concern with risk is certainly not an

invention of modern technological soci-

eties. It can be argued that the major

function of religion and law has been risk

control or avoidance. All religions include

rituals through which spirits can be in-

voked to protect person, family, and

property. Law focuses on the social con-

trol of risk and risky individuals and what

is considered as the equitable distribution

of risk in a society.

However, concern with risk in modern,

democratic society has become fine-

tuned. There are now hosts of profes-

sionals devoted to discovering new risks,

more accurately estimating known risks,

better communicating risks, and more ad-

equately controlling risks. Risk has be-

come big business. In fact, risk discovery,

estimation, communication, and control

is fast becoming a somewhat independent

academic discipline embracing natural

and social-behavioral scientists of many

persuasions and even publishing its own

professional journals.

While this growth of the risk establish-

ment has much to commend it, there may

be unexpected consequences which have

not been adequately addressed. Consider

that it is now virtually impossible to es-

cape news of the latest “significant” risk

on an almost daily basis. Newspapers, tel-

evision news and advertising, government

pronouncements, and popular books and

magazines provide constant reminders

that life is one constant flirtation with dis-

aster. Questions about fiber, fat, alcohol,

sugar, and caffeine in the diet, the relative

safety of flying congested airways with a

suspect population of air traffic control-

lers, the possibility of terrorism abroad,

the need to get more (or less) exercise,

the threat of the AIDS virus, the latest

crime statistics and so on ad infinitum cre-

ate a climate in which attention to risk

may have become almost pathological.

While the mental and behavioral out-

comes of constant attention to risk are

debatable, there has been virtually no re-

search on that specific topic, there is little

reason to believe that lowered anxiety or

a willingness to assume greater health

risks are among them.

Another historical dimension of risk is

that it is seldom distributed equitably.

The poor generally bear greater burdens

of risk than do the rich. Modern studies

demonstrating that the poor breath fouler

air, experience more occupational haz-

ards, and tend to live nearer to environ-

mentally risky facilities should come as

little surprise.° The more affluent have

always had greater opportunity to relo-

cate to areas of less risk, to purchase more

adequate diets, and to assume safer jobs.

However, contemporary “. . . features of

environmental risk seem so ubiquitous

... that even the wealthy and the pow-

erful are becoming anxious.”’’

Risk experts have made it clear that

environmental pollutants in the air, soil,

water, and food chain are no respectors

of social status. Nor is it possible for most

people to geographically relocate to es-

cape the more common environmental

hazards. Modern surverys of environ-

mental attitudes, especially attitudes to-

ward risky facilities, tend to demonstrate

no consistent pattern for social class vari-

ables such as education, occupation, and

income.® One resonable interpretation of

those results is that everyone is frightened

or anxious to some degree. The only con-

sistently discriminating demographic vari-

able is sex: women demonstrate higher

REACTOR AND NUCLEAR WASTE SITING 229

levels of concern than do men and, at least

in my data on LLRW siting, proclaim

themselves as unequivocal ‘““NIMBY’s”’

more often than do men.’ In this context

it is worth noting that emergent local op-

position is often lead by middle to upper-

middle class women.”

Sensitivity to a wide range of risk has

been popularized and democratized. The

risk enterprise continues to document

possible health hazards and the various

information media helps keep the general

public aware of the latest health threat

fad. The ubiquitousness of modern pol-

lutants insures that everyone shares in

exposure to some degree. Heightened

anxiety and avoidance is a reasonable re-

sponse.

Paradoxically, while we may be the

healthiest and long-lived peoples to ever

inhabit the planet we may also be the most

concerned with issues of health and

safety. It makes little sense to label this

a phobia or some other mental health ab-

erration. There is a dense network of or-

ganizations whose major goals include

keeping the public concerned about their

health. That is how one garners contri-

butions to health organizations, how nu-

merous magazines and newsletters are

promoted, how exercise equipment and

health foods are sold, how careers in var-

ious health organizations are maintained,

and how a plethora of health and beauty

aids are marketed. Promoting anxiety

about health is a very profitable enter-

prise.

Problems Associated with

Risk Information

Much has been written about the ra-

tionality or irrationality of the public’s re-

sponse to risk information, especially risk

information dealing with radiation haz-

ards.''!* The more technically minded

tend to see the problem as one of properly

educating the masses so that decisions are

made which allow the utilization and fur-

ther development of the technology.

However, judgments of rationality-irra-

tionality are clearly value based. The

more pertinent question is exactly how do

people process risk information and what

is the probability that their judgments can

be modified. Three issues are crucial:

1. how is risk information processed;

2. what information is available for pro-

cessing;

3. and, who provides the information

with what effect.

Problems in Risk

Information Processing

Three interrelated aspects of risk in-

formation processing are central to this

discussion:

1. the importance of attention selectivity;

2. the perceived voluntariness of the risk;

3. and, the issue of generalizing risks.

‘People’s perceptions of risk .. . are

influenced by the memorability of past

events and the imaginability of future

events. As a result, any factor that makes

a hazard unusually memorable or imagi-

nable, such as a recent disaster, heavy

media coverage, or a vivid film, could se-

riously distort perception of risk.’’’ Cog-

nitive pyschologists agree that attention

selectivity is a key issue in information

processing. The more vivid or dramatic

the event the more likely it will garner

attention. That is why advertisers employ

unusual scenes, loud and rapid sounds,

brilliant colors, sex, and other attention-

getting devices. It is worth noting that in-

formation about a plane crash which kills

200 people is attention getting, informa-

tion about the hundreds of planes which

fly daily across the country is not.

Related to the issue of attention selec-

tivity is the fact that people seldom ac-

curately interpret information based on

probabiliites.'* While this tendency is

sometimes used as a example of irration-

ality it may be more pertinent to ask why

anyone, except a scientist doing imper-

sonal analysis, should pay any attention

230 RICHARD J. BORD

to probabilities. From an attention getting

perspective, news that something in

drinking water increases the incidence of

annual cancer by one in ten-thousand is

simply news that the cancer rate has in-

creased. The “‘red-flag”’ is more cancers.”

The one in ten-thousand is personally ir-

relevant. After all, the individual either

gets cancer or does not get cancer, he or

she cannot experience a probability.

The perceived voluntariness of the as-

sumed risk is close behind attention se-

lectivity in importance. People routinely

assume all sorts of risks on a voluntary

basis. They do so because the risk taking

provides benefits such as easier living,

personal satisfaction, ego-enhancement,

or simple physical pleasure. Comparison

of this type of risk taking with living next

to waste disposal or power generating fa-

cility is futile. They are not comparable

within any reasoned frame of reference.

However, the involuntariness per se is not

the critical issue. Involuntariness arouses

public ire when it is imposed by some per-

son or agency who Is perceived as occu-

pying a position of power.'® Recall the

discussion of our historically based cul-

tural hostility toward authority viewed as

arbitrary. In addition, there are enough

examples of corporate, industrial, and

governmental insensitivity which results

in significant negative outcomes to justify

suspicion and hostility toward those who

would impose unwanted risks.

Finally, the current state of risk esti-

mation is greatly deficient in one aspect

of central concern to many citizens, the

ability to estimate the cumulative effect

of exposure to many environmental haz-

ards. The person who is informed about

the increased risk posed by a particular

substance quite logically wonders about

how it interacts with all the other hazards

being ingested, inhaled, or absorbed. This

is especially the case in our highly charged

risk information society. While the EPA

is presently considering a “‘total human

exposure” methodology, useful informa-

tion will not be forthcoming soon.!’ Fur-

thermore, it should not be assumed that

once this information is made available

that it will diminish public anxiety. The

accuracy of the information can always be

challenged, its sources impugned, or it

can result in increased fear and a more

militant avoidance response, a frequent

result of risk information campaigns. A

typical reaction to such news is, ““My God

I didn’t know thing were so bad.”

