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Number 2

Summer 2019

Journal of the

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ISSN 0043-0439 Issued Quarterly at Washington DC

Washington Academy of Sciences

Founded in 1898

BOARD OF MANAGERS

Elected Officers

President

Judy Staveley

President Elect

Mina Izadjoo

Treasurer

Ronald Hietala

Secretary

Poorva Dharkar

Vice President, Administration

Terry Longstreth

Vice President, Membership

Ram Sriram

Vice President, Junior Academy

Paul Arveson

Vice President, Affiliated Societies

Gene Williams

Members at Large

Joanne Horn

David Torain

Barbara Ransom

Noriko Behling

Lisa Frehill

Mike Cohen

Past President

Mina Ilzadjoo

AFFILIATED SOCIETY DELEGATES

Shown on back cover

Editor of the Journal

Sethanne Howard

Journal of the Washington Academy of

Sciences (ISSN 0043-0439)

Published by the Washington Academy of

Sciences

email: wasjournal@washacadsci.org

website: www.washacadsci.org

The Journal of the Washington Academy

of Sciences

The Journal is the official organ of the

Academy. It publishes articles on science

policy, the history of science, critical reviews,

original science research, proceedings of

scholarly meetings of its Affiliated Societies,

and other items of interest to its members. It

is published quarterly. The last issue of the

year contains a directory of the current

membership of the Academy.

Subscription Rates

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Volume 105

Number 2

Summer 2019

Journal of the

WASHINGTON

ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

Editor's Comments 5S. Howard

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ISSN 0043-0439 Issued Quarterly at Washington DC

Summer 2019

EDITOR’S COMMENTS

Presenting the 2019 Summer issue of the Journal of the Washington

Academy of Sciences.

On 8/15/2019 Physics & Astronomy Ph.D. student José Flores

Velazquez was shot and killed in a drive-by shooting near his family home

in Los Angeles. He was a student at UC Irvine. His department called him

‘a ray of light”. We mourn the loss of a new scientist by gun violence. The

interim CEO of the AAAS in last week’s issue of Science used his editorial

section to write about the “public health epidemic of mass shootings and

gun violence”. His editorial was titled “Stop blaming mental illness”. I echo

his statements. Mental illnesses are not the major cause of mass shootings.

The National Council for Behavioral Health estimates that less than 4% of

violent crimes are caused by people with mental illnesses. It is dangerous to

stigmatize people with mental illness in this way. In addition the world wide

average of mental illness is about the same for all countries, yet only the US

has a substantial spike in mass shootings.

Congressional actions of the past few years have essentially stopped

all research into the causes of gun violence. However, in June 2019 the

funding bill passed by the US House of Representatives includes $50

million for research on gun violence. It is not much given the scale of the

problem, but it is a start. We need the Senate and White House to agree with

this and get on with the studying and solving the problem.

This issue of the Journal presents three papers not related to gun

violence. We return to and celebrate science. First up is a review of

evolution through the years since Darwin. As the author says: regarding the

general format of the article this 1s not a traditional paper indeed or a

traditional review. This is a survey of some recent publications with a

common, general topic.

Next is a paper on self-gravitating spheres of fluid (this is an

astronomy paper). Such objects are important in astronomy.

Although the [AU (International Astronomical Union) is the

authority responsible for assigning official designations and names to

celestial bodies, in recognition of its 100th year, the [AU now offers every

country the chance to name one planetary system - an exoplanet and its host

Washington Academy of Sciences

ill

star. Each nation’s designated star is visible from that country, and

sufficiently bright to be observed through small telescopes. The star for the

United States is HD 17156 in the constellation Cassiopeia. HD is the

designation for objects in the Henry Draper Catalog of stars. The US

national campaign will run from September 2019 to November 2019 and,

after final validation by the IAU100 NameExoWorlds Steering Committee,

the global results will be announced in December 2019. If you would like

to receive a reminder when the naming contest opens, you may sign up to

receive a one-time email:

https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1 FAIpOLSdZF9OgHiaZGSBEmOr | cj

ZWBel7LT HRS5pgi3JM4uBce4niQw/viewform

The last paper is a study on changing social systems looked at from

the legal perspective.

We end with the photos of this year’s award winners at the Annual

Meeting and Awards Banquet. The majority of our members live in

Maryland, and this year, for a rare change, the banquet was held in

Frederick, Maryland.

The Journal is the official organ of the Academy. Please consider

sending in technical papers, review studies, announcements, and book

reviews. Please send manuscripts to w ashacadsci.org. If you

are interested in being a reviewer for the Journal, please send your name,

email address, and specialty to the same address. Each manuscript 1s peer

reviewed, and there are no page charges. As you can tell from this issue we

cover a wide range of the sciences.

asjournal(@w

I encourage people to write letters to the editor. Please send email

(wasjournal@washacadsci.org) comments on papers, suggestions for

articles, and ideas for what you would like to see in the Journal. I also

encourage student papers and will help the student learn about writing a

scientific paper.

We are a peer reviewed journal and need volunteer reviewers. If you

would like to be on our reviewer list please send email to the above address

and include your specialty.

Sethanne Howard

Summer 2019

Journal of the Washington Academy of Sciences

Editor Sethanne Howard

showard@washacadsci.org

Board of Discipline Editors

The Journal of the Washington Academy of Sciences has a twelve member

Board of Discipline Editors representing many scientific and technical

fields. The members of the Board of Discipline Editors are affiliated with a

variety of scientific institutions in the Washington area and beyond —

government agencies such as the National Institute of Standards and

Technology (NIST); universities such as Georgetown; and professional

associations such as the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers

(IEEE).

Anthropology

Astronomy

Behavioral and Social

Sciences

Biology

Botany

Chemistry

Environmental Natural

Sciences

Health

History of Medicine

Operations Research

Science Education

Systems Science

Emanuela Appetiti

Sethanne Howard

Carlos Sluzki

Poorva Dharkar

Mark Holland

Deana Jaber

Terrell Erickson

Robin Stombler

Alain Touwaide

Michael Katehakis

Jim Egenrieder

Elizabeth Corona

eappetiti(@hotmail.com

sethanneh(@msn.com

csluzki(@emu.edu

poorvadharkar@gmail.com

maholland@salisbury.edu

djaber@marymount.edu

terrell.erickson](@wde.nsda.gov_

rstombler@auburnstrat.com

atouwaide(Whotmail.com

mnk(@rei.rutgers.edu_

jim(@deepwater.org.

elizabethcorona@gmail.com

Washington Academy of Sciences

DARWIN, EVOLUTION, AND LIFE

Alain Touwaide

University of California Los Angeles

Abstract

A Selection of Some Recent Publications on evolution that aims to give the

gist of these publications and, at the same time, of some trends in science,

history of science, and philosophy of science.

ONE CENTURY AND A HALF and even more (160 years, actually) after the

publication of the Origin of species, Charles Darwin (1809-1882) and the

theory of evolution are more than ever on the agenda of research. The

following pages are a presentation of some recent books on Darwin,

evolution, and life. It is not a review sensu proprio, but a walk through these

books that aims to give the gist of these publications and, at the same time,

of some trends in science, history of science, and philosophy of science.

Before anything else, it must be noted that the Origin of species 1s

now available online in the Darwin Online site at:

http://darwin-

online.org.uk/content/frameset?itemID=F373 &viewtype=text&pageseq= |

The full title of Darwin’s landmark of science is: On the origin of

species by means of natural selection, or the preservation of favoured races

in the struggle for life (first published in London: John Murray, 1859).

As an introduction (or, more exactly, as a re-introduction), the

Historian of Science and Professor at Harvard University Janet Browne

compiled a thematically organized anthology of Darwin’s oeuvre,

Darwinism, and Darwinian things: The Quotable Darwin: Janet Browne

(Collected and edited by-), The Quotable Darwin. Princeton, NJ, and

Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2018. ISBN: 978-0-691-16935-4.

Browne authored a monumental and authoritative biography of

Darwin: Janet Browne, Charles Darwin: Voyaging, and Charles Darwin:

The Power of Place, both published by Alfred A. Knopf, New York, NY,

in 1995 and 2002, respectively.

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ie)

The Quotable Darwin is a small-size, pocket book that takes its

substance from a vast array of sources (including, but far from being limited

to, Darwin’s own works). It offers all this in six parts that form three major

groups: biography; scientific achievements; Darwin, his entourage, and his

impact. Selected quotations are rather short, and go from:

‘Why is thought, being a secretion of the brain, more wonderful than

gravity a property of matter? It is our arrogance, it our admiration of

ourselves” (p. 55)

and:

“He who understands baboon would do more towards metaphysics

than Locke” (p. 56)

0:

“Dear Sir, | am sorry to have to inform you that I do not believe in

the Bible as a divine revelation & therefore not in Jesus Christ as the

son of God” (p. 224),

including a quote often attributed to, but not by, Darwin:

“It is not the strongest of the species that survives, nor the most

intelligent. It is the one that is most adaptable to change” (p. 306).

Interestingly enough, Science recently published a paper about some

mechanism of selection: Jiani Chen, Yugi Zou, Yue-Hua Sun, and Carel ten

Cate, “Problem-solving males become more attractive to female

bugerigards”, Science 363/6423 (11 January 2019), pp. 166-167.

In another work, the Professor of Behavioral and Evolutionary

Biology Kevin Laland takes evolution where Darwin left it, moving it from

biology to neuro-sciences and culture in a book the sub-title of which is

significant: Kevin N. Laland, Darwin’s Unfinished Symphony. How Culture

Made the Human Mind. Princeton, NJ, and Oxford: Princeton University

Press, 2017. ISBN: 978-0-691-15118-2.

There are two stories here: the history of the human mind and the

story of the research on this topic. As for the first, as the author puts it, it is

(well, he wrote “I hope’) (p. [X): “a compelling scientific account for the

evolutionary origins of the human mind, our intelligence, language, and

culture; and for our species’ extraordinary technological and artistic

achievements”.

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Lo)

The second story is that of the Laland Lab and 30 years of research,

with its (p. IX): “struggles, false starts, moments of insight and inspiration,

and our triumphs and failures in a scientific journey of discovery”.

The starting point of both histories is that (p. 6): “Darwin provided

a compelling explanation for the protracted history of the biological world,

but only hinted about origins of the cultural realm”.

And, as the author pursues (p. 6): “When discussing evolution of the

“intellectual faculties”, he [= Darwin] confessed: “Undoubtedly it would

have been very interesting to have traced the development of each separate

faculty from the state in which it exists in the lower animals to that in which

it exists in man; but neither my ability nor knowledge permit the attempt.”

Moving from rats to genes, the author deconstructs the multiple

mechanisms that completed Darwin’s unfinished symphony, locating the

final notes of the current symphony in (p. 227): “Structural reorganization

of the brain during evolution is as important as increases in brain volume.

Indeed ... the two typically go together, because enlarged brains not only

have more neurons but also have greater organizational complexity ...”.

And he does not stop at this conclusion, but he asks about the source

of this reorganization (p. 227): “In many instances, the genome regions

underlying these changes have been identified and are found to have been

subject to recent selection, or to exhibit differences from the homologous

regions of the chimpanzee genome”.

Once this is established, he concludes with three chapters about

what is probably the distinctive mark of humanity: civilization, cooperation,

and the arts. And also a deep contradiction (p. 235): “Our impact on the

planet is now so devastating that scientists have marked it as a new

geological epoch called the “Anthropocene”. We, on the other hand, adapt

with no problem at all, because we uniquely possess a culture that enables

its

In the conclusion, the author asks a major question and gives a no

less interesting answers (pp. 317-318): “How did our ancestors achieve

high-fidelity information transmission? The obvious answer is through

teaching, which is rare in nature but universal in human societies, once the

many subtle forms it takes are recognized. Mathematical analyses reveal

tough conditions that must be met for teaching to evolve, but show how

Summer 2019

cumulative culture relaxes these conditions. This implies that teaching and

cumulative culture coevolved in our ancestors, creating for the first time in

history of life on earth a species that taught their relatives across a broad

range of contexts. Humans are unique in the extensiveness of their teaching

mainly because cumulative culture makes knowledge that is otherwise

difficult to acquire available in the population to be taught”.

A similar case is made by Robert Boyd, Origins Professor in the

School of Human Evolution and Social Change at Arizona State University:

Robert Boyd, 4 Different Kind of Animal. How Culture Transformed Our

Species (The University Center for Human Values Series). Princeton, NJ,

and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2018. ISBN: 978-0-691-17773-1.

The title of both his Professorship and his affiliation, clearly

indicates the meaning of Boyd’s research and his belief in the role of culture

as a major transformative, evolutionary agent. The book is built in a

different, yet interesting way: its first two chapters reproduce the text of the

Tanner Lectures delivered at Princeton University by the author. They are

followed by four chapters that challenge Boyd’s views, by a biologist, H.

Allen Orr, a philosopher, Kim Sterelny, an economist, Paul Seabright, and

an evolutionary anthropologist, Ruth Mace, in addition to an introduction

by Stephen Macedo, Professor of Politics at Princeton University and then

the Director for the University Center for Human Values and the Chair of

the Tanner Lecture Committee. The book concludes with a response by

Boyd.

The title of each of Boyd’s two long chapters totaling over 100

pages, provide a clear indication of his approach: “Not by Brains Alone:

The Vital Role of Culture in Human Adaptation”

and

“Beyond Kith and Kin: Culture and the Scale of Human Cooperation”.

The title of the shorter responses (between 10 and 15 pages each)

are no less significant: “Imitation, Hayek, and the Significance of Cultural

Learning”, where Hayek is (see p. 132, in the chapter by K. Allen Orr): “the

economist Friedrich Hayek ... [who] famously argued that social norms,

ethical mores, and even institutions are sometimes a product of a sort of

social evolution, a Darwinian natural selection that acts among groups that

embrace different norms”.

Washington Academy of Sciences

“Adaptation without Insight?” by Kim Sterelny, “Inference and

Hypothesis Testing in Cultural Evolution”, by Ruth Mace, and “Adaptable,

Cooperative, Manipulative, and Rivalrous”, Paul Seabright.

From the final response by Boyd, I will select only one line, which

perfectly expresses his belief (p. 195): “For most part, norms aren’t

communicated or transmitted: they are adopted.”

This relatively small book, superbly written, includes multiple

endnotes (unfortunately, when reading such a book, one is always disturbed

by the go-back-and-forth that endnote require, contrary to footnotes), a

substantial, but not overwhelming bibliography by chapter, and a useful

analytical index.

Natural evolution—whatever its primum movens—sometimes also

went together with not-so-natural selective breeding at the hand of man. The

resulting creations have twisted selection, as for example with “chickens

[which] became bigger before they were made smaller” as per Katrina van

Grouw’s own writing (p. 14, with the illustrations on pp. 14-15).

In a magnificently illustrated large-size album, Katrina van Grouw

surveys these Faustian, man-made transformations in a book that reads like

a visit to a museum: Katrina van Grouw, Unnatural Selection. Princeton,

NJ, and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2018. ISBN: 978-0-691-

15706-1.

She plays with her multiple images, juxtaposing the animals

resulting from selection and the modifications of their skeletal structures,

for example. The results are surprising. A case in point is the fishing fly (p.

209 with related illustration): “It takes a very special feather to make a good

fishing fly. These are hackle and saddle feathers from poultry bred

specifically for fly tying ... They’re amazingly flexible and almost slippery

to handle-the result of selective breeding finely tuned to precise

environmental conditions”.

This story of human-engineered selection is organized in four major

sections, in a very Darwinian sequence: “Origin”, “Inheritance”,

“Variation” and “Selection”.

Almost all pages are illustrated with zoological, anatomical and

other pictures in sepia in the way of old scientific books that adds to the

Summer 2019

6

fascination of the natural and un-natural worlds with evolutionary

transformations sometimes surprising (see the illustration p. 262 with its

caption reproduced here):

“The silkie mutation affects the microstructure of feathers,

preventing the barbules from knitting together to form a continuous

vane and rendering the bird flightless. This is obviously a

disadvantage in most wild birds, but in isolated predator-free

environments—for example, on oceanic islands or in captivity—birds

with silkie plumage might thrive.”

Whereas evolution was believed to be almost exclusively genetic

during all the twentieth century, a different kind of evolution, non-genetic

in nature, is making its way into science. This different evolutionary

mechanism(s) is/are based on history, environment, behavior, and culture.

As Russell Bonduriansky and Troy Day convincingly demonstrate, these

factors are as effective as genetics: Russell Bonduriansky, and Troy Day,

Extended Heredity. A New Understanding of Inheritance and Evolution.