The Availability of Information

The importance of selective attention

has been established. It now becomes im-

portant to explore what kinds of risk in-

formation is readily available to the

general public. In my own research on

public attitudes toward a proposed

LLRW volume reduction facility and a

LLRW disposal facility'®” several events

are frequently mentioned: Love Canal,

Three Mile Island, nuclear bomb testing,

and the movies ‘‘Silkwood”’ and “China

Syndrome.”’ These examples are used by

people to illustrate the perceived serious-

ness of the risk, the callousness of gov-

ernment and industry, and the reason why

no governmental regulator or facility

manager can be trusted. In other words,

these events appear to be part of a com-

mon culture through which related pieces

of information are filtered. If indeed these

are elements of a coherent cognitive sys-

tem they may have the same effect as any

deeply held belief system: they are vir-

tually impossible to change.

Exploring my own ““memory dump” of

fairly recent related bits of information

produces the following: the infamous gar-

bage barge looking for a home; an article

in an outdoor magazine advising that if

you must hunt waterfowl make sure you

only eat one a month because of PCB and

EDB contamination; a similar advisory

on fish from the Great Lakes and bottom

feeders from the Atlantic; a local advisory

on fish from my favorite fishing lake; the

Bhopal tragedy; Chernobyl; the death of

porpoises off the east coast being tied to

possible offshore chemical dumps; and

the recent discovery that our local water

REACTOR AND NUCLEAR WASTE SITING 231

supplies have unacceptably high levels of

PEC's:

I am sure the reader can supply their

own shopping list of environmental hor-

rors which would vary in specifics but not

in general impact. Whether the items in

any particular shopping list are truly en-

vironmental disasters is not the issue. The

fact is they are dramatic, frightening, and

frequent. That is, they embody all the cri-

teria for attention getting stimuli and they

do remain in memory. Even if people

were regularly exposed to more objective

information, which they are not, it could

not hope to compete with that informa-

tion which is already stored and which

comprises daily risk information fare.

However, perhaps the single most vex-

ing issue facing those who favor more ob-

jective risk information as a palliative to

public opposition is the lack of certitude

which plagues risk estimates. For exam-

ple, the problems with low dosage radio-

active materials is that they carry some

degree of risk but the magnitude of that

risk is largely conjecture and open to chal-

lenge:

“There appears little consensus among

scientists over the health effects of ex-

posure to low-level radiation. In an ex-

tensive study done by the Committee

on the Biological Effects of Ionizing

Radiation issued in 1980, the authors

reported that health risk estimates are

based on incomplete data and involve

a large degree of uncertainty, especially

in the low-dose region.’’”’

The kind of uncertainty permits British

anti-nuclear activist Dr. Alice Stewart to

predict a “hidden epidemic” as a result

of the Chernobyl accident.*' Hidden ep-

idemics tend to be more frightening than

those whose effects are easily observable.

Uncertain information invites challenge

and encourages rejection among those

who are not experts in the field. It seems

a reasonable response to assume that if

the experts cannot agree why should any-

one tolerate it.

Finally, the argument has been effec-

tively made that the selection of risks to

evaluate, the methodologies employed in

determining risk, and the selection of data

all embody values and baises. As in most

important policy arenas, it is extremely

difficult to separate fact from value in the

great risk debate. The issue of a possible

underlying ideology is another barrier to

public acceptance of information pro-

vided by experts they do not trust.

The above discussion naturally leads to

consideration of who does, and does not,

provide that risk information which elicits

attention.

Although there is a relative paucity of

research on the subject there is general

consensus that the media sets the agenda

for risk perception” and that media pro-

vided risk information is highly dis-

torted.* One of the obvious reasons for

this bias is that attention-getting news

sells papers. News of human tragedies,

failed technologies or management sys-

tems, or of a powerless public being

bilked by some powerful industrial or

government giant is “juicy” fare. This

phenomenon helps explain the public’s

keen interest in a policitician’s sex life and

relative indifference to his views on im-

portant policy issues.

However, the issue of media bias is

more complicated than simple over-atten-

tion to the dramatic. Rothman and Lich-

ter provide provacative data indicating

that journalists who write on scientific

matters are: (a) more likely to attend to

the writings and pubic statements of an-

tinuclear scientists; and, (b) are strongly

influenced by their political beliefs. That

is, ‘‘. .. key science journalists are far

more skeptical of nuclear energy than are

scientists” (p 51) and therefore more at-

tuned to the pronouncements of anti-nu-

clear activists such as those affiliated with

the Union of Concerned Scientists, Ralph

Nader, and Dr. Ernest Sternglass. Also,

the more liberal the journalist, both sci-

ence journalists and others, the more anti-

nuclear: ‘““The best predictor of opposi-

232 RICHARD J. BORD

tion to nuclear energy is the belief that

American society is unjust” (p 51).”° It is

likely that this bias generalizes to risks

other than nuclear energy. It is true that

many environmental problems are tied to

the operation of large, for-profit organi-

zations and are regulated by government

bureaucracies which are viewed as being

allied to the for-profit industries. It is easy

for a journalist, or anyone, concerned

with social justice to view this as another

case of the helpless individual against cor-

porate and government giants. Appar-

ently that is the definition promoted by

the media and accepted by much of the

general public. The “‘us little people ver-

sus them powerful, insensitive bureau-

crats’’ theme recurred frequently as

unsolicited comments on my LLRW sur-

vey. This also explains how nuclear tech-

nology evolved into a liberal-conservative

issue.

While the media, with its biases, is the

most prevelant source of risk information

there has been an interesting develop-

ment in the evolution of nuclear experts

who offer their services on the informa-

tion market. Risk information experts tra-

ditionally are affiliated with government,

industry, and educational bureaucracies.

Within the past several months, however,

anti-nuclear activist Marvin Resnikoff has

begun advertising as a “second opinion”

resource to state and compact officials.

His “Radioactive Waster Management

Associates”” provides an attractive and

convincing brochure which touts the

professional qualifications of he and his

staff. In addition, Resnikoff’s former or-

ganization, the ‘“‘Radioactive Waste Cam-

paign,’’ is under new leadership and is

advertising ““Living Without Landfills” to

state officials, radwaste generators, and

other interested parties. “Living Without

Landfills” provides state or compact of-

ficials with detailed information on how

to calculate “. . .total radioactivity and

radioactive hazard over the lifetime of

waste generated in a State or Compact

region.” This professionalization and im-

proved marketing strategy of anti-nuclear

activists should increase their influence

with the general public and, perhaps, with

state and local officials. In the LLRW sur-

vey mentioned previously, respondents

were asked who they trusted as sources

of information on LLRW. Anti-nuclear

activists scored very low in terms of public

confidence while any source which had

the term “expert” appended to it elicited

high votes of confidence.

Finally, information regarding risky

technologies is not provided solely by for-

mal sources such as the media or profes-

sionalized interest groups. Information,

and its meaning, is usually filtered and

negotiated through informal networks of

co-workers, friends, and relatives. Little

is presently known about the role of in-

formal information sources on the for-

mation of attitudes toward risky facilities.

It does appear that negative attitudes are

relatively easy to mobilize. Siting cam-

paigns that start on a positive note fre-

quently turn sour once the information is

more widely distributed in the commu-

nity. The source of this opposition prob-

ably lies in informal opinion leaders and

the negotiation of meaning in the context

of small, informal groups.

Improved Disposal and/or Treatment

Technology as a Solution

Improved technology proponents tend

to originate from two quite disparate

sources: environmental activists and

waste technology developers. Environ-

mental activists, particularly the Sierra

Club and East Coast anti-nuclear groups

such as the Radioactive Waste Campaign,

have publically disparaged landfill dis-

posal since the passage of the 1980 LLRW

Policy Act. Their preference is for high-

integrity, above-ground storage which

would allow constant monitoring and the

possibility of material removal should

problems develop. A number of com-

pacts, recognizing the poor reputation of

landfills, have officially opted for engi-

neered containment. Waste technology

companies have recognized that the de-

REACTOR AND NUCLEAR WASTE SITING

velopment of high-integrity, easily mon-

itored, containment, along with volume

reduction technology, can have substan-

tial payoff and have been developing

competing versions in an effort to capture

a viable market share.

While this solution to the problem of

public intransigence has substantial sup-

port among diverse constituencies it is still

not known whether other sectors of the

public, particularly the communities tar-

geted to host risky sites, can be convinced

of its relative merits. Above-ground stor-

age, in particular, has its detractors in

terms of costs, overall safety, and worker

protection. In my Pennsylvania survey, a

substantial majority of the general public

did not view above-ground storage as sig-

nificantly safer than traditional landfills.

They did clearly prefer below-ground dis-

posal with engineered barriers. The prob-

lem is that environmental activists can,

and will, challenge any below-ground fa-

cility on the basis that it is technically im-

possible to guarantee zero migration of

radionuclides into the soil and eventually

the water. This is especially likely in re-

gions of high rain and snowfall. Given

previous arguments, it can be expected

that the local news media will focus on

controversy of this sort and this may fur-

ther erode public confidence in the via-

bility of a technical fix.

Furthermore, attempts at technological

fixes will be very expensive. It appears

that many decision-makers have decided

that the costs can be passed on to the

consumer with relatively little effect.*

However, this may be a dangerous atti-

tude in the sense that once the public is

made aware that they are again being

asked to pick up the tab for for a tech-

nology that was once touted as producing

electricity at a rate “too cheap to mea-

sure’’, their opposition may escalate.

While decision makers may not think the

per capita cost is excessive, the public will

have to be convinced.

Finally, there is a growing recognition

that beyond the issue of the scientific and

technical integrity of a given technology

233

is the question of management: can it be

operated safely on a routine basis over

long periods of time. The Bhopal, India

disaster provoked the following com-

ment:

‘What truly grips us in these accounts

is not so much the numbers as the spec-

tacle of suddenly vanishing compe-

tence, of men utterly routed by tech-

nology, of fail-safe systems failing with

a logic as inexorable as it once was. . .

indeed, right up until that very moment-

unforseeable. And the spectacle haunts

us because it seems to carry allegor-

ical import, like the whispering omen

of a hovering future.’’”’

News of mismanaged high tech is in-

creasingly common. For example, it is

well known that managemet decisions

were somewhat responible for the space

shuttle disaster, TMI, Chernobyl, and

cases of failed waste sites. Male respond-

ents especially, in my LLRW survey and

a survey dealing with a volume-reduction

facility, spontaneously mentioned the

high probability of human error as a rea-

son for their opposition to siting. They

view Murphy’s Laws as alive and well in

high tech industries.

Negotiation for Incentives and

Assurances as a Solution

First, it must be made clear that incen-

tives and assurances are distinct entities

and vary considerably in their degree of

attractiveness to various communities and

people within communities. Incentives,

or concrete material rewards, are gener-

ally viewed in the context of restoring eq-

uity. It is reasoned that a risky facility is

a common good distributing benefits

widely but concentrating costs locally.

The key to public cooperation is viewed

as some sort of concession which raises

the reward value of the facility and thus

makes the costs less onerous. Material re-

wards appeal to pecuniary motives, are

more attractive to financially strapped

communities, and are subject to being la-

beled as crass payoffs by the opposition.

234 RICHARD J. BORD

They do not address issues of fear and

distrust.

Assurances, on the other hand, are typ-

ically in the form of options which provide

the community with some means to pro-

tect itself and to check on the data pro-

vided by experts and site operators.

Assurances provide some measure of

power sharing and do directly deal with

issues of fear and distrust. Their major

shortcoming is that whatever assurances

are offered can always be defined as in-

sufficient by those dedicated to stopping

siting.

Again, in my 1985 survey on Pennsyl-

vanians’ attitudes toward various policy

issues connected with LLRW siting, re-

spondents were asked to evaluate mate-

rial incentives and assurances. The

incentives included guaranteed property

values, local tax relief, a surcharge on the

waste to be returned to the community,

and local hiring and buying agreements

by the site operator. The assurances in-

cluded community control over who op-

erates the site, the provision of resources

to hire independent experts as checks on

industry and government experts, the

provision of resources to train locals to

monitor the site and local power to shut

down the site should malfunctions occur.

Each of these options were presented in

two formats. First, the respondent was

asked how important they thought it was

to provide a community with the partic-

ular option. Then, they were asked if they

thought that the provision of that option

would encourage community coopera-

tion. In addition to the general public,

these same questions were put to a small

sample (38) of state level heads of envi-

ronmental, civic, and public health asso-

ciations.

The results of these surveys indicated

that the public thought that affected com-

munities should receive both incentives

and assurances but a solid majority ex-

pressed little confidence in material in-

centives, except guaranteed property

values, as means to promote cooperation.

Large majorities (80% and above) chose

the options providing control to the com-

munity. This is simply a reaffirmation of

the primacy of health and safety concerns.

However, in responding to the same

items, major decision makers demon-

strated the opposite tendency. They tend

to overchoose the material incentive op-

tions. During interviews they often ex-

pressed the opinion that “money talks.”

The exception to this generalization was

those leaders of environmental activist or-

ganizations. Their responses paralleled

those of the general public. That is, op-

tions granting local control were viewed

as much more crucial than simple material

incentives. This gap in perception be-

tween the public and decision makers

highlights the different basis from which

each is making their judgments. For the

public, personal protection is paramount.

For most decision makers, siting is par-

amount. Since incentives are easier to ma-

nipulate than shared power options they

are likely to be favored by decision mak-

ers.

If shared power is to be taken seriously

then what form can it assume given the

existing legal and institutional infrastruc-

ture? Providing grants to communities to

hire independent experts and to pursue

site monitoring are manageable options

and are presently being written into siting

legislation in various states. No means

presently exists to allow communities to

control site operations. While grants to

hire independent experts and to monitor

the site are welcome assurances they may

not be enough. For example, the com-

munity could hire independent experts

who they know will challenge government

and industry data.

A related issue is who does the com-

munity trust to represent them to the sit-

ing agency. Communities are never

homogeneous on issues such as this. Some

members will favor siting, some will be

on the fence, and many will be opposed.

To be viewed as a legitimate exercise, the

negotiation process will have to include

community members who enjoy trust and

credibility. In the same study referenced

REACTOR AND NUCLEAR WASTE SITING 235

above, respondents were asked who they

trusted to represent the community. Sur-

prisingly, local and county officials elic-

ited very low votes of confidence. Higher

confidence was expresed in locals elected

to a committee, referenda, or general

town meetings. Of course each of these

options could be used to effectively stifle

the siting process.

Somewhat complex incentive and as-

surance packages are currently part of all

serious attempts to site nuclear facilities.

The Texas low-level radioactive waste

campaign is a good example.” Their de-

gree of success will have to be evaluated

post hoc.

Note that most of the issues discussed

above focus on changing individuals. Lit-

tle systematic attention has been given to

crucial political aspects characterizing this

problem. The reason for this relative lack

of attention may lie in the fact that so-

lutions aimed at individuals are consistent

with our democratic beliefs and our faith

that reasoning will win out. Attention to

political issues are certain to mobilize

deeply held passions.

Political Dimensions of the

Siting Problem

Three issues will be discussed in this

section:

1. the decline of the notion of ““common

interest;”’

2. the political rewards for being “‘anti;”’

3. and, the multiple publics and overlap-

ping jurisdictions involved in our frac-

tionated waste policies.