Princeton, NJ, and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2018. ISBN: 978-0-

691-15767-2.

Their analysis proceeds in two phases: they first examine the history

of the gene-centered interpretation of evolution, and they then illustrate the

role of non-genetic inheritance to posit the concept of “extended heredity”.

Some citations are relevant:

“In our view the collective weight of this logical, historical, and

empirical evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that genes should

not be viewed as the only vehicles of information transfer between

generations. Instead, the concept of heredity in evolutionary biology

must be extended to include non-genetic material as well.” (p. 114).

“Extended heredity is a controversial idea. Some biologists view it

as a Pandora’s Box of woolly minded misconceptions whose

advocates fail to understand or pay proper homage to the scientific

advances made during the formulation of the Modern Synthesis.

Others feel that extended heredity does not represent a significant

departure from the ideas and practices of evolutionary research that

have developed in the intervening decades, and therefore does not

constitute a serious challenge to the status quo.” (p. 137)

Washington Academy of Sciences

“The existence of non-genetic inheritance is no longer in doubt.

Although particular examples might ultimately prove to be illusory,

the reality of parental effects and the processes of structural,

cytoplasmic, epigenetic, symbiotic, and behavioral/cultural

inheritance cannot be denied.” (p. 154)

“Sins of the father. Developmental origins of health and disease

(DOHaD) studies ... quite sensibly focus on the role of the mother

and the intrauterine environment. But what about fathers? While

researchers have now accepted the idea that the mother provides the

environment in which her child develops, in most organisms

(including humans) the father’s contribution to the development of

his offsprings is typically assumed to consist of a bundle of genes

fitted with a tiny outboard motor. But this view is starting to change

under the weight of mounting evidence that parental environment

prior to the conception can affect children’s development and

health.” (p. 204)

Pursuing our exploration of the dismounting or, possibly better, of

the refinement and fine-tuning of the evolution theory through current

literature, Paul Davies, the Regents’ Professor of Physics and Director of

the Beyond Center for Fundamental Concepts in Science at Arizona State

University, pushes genetics beyond the limit in this book: Paul Davies, The

Demon in the Machine. How hidden webs of information are solving the

mystery of life. London: Allen Lane, 2019. ISBN: 978-0-241-30959-9,

He goes beyond epigenetics and reaches the complex information

system that underlies genetics. And not only genetics, but a whole range of

disciplines, from biology to technology, including chemistry, medicine, and

nanotechnology to mention just a few. Again, an extract will illustrate the

author’s thought better than any comment (p. 113):

“Perhaps the biggest source of variety comes from the fact that, at

least in complex organisms like animals and plants, the vast majority

of DNA does not consist of genes coding for proteins anyway, the

purpose of this ‘dark sector’ of DNA remains unclear. For a long

while much of the non-coding DNA segments were dismissed as

junk, as serving no useful biological function, But increasingly there

is evidence that much of the ‘junk’ plays a crucial role in the

manufacture of other types of molecules, such as short strands of

RNA, which regulate a whole range of cellular functions. Cells are

Summer 2019

beginning to look like bottomless pits of complexity. The discovery

of all these causal factors which are not located on the actual genes

is part of field known as epigenetics. It seems that epigenetics is at

least as important as genetics as far as biological form and function

are concerned.”

And again (p. 214):

“What I am proposing here is universality in informational

organization, in the expectation that common information patterns

will be found in a large class of certain complex system—patterns

that capture, at least in part, something of the features of living

organisms.”

And in conclusion (p. 215):

‘This is a field in its infancy and many questions remain

unanswered. If there are new physical laws at work—informational

laws, perhaps involving state dependence and top-down causation—

how do we mesh them with the known laws of physics? And would

these new laws be deterministic in form or contain an element of

chance, like quantum mechanics? Indeed, does quantum mechanics

come into them? Does it in fact play an integral role in life? In

addition to these imponderables lies the question of origins. How do

life’s informational patterns come into existence in the first place?”

More conventional evolution is at the center of the book by the

Korean anthropologist Sang-Hee Lee: Sang-Hee Lee, with Shin-Young

Yoon, Close Encounters with Humankind. A Paleoanthropologist

Investigates Our Evolving Species. New York and London: W.W. Norton

& Company, 2018. ISBN: 978-0-393-63482-2.

Conventionalism, however, is only in the biological approach to

evolution, because this book is everything but conventional. According to

Lee, indeed, humans did not originate in Africa, but in Asia and moved then

to Africa. In any case, they did not develop in just one region, but in several.

This is just an example of the many original theses in this series of short

studies originally published as independent articles and collected here for

the first time. The book goes beyond past macro-evolution, as it also raises

the question of possible present evolution with this fundamental question

about whether evolution continued in present day or not. Besides revisiting

a certain number of evolutionary notions considered to be solid facts, Lee

Washington Academy of Sciences

revises the history of the theory of evolution and its European, mostly

English-speaking, matrix. She opens the door to a fresh approach to both

the discipline and its results, introducing complexity into a way of thinking

that might have been excessively linear.

In matter of complexity, microbes are exemplary. They have been

frontstage in recent publications. As early as 2015, Paul G. Falkowski, the

Bennett L. Smith Chair in Business and Natural Resources at Rutgers

University, dismounts their engineering in this small, yet fundamental book:

Paul G. Falkowski, Life’s Engines. How Microbes Made Earth Habitable

(Science Essentials). Princeton, NJ, and Oxford: Princeton University Press,

2015. ISBN: 978-0-691-17335-1.

He starts with a simple statement (p. 1): “Life is a series of

connected historical accidents, contingencies, and opportunities” with the

goal (p. 30): “to explore and explain how the global electronic circuit came

to exist, how it controls the balance of nature on Earth, and how humans

can disrupt it, to their potential peril.”

His starting point is historico-epistemological (p. 11):

“To a large extent, science is the art of finding patterns in nature.

Finding patterns requires careful observations, and inevitably we are

biased by our senses. We are visual animals, and our perceptions of

the world are based primarily on what we see, What we see 1s

determined by the tools we have. The history of science is closely

tied to the invention of novel tools that allow us to see things from

different perspectives, but ironically, the invention of tools is biased

by what we see. If we don’t see things, we tend to overlook them.

Microbes were long overlooked, especially in the story of the history

of evolution”.

Pursuing in this direction (pp. 19-20):

“The concept of genes and the basis of the physical inheritance of

traits were totally unknown to Darwin, or anyone else at the time ...

Darwin would not have had a major problem accepting Lamarck’s

basic concept that organisms can inherit traits from their

environments; however, Darwin’s major contribution was the idea

that within all species there is natural variation that can be selected.”

And (p. 21):

Summer 2019

“While we have made great progress in the 150 years since the

publication of the Origin, scientists are still struggling to understand

whether life began in a small warm pond, at a deep-sea hydrothermal

vent, or somewhere else. How might it have started? How did it get

going? How did microbes lead to the evolution of plants and

animals?

And also (pp. 21-22):

“Although microbes were well known in the nineteenth century, it

took another century before they were included in our understanding

of the evolution of life on Earth. Microbes were missed because of

our observational biases.”

The whole book is about dismounting the subtle, yet complex mechanisms

of the microbial engineering, leading to the role of microbes in the recycling

business so much in demand nowadays (p. 160):

“Microbes are responsible for removing the excess nitrogen from

the world’s lakes, rivers, and oceans. They are the unwitting garbage

recyclers for our global waste products.”

Arrived at that point, the book moves to the future (p. 160):

“As humans have increasingly plundered the planet for resources to

feed and serve their needs and desires, they have impacted not only

the carbon and nitrogen but also virtually all natural cycles of the

chemical elements. The result has been a rapid and large distortion

of basic biogeochemical cycles across the globe. The balance in

these cycles, which largely is controlled and maintained by microbes

in concert with geological processes, has been disrupted by humans

on unprecedented scales over a very short period of time.”

This statement elicits the question (p. 160):

~ “Can humans cohabit the planet with microbes without plundering

so many resources and disrupting its chemistry so rapidly?”

The answer lies in microbes of a new type (p. 160):

“A field of science has emerged, synthetic biology, in which

scientists try to design the metabolism of microbes so that they can

fix nitrogen orders of magnitude faster than they would naturally ...”

Three recent works complement this investigation into the world of

microbes. The first one is a deep exploration of viruses’ behavior: Ricard

Washington Academy of Sciences

1]

Solém and Santiago F. Elena, Viruses as Complex Adaptive Systems

(Primers in Complex Systems Series). Princeton, NJ, and Oxford: Princeton

University Press, 2019. ISBN: 978-0-691-15884-6.

Both the title of the book and that of the series in which it has been

published are significant.

Another work is about retroviruses, which make a special category

of viruses: Anna Marie Skalka, Discovering Retroviruses. Beacons in the

Biosphere. Cambridge, MA, and London, England: Harvard University

Press, 2018. ISBN: 978-0-674-97170-7.

Anna Marie Skalka, who received the Outstanding Woman Scientist

Award from the American Association of Women in Science, not only

explains these viruses, but also scrutinizes the history of their discovery and,

more than anything else, brings to light the long evolutionary history of

which they are testimonials.

And, since viruses have gained so much attention, an encyclopedia

provides all the relevant information about one hundred of them: Marilyn J.

Roossinck, with a foreword by Carl Zimmer, Virus. An Illustrated Guide to

101 Incredible Microbes. Princeton, NJ, and Oxford: Princeton University

Press, 2016. ISBN: 978-0-69 1-16696-4.

Viruses are presented in an identikit that includes a superb, full-

page, color photo, a map, the structure of the virus, and a definition that

might sometimes take the form of an intriguing story. A case in point of a

curious virus with its strange behavior is the following (p. 179):

“Tulip breaking virus. In the seventeenth century the Dutch became

possessed by a kind of madness known as tulipomania. They were

already very fond of tulips, which originated from Turkey, but they

became completely enamored of a newly discovered tulip with

striped colors. It is said that a single bulb once sold for the price of

a sailing ship laden with goods. However, the beautiful striped tulips

were not always stable; sometimes a bulb from a striped tulip would

lose its stripes and revert to an ordinary solid-colored tulip. This

resulted in speculation when bulbs were purchased, huge sums of

money were spent on the odds that the tulips would be striped, and

tulipomania is referred to as the first economic bubble. Many

famous paintings from the seventeenth century show the lovely

tulips, and the craze spread into much of Europe. It wasn’t until the

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twentieth century that the source of the coveted striping in tulips was

determined to be a virus. In fact viruses can cause many color

changes in flowers, and other parts of plants, by interfering with the

production of pigments.”

From the Denisovans, who might be Asian Neanderthals, to tulips

and, more recently, to synthetic biology, Darwin’s heritage is still a living

source for research in an evolutionary way that might not end soon. The

works above are like the tiles of a mosaic which contribute to give a picture

of the directions taken by evolutionary thinking. The more you read, the

better you’ll see the picture.

Bio

A former President of the Academy, Alain Touwaide earned a PhD degree

in Classics at the University of Louvain (Belgium) in 1981. He has been

doing research on the History of Science and Medicine, with a particular

focus on the Life Sciences. He has co-founded the Institute for the

Preservation of Medical Traditions of which he is the Scientific Director.

For fifteen years he was affiliated with the Botany Department at the

National Museum of Natural History of the Smithsonian Institution and he

is now at the University of California Los Angeles (UCLA). He has

extensively published on the History of Botany and has received multiple

awards for his transdisciplinary research.

Washington Academy of Sciences

CARNAHAN-STARLING FLUID

T..C, Lipseombe

Catholic University of America

Abstract

In astrophysics, great attention is paid to self-gravitating spheres of fluids,

which serve as models of stars and gaseous planets. Such models usually

described the fluids as comprising of a perfect gas. Here we explore a self-

gravitating cloud of a real gas that comprises of hard spheres, a fluid

modeled by the Carnahan-Starling equation of state. As such, we present a

simple model that provides an application of real gases that might be of

interest in the classroom, and which might find applications in the study of

clouds of nonpolar gases, such as can be found in the interstellar medium.

Introduction

THE EQUATION OF HYDROSTATIC EQUILIBRIUM forms an indispensable

part of an introduction to astrophysics or planetary science. One way to

derive it is to consider a static, spherically symmetric sphere of gas (a model

of a star or of a gaseous planet) and balance the inward force of gravity

acting on a fluid layer with the outward pressure exerted by the gas. A more

advanced derivation 1s to combine the hydrostatic Euler equation from fluid

dynamics with the Poisson equation for the gravitation field due to matter

of a variable density. Further assumptions must be made. One ts usually that

thermodynamic processes within the self-gravitating object are polytropic.

The second is that the sphere consists of a perfect gas.

But what if it doesn’t? In undergraduate thermodynamics, a great

deal of attention is focused on the perfect gas, since it is relatively simple to

study and is an extremely good approximation for many gases. Real gases

are introduced, but often one restricts attention to the van der Waals gas,

often only introduced to explore the topic of phase transitions. There are,

though, other models for a real gas. One such model is the Carnahan-

Starling equation of state’. This is a model for a fluid comprised of hard-

sphere molecules. It was derived by Carnahan and Starling in an ingenious

way. Looking at the then-known numerical values for the virial coefficients,

they noticed that these took on almost-integer values. By assuming that the

coefficients should be exactly those integer values, they could predict other,

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14

higher-order virial coefficients (since confirmed by further experiments)

and, arguably most impressive, could sum the temperature-independent

series to obtain the Carnahan-Starling equation of state, Equation (1):

=

Here, P is the fluid pressure, kg is Boltzmann’s constant, 7 is the

temperature, NV is the number of molecules, V is the volume occupied by the

gas, and 7 is the so-called packing fraction, which is defined by means of

Equation (2):

P (1)

= ee (2)

in which a is the radius of the hard-sphere molecules of which the Carnahan-

Starling gas (CSG) consists.

From Equations (1) and (2), one can see that the CSG reduced to the

perfect gas for the case when the packing fraction is zero. Note that as the

packing fraction increases, which is the case close to the center of the gas

cloud, the pressure in a CSG will be far higher than that of its perfect-gas

counterpart.

The CSG has other advantages. First, it is accurate’. Also, it can be

adapted readily to describe non-spherical molecules, simply by multiplying

each of the packing-fraction terms by specific shape-dependent numbers’.

In addition, modifications exist to describe temperature-dependent virial

coefficients? and others to allow for binary mixtures of molecules®.

Furthermore, the packing-fraction polynomial in the numerator of Equation

(1) is the polynomial of best fit when considering the first four

experimentally determined virial coefficients, but it can be replaced by a

more-accurate formula based on the first seven virial coefficients’.

However, as we seek simplicity rather than the highest-level of accuracy,

we use the simplest form of the CSG, as modeled by Equation (1), rather

than include higher-accuracy terms or the effects of non-sphericity.

Further justification for choosing the CSG as the real gas is that it

provides a good description for non-polar molecules. Non-polar molecules

include hydrogen and helium, the two dominant elements in the universe,

Washington Academy of Sciences

~

15

cosmologically speaking. But they also include methane, carbon dioxide,

and some amino acids. Hence, as these chemical compounds are part of the

building blocks of life, the study of a self-gravitating sphere of a CSG might

well have application in astrobiology. The CSG is also related to other real

gas equations, such as those for a Mie-Gruneisen fluid.®

In this paper, we develop the equation of hydrostatic support for a

cloud of Carnahan-Starling gas. This is then solved subject to appropriate

boundary conditions. We compare this to the same cloud but which consists

of the perfect gas.

Hydrostatic Support

The equation of hydrostatic support balances the thermal pressure

exerted by the gas within the cloud by the gravitational forces acting within

the star. For a static, symmetric, spherical cloud, the requirement for

hydrostatic equilibrium leads to Equation (3):

ef ==) =—4rGpr’. (3)

Here, r is the radial coordinate, P is the gas pressure. p is the mass density,

and G is Newton’s constant of universal gravitation.

If we introduce m, the mass of a gas molecule, we can recast

Equation (2) for the packing fraction as Equation (4):

m{a N

acid Ga)

The second term in parentheses, though, is the mass density of the CSG. As

a consequence, we may rewrite Equation (1) in the form of Equation (5):

aha

pee Ore ee es)

m py 1-2 }

Po

We have used the mass density, p, defined by Equation (6):

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p=m—. (6)

and introduced a critical density pp) through Equation (7):

{a

=|, == |, (7)

Ps a{<

which corresponds to the maximum possible density of the fluid.