Decline of the Notion of

“Common Interest”

The perception of events from an in-

dividualistic perspective mitigates against

definitions of common interest. “Sup-

port—even identification-of the common

interest becomes elusive under conditions

of extreme normative dissensus.”””” While

“doing your own thing” is in some re-

spects an admirable philosophy of indi-

vidualism it tends to collide with the social

realities of teenage pregnancies, the

spread of lethal diseases, highway shoot-

ings, insider trading on the stock ex-

change, and homeless hazardous waste.

This fragmentation of the common in-

terest favors the political activities of sec-

tarian voluntary associations. Groups

favoring extreme positions and simple so-

lutions will tend to dominate when gov-

ernment is too weak or divided to provide

legitimate leadership. The absence of a

notion of common interest favors con-

frontation and conflict over compro-

mise.*” From this perspective it should

come as no surprise that risky waste siting

has foundered on the shoals of interest

group, local, and sometimes state intran-

sigence. Furthermore, since there is no

developed notion of common interest

there is no incentive for a politician, or

an aspiring politician, to take up the ban-

ner of safe siting ““somewhere.”’

The Political Rewards for

Being “‘Anti’’

All the above arguments foster the con-

clusion that political hay is to be made by

being anti-siting: not anti-siting in gen-

eral, but certainly in particular. If the

public does not trust the technology, the

waste industry and its regulators, or state

and local government to adequately rep-

resent their interests on this issue then the

only popular role for a politician is to fa-

vor safe siting in principle but to quash

any siting attempt that might impact on

his or her consituency. Since the issue

tends to be defined in terms of the little

person versus the powerful bureaucracy,

the politician is in somewhat the same po-

sition as the journalist. To side with the

waste industry or government is to ally

with evil against good. Like journalists,

politicians can be expected to publically

place more credence on the pronounce-

ments of those who appear to represent

the “‘little people,” that is, environmental

and anti-nuclear activists. In private, of

236

course, the politician has the unenviable

task of negotiating around a number of

state and federal agencies and trying to

reconcile official views with interest group

and local citizen perspectives. Decisive

pro-siting political leadership is a highly

improbable outcome.

The Problem of Multiple Publics and

Overlapping Jurisdictions

Unpopular political issues become

footballs. They get tossed around in the

hope that someone will be able to solve

the problem. In the process of being

tossed around they pick up more and

more players who want to get into the

game. Eventually, the resulting chaos

practically insures the game will never get

played. Although there are numerous ex-

amples, one will suffice to make the point.

The economically strapped town of

Edgemont, South Dakota viewed a

LLRW disposal site as a source of jobs

and revenue. The town had been a ura-

nium mining and milling town and its fa-

miliarity with radioactive materials

translated into less fear. Almost 70 per-

cent of the county and 80 percent of Ed-

gemont’s citizens voted in favor of the

proposed disposal facility in June, 1984.

However, anti-nuclear activists forced the

issue to a Statewide referendum in which

a majority of the State’s voters favored

statewide approval before South Dakota

could enter into a nuclear waste compact

with another state and approval by a ma-

jority of voters before any private indus-

try could be licensed to open a disposal

site.*’ The result was no site.

When the Federal Government threw

the LLRW problem to the states in 1979

they hoped that they had taken the initial

steps toward a solution of a political crisis.

However, the requirements of interstate

cooperation, intrastate approval, the

meeting of both federal and state regu-

latory guidelines, the burden of obtaining

local cooperation, and pressure from var-

ious interest groups has made the entire

process something of a nightmare. This

RICHARD J. BORD

multi-group involvement highlights the

limitations of all the proposed solutions.

A siting project can be scuttled at a num-

ber of junctures by a host of different ac-

tors, not the least of which is the court

system which has been very sensitive to

citizen and interest group arguments on

environmental issues.

Discussion and Conclusions

We are now in a better position to un-

derstand the limitations of currently pro-

posed solutions to siting problems.

More technically adequate risk com-

munication has little chance of success-

fully competing with the daily “‘scare

fare’ which greets us Over our morning

newspaper or television news program. It

is unlikely to command attention, to be

given adequate coverage by the media, or

to be trusted as objective. In focused set-

tings, such as a local community facing

siting, it may be possible to get some peo-

ple to carefully digest this kind of infor-

mation. However, they will certainly be

a minority and will be very constrained

by social pressures from neighbors and

counterarguments from visiting “‘anti’s’’.

Should the entire community be con-

vinced that siting is safe then opposition

can still emerge at the regional or state

level.

Since the source of opposition to siting

is fear and distrust there are no compel-

ling reasons why equity solutions should

promote acceptance. Compensation and

incentives simply do not address these is-

sues. It may be difficult to find a large

enough ‘‘carrot” to overcome public fear

and distrust. The search for a high-level

radioactive waste site is now facing this

problem.

A more thorough involvement of the

affected public in the siting proces could

have some effect /F it is acknowledged

that the goal of that participation is to put

some real power in the hands of the locals.

Control is clearly what locals see as a pre-

requisite to any serious consideration of

siting. However, it may be practically and

REACTOR AND NUCLEAR WASTE SITING 237

legally impossible to give them the degree

of control necessary to establish trust.

Furthermore, even if a local involvement

Or an incentive program is successful the

project can be halted by other levels of

government. This is exactly how a pro-

posed Monitored Retreivable Storage fa-

cility was recently stopped in Tennessee.

“The siting process was stopped by ex-

tensive state-wide opposition resulting in

legal challenge by the state and vetoes by

the governor and state legislature.’

Improved siting technology certainly

has a chance of winning some converts.

However, like risk estimates in general,

debates can go on interminably over

whether the new technology is truly more

safe or safe enough. Containers fail, mon-

itors malfunction, operators doze off and

come in hungover, water infiltrates,

storms threaten, terrorists could blow it

up, and government regulators never

have large enough budgets to do a thor-

ough job of regulating. The success of im-

proved technology depends on

establishing trust. That will be difficult to

accomplish.

All the above paints a grim picture for

hazardous facility siting and may lead the

reader to the conclusion that all that is

left is to pack up and go home. However,

the waste issue must be solved. I will end

by briefly discussing what I think those

concerned with siting will try to do, what

will actually happen, and what could hap-

pen.

Clearly, there will be ongoing attempts

to meet the legal guidelines established in

the amended LLRW Policy Act and the

legal amenities demanded for the siting

of other risky facilities. Combinations of

all the solutions discussed above will be

employed. Some successes will certainly

occur and it is possible that a few suc-

cesses will stimulate other compacts and

states to “bite the bullet.”” No one should

be surprised, however, if many states do

not have operating sites by the prescribed

deadline. Any chance for success of a

high-level waste facility in the next two

decades will likely depend on a volunteer

state. This conflict has been referred to

as a second “‘Civil War” and a go-very-

slow approach can be expected. The fur-

ther establishment of nuclear power

plants is likely to depend on geo-political

events beyond anyone’s immediate con-

trol. The difficulties in solving the radio-

active waste issue has provided a back-

ended rationale for holding the line on

more nuclear power plants. Anti-nuclear

activists have high stakes in seeing to it

that this issue is not resolved soon. How-

ever, another international oil crisis could

change the perceived reward-cost ratio

for nuclear power.

In the meantime, waste will continue

to be generated. At present there are

strong pressures to reduce waste volumes,

not only through treatment technologies

and more efficient practices, but through

redefining what is hazardous enough to

require special treatment. In order to

solve their waste problems the medical

community may take steps to redefine

much of their waste so as to separate it

from reactor waste. Suggestions to this

effect were made at the recent American

Chemical Society meetings. If this hap-

pens then anti-nuclear activists will be

free to more vigorously attack reactor

waste. Since low-level radioactive waste

has been a combination of reactor, in-

dustrial, and medical wastes there has

been some constraints on an all-out at-

tack. No one wants to be accused of

threatening public health by hampering

nuclear medicine. It is likely that more

materials will find their way into solid

waste landfills and more will be stored on

site. The pressures for on-site storage may

eventually redefine the entire problem. In

line with what environmental activists are

proposing, much waste may eventually be

stored in expensive, above-ground facil-

ities on-site. In other words, there will be

a great deal of “muddling through” to

invent solutions to the continued waste

problem. None of the solutions are likely

to be optimal either from a safety or a

cost perspective. ;

However, it should be made clear that

238 RICHARD J. BORD

the bottom line to risky facility siting is,

and will remain, public fear and distrust

along with political timidity and favor-

seeking. Public health and safety and eco-

nomic efficiency are the major issues.

Many analyists are optimistic that the ex-

isting piecemeal approach will, in the long

run, favor improved safety while pro-

moting democratic ideals.** However, a

viable counterargument can be made that

a solution involving the long term inter-

ests of the public and industry requires

planning, negotiation, compromise, and

especially leadership from the highest lev-

els of government. National mobilization

similar to that experienced during war-

time may eventually be necessary. Given

continued lack of progress, we may be

forced to question whether our present

course is a Optimal one or whether the

long-term impact is simply more eco-

nomic and health habilities forced on our

progeny.

References Cited

1. Freudenburg, W. R. 1985 Waste not: the special

impacts of nuclear waste facilities. In: R. G.

Post, ed., Waste Isolation in the U.S., Technical

Programs and Public Participation, Proceedings

of the Symposium on Waste Management, Vol.

3, Tucson, Arizona.

2. Douglas, M. 1985. Risk Acceptability According

to the Social Sciences. Russell Sage Foundation,

New York, NY.

3. Ruckelshaus, W. D. 1983. Science, Risk, and

public policy. Science, 221: pp. 1026-1028.

4. Covello, V. T., P. Slovic, and D. von Winter-

feldt. 1987 Risk Communication: a review of

the literature. Unpublished Manuscript. p. 79.

5. Con, W. D. and N. R. Feimer. 1985 Commu-

nicating with the public on environmental risk:

integrating research and policy. The Environ-

mental Professional, 7: pp. 39-47.

6. Epstein, S. S., M. D., L. O. Brown, and C.

Pope. 1982. Hazardous Waste in America.

Sierra Club Books, San Francisco.

7. O’Riordan, T. 1983. The cognitive and political

dimensions of risk analysis. Journal of Environ-

mental Psychology, 3: pp. 345-354.

8. Douglas, Ibid.

9. Bord, R. J. 1985 Opinions of Pennsylvanians

on policy issues related to low-level radioactive

waste disposal. Institute for Research on Land

and Water Resources Report. The Pennsylvania

State University.

10. Schnaiberg, A. 1987 Economics of envi-

ronmental regulation: the impact of environ-

mental protest dynamics. Paper delivered at the

annual meetings of the American Association

for the Advancement of Science, Chicago,

Ill.

11. DuPont, R. L. 1981. The nuclear power phobia.

Business Week. September 7: pp. 14-16.

12. Mitchell, R.C. 1984. Rationality and irration-

ality in the public’s perception of nuclear power.

In: W. R. Freudenberg and E. A. Rosa, eds.,

Public Reactions to Nuclear Power: Are There

Critical Masses? Westview Press, Inc., Boulder,

Colorado.

13. Covello, et. al., Ibid.

14. Slovic, P., B. Fischhoff, and S. Lichtenstein.

1982. Facts versus fears: understanding per-

ceived risk. In: D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, and

A. Tversky, eds., Judgment Under Uncertainty:

Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University

Press, Cambridge.

15. Conn and Feimer, I[bid.

16. Douglas, Ibid., p. 34.

17. Yosie, T. F. 1987. EPA’s risk assessment cul-

ture. Environment, Science, and Technology,

21: pp. 526-531.

18. Bord, R. J., P. J. Ponzurick, and W. F. Witzig.

1985. Community response to low-level radio-

active waste: a case study of an attempt to es-

tablish a waste reduction and incineration

facility. ZEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science,

Vol. NS-32, December, pp. 4466-4471.

19. Bord, R. J., Ibid.

20. Eisenbud, M. 1984. Radioactivity and you. En-

vironment, 26: pp. 6-33.

21. Horneday, A. 1986. Straight about Chernobyl.

MS Magazine, IV: pp. 83-86.

22. Freimuth, V. S. and J. P. Van Nevel. 1981.

Reaching the public: the asbestos awareness

campaign. Journal of Communication, 31: pp.

155-167.

23. Pfund, N. and L. Hofstadter. 1981. Biomedical

innovation and the press. Journal of Commun-

ication, 31: pp. 138-154.

24. Covello, et. al., Ibid., p. 27.

25. Rothman and Lichter, [bid., p. 51.

26. The Radioactive Exchange. 1987 Low-Level

Radioactive Waste Management: Facing the New

Realities. A Briefing book Presented to Partic-

ipants of the Third Annual Decisionmakers

Forum Sponsored by the Radioactive Ex-

change, June 16-19, Traverse City, MI.

27. Editorial. 1985. The New Yorker. Feb. 18, Re-

ported in Covello, et. al., Ibid, p. 25.

28. Texas Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal

Authority. 1985 Siting a Low-Level Radioactive

Waste Disposal Facility in Texas: Local Govern-

ment Participation, Mitigation, Compensation,

Incentives, and Operator Standards. Texas Ad-

visory Commission on Intergovernmental Re-

lations, Austin, Texas.

29. Short, J. F. 1984 Toward the social transfor-

mation of risk analysis. American Sociological

Review, 49: pp. 711-725.

30. Short, Ibid.

31. McCaughey, J. 1985. South Dakota town

dreams of its own nuclear waste dump. The En-

ergy Daily, 13: pp. 1 and 4.

32. Peelle, E. 1987. Innovative process and inven-

tive solutions: a case study of local public ac-

Journal of the Washington Academy of Sciences,

Volume 78, Number 2, Pages 239-244, June 1988

ceptance of a proposed nuclear waste packaging

and storage facility. Symposium on Land Use

Management, Praeger Press, New York, NY.

33. Bullard, C. W. 1987 Issues in Radioactive Waste

Management. Paper Presented to the National

Advisory Committee of the Institute of Gov-

ernment and Public Affairs, University of Illi-

nois, Champaign-Urbana, June 15.

Round Table Discussion:

Policy Considerations

McGUIRE: Steven McGuire, Nuclear

Regulatory Commission. This is for Dr.

Bord. |

You expressed the opinion that im-

proving technology would not help siting.

In view of the last talk, covering state-of-

the-art technology, what comment would

you make?

BORD: As a citizen, I was very excited

about the information that was provided

in the last talk. I think that kind of dra-

matic improvement might have some ef-

fect. Now, what would happen, and it is

predictable, you would go on 60 Minutes,

and someone would try to demonstrate

that there are problems with this. There

are anti-nuclear activists who, I am sure,

would dig up something. But I think we

have to look at the whole issue of what

reasonable people can agree on. If we can

invent a technology that is powerful

enough that we can make opportunistic

politicians not look so good by opposing

it, we will be in better shape. I think that

the information provided in the last talk

gave some realm of hope in that line.

There is one other point there where

the technology does interact with insti-

239

tutional problems. The question came up

here, How does this affect the waste dis-

posal problem, because it certainly makes

the siting problem easier. There are two

features that need to be considered.

One of the things that has happened in

the last bit of time is that the waste dis-

posal problem is being treated very dif-

ferently than it was early on in the fission

program. When you believed the nuclear

power was very cheap, if you spent any

money at all in disposing the waste, you

really affected the cost of nuclear power

at the front end of the system. Now, luck-

ily, nuclear power is very expensive. You

can spend fortunes disposing of the waste,

and it will hardly affect the cost of power

at all.