While the Carnahan-Starling equation of state is extremely good at

modeling hard-sphere fluids, it is best when the packing fraction is less than

0.55. As we seek to construct a reasonable model for a gas cloud comprised

of the CSG, we impose a central density in the cloud such that n = 0.5. Put

differently, we require that the central density of the gas cloud, pc = = Po:

This is, in a certain sense, the gas cloud that is most likely to show

differences from a cloud of perfect gas, as its central density is the largest it

can be (apart from a cushioning factor) and still be adequately described by

the Carnahan-Starling equation of state.

1

At the center of the gas cloud, where pc = 5 Po: the pressure takes

on its maximum value, too. From Equation (5), we can determine this

central pressure P-, which is given in Equation (8):

(8)

Notice that this pressure is thirteen times higher than a gas cloud

comprised of a perfect gas that has the same central density and temperature.

While the equation of hydrostatic support, Equation (3), and the

equation of state for the Carnahan-Starling fluid, Equation (5), are

independent, they do not form a mathematically closed system. To proceed

further, we need to make another physically based assumption. Usually, one

assumes that processes in a gas cloud are polytropic. In this case, though,

we proceed to look at isothermal gas clouds for which the temperature T is

constant throughout the star. This is mainly done for sake of mathematical

convenience, but isothermal stars have a long history, having been studied

by Chandrasekhar, among others’. Also, in looking at star formation and the

Jeans mass, most textbooks begin by considering the collapse of an

Washington Academy of Sciences

7

isothermal gas cloud. And, as a star approaches the end of its life on the

main sequence, with its core no longer burning hydrogen, the core 1s also

approximately isothermal.

We ignore the effects of radiation pressure. This is relatively simple

to incorporate, as it essentially will affect only the central pressure of the

gas cloud and leave the rest of the equations unchanged, but again we do so

for the sake of mathematical simplicity.

For economy, introduce the dimensionless variable y = p/po and

thereby recast the equation of state in the form of Equation (9):

ae ae

ene pa ay a

If we introduce the dimensionless pressure P = P/P- and a

dimensionless radius x through r = ax, with a to be determined, the

equation of hydrostatic support—Equation (3) —reduces to Equation (10):

(9)

Me CE le, Sey jes (10)

GEN ax de

Thus, if we select a according to Equation (11):

‘ Fe See

are er a ; (11)

47Gp, s8amGPp,

the equation for hydrostatic support simplifies to Equation (12):

coll sal Pe (12)

ak y ax

and the equation of state becomes Equation (13):

aoe si

cst ji ey ea ; if (13)

13 (1 — y)

These are the two equations to be solved to determine the density,

pressure, and mass profile of a self-gravitating sphere comprised of hard-

sphere molecules that obey the Carnahan-Starling equation of state.

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Results and Discussion

The solution to Equation (12) and (13) has no free parameters. That

is to say, once the particular molecule is chosen, we know m, and a that

together determine—by means of Equation (7) —the density M9 and thus

the central density. These, once the temperature is selected, determine the

central pressure by use of Equation (8). With this knowledge, Equation (11)

permits us to determine the length scale @ over which the density and

pressure change.

To solve equation (12), rewrite it as Equation (14):

d(x dPdy)__o es

aot Wi ay ax

For brevity, define g(y) through Equation (15):

_1dP_ 2 (y'—-4y° +4y’ +4y4])

Sv , (15)

” ydy 13 py

Inserting Equation (15) into Equation (14) results in Equation (16):

fy. __1_ ae) _2dy 6)

dx g(y) gly) ay \ ae x dx

As we require the solutions to be finite, we infer from Equation (16)

—specifically from the last term on the right-hand side—that when x =

dy

Ue = 0. We have also, by definition, the conditions that P = 1 when x =

d*y _

dx2

0 and that y(x = 0) = 1/2. Additionally, we can see that at x = 0,

13

. With Equations (14), (15), and (16) in place, together with the set of

initial conditions, we can solve numerically for the structure of the gas

cloud. One can do so, for example, using the Euler method implemented on

an Excel spreadsheet. The results for the density of a Carnahan-Startling

gas, compared to that of a perfect gas, are seen in Figure 1. The Carnahan-

Starling gas cloud starts off with an almost-constant density, but then

plummets downwards as the outer radius of the gas cloud is reached. This

contrasts greatly with the perfect-gas cloud, which has a lower density than

Washington Academy of Sciences

19

the Carnahan-Starling gas cloud towards the origin, but the density of the

perfect gas drops off far more slowly with distance.

Density of isothermal gas spheres

2 3 a

——— Carnahan Starling

6

— ~ Perfect Gas

Figure |

Numerical calculations show that the dimensionless radius of the

Carnhan-Starling gas cloud is x = 5.4, corresponding to a physical radius

given by Equation (17):

R=5.4@=5.4 fat ll

8zmG P,

(17)

The mass is given by Equation (18):

4 R 4 5.4

M= =r) pr dr=—1p,@ | yx" dx.

3 0 3 0

(18)

For the Carnahan-Starling cloud, the integral in Equation (18) sums

to 18.11. The mass, then, is given by Equation (19):

18.11 4

Gse ~ (5.4) 3 Po - (19)

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20

which results in an average density given by Equation (20):

Mose 18.11

Pas? ae aCe cteaa 7 Py HONS 9, (20)

Recall, though, that our original requirement was that, for physical

reasons, the central density of the Carnahan-Starling sphere should be no

more than p)/2. As a consequence, the mass given by Equation (18) is a

maximum for a cloud of radius R if the cloud is to be reasonably described

by the Carnahan-Starling equation of state.

To compare this with an isothermal cloud of a perfect gas, note that

for the perfect gas we again obtain Equation (14), but with a different

scaling. Namely, for a perfect gas we have the scaling given by Equation

(21):

ped | eee

4nGp. 4mmGp,.

(21)

where fc is the central density of the perfect-gas sphere, which needs to be

determined.

The challenge, though, is that the radius of an isothermal sphere of

perfect gas is infinite. Indeed, one of the major features of the isothermal

real-gas cloud comprised of Carnahan-Starling fluid is that it possess a

finite-radius solution.

To compare, though, we can contrast the mass of the Carnahan-

Starling gas cloud with the mass contained within the same radial coordinate

of the infinite cloud of perfect gas. We can also compare it to the Bonnor-

Ebert mass: This is the maximum mass that an isothermal sphere of radius

R can possess, when an external pressure P(Q) acts upon it, and yet remain

stable.

The radius of the Carnahan-Starling gas cloud is given by Equation

(17). This corresponds to a radial coordinate in the infinite perfect gas cloud

given by Equation (22):

rasay|! 29.735 (22)

Washington Academy of Sciences

21

The dimensionless mass of the perfect-gas cloud within this radius

is approximately 7.61. This implies that the total mass contained within a

radius of perfect isothermal gas corresponding to a sphere of Carnahan

Starling fluid of the same central density is given by Equation (23):

3

4

M pg = 7.61—7, ee ae (23)

3 4n7mG p-

Hence, if two isothermal gas clouds have the same temperature and

radius, the cloud of perfect gas has a central density about 3.5% of the

critical density of the Carnahan Starling cloud. If the Carnahan-Starling

model is appropriate for an interstellar cloud of gas, this higher density

means that the Jeans length for a Carnahan-Starling gas cloud will be far

smaller, and so the cloud is far more unstable and likely to collapse to form

a star or gaseous planet than that of the equivalent perfect gas cloud.

The central pressure of the perfect-gas cloud is therefore given by

Equation (24):

P, = 0,035 8! Po (24)

m

significantly lower than the central pressure of the Carnahan Starling gas

cloud, which is Pc = 6.522.

The mass of this perfect-gas cloud 1s given numerically by Equation

(25);

= 261%0035( 4 mp.p')=18.10°(4ap,R'). 08)

(2.588) ;

PG B

This means that the Carnahan Starling isothermal sphere of the same

radius is over 1,000 times more massive.

The numerical solution suggests that the infinite sphere of a self-

gravitating perfect gas has a density, at x = 9.735, of y = 0.013835644. A

finite sphere of isothermal perfect gas of that radius could be created by

applying an external pressure P(() that is given by Equation (26):

kT

P =0.013835644 22-0. (26)

m

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However, the radius of a Bonnor-Ebert sphere is Equation (27):

Lts{ “|

Wi dy ware = (27)

PG?

And hence for an isothermal perfect gas of the required radius, the

maximum mass for stability 1s given by Equation (28):

3

taf SY

mM

Me —

[0.013835644p,

For the Carnahan Starling fluid, though, the mass is given by Equation (29):

3

S11] 4 1ISkol

Mosc = 5) GG Dee es (29)

(5.4) 3 8zmG P,

Hence we have the ratio of equal-radii Carnahan-Starling and Bonnor-Ebert

spheres that is given by Equation (30):

3

wan] Sa( (2)

Meso e

= —__+_______= =],04 (30)

M op 1.18

V0.013835644

As a consequence, a self-gravitating sphere comprised of a

molecular fluid that obeys the Carnahan-Starling equation of state is at the

very limit of stability, in terms of a comparison to the Bonnor-Ebert mass of

a sphere of perfect gas of the same radius constrained by an external

pressure.

(28)

Conclusion

This article has introduced the concept of a self-gravitating sphere

comprised of a real gas. Specifically, the Carnahan-Starling equation of

state — used to model hard-sphere, non-polar molecules — was employed.

Further, we assumed the cloud to be isothermal. With these assumptions,

together with the condition that the center of the Carnahan-Starling cloud

Washington Academy of Sciences

to

ee)

was maximal, we showed that a cloud of Carnahan-Starling gas has finite

radius, is far more massive than its perfect-gas counterpart, and the central

pressure is significantly greater. In addition, the Bonnor-Ebert mass,

considered the upper limit for stability for a sphere of an isothermal perfect

gas, has approximately the same mass as a sphere of an isothermal

Carnahan-Starling fluid. This suggests that gas clouds comprised of real

gases are significantly more compact than those of a perfect gas. In the

current absence of a polytropic equation for a Carnahan-Starling fluid, it

remains to be seen how massive a self-gravitating sphere of Carnahan-

Starling fluid, with maximal central density, might be in comparison to

polytropic perfect-gas spheres.

' In astrophysics a polytrope refers to a solution of the Lane-Emden equation [a

dimensionless form of Poisson's equation for the gravitational potential of a Newtonian

self-gravitating, spherically symmetric, polytropic fluid] in which the pressure has a

power-law dependence on the density. The power law constant ” 1s known as the

polytropic index.

> Norman F. Carnahan and Kenneth E. Starling “Equation of State for Nonattracting

Rigid Spheres.” J. Chem. Phys. (51) 635 (1969).

> Yuhua Song, E.A. Mason, and Richard Stratt. “Why does the Carnahan-Starling

equation Work So Well?” J. Chem. Phys. (89) 93 6916-6919.

+ Leonid V. Yelash, Thomas Kraska, Erich A. Miiller, and Norman F. Carnahan.

“Simplified equation of state for non-spherical hard particles: an optimized shape factor

approach” Phys Chem. Phys 1991 (1) 4919-4924.

> P.F. Bryan and J.M. Prausnitz “Thermodynamic properties of polar fluids from a

perturbed-dipolar-hard-sphere equation of state” Fluid Phase Equilibria 38 (3), 201-

216 (1987).

® H. Hanson-Goos and R. Roth “A new generalization of the Carnahan-Starling equation

of state to additive mixtures of hard spheres.” J. Chem. Phys. 124 (15) (2006) 154506

1-8.

’ Xian-Zhi Wang and Hong-ru Ma “Improvement on the Carnahan-Starling Equation of

State for Hard-sphere Fluids,” Chinese J. Chem. Phys. 23 (6) (2010) 675-679.

8 See, for example Don S. Lemons and Carl. M. Lund , “Thermodynamics of high-

temperature Mie-Gruneisen Solids,” Am. J. Phys. 67(12) (1999) 1105-1108.

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” S. Chandrasekhar An Introduction to the Study of Stellar Structure (Chicago: University

of Chicago Press, 1930) devotes chapter IV to polytropic and isothermal gas spheres.

The latter are covered in §pages 155-157.

Bio

Trevor Lipscombe serves as the director of the Catholic University of

America Press. He has long been interested in real gases and novel solutions

to the equation of hydrostatic equilibrium, and so is pleased to combine

them in this article.

Washington Academy of Sciences

THE (LEGAL) PARADIGM / DOGMA

An essay for a three-fold methodological instrument for

analyzing social systems under changing conditions

Konstantinos (Kostis) Demertzis

Lawyer (Athens Bar)

Abstract

This article outlines, in an abstract form, a three-fold analytical method which

was first developed in order to examine legal systems under changing

conditions. The main functional features of the system under examination are

set down through a “Paradigm analysis”, based on Kuhn’s ideas. Issues of

values and hierarchy are channeled to a second analysis, the dogmatic one.

Issues on how a system pursues practical objectives are examined in the

frame of a third analysis, the administrative one. The consistency of the

picture obtained involves special considerations regarding how these three

analyses of the system are being correlated to each other. Furthermore, this

article attempts to indicate the way in which this analytical method may be

generalized and used in systems such as politics, economics, religion, social

sciences and hard sciences.

I. Preliminary observations

1. Deducing a method from an application

IN THIS ARTICLE I INTRODUCE a three-fold methodology for analyzing

social systems under changing conditions.

This method was first developed for the needs of my PhD thesis in

law [3], entitled “Public Character of the Law Concerning Children of

Divorced Parents’, in order to address matters of structural coherence and

functional adequacy concerning given legal systems'.

Within this work two types of legal systems were analyzed: Family

Law and Human Rights. It was the need for their critical analysis which

instigated the development of the method which is “distilled” in this article.

| An illusion of systemic incoherence is already inserted in the title of my thesis. In Greek

legal order, as well as in many central-European legal orders, family law belongs to the so-

called “private law” (I6tmtuK6 dikato). In these legal orders the distinction between “private

law” and “public law” is much more clear-cut than in Anglo-Saxon legal orders. Within

this frame speaking for “public dimensions” in a “private trial” is already pointing out to a

dogmatic paradox.

Summer 2019

Within my PhD the same legal systems, subsequently, served as

fields for the application of this method.

— The first of them, i.e. family law, has been extensively analyzed as a

system which underwent at least one major Paradigm” shift during the last

decades; this happened in 1983 through the abrupt transition of Greece from

a “traditional” family law system to a “modern” one;

— The latter, i.e. human rights, as reflected in the European Courts of Human

Rights (ECHR) jurisprudence and praxis, is a system which is evolving,

from the outset, within one and the same Paradigm structure, while it is

forming, at the same time, its own Paradigm pattern.

In this article, the PhD’s methodological framework is isolated in an

“autonomous” form, rising, thus, to a considerable degree of abstraction.

Abstraction is being ventured as a step necessary to examine the

methodology’s usefulness to analyzing systems:

In the legal sphere there are other legal systems, beyond the ones

analyzed in the frame of my thesis. Such legal systems may be defined

within any method. They may include, for example, international law, or,

within it, human rights or, within it, a certain Convention, or Court of human

rights; a given state’s entire legal order, or, within it, a branch of law, e.g.

civil law, or, within it, family law, or, within it, a given legal doctrine.

In other areas, beyond the legal field*, systems of this kind may

expand into administration, politics, religion, economy, and science

(primarily as a social system).

The only assumption for a system to be analyzed in the pattern

presented here is that it should present a degree of “unity”, i.e. of coherence

in its structure and continuity in its function, permitting it to be examined

as a “whole”.

In this article, except for isolated examples illustrating some basic

notions, no further integrated application is attempted. This may leave the

* In this article, the word Paradigm is written with a capital “p” when it is taken in the sense

of Kuhn’s theory on “The Structure of Scientific Evolutions” [7]. When the same word is

used in its common reference, it is written with a small “p”.

* This is the reason why the word “legal”, in the title of this article, has been put in

brackets.

Washington Academy of Sciences

ae |

reader wondering about the “wo und wie” of the structure, which is

presented here in the form of a quasi-geometrical pattern.

| cannot but consider this issue as the price of the abstraction

ventured here, and note that “where and why” is a question that might

fruitfully be put to the method itself, in the case one examines any of its

potential applications.

2. A transatlantic issue of understanding and application

It should be recalled that the methodology presented here has been

developed in view of two European legal systems: the Greek family law and

the European Courts of Human Rights (ECHR) controlling mechanism.