That lets us begin technologically to

consider lots of things we couldn’t con-

sider before. It also lets us consider, be-

Cause uranium is so available, just

throwing the stuff away without ever re-

processing it. If you do that for the sort

of reactor that I spoke most about here,

the trick is, you take the fuel as it exists,

and if it is capable of surviving in the cen-

ter of an operating uncooled reactor with-

240 POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

out relinquishing its waste, it is as

beautifully packaged as you could possi-

bly imagine to put it somewhere else in a

hole in the ground where those conditions

are not there. So the fuel comes prepack-

aged for disposal, and it does become a

lot easier. Proving that it survives in one

condition makes it a lot more plausible

that it survives in another.

SORENSON: I like tech fixes, too. I

think the public ultimately would want a

tech fix for the nuclear power. But I be-

lieve the social and institutional process

by which the public gets involved in these

new technologies and independently

comes to accept them as safer is as im-

portant as having the safe technology it-

self. It’s like the government saying,

‘Trust me. We have this new reactor. It

won't fail” will not solve the problem, but

it’s the whole social process that must take

place as well.

BRODSKY: Allen Brodsky, George-

town University. I was impressed by Dr.

Lidsky’s presentation. I think maybe if we

can get some of these ideas across, that

would be great, but I still go back to worry

about how the media might present it

anyhow. We might find new methods that

are safer, and this is very good, but if the

kinds of myths that have been propagated

are dreamed up against the new technol-

ogy, the same thing could happen again.

I believe that the public can understand

this aspect of chance. Somebody men-

tioned today that you could not say 1 in

10,000, that it is meaningless. I would like

to question that word “‘meaningless.”’ Our

only hope is to get the public to think in

terms of chance and quantitatively about

risk. ;

We have to devise ways of doing it and

we have to get it to them, not only by

person-to-person contact, which I think is

important, but we also have to try to get

it on the media, and I think there are

possibilities of doing that, too.

BORD: In this public education/infor-

mation program I was on for about three

years, we spoke to League of Women

Voters and all kinds of civic groups

around Pennsylvania. We were very suc-

cessful in having them sit there and listen

to us and afterwards agree that it was a

wonderful presentation, they had much

better understanding of radioactive waste

issues, and they thought everyone should

hear this presentation.

I would ask them, “All right. Does that

mean that you would be more supportive

of a waste site near you?” And they said,

“No.”

MARKS: Franklin Marks from the

U.S. Public Health Service, in the Office

of Emergency Preparedness. My office

deals a lot with coordinating Public

Health Service efforts to combat disasters

of one sort or another, often helping work

on nuclear power plant problems. Two of

the agencies we have worked with often

are the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

and the Federal Emergency Management

Agency.

Earlier in Mr. Sorenson’s talk, he was

talking to some extent about evacuations,

moving people out if necessary. We at

some times have had to pay attention to

some of the specifics of that, and you can

quickly run into some pretty thorny ques-

tions. One of them is, How to get people

out of an area you want to evacuate if you

are talking about patients in a hospital or,

secondly, patients in an old age home, or

something like that.

Then we often have people raise the

issue, What about individuals who don’t

have cars? Of course, one answer can be

mass transit, but that has to be worked

out well. Sometimes it even gets a little

comical, but it isn’t really funny. What

about all the people with cars who ob-

viously from time to time will need some

gasoline? Will the gas stations be open?

If not, you may run into a number of cars

running out of gasoline.

Of course, where do all the people go?

Presumably some miles away, but where

do they wind up staying? Is it friends, big

mass area, or what have you. Could you

address some of these issues, please?

SORENSON: Certainly I cannot ad-

dress them in a depth to which we have

ROUND TABLE DISCUSSION 241

knowledge on them, because there exists

a considerable amount of information on

how publics behave in evacuations. To

date, we have maybe 15 detailed empir-

ical studies of different evacuation situa-

tions that document those kinds of

problems, and we are in the process of

developing a lot more information on

some of the specific topics that you raise,

such as how are hospitals and nursing

homes being evacuated?

We have a study going on now, funded

by FEMA, with Oak Ridge and the Uni-

versity of Tennessee, to address those

kinds of issues. By and large, the record

of information to date indicates evacua-

tions occur with surprisingly few great lo-

gistic problems, in situations in which

warning information gets out to the public

in sufficient time for them to take action.

People adapt to the amount of time they

have available to respond to the hazards.

Evacuations prevent a considerable

number of deaths and injuries every year

from a variety of hazards. So you are

faced with a litany of problems. Yet, when

you look at the actual record, you find

that somehow people are pretty good at

taking care of themselves in emergencies,

adapting and helping each other to over-

come those kinds of problems that you

raised.

BRODSKY: I do think people need to

understand. People get turned off at the

end of all these things when the an-

nouncement to the public is, ‘““There is no

danger.” You cannot say that anymore,

because people have heard about the no-

threshold concept. They have heard peo-

ple like Art Upton get up in public and

say, “Any level of radiation is danger-

ous.” What people have to realize is that

the question is not, ‘Is radiation danger-

ous” The question is, ““How much radia-

tion is how dangerous?”

McCALLUM: I think it is interesting,

and I would like to move us back to the

positive side of this. I liked Mr. Soren-

son’s comments about needing the sort of

social machinery to look at evaluating

new technologies and dealing with that

and, ultimately, achieving the benefits of

them. I also wonder if Dr. Lidsky could

talk a little bit about research policy and

the kinds of things that ought to be con-

sidered in the area of research policy to

try to move in some of these directions

and some of the potential problems, in

terms of either economic or political or

other kinds of disincentives to evaluating

and trying new technologies that might

throw some roadblocks in the way.

LIDSKY: That is an immense area of

discussion you have opened up, of course.

It involves the politics of large commercial

organizations interracting with the gov-

ernment, politics that are implicit in peo-

ple making policies that are wide-ranging,

long-lived, and possibly not being as pro-

ductive as they thought, and all those

other issues that I think it is almost hope-

less to open up here.

Large research programs develop in

their wake. Large research organizations

are very hard to turn around quickly, for

all sorts of reasons. The nuclear industry

in this country, for example, is not going

to save itself. The idea is to find some

trick. In some ways, I took Mr. Soren-

son’s comment very much to heart also,

because it does not just do to have the

technological fix available, especially

after I have been advocating that you

match your technological fix to what so-

ciety needs. You also have to do some

degree of institutional karate, and it hap-

pens differently, in different ways.

It turns out, in this particular case, the

particular reactor I was looking at—and

here again, each particular case is sul ge-

neris. You have to tailor it. I did not men-

tion—although not for reasons of hiding

it but because I spoke too quickly—that

in building a reactor with Level 1 prop-

erties, it must be small. If you make it

big, it can heat itself up. It took a long

time for people to perceive that this was

okay. If we believed that big ones were

cheaper than small ones, and if we be-

lieved in economies of scale, then there

was no sense in building a small one.

If you also believed, as everyone did

242 POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

for a long period of time, that existing

reactors were safe enough, then having a

reactor that was so much safer was just a

marginal inconsequential benefit. It is

only recently that people perceive small

size being a good thing as far as utilities

are concerned—it means they are

smaller, they are cheaper and easier to

manage; it is easier to build one and test

it. But other perceptions come along also.

The institutional karate that is used in

this particular case comes about because

a reactor of small size, if it is going to

meet large power needs, is going to have

to be built in very large quantities. People

who are interested in building small things

in large quantities jump at something like

this. I discussed this reactor in Japan, and

they have difficult siting problems. They

have used up their whole sea coast. They

have to move everything else inland, in

smaller quantities and closer to cities.

They need to have demonstrable safety.

They are also very used to building things

in large quantity, for their own use and

for export use. It turns out, my research

now is going to be supported by Japan for

the next two years. That is a specific an-

swer, but it is meant, again, to illustrate

a general point.

When it comes to technologies, there

is no Overriding way to do this, because

you are trying to match some very difficult

constraints that come from different an-

gles. The trick is to find out if you can.

It is not always true that you can do it.

BURLEY: Gordon Burley, Environ-

mental Protection Agency. I would like

to pursue that same question of alterna-

tive technologies just a little bit further.

I started work modeling of severe reactor

accidents in 1967 when I was with the old

Atomic Energy Commission. We also at

that time recognized that there were safer

reactors. The German pebble reactor was

one. I think you did not mention the mol-

ten salt reactor All of these were killed

effectively by fiat early on, and some

other technologies, evolving technolo-

gies, the liquid metal fast breeder reactor,

was also killed at about the same time.

We have to put this in the context of

the time. We did not have any real anti-

nuclear sentiment in the country at that

point. The decisions that were made by

the Atomic Energy Commission effec-

tively held. So we went with the light

water reactors, which has been indicated

are 15 seconds away from disaster. The

thing is that we are heading into an era

now where the fossil resources are begin-

ning to diminish. We are going to have to

go to alternative energy sources. The

question is, how does one introduce a

change of policy at this point into the

thinking process so that there is adequate

funding. One is talking about lead times

of 15 and 20 years on evolving technology.

These decisions cannot be made 15 years

from now when we are down the road.

The question is, What should be done

at this point to start moulding public opin-

ion to either accept the light water reac-

tors with all their warts or try to get some

funding for these alternative technologies

which might provide a safer environment.

LIDSKY: Here again, you have come

right to the heart of the institutional issue.

This country does not have a long-lasting

well-thought-out energy policy. Electric-

ity is made by a number of utilities which

work in more or less autonomous fashion.

Some are very large and very well run.

Some are very large and very poorly run.

And there is a whole gamut of utilities.

That is one of the differences between this

country and almost every other, except

Germany, by the way, which has a system

very much like ours and has a very suc-

cessful nuclear program going. They do

not have quite the choice we have, and

they have somewhat different incentives.

Unless you want centralized govern-

ment planning—and what you have just

done is given me an example of a case

where centralized government planning

did not work. In fact, if the AEC had had

its way, we would have many more of the

sort of reactors we are finding we wish we

did not have right now. So the natural

antipathy to centralized planning of that

sort in a place where you have a choice

ROUND TABLE DISCUSSION 243

is very valid. The thing you have to do is

find a way to make things attractive to the

system we have, to the utilities we have.

If they are working in a capitalistic sys-

tem, as most utilities are, then you find a

way that makes it attractive for them to

put the power they need on line, cheaper

and easier than any other way. That is

going to be some entity making reactors

of this sort, which can be done now by a

single entity because they are small and

selling them.

Absent that, what we will do is what I

said we will do. Each utility will respond

individually in a way that makes most

sense for them, and that is to put on gas

plants and then coal plants. Though I sit

in the middle of a nuclear engineering de-

partment, I cannot really claim that is

going to be a great tragedy for this coun-

try. Even as we think about that, and the

difficulty I have in developing nuclear re-

actors that will win, you can build coal

plants now that are many times better

than existing ones, many times better than

we dreamed they could be, in terms of

clean emissions, efficient use, small size,

and lots of other things. It is not a panic

issue in this country, and it may well be

that this time we take the time to do the

job right.

McCALLUM: Is there a way, from

your experience in dealing with waste sit-

ing problems and other general issues, to

focus the public debate on trying to see

things in the context of a larger energy

policy and to look at a variety of options

and choices. That is a fairly complicated

thing to get political force behind, but do

you see hopes or have insights into how

something like that might work?

BOND: I think that we have not failed

in communicating with the public so much

in the sense that we have not gotten them

to understand probability. I think we

failed in getting them to understand pro-

grams and international competition. It

may well be that certain geopolitical

events could occur that would tip the bal-

ance of costs and rewards and refocus

public attention on some other things.

Specifically with the problem of the

NIMBY syndrome, : do not know. I wish

I could be more optimistic about that. But

right now, I think we would have to come

up with an amazing technology to get peo-

ple to accept it, to show some enthusiasm

for it. We cannot site incinerators, we can-

not site chemical plants. We are fighting

that battle right in my home county with

solid waste in Pennsylvania right now.

The courts have given the public the

power to say no, and that is what they are

saying.

I think that in line with some of the

remarks that have been made, perhaps

eventually in order to deal with the prob-

lem, the change will have to occur in the

institutions and in the infrastructure. I

really do not want to predict how I think

that might go.

LIDSKY: There is an aspect of the

technology that has been described by our

last speaker today that has great appeal

from a social policy issue. There are schol-

ars who interpret the controversy over nu-

clear power in a public reaction against

largeness and large scale technology,

large scale organizations and the like.

There is this resentment among the

American public against things that they

perceive are out of their control. The idea

of a small reactor brings the technology

back down in scale to which the individual

may feel like they have more opportunity

to control the management of that tech-

nology.

I think at one point the idea of a neigh-

borhood nuclear power plant would have

been very facetiously received, but the

idea has inherent merits on its own.

KASPERSON: Perhaps the Chair

could add one note of optimism on the

radioactive waste siting situation. I have

been struck by the experiences of a num-

ber of countries in their programs for ra-

dioactive waste siting. Sweden is in the

process of solving their radioactive waste

siting program. They are solving it in a

country that has a strong tradition of en-

vironmental movement. It has had an ac-

tive debate over the situation of nuclear

244 POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

power. The institutional situation is that

in Sweden there is a local veto right over

any industrial plant or waste facility to be

located in the community.

Sweden has successfully sited several

radioactive waste facilities. They have

done it partly by locating the facilities at

existing nuclear sites, which may indicate

some reason for optimism. That may yet

be managed with a monitored retrievable

storage facility if we build it at Oak Ridge,

so DOE may have been at least partly on

track with that particular approach.

But also in Sweden they are not trying

to fine-tune the safety of the facility which

is rather critical to this process. The ap-

proach in Sweden is that they are going

to make the facilities so super safe that

they are going to win over the broad con-

sensus of expert and even environmental

opinion about that. They are not going to

try to hedge on the safety issue.

By the way, I wish we could convince

the American institutions to do that be-

cause the process costs in this area are so

enormous compared to the substantive

costs of putting the issues to bed that it

does not make any sense to get in long

protracted siting fights and debates if you

can overwhelm the problem by additional

investment.

Sweden has also reached something of

a societal consensus on the future of nu-

clear power. If you can do that, some of

your problems go away in the siting of

facilities.

I think that if you look at the interna-

tional experience, appreciating the fact

that cultures are different—and in Swe-

den, if you make a decision, basically

everybody feels it is their obligation to

pull together and make it work; we do not

have that luxury—there are important

clues as to how this problem can be man-

aged. I think we have gone about it

poorly, and we have made a lot of mis-

takes along the way, but I really do not

believe that it is not a manageable prob-

lem.

QUESTIONER: Under the present so-

cial and political climate of wanting the

United States’ high technology to be com-

petitive, do you feel that the new tech-

nology proposed by Dr. Lidsky would

find sympathetic avenues for significant

development?

SPEAKER: Viewing the utilities as ef-

fectively independent entities whose job

is to make money, the answer is yes, if

you can make a buck on it. The trick in

that case is to find someone to build the

first one. It may be possible to do it here,

and if it does not happen here, it will be ~

built elsewhere sooner or later. Eventu-

ally, if it is built elsewhere and found suc-

cessful, it will be imported into this

country. So the answer is that in the long

term, very definitely yes.