That means that it was initially aimed to analyzing legal systems of

the European continent.

Yet, both fields, which were extensively analyzed in my thesis, i.e.

the quasi-global modern family law system based in the “best interests”

doctrine, which underlies the modern Greek family law, and the quasi-

common law method of developing the jurisprudence of the Human Rights

Strasbourg organs, which is situated in the heart of a Central — European

area, are marked by a considerable Anglo-Saxon, if not American,

pervasion, not to speak of an “invasion”.

This Anglo-Saxon permeation is affecting primarily the “method”

by which these legal systems “understand” and elaborate matters

concerning their function. The Central-European and the Anglo-Saxon

components, being undiscernibly mingled within the “wholes” of these

functioning legal systems result in a considerable mess for everyone,

officials, professionals, theorists, and laypeople, when it comes to

“understanding” what exactly they are doing and why the system functions

the way it does.

To cite an example: within the European frame of understanding,

the typical family trial, as is developed in the Greek family law legal system,

presents a stressed — and stressing — paradox. Family trials in Greece follow

the norms of a typical trial of any other kind, since no “family courts” are

4 This is an expression from Goethe’s Faust (Irst part, Chapter 7). It means “where and

how”.

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28

presently available in the Greek judicial system. A typical trial of this type

aims to providing justice. Yet, the basic instrument of administering

judgments in family law area, i.e. the “best interests” doctrine, has very little

to do with justice. It is a rather utilitarian principle (of American

provenance), which introduces to the Courtroom utilitarian considerations.

The latter have much less to do with justice and judgment, which are, par

excellence, the object of a trial of this kind; they constitute, instead, much

more a kind of administration °.

In other words, within a typical family trial, the judge, while keeping

all his/her judicial countenance, is not performing judicial tasks, but

administrative ones. In this fundamentally distorted procedural frame, the

typical litigant parent, who is attached to the “trial-like” form of this frame,

or even misled by it, grows thirsty for “justice”, and demanding it. No form

of “justice”, though, is dispensed, or at least aimed for, in the Courtrooms

in his case.

This structural deficiency is a continual source of stress and

frustration to the litigant parents, also for their children, and all people

involved in “trials” of this kind, including the judges.

The same structural deficiency of this “trial” pattern raises, also, a

problem of “understanding”, which results in a fundamental systemic

failure: the failure to “persuade” the litigant parents that the “judgment”

issued in their case is justifiable in terms of “justice”.

Moreover, for the Central-European legal thinking no utilitarian

principle is even conceivable within any trial, including a trial of this kind.

Who is the person who, assuming judicial authority, “judges” what is more

> A utilitarian principle cannot be the base of any “justice” consideration, as John Rawls

rightly puts it in its “Theory of Justice” [15].

° This idea has been also promoted in theory. Amartya Sen, in his own “Idea of Justice”

[17], promotes a comparative, hence more “administrative” model of justice

administration. The edition of Sen’s book, it should be noted, was enthusiastically hailed

by the President of the European Court of Human Rights, Mr. Jean-Paul Costa (ECHR’s

Annual Report 2011, p. 40). The ECHR, indeed, is striving, especially after the year

2000, to delimit its own role rather to an “administration” of the human rights protection

practiced by the national Courts of the member States of the Council of Europe, than

relying, for this purpose, on its own strictly “judicial” role.

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29

“profitable” for a child? Who gave him this authority? How can he/she

“know” better than the child’s parents?’

This is a structural problem of the legal system itself, which

administers roles and expectations in a way distorted, reflecting its

incoherence to all persons involved in trials of this kind.

3. Resort to “universals”: the triad “description” / “interpretative” /

“regulatory” (or “normative”)

A methodological instrument aiming to guide and support analyses

of the kind illustrated through the above example should not begin with a

definition of, say, a “European” and an “American” component.

Definitions of this kind might — and should — be ignored. It needs,

instead, notions of general use, a sort of “universals”, which may serve in

the analysis of each component in an objective, neutral way.

Any attempt critically to address problems of this kind should begin

with a placement of the system’s own functional items within a general

frame of notions. It is this “general frame of notions” which forms and,

subsequently, defines a methodology, like the one presented here.

This is the aim of the triad descriptive / interpretative / regulatory

(or normative)*, which underlies the three analyses, aspects or “projections”

of a social (legal or not) system presented here:

’ These questions do not apply to extreme cases, in which children are taken to social care.

In these cases, the child’s best interest lies in its protection. The latter is, from any legal

point of view, fully understandable and acceptable.

* The pattern of the triad descriptive / interpretative / regulatory (or “normative”’) has been

borrowed from Linguistics [14]. In Linguistics these categories are used in order to

designate grammars. A Saussurian Linguistics, or early American linguistic schools,

introduce descriptive grammars. Chomskian Generative grammar is considered an

interpretative one. And traditional grammars, focusing on how a language should be

written (or spoken) are considered regulatory, or normative ones. For the needs of the

methodology introduced here, these categories have been largely re-defined, in a way

which may differ from the above linguistic classification. For example, Chomskian

Generative grammar, if it should be labeled as a linguistic Paradigm, would be

considered rather as an explanatory grammar, i.e. as a one developing within the

boundaries of a descriptive approach, although it focuses to generative mechanisms

rather than first-grade linguistic items. The concept of the interpretative approach, as is

introduced in the dogmatic analysis, is closer to the methods of philology than to those

of linguistics.

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— How the system factually works (which corresponds to the Paradigm

analysis),

— How the system understands itself (which corresponds to the dogmatic

analysis), and

— How the system pursues targets by itself, or aims by other systems

interacting with it (which corresponds to the administrative analysis).

Application of such deliberately different approaches to an

organized social system or sub-system within one and the same method

would be compared to a kind of magnetic tomography of it. Under this

aspect, the triad descriptive / interpretative / regulative should be considered

as defining a quasi-Cartesian three-dimensional system of reference, within

which this magnetic tomography is processed.

One may detect a certain amount of Cartesianism, also of

Kantianism, in the layout of a methodology of this kind’. Yet one should

bear in mind that, in order to use this triple approach, no sort of metaphysics

is pre-assumed, Cartesian or Kantian or any such of any kind, latent or

expressly stressed.

On the contrary, the usefulness of each approach — and of the three

approaches as a whole — lies in the critical understanding of a system’s

structure and function.

Such a critical work may involve a kind of demystification,

debunking, or even debugging of the system’s structure and functional

mechanisms.

Of course, and in order to be critical, one may feel the need to resort

to a system of values — hence, to some metaphysics. In this case, he may

feel free to use his own.

’ Thomas Kuhn himself used to declare “I am a Kantian with movable categories” [8, p.

264].

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4. “System” and systemic thought

All analyses involved in the methodology presented here, as well as

their combination, presuppose the existence of a “system”; alternatively,

any object of the analysis, is assumed to be a system.

The word system, in this article, is understood under an aspect both

structural and functional, which implies a cybernetic, systemic and holistic

frame of thought.

(a) Under the cybernetic aspect it is assumed that any social system,

including legal ones, is integrated in a sort of administrative

function, hence, administrative analysis is suited to every system of

this kind.

(b) Under the systemic aspect, the system is defined by the mutual

relations and interactions of its elements to each other and to the

whole.

(c) Under the holistic aspect, the concept of every one of the above

analyses, as well as of their combination, is anti-reductionist.

I would stress, at this point, that the systematic approach, as is

applied here, alludes to a considerable gnoseological'® evolution, which,

historically, has been developed since the ig century, and is essential to

modern gnoseology. Putting items of knowledge 1n order and classification

leads to a kind of understanding them within a frame emancipated from the

medieval concept of “reality”!

The systemic analysis introduced here does not coincide with a

system’s analysis. System’s analysis may be classified, in the present

methodology, as a part of administrative analysis, i.e. as a regulatory

approach to the system. It may be applied both, to already established

systems and to systems under planning and construction.

On the other hand, both, Paradigm analysis, as a descriptive

approach, and dogmatic analysis, as an interpreting approach, may be useful

to a systems analysis, but not intermingled with it. In fact, any regulatory

considerations, inherent to system’s analysis, would distort pure description

\0 Gnoseology is frequently defined as the philosophy of knowledge, the philosophic

theory of knowledge, the theory of human faculties for learning, and the theory of

cognition.

'! | am referring to an observation by Niklas Luhmann [11, pp. 11-12].

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ir)

and pure understanding, which underlie, respectively, these two types of

analysis.

5. The synchronic basis of the systemic analysis and the role of the

Kuhnian Paradigm to define a systemic synchrony

The concept of the system as a whole, whose items are somehow

present to each other and to the whole (and the whole is present to them)

leads to the question of the systemic synchrony.

The distinction between synchronic and diachronic obtains its

contemporaneous meaning after the Swiss linguist’s Ferdinand de Saussure

(1857-1913) crucial work “Course in General Linguistics” [Ley

Saussure’s concept of the language-as-a-system focuses on the analysis of

one existing language “‘as a complete system at a given point in time”, which

is a synchronic approach. Synchronic approach, in this sense, is meant in

contrast to the diachronic approach, which focuses on the development of

the language during or through large historical periods.

It is in this context that Kuhn’s theory on the structure of scientific

revolutions is being used to afford a concept of synchrony, for the needs of

the systemic analysis. In a general way, items of a single “Paradigm”, in the

Kuhnian sense of the word, are considered to correlate to each other within

a quasi-synchronic frame. Hence, they may be examined as a system, in

spite of the system’s continual adaptation and evolution in time, which

Kuhn himself prescribed in the “Structure of Scientific Revolutions”.

On the contrary, items belonging to different “Paradigms” may not

be examined as a system, because of the incommensurability developed

between them.

At large Kuhn’s Paradigm is used to define a “System”, either by

adapting the Saussurian notion of synchrony for the needs of the present

analysis, or even by replacing it.

'? This seminal text by Saussure was edited posthumously, in 1916, by his pupils, who were

based on lectures by Saussure in the University of Geneva, given in the years 1910-1911.

Saussure, by the distinction “synchronic” / “diachronic” aimed to discern his own systemic

linguistic model from that of the “historical linguistics”, which was the predominant trend

among the linguists during the 19" century.

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LoS)

LoS)

y . . ° . .

6. Kuhn’s theory on the “structure of scientific revolutions” and its

acceptance in various fields

The word Paradigm has become, today, a household name in

popularized science. It bears, on the one hand, the seal of Thomas Kuhn’s

landmark book “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions” (first appeared in

1962) [7], and it somehow abstracts, on the other hand, most of the

particularities of Kuhn’s theory",

The term “Paradigm”, as Thomas Kuhn suggested it, refers to an

analogical thought, inherent to a given scientific discipline for a given

period. During this period, within the given discipline, some problems are

considered resolved; accordingly, the scientists of that discipline use them

as models to solve other problems, or to deal with puzzles.

In the main text of his book, Kuhn denoted that “paradigms ... I take

to be universally recognized scientific achievements that for the time

provide model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners” [7,

p. 56}: At the 1969 Postscript of the 1970 edition of his book [7, p. 175],

Kuhn admitted that the word paradigm, as he had used it in his theory, might

have two senses: (a) a sociological one, which “stands for the entire

constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on, shared by the

members of a given community” (b) a philosophically deeper one, which

“denotes one sort of element in that constellation, the concrete puzzle-

solutions which, employed as models or examples, can replace explicit rules

as a basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal science”. That

is already a de-composition, by Kuhn himself, of the initial compound

notion of Paradigm, to two components, a more sociological one, and a

more philosophical one.

Yet, despite the constant editing of this theory by its author, its

fundamental concept did not change: It has been conceived and formulated

as a way of understanding large-scale evolution in strictly scientific areas,

such as physics, chemistry, and astronomy. Kuhn himself excluded from its

'3 For analytical purposes, simplified versions of Kuhn’s theory might also be helpful. Yet,

even if Kuhn’s theory was recurrently revisited, explained, clarified and (at the same

time) partially revised by its own author for the rest of his life, it would be going too far

to reject all of these theory’s particulars, as did Niklas Luhmann [12, pp. 18-19], who

considered that, trying to find “what exactly meant” Thomas Kuhn with his theory is a

“hopeless” (hoffnungslos) affair.

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application any social sciences field, to which he included not only

sociology, but also psychology [7, p. 56].

Yet, while Kuhn’s ideas have been generally set aside in their

primary field of application, ie. the physical sciences, they have been

popular in social sciences, especially sociology and political science. The

reason for both, the theory’s rejection and its acceptance lies in one and the

same feature of it: its anti-authoritative character. Physical scientists find

that Kuhn’s making scientific findings relative jeopardizes science’s

authoritarian claim to an objective truth and to progress.

On the one hand physicists and other hard science scientists felt that

they might dispense with such a theory, since Kuhn’s methodology was not

assigned to lead, or even help, science, however one defines this term, in its

own work, say: to get better results or find the truth. It rather provided an

empirical model of scientific evolution in a_ large-scale historical

perspective. Yet, such a historic perspective seems also dispensable, when

scientific research per se views itself under an unhistorical perspective,

which is the case when scientific methodology has been emancipated from

its historical context.

On the other hand social and political scientists found in Kuhn’s

scheme an ideal theory to support their anti-authoritarian trends, especially

in the seventies. For them Kuhn’s perspective would sound much more

familiar, since their own perspective 1s permeated with historicity.

As regards legal sciences, in spite of their social and historical

background, it seems that the anti-authoritarian tone of the Kuhnian reading

of science’s history (which made it popular to sociology) averted eventual

attempts to use it as a legal methodology; this, understandingly, would seem

to be too much for an authoritarian field like law, largely permeated by the

authority bias!*.

Moreover, the empirical, historical, character of Kuhn’s Paradigm

would make dubious any attempt to found mainly, or exclusively on it a

legal methodology, trying to find solutions in given cases, which present

themselves as isolated from their social and historical context. Kuhn’s

Paradigm is an a posteriori survey of historical system changes. Not a way

'* Among many references to the authority bias, I like especially the concise exposition

by Rolf Dobelli [4, p. 37 on].

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EP)

of working within a Paradigm. Most common legal methodology moves

inside a given Paradigm, like a goldfish in its fishbowl.

Today, the word “Paradigm”, as is broadly used in sciences not only

like sociology, but also psychology, medicine etc., echoes only in a general

way Kuhn’s theory. Yet this generality means abstractions of the specific

features of Kuhn’s historical perspective in such a degree that renders it

quasi-neutral and almost meaningless.

7. Turning Kuhn’s theory to a methodology

In this frame the task for the methodologist lies in turning Kuhn’s

historical theory to an analytical methodology — which was not targeted by

its author.

The feature of Kuhn’s theory which enables such a use lies in its

systematic concept. Indeed, in Kuhn’s historical perspective typical

scientific investigation patterns, ranging from scientific equipment,

searching data and results, to the models in use to process and to understand

them, were placed by Kuhn into a systemic frame of understanding, using

the notion of Paradigm (meant both 1n the sociological sense, as well as the

philosophical deeper one, to use Kuhn’s words).

Within this systematic frame:

— If these data are organized 1n a way that there 1s interaction between them

within the same model of factual processing, they belong to the same

Paradigm. In this case, they mutually define each other within the Paradigm-

as-a-system.

— If not, they belong to different Paradigms. In this case they are

incommensurable to each other, since the reference of each, meant in a

holistic frame of thought, is different.

Read in this way, Kuhn’s theory provides a_ systematic

understanding of the evolution of any science, hard or not, and, beyond that,

of any organized social model, including economy, law, and politics.

For the needs of turning this theory to a method of systematic

analysis of social systems, as were defined above, the following guidelines

have been established:

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— Kuhns’ Paradigm corresponds to a system, which is established within a

social sector. Science, economy, politics and law may be such systems. The

entire society may also be such system. Science, especially, obtains the

status of a Paradigm from the moment it is applied by and within a social

system, giving it a kind of inertia to changes. Scientific theories, or methods,

by themselves, in their pure forms, are not yet considered as Paradigms.

Yet, the theory or bundle of theories giving the tune to a given applied

scientific activity is an essential part of the respective Paradigm.

— Such a system is functional, affording responses to questions and demands

put to it. It might be that the society in general poses questions and demands

to a subsystem of the same. It might be that one sub-system poses questions

and demands to another sub-system. It might be that the system poses

questions and demands to itself. When the entire society is the system under

analysis, questions may be posed by one of its subsystems, or by the society

itself, or by the same, meant in a specific way, e.g. its individuals.