In the shorter range, only if one sees a

way to make a relatively clear profit on

it. Again, time scales in this country being

what the are, to make that relatively clear

profit in the relatively short period of

time. That requires a lot of things to hap-

pen just precisely right, and I am not

about to predict that that will happen.

There are ways in which it might happen.

McCALLUM: This was a very exciting

panel. I like the idea of extending this

debate to other fora and other places. The

panel this afternoon also suggests new

ideas and new things that could be in-

cluded in those discussions that could be

very exciting and very useful. There are

things we have talked about before, trying

to find ways to get more people involved

in it and looking at whether or not, in

some of the siting debates or in some of

the emergency exercising around existing

nuclear facilities might be used as focii for

attention to get discussion of some of

these broader issues when the awareness

or the attentiveness of the public has been

enervated because of special events. I

think that the conference has done what

we wanted it to do, which was to produce

some new ideas and some things that can

be applied in the future.

DELEGATES TO THE WASHINGTON ACADEMY OF SCIENCES,

REPRESENTING THE LOCAL AFFILIATED SOCIETIES

Pepa Ne Ale SOCIE YP Or) WV ASEM LOM. ors 020 secre. ole see aves ects nie) andine Sow alae Sai calg a ayslerw aie ded Barbara F. Howell

PRRMEOPOrICAl SOCICLY OW aASMING (ON). <hoc kes cob ec molsspdeer ols diedadaaseeeeaed eas Edward J. Lehman

Pee AESORIC EVOL VV ASTIN LOM. sere) 5 2) dalaie cia/e sna is los aisrwin od bone ale aedee elatel hater euaiy wee Austin B. Williams

EMME ECIELY Ol WaASHINOTON: (ccc... vclns he tieciees csed ss ass meehisle cl ee aecies Jo-Anne A. Jackson

Pemeemmleical SOCICLY. OF WaSHINGtON. oot. is iene wees ee ee dale ed ewe eeeae shares Manya B. Stoetzel

MME TLC OT ARC SOCICLYR El icicles c( aloe ae Be clic oi tai e dened or keen ees Se Gilbert Grosvenor

Pee ee ESO CICEVLOL WVASHIN GLO. oe .ccyccce ite bol ore cls oe We we blete Wouin e medina Sov ee hele James V. O’Connor

Mestcansocicuy Or the District of Columbia ...... 2.0... ia eek ena eee ee Charles E. Townsend

MELB ETSI OA CAME SOCIC UY os ticle sclele cya) a isisla wird ic. sisue 4) eusie S dw rae ban we lod Sp eae and Paul H. Oehser

SME AES OCI LV EOIN VASIITIOTOR Lhe) ois ciahceo fe clit os ceca soe oreo vane dics Aiejayscc «ole blornea wee nk Conrad B. Link

Secicmeomsinencan Foresters, Washington S€CHON . 2... 6.6.5 oes eee cee wees cee ec des es Mark Rey

Pe tee en SUCICLYO la NOMECTS 5 alas sie 5.06 on wales ps Sees coh ee Oe Weegee e deems s George Abraham

Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Washington Section................. George Abraham

American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Washington Section....................00 000 Michael Chi

Picwmtintnolorical Society Ol WasninetOn . 5 5.52 on pete ence wee eet vodens Robert S. Isenstein

pumerecansociety for Microbiology, Washington Branch ..............6.00. coe w ste esndneane’ Vacant

Society of American Military Engineers, Washington Post...................00.. Charles A. Burroughs

punetican society of Civil Engineers, National Capital Section. :..........20... 0005-00 e ee Carl Gaum

Society for Experimental Biology and Medicine, DC Section ...................... Cyrus R. Creveling

Pancnean society tor Metals, Washington: Chapter .....- 2.2.2... ete cae eee eee eens James R. Ward

American Association of Dental Research, Washington Section...................00.05. Eloise Ullman

American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, National Capital Section............... Paul Keller

PuEaPaeanevictcorolopical Society, DC Chapter . .0: 25.05. 5. cc ck bees bee deme eens A. James Wagner

IPHONE DSOCICLV OL WVASMINCLORN oft e snldig is oe ine gig boas aide bial elete gy woe eles merle! Albert B. DeMilo

Beeusicalsocicty Of America, Washington Chapter. ..... 2.2... ..00055 eos eee eee Richard K. Cook

PAaeHcaneNucicar Society, Washington Section... ...5..6.. 0k ec e eee cee cee eee beet te cee Paul Theiss

lustre ot Food Technologists, Washington Section ... 07.2... 0.2.22 e epee eee es Melvin R. Johnston

American Ceramic Society, Baltimore-Washington Section.....................--. Joseph H. Simmons

PE PREM EME MAIC AME SOCIO INET oo oye > c/s ic rays ei ese SE ss Selle aos 4 8 diane swe slave pie roms ell wien Alayne A. Adams

Ase OHM EN STORY Ole SClence CLUB 7.0.5. ive is otc tit os bie be aie boinc Slave wine ccivnceaie ae Albert Gluckman

American Association of Physics Teachers, Chesapeake Section ...................... Peggy A. Dixon

Warcaesocicty (of America, National Capital Section. ... 22... 026.08. ce ee eee ee William R. Graver

American Society of Plant Physiologists, Washington Area Section............... Walter Shropshire, Jr.

Washington Operations Research/Management Science Council ....................-. Doug Samuelson

lnsrument Society of America, Washington Section... 2.2.2.6. 6 523 ceed ees be eee rene Carl Zeller

American Institute of Mining, Metallurgical

aiceectroleum: Enomeers, Washington Section ..... 2... 0... 2... bee ee See ae ees Ronald Munson

Pe GEE Hae APIA NSECOMOMICES (0 pe Bolo cce oie aie oe by wines are ode o Se Hula eet aleve we wpeiere Robert H. McCracken

Mathematics Association of America, MD-DC-VA Section. ................0.00 eee Alfred B. Willcox

IS LEIS HEE CIO INC NEIEISES Te ts are, cio decsh blew oie whdin iaeelieiw gale alee lelie vere cvete) sista Miloslav Rechcigl, Jr.

OES ENO IO CIE AIP ASSOC AINOM eR Se oles ons oem oid: ee w ae, Von es wise, wins e Mijee guar we opm eR ededm slanete Bete Bert T. King

MAS MIME CO AU pUCCUEICAICGTLOUDS 905 coe c.sisis ee oie c Sreje sb s alare, S)L eis ieiw os (e tule aunts pha ne ape Robert F. Brady

American Phytopathological Society, Potomac Division................00-:ee ee ee eee Roger H. Lawson

Society for General Systems Research, Metropolitan Washington Chapter ..... Ronald W. Manderscheid

PAM An ER ACIGES SOCICTY LOtOmMacC hapten c02):)2 5 dea <'e oe se 2 siete c.0' enere tim dike esse # oni ole Stanley Deutsch

Pane bedi PISHCHES SOCIEDY a Ee OLOMAG CDAPLEL, -1:)c)c 5.2'e <i-\a iiss + 0; \n) iv d slely oie nievsinminnttie amie Robert J. Sousa

ASSOCIatoOn LOE Science, Hechuolopy and Innovation )....:. ... i654 ..6 alesis mom cae cere abn ele Ralph I. Cole

Eastern Sociological SOclebyas neni eis iy. an) s x onis he <a dooeans = Syele ia © olttercibie gb bie sel Ronald W. Manderscheid

Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Northern Virginia Section.............. Ralph I. Cole

Association for Computing Machinery, Washington Chapter.....................2-. James J. Pottmyer

WVaSHINCLON Sa tatiStiCalnSOGletyin 05 cre oe Sole feta Wa wines dinvala acgebahe ie avelsnk ohs te Miao R. Clifton Bailey

Delegates continue in office until new selections are made by the representative societies.