Application of Kuhn’s Paradigm theory to such a model subsumes that the

functional processes of the system have been quasi-normalized within a

certain period!®, through its organization according to certain models of

giving responses to questions and demands put to it. Under this aspect,

questions and demands are afforded along with their reasoning, or

justification, which belongs also to the Paradigm’s defining features.

— This quasi-normality is meant, according to Kuhn’s perspective, under

constant elaboration and evolution. Yet, it does not threaten the Paradigm’s

identity, since it does not exceed some crucial boundaries, beyond which

we may speak of another Paradigm.

- The dynamics of a Paradigm’s functional structures is propelled by the

fact that a Paradigm does not respond adequately, or at all, to certain

questions and demands. Yet, the Paradigm’s existence and perseverance is

'S Reference is made, at this point, to the Kuhnian notion of normal science [7, pp. 10 on,

35 on and passim]. Normal science is considered by Kuhn a working model which cannot

be put aside, since no other working model is available (op. cit., p. 79, 160, 126 and

passim).

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largely due to it functionality, which corresponds, in some way, to the

questions and demands answered!®.

— Under this aspect, a Paradigm may be described through a quasi-

behavioral model of its function, within which the questions and demands

which are being answered, or unanswered, are put down, described,

classified, measured efc., according to the aim the researcher sets for his

study. Models of reasoning or justification typical to the Paradigm are being

recorded, too.

— This strictly descriptive approach may be extended to the direction of

making assumptions about the Paradigm’s true structural schemes and

generative mechanisms, as well as for the explanation of its functional or

dysfunctional traits, guesses or predictions about their future evolutions efc.

Such an explanatory work is not considered to transgress the field of

description. Description, in this sense, includes explanation — taken as an

objective base for the ensuing critics.

Concise and practicable definitions of the fundamental notions for

an analysis of this kind are given in the following paragraphs.

II. Outline of a Method:

Basic Notions and Their Correlation to Each Other

0. Three analyses and their correlation to each other: an outline

In view of the above considerations, the methodology presented here

may be outlined as follows:

Any organized social system, meant as above, may be subject to

three analyses:

|. A Paradigm analysis. The term Paradigm, seen in a strictly

methodological frame (not presupposing any given theory), is

modeled after Thomas Kuhn’s theory on the “Structure of

Scientific evolutions” [7]. In the frame of the method presented

here, Paradigm analysis is applied in a descriptive / explanatory

'6 On the ideas by Kuhn of the answered questions and the puzzle-solving activity by the

normal science see, for example, the chapter of the “Structures” “Normal Science a

Puzzle-solving” [7, pp. 35 on].

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setting. The basic notions of such analysis are introduced in

Chapter 1.

2. A dogmatic analysis: Such an analysis is meant in an

interpretative / empathetic direction. The basic notions of such

analysis are introduced in Chapter 2.

3. An administrative analysis: An administrative analysis

represents the normative / organizing way to approaching the

system. The basic notions of such analysis are introduced in

Chapter 3.

After each analysis has been presented, it is correlated with the ones

which have already preceded it. Thus, dogmatic analysis is correlated to

Paradigm analysis. And administrative analysis is correlated to the

Paradigm and dogmatic ones.

* OK

The basic idea for a three-fold analytical methodology like this is that,

each one of the three analyses introduced, is autonomous and complete in

relation to the other two.

There is no use trying to form a one-way analytical methodology on a

mixed basis, formed out of selections of different approaches — or even to

merge them into a unified analytical approach.

It is better, hence, to allow them to form wholes, i.e. theories complete-

in-themselves. Then, in a later stage, correlate these wholes to each other.

The wholeness of each approach, in this frame, depends on:

(a) The autonomy of the approach, and

(b) Its potentiality to affording a systematically complete and possibly

autonomous picture of the system examined.

Paradigm, dogmatic and administrative approaches are being

considered, here, to possess such autonomy and to afford such potentiality.

Henceforward, a basic assumption of the philosophy of this

methodology of triple analysis is that, once these three approaches are

discerned from each other, and the respective analyses are developed

independently from each other, then they must be correlated to each other.

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Correlations of this kind constitute postulates of the method, since the

different analytical approaches render, in the end, one and the same system.

Such correlations are illustrated in the diagrams of the Sections 2.7 and 3.3.

The demand for correlation of the three analyses to each other,

thereinafter, may give rise to important issues and questions, which may be put

forward only after the three analyses are completed.

1. Paradigm analysis

1.1. Basic notions: Paradigm and Paradigm shift

For the purposes of the Paradigm analysis presented here, a

Paradigm is a system which processes problems and demands, and provides

solutions subject to an observable degree of typification.

Typification, within a practicable system, is a matter of economy

both in resources and procedures. In this analytical frame it is considered a

kind of morphological feature of the system analyzed.

In praxis such a system leaves a number or problems unsolved. This

can be explained, in most part, based on the system’s typification. Because

of it, the complexity of the issues posed to a system surpasses the

complexity of the system of solutions'’.

Such a system raises to the status of a Paradigm when it acquires actual

prevalence within a given social system (or sub-system): it has been adopted

by all, or almost all, practicing professionals of a given discipline, it is being

taught to new professionals and has been diffused to the general society,

including non-professionals, at least as an idea, or an “icon’’'®.

'7 T refer, here, to the central idea of the Luhmannian theory on the “Legitimation through

process” [13]. According to this theory, any system which is preserved within a society,

it is so because of its “function”. Legal systems (and some others, referred to in this book,

as is, among others, an electoral system) are being preserved because they are functional

in “delimiting the complexity” of the issues put to them.

\8 This picture appertains to one-Paradigm evolution models, i.e. in cases in which only

one Paradigm is prevalent along a given period. Kuhn himself considered only one-

Paradigm states of a science. Multi-Paradigm models may also be considered in

Paradigm analysis. This is the case, e.g., in Psychology, in which different Paradigms

(say: Psychoanalytical and behavioristic models) have been established quasi-

simultaneously among the professionals of, largely, the same discipline. In this case, the

analyst may consider each Paradigm as a self-standing system, or analyze the co-

existence of different Paradigms as a system by itself.

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In order for the system to respond adequately to several issues posed to

it, it may reserve itself a status of flexibility and constant elaboration. Yet,

resolution to some of the problems put to the system may be incompatible to

the system’s typified structure. Hence, an established Paradigm not only does

not afford solutions to a number of issues, but may also oppose such solutions

to a number of other issues.

If such problems should be answered, a new typification may

indicate to another systemic structure, i.e. to another system of solutions /

non solutions, i.e. to another Paradigm. Structuring, development and social

acceptance of a new system of solutions / non solutions would lead to what

Kuhn called a Paradigm change (Paradigm shift). In a historic frame

Paradigm changes (shifts) are induced by extensive restructuring of both:

the problems put/non put to the system and the way the system responds/not

responds to them. Paradigms succeeding one another through a Paradigm

shift are considered different systems.

Within Paradigm analysis, no Paradigm shift should not be taken for

granted. Diagnosis and ascertainment of a Paradigm shift is, by itself, a

major preliminary step for Paradigm analysis.

1.2. Paradigm changes and incommensurability

Incommensurability may be defined as the impossibility to translate

the notions of one Paradigm to the notions of another without an essential

portion of the meaning of each being lost in the translation. This loss of

meaning is so great, that it makes arguments by the proponents of each

Paradigm “talk through each other”!’, as Kuhn himself puts it.

From a systemic point of view, each notion within a system refers

to the system-as-a-whole, the latter serving as a system of reference to its

meaning. Incommensurability occurs between the notions of the systems

evolved before and after a Paradigm shift because of the radical change of

the system to which each system of notions is referring. See Diagram 1.

“To the extent, as significant as it is incomplete, that two scientific schools disagree

about what is a problem and what a solution, they will inevitably talk through each other

when debating the relative merits of their respective paradigms” [7, p. 109].

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4]

SYSTEM II pene II)

Sox

notion notion l.a

Incommensurability

Diagram 1: Incommensurability along Paradigm shifts according to Kuhn’s theory

From an analytical point of view, this may serve for diagnostic

purposes: a considerable portion of incommensurability among the notions

of a system and the notions of another may indicate, or even ascertain, a

Paradigm shift, or, more generally, a different Paradigm.

1.3. A behavioral frame for Paradigm analysis

Taken as a methodological tool, a Kuhnian Paradigm is a way of

scrutinizing a system, launching its analysis from a description of its

function. Hence, a typical depiction of a Paradigm, also of a legal Paradigm,

close to the Kuhnian sense of it, is behavioral in its essence: a Paradigm can

be depicted, from an observational point of view, as a system, which

correlates answers to questions posed to it.

Viewed as a typical Paradigm, a system may be presented like Diagram

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Systemic answers (along

with their reasoning)

Questions functionally

answered

Systemic omission of answer

Unanswered questions

Issues under elaboration Elaboration towards systemic answers

QS ee

Unsolved riddles M Questions recognized as unsolved

by the system

Recycling issues Answers recycled

as problems by/of

the system

Diagram 2: Typical depiction of a Paradigm

A system of this sort:

— Answers functionally to certain questions posed to it. This category of

answers supports the system’s functionality, which, in turn, supports the

system’s preservation within the general society.

— Omits or resists answers to certain other questions.

— Is continuously elaborating answers to several issues.

— Searches answers to certain unanswered questions, which are considered by

the system as unsolved riddles.

— Produces answers which are problematic in such a degree and way, that they

are returned to the same system as recycling issues, eventually leading to chain

reactions.

When it comes to legal Paradigms, the same analytical pattern

applies, since:

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— A question is meant as a social need, which is addressed to the legal

System, in the expectation of an answer, and is, to this purpose, somehow

translated into the legal system’s notions (and vernacular).

— An answer is meant as the legal system’s output referring a question /

demand posed to it. It consists not only in practical consequences but,

typically, in certain reasoning schemes attached to that practical

consequence by the system. Non-response or over-responses by the legal

system are also considered as systemic answers.

1.4. A list of questions (protocol) for a Paradigm analysis

A Paradigm analysis of a given system may be organized along a

series of questions to be put by the researcher (- analyst) to the system

inquired.

These may be typified in the following chapters:

(1) Definition of the Paradigm which is analyzed: its degree of

typification, its main features, its historical and geographical

placement, eventual incommensurability relations in respect to its

previous Paradigm, or other Paradigms, indications and

manifestations of its social predominance.

(2) Problems / issues which are been answered / satisfied by the

system: paradigms (exemplars) of typical questions and typical

answers provided by the Paradigm (along with their reasoning

schemes).

(3) Unanswered questions / problems which systematically are not

being met by the Paradigm (especially: questions systematically

rejected, systemic blind spots, riddles, or recycling problems,

eventual chain reactions).

(4) Processing of unsolved problems: a continuous activity by the

Paradigm to process and provide answers to unanswered questions.

(5) Eventual propositions or development of new Paradigm /

Paradigms, within or outside the Paradigm itself, which afford the

dynamics to replace the present one; in this case, the development

of incommensurability relations among the notions of the two

systems may serve as indicator of a different Paradigm.

These chapters represent issues which may be put in a descriptive

frame of study and, to a great extent, they can be somehow measured. A

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protocol like this may, subsequently, form the basis for a program for

empirical, qualitative and quantitative research of any given Paradigm,

since all items set out above, questions, demands, problems, answers, social

reception etc. can be reflected to “measurable” variants. The frame of such

an enquiry is thoroughly “descriptive”.

1.5. Paradigm analysis as description and explanation

On the basis of such a research, “Paradigm analysis” is the process

ot:

(a) Describing the systemic behavior as it is,

(b) Elaborating a theory explaining why the system behaves in the way

it does.

Typically, an explanation of this sort may refer to structural traits of

the system; they may identify, or describe, or analyze, its fundamental

features and mechanisms, which are both, providing and restricting the

practical consequences of the system’s function.

An explanation of this kind is given by the observer, independently

of the reasoning which is given within the system. Reasoning schemes by

the Paradigm are also objects of observation, study, and explanation.

Hence, such a theory will, presumably, refer to the system’s notions,

but it may not use them as its own.

Rather it adopts the viewpoint of an external observer?’, who,

Wandering from clime to clime observant strays

Their manners notes and their states surveys,

as the poet puts it?!.

°” The idea of an external, observer has been recently stressed, in the philosophy of justice,

by Amartya Sen, in his “Idea of Justice” [17, pp. 114 on and 124 on]. Sen, for the

formation of his own considerations thereupon, draws from Adam Smith (1723-1790).

*! The verses cited here are from one of the many English translations of Odyssey. This

translation was issued in 1726, under the name of Alexander Pope (1688-1784), yet the

translation of the 1 Rhapsody was commissioned by Pope to a minor poet, Elijah

Fenton (1683-1730). It is to Fenton, hence, that we owe this wonderfully English

version (Rhapsody |, v. 3-4, here slightly altered) of the Homeric moAXov avOpamwv

sidEVv GOTEG KL VOOV EYVO.

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On the other hand, explanation, as is ventured by the Paradigm

analysis, differs from interpretation. While the former presupposes a degree

of psychiatrist-like distance, the latter demands a degree of identification

with the object analyzed. Such identification is not a part of Paradigm

analysis. An Interpretative function needs another method of approach,

which is afforded by the dogmatic analysis.

2. Dogmatic analysis

2.1. Basic notions: dogma, dogmatics and dogmatic analysis

It should be stressed from the outset that here, the words dogma,

dogmatics and dogmatic are used in a technical sense, disconnected from

any pejorative connotation, also from any exclusivity, or strong relation, to

religious systems.

Religious systems possess, of course, their own dogmatics, since

they are systems. On the one hand they do so like any other system. On the

other hand every system, not only religious, but also legal, economic,

military, political etc., possesses its own dogmatics, which affords it certain

basic systemic functions, as outlined below.

The methodology of dogmatic analysis presented here follows an

idea promoted by the German sociologist and jurist Niklas Luhmann: the

distinction between dogmatics and theory~”.

This distinction was put forth by Luhmann regarding legal systems,

and may be outlined as follows: given a raw legal material (consisting

mainly of laws and judicial decisions),

— Dogmatics corresponds to a first degree of abstraction and

2 Admittedly, Luhmann [11, pp. 12-13] introduced this distinction concerning the legal

system, speaking about “Legal systems” and “Legal dogmatics” (Rechtsysteme und

Rechsdogmatik). It should be noted that, in German legal theory, the term Dogmatik

(dogmatics) is much too common, when it refers to the accepted theory of established law

within the legal scholarship. It yields the same for the Greek term «doypatiKn, since

Greek legal scholarship is heavily influenced by the German legal theory. Yet, given the

growing pejorative sense that the word “dogma” and any one of its derivations, the relevant

terminology in legal Schoraship tends to substitute “dogmatics” by other terms, as are, e.g.,

“theory” (Oewmpia), “science” (EmotHn) ete. In the present article I use this term in a

“technical”, hence “neutralized” sense, which is specified within this text.

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— Theory corresponds to a second one.

Of them:

— The first degree of abstraction, which results to the system’s dogmatics

(Dogmatik), consists of the result of the elaboration of the existing raw

material (law and jurisprudence) to principles, categories, rules, proposals,

and a (possibly) concise theory for the interpretation and adaptation of the

law to legal praxis. This degree of abstraction has a systematic delimitation:

it extends to all the sentences claiming to be applied to legal praxis under

the existing law which is elaborated.

— The second degree of abstraction, meant, according to Luhmann, as an

abstraction of the abstraction, leads to theory. A theory, in this connection,

obtains also a systematic delimitation: it belongs not to the dogmatic system

and has resigned from any perspective to be applied into it. Gaining, in this

way, its liberty, a theory (in the Luhmannian sense) is structured as a

scientific theory, which is modeled in a way which differs substantially

from a system’s dogmatics [11, p. 13]?°.

For the needs of a dogmatic analysis methodology, the above

Luhmannian distinction is adapted in the following pattern:

(1) The dogma consists of all the systemic elements, both raw and

elaborated.

(2) The dogmatics is the “software” of the dogmatic machine; its

function is to elaborate propositions which are acceptable and valid

within the system and applicable to praxis in the name of the

system. Such sentences are designated, here, as dogmatic sentences.

> An idea of this method, as is implemented by Luhmann himself, is given in his 1969

study “Legitimation through process” [13]. In this work, Luhmann, explaining that the

function of the legal system has little to do with right or wrong decisions, concludes that

the legal system’s function is to “delimit the complexity” of the overall social system,

by affording enforceable decisions which simplify the social situation presented to it.

From this point on, he recurs to a “hard science”, i.e. the Information Theory, in order to

explain how the legal system works. This (radically anti-authoritative) stance was, of

course, rejected violently by the legal scholarship. Luhmann tried too hard (and in vain)

to explain that his aim was not to afford ways to ameliorate the quality of judicial

decisions, but to afford a general theory of the legal system. Today’s trend is to suppress

Luhmann’s theories, not only in the philosophy of Law, but also in Germany.

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(3) Dogmatic analysis is the theory (and the elaboration of a theory) by

which the system’s dogmatics is understood, analyzed, compared to

others and, in the end, criticized.

To meet these ends, dogmatic analysis, as a theory, in the

Luhmannian sense of this word, has emancipated itself from the claim to

produce dogmatic sentences, i.e. propositions of the dogma, which the

dogma recognizes as its own, are valid within the dogmatic system, or

applicable to praxis in the name of the system.

2.2. A dogmatics for legal and beyond the legal systems

Defined as above, dogmatics seems, at first glance, expedient to

legal systems. Legal systems are quasi dogmas by definition’* and,

consequently, dogmatics should be considered an indispensable major

component of every legal system, which is — or should be — familiar to every

legal scientist, scholar, or professional.

As pointed out already, the words dogma and dogmatics are of

religious provenance. There is no reason why religious systems (and

Paradigms!) might not be analyzed in the Luhmannian scheme dogmatics /

theory. Yet, the analyst’s dogmatics should re-assess all items of the

religious dogmatics, e.g. searching deeper or factual dogmatic structures in

a given religious system, in a way which may not exactly coincide with

what, say, a professor of religious dogmatics would teach to his/her

students.

In other fields, the word dogma (i.e. in its use in economy, or in

politics, or regarding military dogmas) is rather common. This use implies

a quasi-neutral connotation of the word. Yet, the words dogma and

dogmatic (as an adjective) have acquired in modern societies a mostly

negative connotation, since they have been related to religious dogmas, or

to inflexible, uncompromising, maladaptive, or fundamentalist systems in

religion and politics. Alternative terms, like school’, or school of thought

24 T owe the idea that the law is inherently dogmatic, along with a thorough presentation of

the history of the European legal dogmatics to the work by the Professor of criminal law

in the University of Athens Mr. Nikolaos Androulakis [1].

25 The Chicago School of Economics affording such an instance.

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may be used, avoiding such negative connotations, yet they, also, may

denote, in the end, the respective dogmas and dogmatics.

This is valid, regardless whether the given dogma considers itself as

a dogma, regardless whether the given dogmatics considers itself as a

dogmatics, given that, not uncommonly, dogmas consider themselves as the

world, and dogmatics view themselves as theories of general acceptance,

factual, virtual, or aspired to.

In this frame regardless whether a given dogmatics considers itself

to be dogmatics, the terms dogma, dogmatics and dogmatic analysis belong

to the theory underlying the methodology exposed here. These terms do not

imply any given metaphysics, or any connotation, positive or negative, but

a certain systemic placement. Here, also, the analyst may contribute his/her

own systemic placement of the dogma, in order to proceed to a critical

theory of it.

In scientific systems the question of a dogmatics exists from that

point on, when human and social understanding of scientific processes Is at

stake.

Of course, dogmatics, in this sense, is easier to be discerned,

analyzed and criticized in front of social sciences, extending from politics

to economy, sociology, and psychology.

Yet, hard sciences present also, admittedly a more difficult — and, in

this way, a more interesting — field for dogmatic analyses. Scientific theory,

as an axiomatic system of abstracted notions obtains, in this case, a further

meaning, concerning:

(a) The (usually unnoticed by the scientist) metaphysics of the numbers,

the symbols, and of the mathematics used in the science’s theory

and praxis (be it of ontological nature or not), the ontological

prerequisites and connotations of the basic hypotheses of the science

not excluded. This level of a science’s dogmatics may be latent, not

spoken out and, hence, difficult to trace. And -

(b) A system of values related to the system’s hard-core scientific

processing unit. This system of values may extend from the core

question “what the scientist is thinking he is doing” at the moment

he is performing a typical process of his discipline, to matters of

ethics and deontology, to the choice and the way of practical

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applications, and to the way the scientific results are made public

and understood by the scientific auditorium, or by the mass media,

or by laypeople.

Again, a systematic placement of these questions, in order to sketch

out a scientific system’s dogmatics, and afford thereupon a dogmatic

analysis, would lead to a gnoseology of science put on a different basis from

what scientists themselves are thinking, or are doing, or are thinking they

are doing, or even from any philosophy of the science, including its

gnoseology. A philosophy of science, instead, which is accepted within the

science, is considered an element of its dogmatics.

2.3. Functions of a system’s dogmatics

Defined as such, i.e. as a part of the system, dogmatics is functional

within the system in which it belongs, since it provides to the latter (among

others) three essential functions:

(a) The function of composing a systemic whole out of its components

items. For this purpose, the dogmatics must elaborate a systemic

distinction for the polarity “part / whole”.

(b) The function of discerning the “inner” of the system from the

“Outer “Of fhe Same, e.g. from other systems, or from its

environment. For this purpose, the dogmatics must elaborate a

systemic distinction for the polarity “system / environment”, or

“systemic / extra-systemic” and, accordingly, establish

dogmatically proper ways to connect the “inner” and the “outer” of

the system to each other.

(c) The function of self-reference by the system to itself, and the

discernment of the given system from the others.

For this purpose the system’s dogmatics must elaborate a systemic

distinction for the polarity “identity / difference”. The dogmatic identity

serves as a point of self-reference by the system and of meta-function, i.e.

understanding each systemic sentence within the system”.

26 | adapt, in this point, distinctions made by Nicklas Luhmann in the introduction to his

theory of social systems [12]. The systematic placement of these notions in my text does

not coincide with Luhmann’s. Luhmann, in his introduction to his social system theory,

is discerning three “paradigms” (meant as Paradigms, i.e. in a loosely Kuhnian sense),

which predominated successively in the history of occidental societies. The first of them

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To cite an example, here: it belongs to the dogmatics of a scientific

system to discern itself from non-scientific ones. In this function words like,

for instance, pseudoscience, which aims at discerning what is considered

scientific and what is not, regardless of how concise, cohesive, and well-

founded it is, is performing a function of the scientific system’s dogmatics.

To take another example: the successive editions of diagnostic

manuals (among them the DSM by the American Psychiatric Association,

ICD, by the World Health Organization) condense, propagate, and even

popularize an immense volume of scientific research in those fields. Yet,

their role is easy to ascribe to the respective scientific (medical or

psychiatric) Paradigm (in the Kuhnian sense of the word) which is installing

and using them, since their primary role lies in the typification of the

discipline’s practitioner’s professional routine. They, moreover, reflect the

Paradigm’s constant elaboration, in their successive editions”.

No less evident 1s their dogmatic function, 7.e. their function as items

of the medical and psychiatric system’s dogmatics. Namely:

(a) They coordinate the individual practitioners’ routines to a centrally

installed canon,

(b) They delimitate what is acceptable to the given system and what is

not, hence, the systemic to the non-systemic’*, and

(c) They institute an instrument of systemic self-reference. Under this

aspect, the constant elaboration, which is evident in the successive

put emphasis to the integration of the individual to the society, the second of them to the

distinction of the inner of the society from its environment and the third to the society’s

self-reference. In the present methodological frame I placed, instead, these three

functions not to the Paradigm analysis, but to the dogmatic one, and I considered all of

them as being always performed by the system’s dogmatics.

°7 DSM underwent five editions/revisions from 1952 to 2013. ICD underwent eleven

editions/revisions from 1893 to 2018, the eleventh one approved for coming into effect in

2022:

°8 An instance of a dogmatic borderline issue is given readily by the heated debate about

including or not the “Parental Alienation Syndrome”, also known as PAS, in the DSM or

the ICD last editions. From the viewpoint of a systemic analyst, this is not — and was never

— a clear-cut “scientific” dilemma. Criteria frequently cited [2, pp. 127 — 136], like if

Richard Gardner’s book, in which PAS-theory was firstly couched [5] was a self-edition

or a peer-reviewed one, which Courts, which states and which countries accept PAS and

which not, and, ultimately, if PAS would or would not be included in the next editions of

ICD, or of DSM, do not refer to “science” meant as a scientific methodology, but as a

system of authority, and are thoroughly dogmatic in their nature.

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editions of the diagnostic manuals, obtains the meaning of the self-

elaboration, of a meta-language of the diagnostic system.

Hence, the said Psychiatric system possesses its own dogmatics,

which provides to it (among others) the basic functions ascribed above to

any adequate dogmatics. Under this aspect, it may be considered, examined,

analyzed, and criticized as a dogma.

Dogmas (or, alternatively, dogmatic systems), in this frame, are

defined only systems possessing a dogmatics.

Systems not possessing their own dogmatics are not considered

dogmas.

2.4. A typical arrangement of a dogmatics

A dogmatics is typically arranged in a manner that aims to produce

out of established dogmatic sentences other (derived) sentences, which are

considered also dogmatic, i.e. valid within the system / dogma.

The structure of any dogmatics may be depicted in a diagram like

the following Diagram 3:

Prime

dogmatic

“Derived”

dogmatic sentences

(along with their reasoning

Practical implementations of the systemic

sentences

(factual outputs of the systemic reasoning /

Diagram 3: Typical structure of a dogma, as is reflected in its dogmatics

A system’s dogmatics, since it assumes the function of denoting

what is systemic (acceptable within the system), in other words, what is

dogmatic (acceptable within the dogma) and what is not, reflects the whole

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system-as-a-dogma in its own organization. Hence, the structure of a

dogmatics pictured above splits as is reflected in its dogmatics, as well as

the structure of the dogma itself does.

At the one end of this succession of derivations are to be found

sentences not derived from within the system (say: prime sentences).

At the other end the dogmatic derivation results in practical

consequences and applications, i.e. to the impact of its function to other

systems.

One might label the prime dogmatic sentences as the system’s

metaphysics, and the derived dogmatic sentences as the main dogmatic

structure.

In the whole a dogma has the function to bridge a given metaphysics

to practical applications.

The system’s metaphysics does not imply necessarily any given

philosophical assumption. It might be an issue of positivism, of empiricism,

of materialism, of pragmatism, as well as of idealism, phenomenology, or

of ontology, even a variant of theism.

Yet, the practical applications (which are accepted or typical within

a dogma) represent a level of its integration equally important to its

metaphysics.

Without practical applications there is, again, no dogma. There is

only a theory.

Hence, the arrangement depicted in the icon does not represent any

historical, or even logical, evolutional, or etiological development of a

dogma. A dogma, historically, or evolutionary, may begin from any part of

it, be it its metaphysics, or its derivation mechanisms, or its practical

consequences.

In this frame the pyramid depicted in Diagram 3 represents only a

typical arrangement, or a hierarchy of the various dogmatic elements within

the system’s dogmatics.

This yields a headway, by which a dogmatic analysis may de-

compose a dogmatics, since the first may point out that the true, or essential

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relations within the dogma, which the dogmatics of the system may present

in a false way.

One should bear in mind, though, that dogmatics may be a systemic

element equally important to any else. An eventually radical decomposition

of it cannot claim acceptation within the dogmatics itself. It is, hence, bound

to the status of critics.

2.5. Typical production mechanisms of a dogmatics

Bridging metaphysics to practical applications means to gradually

transcend from a genus to another’.

This way of transcendence does not imply rational mechanisms, but

systemic ones, which are embedded within the system, via its dogmatics.

Dogmatic derivation mechanisms involve, typically:

(a) Hierarchy, since dogmatic structure is a strongly hierarchized one.

Typically, items of lower hierarchy are being derived from the ones

of higher hierarchy and, mutually, ascertain the systemic status of

the latter.

(b) Reasonableness, meant as a kind of proportionality. A reasonable

deduction is rather loosely defined, and does not display the

formality of logical inference.

(c) Relative homogeneity, which implies that the parts reproduce the

traits of the whole in which they are contained, in a quasi-fractal

way.

This is due to the congruence of the dogma, given that the same

general principles (closely related to its prime sentences) rule the whole, as

well as the parts of the dogmatic system.

Viewed as a production mechanism, a dogmatic structure differs

from an axiomatic one. The latter does not display hierarchy and is based

exclusively on logical formal inference. Moreover, it is moving in one

single genus, and does not transcend, neither to any kind of metaphysics,

nor to any kind of praxis.

29 “Transcendence from a genus to another” is an idea based on Aristotle’s works “On

heaven” (1, 268.a-268.b) and «Analytica Posteriora» (1,7).

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Hence, an axiomatic structure may not be considered as a dogma by

itself. This is valid, also, for the pure scientific part of a science, inasmuch

it presents the form of an axiomatic structure.

On the other hand, an axiomatic structure may be included within a

dogma, affording it an eventually considerable part of its derivation

mechanisms.

Yet, however extended it might be, the axiomatic level of

derivations within a dogmatics does represents only an intermediate level

of the dogmatic structure.

The dogmatics, in its entireness, is formed only if the metaphysical

prerequisites of the axiomatic derivation and its practical applications, along

with eventual other, parallel production mechanisms, are integrated into the

picture.

If the whole of the system under examination is characterized as

dogma, then parts of it, presenting a degree of autonomy, may be

characterized, in respect to it, as partial dogmas.

In law, a partial dogma of this kind may be applicable in the form of

a doctrine. A legal doctrine is better understood as such in common law

legal orders.

Yet, this primary understanding does not exclude the legal doctrine

having expression 1n written law, also, of statuary or constitutional rank, or

within an international treaty, say a treaty of human rights. In this case, the

partial dogma reflects a part of a civil law system.

In this connection, notions as dogma and partial dogma may be

useful to bridge theoretical issues of coexistence of legal components

belonging to different legal dogmas, as common law and civil law legal

systems are.

2.6. On the subtleness of the distinction between dogmatics and theory:

understanding and interpreting critically a dogma from the outside

Since the dogmatic analysis is not bound by the dogmatics, it is in

itself a theory. Its class, so to say, is that of a theory. Yet, in contrast to the

strictly descriptive and explaining Paradigm analysis, dogmatic analysis

may be understanding, interpretative and empathetic.

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As a method, dogmatic analysis focuses on the analysis of the

dogmatics of the system-as-a-dogma. This method of approaching a dogma

through its dogmatics is based on the above-mentioned presumption that,

since the dogmatics aims to compose the elements of the system to a whole,

all systemic (i.e. non accidental) elements within the system should pass

through its dogmatics; in a way: all systemic elements should be reflected

in its dogmatics, in order to be systemic. Thus, dogmatics and dogmatic

analysis, meant as the analysis of a dogma, may resemble each other to a

great degree. Hence, dogmatic analysis presupposes a kind of simulation,

extending even to a kind of identification by the analyst with the dogma

analyzed, in order to understand its function?”,

Since dogmatic analysis may be understanding, interpretative, and

empathetic, the frontier between theory and dogmatics is transparent, and

the quasi-psychoanalytical, distanced stance which is held fast in the

Paradigm analysis (see above, Section 1.5) is no longer considered a sine

qua non of the analytical approach of a dogmatics. Dogmatics is, in the last

analysis, the theory which the system develops for itself, and dogmatic

analysis is the one the theorist develops for the system-as-a-dogma, viewed

through its dogmatics. The one is flesh from the flesh of the other. They,

also, reflect each other: Dogmatics, on its part, simulates theory, assumes

theoretical general acceptance, and a self-standing status. Dogmatic

analysis may, on its part, simulate dogmatics; it may assume the role of the

dogmatics and, by doing so, strives to understand the way in which the

dogmatics runs the dogma, without any objection of existential status being

raised at the methodological, the theoretical or the scientific level*!.

Yet, in its journey to the dogma’s inner world, dogmatic analysis

holds its critical self-standing, which presupposes an external point of

30 The instance of Thomas Edward Lawrence (aka Laurence of Arabia, 1888-1935), who

simulated the Arab condition by learning Arabic, memorizing the Quran, adopting Arab

dressing and developing Arab abilities, as walking barefoot on the hot sand, though

remaining, in the same time, an Englishman serving in the intelligence of the armed

forces of his country, gives an eloquent example of where such a simulation may lead

to.

3! The trend I followed in my thesis [3], in this point, was not to provide any mathematic

theory of the system’s function (as Luhmann did, in his “Legitimation through process”,

mentioned above), but to point out fundamental deficiencies of the system’s structure,

staying outside the system’s dogmatics, yet inside the legal sphere, in its more general

aspect.

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reference, the latter functioning as an Archimedean hold for a theory.

Hence, the action of simulation does not mean that the two systems,

dogmatics and dogmatic analysis, are going to be confused with one

another.

At the end of the day the difference between theory and dogmatics

is reinstated, since dogmatics must succumb to the system’s limitations, in

order to retain its dogmatic status, i.e. its claim that its production be

integrated into the dogma and implemented to the dogma’s practical

consequences.

Theory, on its part, is, so to say, condemned to emancipation from

the dogmatic, and foregoes any claim to dogmatic validity, in order to retain

its theoretical — or scientific — status and independence.

Nothing excludes, after that, that a theoretical position can be

dogmatically accepted, or that theory affirms dogmatic positions and

integrates them within its own system. Yet, this sort of exchange does not

lift the fundamental distinction between theory and dogmatic, which is

based on their different standings in view of the system examined.

Questioning the accepted dogmatic sentences and derivations

should be a main task of dogmatic analysis. Hence, since dogmatics is, in

the last analysis, authoritative, confirming the dogma’s authority, dogmatic

analysis is anti-authoritative, pointing out to the possible worlds that are

available outside of the dogma.

2.7. An instance of theoretical scrutiny of a dogmatics: which direction

follows the production line between two (legal) doctrines?

While exercising its autonomous scrutinizing work, theory may

question any dogmatic production, at any time. Say, given a dogmatic

production linking “doctrine A” and “doctrine B”, dogmatic analysis may

inquire the dogmatically accepted direction of the production line: is it

really A => B, or B => A?

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High-ranked Binding

dogma mechanisms

Ran Doctrine

B

Doctrine

B

Doctrine

A

“Dogmatic” acceptable Dogmatic analysis

disposition “theoretical”

Diagram 4: Dogmatic vs. analytic-dogmatic (= theoretical) disposition of the dogma’s

production line

In Diagram 4, such a questioning pattern is depicted: if, in the eyes

of the dogmatics of a system, “doctrine B” 1s produced by "doctrine A” (A

=> B), and this is the only, or the main accepted systemic reasoning,

dogmatic analysis may question this line of reasoning (recurring, for

example, to the real high-ranked dogma values and the binding mechanisms

inherent to the dogma), and conclude that the real production direction is

the reverse: that “doctrine B” is produced by “doctrine A” (B => A).

Instances of such questioning of the true direction of the production

process can be found in every field, legal fields included.

In the field of the family law dogma, for example, it can be

questioned:

— Does, really, the best interests of the child doctrine produce one-parent

family pattern solutions, or, inversely, is it the one-parent family pattern

which produces the best interests doctrine in order to fit its reasoning needs?

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— Does, really, the private law character of family rights generate family

trial procedural patterns for administering post-split family arrangements —

or, inversely, is it the family trial pattern which generates the private law

character of the parental conflict?

None of these questions is simple, or easily answered. For example,

in order to answer the latter of the aforementioned questions one may ask:

are family rights a question of statutory law, or of human rights? If it 1s the

former, then it is the individuals who are responsible for the defense of their

rights, and the state is responsible simply for providing the rules of this

defense. Hence, it suffices to direct litigant parents to the judge. But if it is

the latter, then, the state becomes co-responsible not only for giving rules,

but also for guaranteeing the rights themselves. Hence, the state must secure

arrangements enshrining those rights, by using any of its authorities,

including its administrative services.

Inquiring how the dogmatic system is really disposed may be crucial

to the exploration of how the system might be otherwise. Questioning the

accepted dogmatic sentences and derivations should be a main task of

dogmatic analysis, while the latter is searching for the otherwise-acting-

possibility of the system.

In order to answer questions of this sort, dogmatic analysis has to

present its own theory, pertaining to which items of the system are really

more basic, more general, more binding, more high-ranked, more

indispensable to the system than others, and why the accepted dogmatics

disposes these items the way it does.

2.8. A list of questions (protocol) for a dogmatic analysis

In his/her venture to the inner depths of a dogma, the analyst may

be helped by a list of questions to be put to its dogmatics, in a way of

simulating the given dogmatics’ pedigree-like disposition**. Such a list of

questions may be couched in the following order:

(1) A “pre-dogmatic” philosophical foundation. This is formed by the

sentences providing the philosophical prerequisites (or

repercussions) of the dogma. Its function is not only that of

** In this place I adapt to the needs of this analysis a set of systematic distinctions by

Nikolaos Androulakis [1, pp. 10 — 11].

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producing the systemic items of the dogma, but that of a confession,

in respect to which all the items of the dogmatic structure have to be

reflected, be conform to it, ascertain and corroborate it.

(2) A set of higher principles within the dogmatic (usually one, or a

few). In contrast to the philosophical pre-dogmatic foundation, the

higher principles of a dogmatic are positive by nature, affording a

closer translation of the philosophical prerequisites of the dogma to

the positive field.

A methodology embedded in the dogma. This is the dimension of

inter-dogmatic production. In a legal dogma, it is usually formed as

rules for interpretation and application of dogmatic sentences. In a

scientific dogma, a major part of the production mechanism may be

axiomatic, or strictly empiricist, or a combination of the two’.

(4) A general part dealing, especially:

(3

—

** The “falsification” principle, introduced in the philosophy of science by Karl Popper

(1902-1994), is a model of combination, within a scientific methodology, on the one hand

of an axiomatic-like structure, represented by the scientific theory, and on the other hand

of empirical data; within the Popperian model, through the falsification principle; clearly

the upper hand is given to the empirical data. It should be noted, here, that Popper’s school

of thought was considered as directly opposed to Kuhn’s theory of the scientific

revolutions, since Popper considered that a falsified theory is no longer valid, while Kuhn

incorporates falsifying data in his “normal science”, as “unsolved riddles”. The thing went

so far, as to organize, in 1965 (three years after Kuhn’s book was first edited) in Bedford

College, London, an International Colloquium, under the presidency of Popper, with

Thomas Kuhn invited, in order to discuss Kuhn’s ideas. Contributions to this Colloquium

were subsequently published by Lakatos and Musgrave [9]. Although the discussion

revolved on philosophy, methodology, and praxis of science, an overall assessment of the

event points out that, what was at stake was the scientist’s system’s dogmatics. Although

its prima faciae scope was an exchange of opinions among theoreticians of science, what

was at stake was if a certain view of the science (namely, Kuhn’s) was to be dogmatically

acceptable or not. Among the dogmatic repercussions of a radical theory, like Kuhn’s, had

serious dogmatic repercussions, e.g. to the idea of the (scientific, social efc.) progress and

the respective authoritarian claim of the scientist within a modern, open society. Hence,

the intense interest by the scientific community (represented, in this case, by philosophers

and methodologists of science) to afford this theory the status of acceptable or not, as is

evident, besides, in the collective character of the Colloquium’s works, which virtually

represented a corporal-like organization of the systemically acceptable. Despite the striking

range and variety of clever and innovative opinions, stances and ideas heard in the works

of this Colloquium (as is recorded in the Lakatos and Musgrave book, op. cit), its

fundamentally dogmatic dimension should not be ignored.

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— With the general principles, i.e. the principles which are ruling

throughout the dogma and meant to be implemented in all its partial

dogmas.

— With its overall structure, i.e. its constitution of more specific parts

(partial dogmas), providing, thus, a map of the entire dogma or, in

some way, its architectural pattern.

(5) A specific part. This comprises the specific dogmatic of any partial

dogma discernible within the overall dogma under examination.

2.9. Paradigm analysis and dogmatic analysis of a system: a correlation

Within the methodological frame presented here, Paradigm analysis

and dogmatic analysis do not represent only different viewpoints of

approach. They are also fully developed systems of critical reasoning,

elaborating for themselves fully developed theories, which, systematically,

do not intermingle with each other. Yet, both analyses somehow render the

same object of analysis, the same system under different viewing angles. It

comes, hence, into examination, the question of them corresponding to each

other. Such a correspondence may be depicted in a general diagram like

Diagram 5:

Diagram 5: a claim (demand) for correspondence between the Paradigm and the dogmatic

analyses of one and the same system

This diagram, using the depictions of the Paradigm analyses

presented in Diagrams | and 3 above, is formulated as shown in Diagram

GO:

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6]

>) >

ue functionally A Systemic answers (along

Nsw with their re ng

R ‘Prime

— >| &

- dogmatic sentences

a redq ns A Systemic omission of answer —_———_ > a | ——

/ \

= aoe | ie re ——— as ll

D ‘Derived

ssues under elaboration Elaboration towards systemic answers 4

L dogmatic sentences

——- | > : (along with their reasoning schemes)

Unsolved riddles G Questions recognized as unsolved s j r Sv 7

by the system \

SI M Practical implementations of the systemic sentences

(factual outputs of the systemicreasoning / consequences

of the dogmatic function to other systems)

Recyclingissues Answers recycled

as problems by/of

the system

Diagram 6: a depiction of the claim (demand) for a correlation between the Paradigm and

the dogmatic analyses (horizontal disposition)

Yet, having into mind that Paradigm analysis represents a rather

external view of the system, and dogmatic analysis a rather internal view of

the same, the latter may be internalized by the former, in the following

Diagram 7. In this diagram, the two separate analysis of one and the same

system become two different aspects of it. The Paradigm one, and the

dogmatic one.

The above diagrams turn up to be, from a certain point of view, self-

evident. Indeed, the two analyses’ correlation yields necessarily by the

simple fact that they, both, render the same object of analysis.

Yet, the reverse yields not so self-evident. Does this correspondence

present a “bi-uniqueness” logic in a way that, when dogmatics of a system

changes, then its Paradigm aspect changes also and vice-versa?

Such a bi-uniqueness may be introduced, or assumed, essentially,

through a postulate of correspondence ** between the dogmatic and the

Paradigm aspects of a system. This postulate yields that from a given

dogmatics it (largely) produces a certain Paradigm pattern, and that, vice-

versa, every Paradigm pattern points (largely) to a certain dogmatics.

4] take the word “postulate” in the way it has been speculated from the antiquity regarding

the 5" “postulate” («aitnpta») of Euclid’s “elements” (“parallel postulate”): a rather

empirical truth, which is axiomatized, giving to the geometry deployed on the base of

it its actual form, yet leaving open the possibility of different postulates pointing out to

different geometries.

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PARADIGM ASPECT

DOGMATIC ASPECT

“Prime”

dogmatic sentences

“Derived” >

dogmatic sentences

-—— — ——__—_———————-(qr>

Questions functionally

answered

Systemic answers (along

with their reasoning)

ra —— >

Unanswered questions Systemic omission of answer

Issues under elaboration

(along with their reasoning schemes) Elaboration of systemic answers

|

Practical implementations of the systemic sentences

re eer

Unsolved riddles

——E

Questions recognized as

unsolved by the system

(factual outputs of the systemic reasoning)

Recycling issues

Answers recycled

as problems by/of

thesystem

Diagram 7: A combined depiction of Paradigm analysis and dogmatic analysis aspects of

a system

A postulate of this kind cannot be formally proven, being closer to

a hypothesis than to an axiom. Such a postulate may be supported by many

arguments, none of them obtaining the status of sufficient evidence, i.e. of

a proof of this proposition. Hence, it should be considered as a presumption

underlying the combination of the two analyses in the frame of one and the

same methodology, as well as a theoretical prerequisite (hypothesis) of this

methodology.

In view of a postulate of correspondence like this, one may bear in

mind possible connotations of a medieval “adaequatio” theory, or a sort of

methodological pragmatism, meant in the frame William James put it in his

“Pragmatism” [6]. None of these connotations would be thoroughly

irrelevant. Yet, in view of its systemic placement, such a postulate should

be primary considered under its pure, geometrical aspect, and not to be

mingled with any theory of truth.

Under this aspect to pose and to consider the correspondence

between the Paradigm and the dogmatic analysis as a postulate may be more

productive in posing interesting questions, especially borderline ones, like

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this: “which changes in the dogmatic structure of the system may lead to a

different Paradigm behavior?”

As a landmark work of this sort | consider Max Weber’s study on

The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, composed in 1904-1905

and first edited in 1905. It does exactly this: searching the impact of a

system’s dogmatic change (the shift from Catholic to Protestant religious

doctrines — along with their ethic) to a Paradigm shift in economy (the pass

to capitalist accumulation). In view of such a concept, speaking of a

postulate of correspondence between dogmatic and Paradigm aspects of a

system may mean nothing more than finding “a new name for an old way

of thinking”, as William James rightly put it [6].

The inverse direction yields equally important examples. One may

bear in mind the Catholic Church’s concerns about the dogmatic

repercussions of the Copernican Heliocentric astronomical Paradigm, as

was accepted by one of its subjects, Galileo Galilei. Here, also, it should be

born in mind that Kuhn used to refer to the transition from the Ptolemaic to

the Copernican model of the Universe (1543) as a typical case for a

“Scientific Revolution’”’. As is evident from the records of the famous trial

of Galileo (about 1610), mere indications that Galileo discussed without

thoroughly rejecting the Ptolemaic system sufficed to render him a suspect

for heresy”.

On the other hand, not every analysis correlates to every other with

a correspondence postulate. This is the case for administrative analysis, in

respect of the Paradigm/dogmatic aspect of a legal system. Here, it might

be accepted that one and the same (legal) dogmatic may support more than

one (virtually: innumerable) administrative dogmas.

55 In p. 66 of his book [7] Kuhn mentions as main instances of Paradigm shifts the

“Copernican, Newtonian, chemical, and Einsteinian revolutions”.

36 One may see, here, a case for “administrative analysis”, as is presented in the following

chapters of this article. In this case, the Catholic Church, through trials like this,

“administrates” its own dominion, for its purposes, which include ensuring dogmatic

homogeneity. Yet, such an interest of the Church’s administration to a scientific discovery,

as is shown in Galileo’s case, would not even be born, if the Copernican scientific

discovery did not reflect to the dogmatic field per se.

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3. Administrative analysis

3.1. Definitions

Administrative analysis’, in respect to a legal system, affords a

generalization, since it poses the question: “what is the function of the given

legal system within the general system of institutions within which it is

integrated and functional?” An instance of this question may be formulated

as follows: how is the legal system used by the state to afford public

administration objectives?

The crucial difference between the two analyses preceded and the

administrative one relates mainly to the way the results of the system’s

function are being taken into consideration:

— When Paradigm analysis is underway, the results, represented by the

system’s outputs are meant in a rather passive way, because of the

descriptive method of this approach.

— When dogmatic analysis is concerned, the practical consequences of the

system’s dogmatic may be either factual, or assumed by the dogmatics

itself, or, even, illusory*®. They represent rather how the dogmatics

understands its practical consequences””’.

— When the ‘“‘administrative” factor

swims into our ken

(as the poet puts it*”) these results become, to the analyst, the object of

purposeful considerations. Purposes may pertain to any subject: to another

system, to a sub-system of it, to the system itself, to a containing system, or

37 In the theory of administrative analysis presented here I re-composed several common-

use notions of public administration, administrative law, constitutional law, business

administration, operational research and cybernetics.

38 On the meaning of illusory in human rights, the ECHR has expressed itself in a clear-cut

way already from the sixties and the seventies: ““The Convention is intended to guarantee

not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective” (see,

among many others, the ECHR judgment of 23 July 1968 in the "Belgian Linguistic"

case, par. 3 in fine and 4 and the Airey v. Ireland judgment of 9/10/1979, para 24).

*° How, say, Christian metaphysics is translated to Christian ethics, regardless of the degree

to which this ethics is to be measured in the believer’s behavior. Or how, to touch base

into the legal fields, the best interests doctrine reigning over contemporary family law

results to indeed happy, sane and successful children of divorce.

” John Keats, in his “first looking into Chapman’s Homer” (1816), here slightly altered.

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65

even to the analyst. Any purpose, induced by anybody, suffices to turn the

system's analysis to a regulative (or normative) one, transmuting it, thus, to

administrative analysis.

3.1.1. Administration in a broader sense, administration in a narrower sense

One may define administration in different levels of a system.

In the general case, given any system (scientific systems included),

administrative analysis is concerned with questions extending to three

levels of the systemic integration:

(a) An infra-systemic one: How the system itself is composed, 1.e.

which of its components are “administrative” in their nature and

which are not.

(b) A trans-systemic one: How the system interacts with other systems,

to an aimed direction (either the aim belongs to the one interacting

system, or to the other). For example how law (or science) interacts

with politics, or economy.

(c) A supra-systemic one: How the system 1s integrated to a more

general system, in a purposeful way.

For this purpose, one may discern between “administration in a

broader sense”, which comprises the sum of institutions and their functions,

and “administration in a narrower sense’, i.e. the administrative subsystem

which remains when the legislative (normation) and judiciary (adjudication)

institutions and functions have been discerned. See Diagram 8.

“Administration” (broader sense)

Normative

component

Judicial “Administration”

component (narrower sense)

Diagram 8: Different levels of defining administration (broader and narrower sense) in

relation to normation and adjudication components

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From this point of view, both notions: the “administrative in the

broader sense” and the “administrative in the narrower sense” are relative

to each other, and system-dependent.

3.1.2. Administrative, normative and adjudicatory functions

In the above considerations, the three fundamental functions,

administrative, normative, and adjudicatory, are defined, for the purposes

of an administrative analysis (meant as a theory), as follows:

— Administrative function is the sum of the options, actions efc., aiming at

a certain objective, which is to be materialized (be it material in its nature

or not).

— Normation represents the gradual stabilization and typification of norms

which regularize a part of the system’s functions.

— Adjudication is the gradual stabilization and typification of specified

mechanisms (institutions) for interpreting and applying system norms under

predefined conditions.

3.1.3. Interaction with the object and feedback mechanisms as

characteristics of the administrative function

In order to achieve its aims, the administrative function possesses

and displays a higher degree of flexibility, which is needed for — and owed

to — its continuous interaction with the object of administration.

This kind of interaction, inherent in any administration, implies

feedback mechanisms, which give the administrative system a cybernetic

overall pattern, as seen in Diagram 9.

_ In contrast to the cybernetic structure of every administrative

function (in the broader or narrower sense), normative and adjudicating

functions, in their pure form (i.e. clear from any administrative admixture)!

are not considered to possess feedback mechanisms.

*! The distinction couched here implies Kantian philosophic patterns from the Critique of

Pure Reason (1781). Legislative and adjudicative functions, in their pure core function,

are thought of as a priori derivations, while administrative function is conceived in a

way analogous to the Kantian a posteriori, i.e. admixed with experience.

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67

Other inputs Resolve / Action Rasilis

(to the system (as “input” (as «output»)

of administration) to the object of the object

of administration) of administration)

Administrative Object

System of

Administration

feedback as input feedback

(to the system [as

of administration) «control»

(of results) |

Diagram 9: “Cybernetic” pattern of any “administrative” function

This is due to their formal structure. Each one of them rests on a

respective logical pattern which is completed and, simultaneously,

exhausted in one act. In this frame:

— The “normative” act is installing within the system a rule couched in the

form “if-then”. Such a rule is placed in the general and abstract field.

— The “adjudicative” act is to apply a given (abstract) rule of the system to

an instance (a “case”’) brought to it. Although an act like this 1s manifested

at a special and concrete level, yet it presupposes a degree of “detachment”

against the result of the act itself, i.e. it is subject to a degree of (systemic)

abstraction.

— “Administration”, in this line of reasoning, 1s the most “material” function

of the system, since it is the one closest to the system praxis, i.e. to the

system’s materializations. It is the way the system produces results in

praxis.

3.1.4. The administrative dogma / Paradigm

Whilst the administrative system works and evolves, it typifies

itself.

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A typification of this sort enables the evolution of the respective

(administrative) dogmatics, thus producing what one can label as

administrative dogma.

An administrative dogma, in its turn, may present observable

behavioral norms, which indicate the emergence of an administrative

Paradigm.

3.1.5. The administrative blend within an administrative system

A question to be posed to any administrative system concerns the

administrative blend inherent in its administrative dogma. In order to rule a

certain area, the administrative (in the broader sense) agent has to put

together:

—a legislative [= normative] factor,

—a judicial factor and

— an administrative factor, in order to form a certain blend, hopefully

the complete consort dancing together,

as the poet puts it?”

3.2. A list of questions (protocol) for an administrative analysis

Because of the empirical nature of an administrative dogma, the

question for a protocol citing the main issues which an analyst of such a

system should search remains an open question by itself.

It needs several applications, spreading across more fields of

administration, in order to put together a more complete list of issues for the

analyst to search in any administrative system. Yet, however complete such

a catalogue might be, it should be considered, again, open. This openness is

necessary, in order to respond to the infinitely evolving variety of the

realities to be administered.

* The verse used in this chapter is by T.S. Eliot in the unit V. of the “Little Gidding”, 4"

poem of the Four Quartets (1942).

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Concerning administration on a state’s level, i.e. a state taken as an

administrative system” subject to administrative analysis, such a catalogue

may be couched as follows:

(1) The correlation between the administrative scope and objectives of

the general administration and its guaranteeing role, e.g. in the field

of human rights. Human rights are a field within which a state, in its

aspect as an administrative (in the wider sense) system, assumes a

guaranteeing (securing) role*’. However, a state may assume its own

objectives, i.e. to exercise its own politics within the society to

which it provides administration. To cite an example from the

family law area, an administration (in the broader sense) may focus

on the scope:

— Either “preserving and promoting the institution of family”, i.e.

pursuing an objective (supposing) pertaining the society into which

the state administration applies,

— Or “guaranteeing respect to the right to family life”, the latter

understood as a human right, i.e. ensuring borderlines to the degree

in which that right may be transgressed“.

A stricter self-limitation by the state to its guaranteeing role (in any

area) pertains to a more libertarian character of the general

administration.

On the other hand, a state pursuing its own deliberately chosen

objectives (social, or of any other sort) means a more interventionist

administration.

(2) The issue of the open or closed character of an administration. An

important implication of the placement of an administration by a

system in relation to other systems lies in the way in which the

administered system is open or closed to external sources of

observation, decisions and reference.

43 Such a guaranteeing role is previewed, e.g., in the article | of the European Convention

of Human Rights, which is worded as follows: “The High Contracting Parties shall secure

to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this

Convention”.

44 An instance of conflict between the aim of “protecting the family” and “protecting family

life as a human right” was addressed by the ECHR in its “Marckx v. Belgium” judgment

of 13/6/1979.

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(3) The issue of the stance (collaboration, or, per contra, resistance), by

the given administrative dogma, of the inputs (decisions,

perspectives, control) induced to it from the external sources with

which it is related.

(4) The issue of focusing on the institutions or focusing on the result.

— Focusing on the institutions means that the main responsibility of

an administration lays in installing institutions, leaving the

achievement of practical results to them.

— Focusing on the result reserves the final responsibility for the

performance of the system to the administration’. Typically, in this

case, the administration will give emphasis to its vertical

integration to the least practical consequences of its administrative

function.

(5) The question of the administrative blend which 1s used by the system

for the administration of a given area. This blend refers to how

much, or how crucial is the normative, the judicial, or the

administrative component (as depicted in Diagram 9), in the overall

structure and function of the administrative system. Such a question

refers to the choice among different options, regarding the

administration of a given matter, e.g.

— To use or not an (important) administrative (in narrower sense)

factor / agent,

— To try to afford the area with such norms, as to become self-

regulated,

— Or to delegate essentially administrative functions to the judiciary.

(6) The question of providing or not the administrative system (both in

the wider and in the narrower sense) with feedback mechanisms. A

lack of feedback mechanisms, indicating a general downplay of the

* A confrontation between these two fundamental directions for an administration (in the

wider sense) is to be traced in the “dialog” between the concept of John Rawls, for “A

Theory of Justice” [15], and that of Amartya Sen, for the “Idea of Justice” [17]. While

Rawls focuses on the structuring of institutions providing a “fair” system of reaching

decisions, Sen focuses on the results to be achieved, which should, by themselves, be

“just”. Shifting too much the administrative focus to the institutions by themselves results

to an administrative trend, which was labeled by Sen [17, pp. 5-6] as “transcendental

institutionalism”’.

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administrative essence (and factors) of the system leads to what

Amartya Sen labeled as “transcendental institutionalism” [17, pp. 7,

24 and passim].

(7) The issue of the dominant character of the (public) administration of

an area. This issue implies both the dominant factor of the

administrative blend, as well as the label, ie. the dogmatically

recognized character of the given administrative system or sub-

system.

(8) The issue of the vertical integration of the administrative system to

the practical ground. Within the system of justice, such a factor of

vertical integration is the sector of the enforcement of judicial

decisions. Whereas the system of justice displays, by itself, a

judicial dominant character, the subsystem of enforcement, when

isolated, displays an administrative dominant character.

3.3. A correlation of the administrative dogma with its respective legal

dogma

Returning to the legal sphere, an administrative dogma, say the one

of a state, develops its own legal dogma. Yet, when one defines the

administrative dogma as above, he cannot postulate a one-to-one

correspondence to its legal dogma.

Administrative dogma, with regard to its own legal dogma, “passes

to another genus”, as Aristotle put it, Ze. from a two-dimensional plane to

the three-dimensional space.

The relation between these two dogmas can be depicted as a

projection of the administrative dogma to a legal level, as in the following

Diagram 10*°:

46 In Diagram 10 illustrating this idea, lines and other schemes are purposely slightly

distorted, implying non-linear mechanisms of reflection.

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Administrative dogma

Projective

process

Diagram 10: Legal dogma as a projection of the administrative dogma on a legal level

In fact, one and the same legal dogma may assume several

administrative roles, functions — and meanings — depending on an

immensurable variety of factors of the administrative system not controlled

by it.

Yet, an administrative dogma is better supposed to form its own

legal dogma compatible with its own purposes.

The legal dogma, respectively, defines certain boundaries of the

administrative dogma — e.g., especially in contemporary democratic states,

constraining the state to respect human rights — but it may never define it

entirely.

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An Overview - Conclusion

The concept of a three-fold approach of a (legal) system displayed

here corresponds to its viewing from three different angles or its passing

through three different filters.

As stressed above, in each one of these three approaches no

philosophical presumption is subsumed. In the systematic framework

afforded, several philosophical presumptions may be placed. For example,

when one considers a (legal) dogma’s metaphysics, no metaphysical

philosophical presumption is implied. What is important here is not the

philosophical classification, but the systemic placement — and functionality.

In this frame, Paradigm analysis is essential to the methodology

deployed here, since it defines boundaries in time, within which a (legal)

system is the same, despite its evolution, hence subject to systemic analysis.

Such an analysis is meant in a quasi-synchronic sense, i.e. dealing

with systemic items which are available to one another while the system is

functional. Between different Paradigms only comparisons are possible.

Such comparisons between Paradigms succeeding each other in the same

legal area are considered diachronic.

Within Paradigm analysis, evolution is meant in a quasi-articulated

form, involving periods of continuity, interrupted by major structural

discontinuities, which may be viewed as Paradigm shifts.

Given that all systems evolve in time, the notion of Paradigm

enables such an analysis, since it denotes if two systemic formations

represent different systems, or if they display two issues of one and the same

system.

On the one hand Paradigm analysis, moreover, focusing on

empirical, observable, and measurable traits of the system, represents the

Anglo-Saxon, empirical method of approach.

On the other hand dogmatic analysis approaches the system as

value-oriented.

Regarding legal systems, it is legal dogmatics which 1s labeled as an

“axiological legal science” [10, pp. VII, IX].

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Under this aspect it represents a rather Central-European method of

approaching legal systems.

Yet, this does not mean that Anglo-Saxon empiricism lacks a

dogmatic structure. It should rather seem that dogmatic aspects in the

Anglo-Saxon approach are rather latent, while in the Central-European

approach more focused.

Conversely Central-European approach may neglect the measurable

impact of the values — or the administrative face-value of them.

A correlation between the Paradigm and the dogmatic aspects of one

and the same system is to inquire if and how changes in the structuring of

its values are correlated with changes in its measurable traits, ie. its

behavior.

Administrative analysis, for its part, places the system within the

more general, administrative system within which it is meant to function.

Such a placement enhances a better understanding of why the given system

functions as it does, since the same (legal or not) system may function

differently and, in this reference, be different, according to the general

administrative system into which is placed.

At the same time it also enhances a better understanding of what

actually a system’s organ does. For example, in the legal field, when the

function of a Court is at stake, one may search, in the frame of an

administrative analysis, what is the essence of this organ’s acts: normation,

adjudication, or administration.

After all, an administrative placement of a (legal or not) system

helps with avoiding the trap of its, conscious or latent, transcendental

institutionalism or, at least, to elucidate it in order to describe, interpret, and

handle it — or confront, or resist it — better.

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iF

i)

1S)

13

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. Rolf Dobelli, Die Kunst des Klaren Denkens. 52 Denkfehler, die Sie besser anderen

liberlassen [The Art of Thinking Clearly. 52 thinking errors which you would better

leave to others], Carl Hanser Verlag Miinchen, 2011

. Richard A. Gardner, The parental alienation syndrome: a guide for mental health and

legal professionals. Creative Therapeutics, 1998

. William James, Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking (1907),

Hackett Publishing 1981: ISBN 0-915145-05-7, Dover 1995: ISBN 0-486-28270-8

. Thomas Samuel Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: Univ. of

Chicago Press (Ist ed. 1962, 2 ed., 1970, 3 ed. 1995, 4" ed. (50th anniversary

edition) 2012)

. Thomas Samuel Kuhn, The Road since structure, philosophical essays, 1970-1993 with

an Autobiographical Interview, The University of Chicago Press, 2000

. Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (ed.): Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge: vol. 4:

Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science, London,

1965, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970)

10. Karl Larenz, Methodenlehre des Rechtswissenschaft |Methodology of the Science of

I,

the Law, \*' ed. 1960]: Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, New York, 1979

Niklas Luhmann, Rechtssystem und Rechtsdogmatik [Legal Systems and Legal

Dogmatic], W. Kohlhammer GmbH, Stuttgard, 1974

. Niklas Luhmann, Soziale Systeme. Grundriss einer allgemeinen Theorie [Social

Systems, a Ground Plan for a General Theory| Surhkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1987

. Niklas Luhmann, Nopuipoxoinon péow diadixaciag [Legitimation durch Verfahren

(Legitimation through process], \st ed. 1969], ed. Kpituky (Greek translation:

Kewvotavtivoc Babiotns), AOnva, 1999

Tehpyiog Maapnwiotns, Oswpytixy TAw@oookoyia. Eioaywyn otnv Xbyxpovn

T,Awoookoyia [Georgios Babiniotis, Theoretical Linguistics, an Introduction to

Contemporaneous Linguistics], Athens, 1980.

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15. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1° ed., Harvard University Press, 1971), revised

edition: Oxford University Press, 1999

16. Ferdinand de Saussure Course in General Linguistics. Edited by Charles Bally and

Albert Sechehaye. In collaboration with Albert Riedlinger (1916), Translated by Wade

Baskin (1959). Edited by Perry Meisel and Haun Saussy, Columbia University Press,

2011

17. Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice, Penguin Books. 2010

Bio

Konstantinos (Kostis) Demertzis was born in Chalcis, Greece, in 1954.

He obtained a degree in Mechanical and Electrical Engineering in-1978. He

then completed his studies in Law in 1983, followed by a degree in

Philosophy in 1988. His PhD on Musicology was approved with distinction

by the Athens University in 1997. His second PhD on Law was approved in

2016, also with distinction, by the Law Department of the Athens

University. In the eighties he worked as an engineer. Since 1998 he has been

working as a lawyer.

Washington Academy of Sciences

Banquet Photos

Summer 2019

Fig

Board of Managers

Washington Academy of Sciences

79

Awardee Photos

The Excellence in Research in Applied Mathematics award was given to

Alfred S. Carasso, who was introduced by Ronald Boisvert.

The Excellence in Research in Computer Science award was given to

Nader Moayeri, who was introduced by Charles H. Romine

Summer 2019

; eS

The Excellence in Research in Mathematics and Computer Science award

was given to Bonita V. Saunders, who was introduced by Michael

Donahue.

The Leadership in Health Informatics award was given to Peter Basch,

who was introduced by Ram D. Sriram.

Washington Academy of Sciences

8 |

The Leadership in Material Science award was given to Erik B. Svedberg,

who was introduced by Jon Mallett.

The Leadership in Computer Science award was given to John P.

Kaufhold, who was introduced by James Egenrieder.

Summer 2019

82

—

=,

i

. &

The Distinguished Career in Computer Science award was given to

Dinesh Manocha, who was introduced by Ram D. Sriram.

The Distinguished Career in Engineering award was given to Alton

Romig, Jr., who was introduced by Guru Madhavan.

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