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TRANSACTIONS

OF THE

WISCONSIN ACADEMY

OF

SCIENCES. ARTS, AND LETTERS

VOL. XIII, PART I

1900

l/V/TH TWENTY-EIGHT PLATES

EDITED BY THE SECRETARY

l'iil)lislied by Authority of Law

MADISON

Democrat Prlnting Company, State Frlnter

19OI

^, ./-^

TRANSACTIONS

OF THE

WISCONSIN ACADEMY

OP

SCIENCES, ARTS, AND LETTERS

VOL. XIII, PART I

1900

WITH TWENTY'EIGHT PLATES

EDITED BY THE SECRETARY

Published by Authority of Law

MADISON

Democrat Printing Company, State Printer

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OFFICERS.

Preside7it.

CHARLES S. SLIGHTER, Madison.

Vice-Presidents.

HARRIET B. MERRILL, Milwaukee.

CHARLES H. CHANDLER, Ripon.

ERASTUS G. SMITH, Beloit.

Secretary,

FRANK C. SHARP, Madison.

Treasurer.

ERNEST R. BUCKLEY, Madison.

Librarian.

LOUIS KAHLENBERG, Madison.

Curator.

SAMUEL WEIDMAN, Madison.

LIST OF PLATES.

To face page

I-XVIII. Buckley, on Ice Ramparts . . 141-162

XIX-XXII. Libby, on the Lead Region . 188-281

XXIII-XX VIII. Peckham, Spiders of the Family Attidae 348-358

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

PAGE.

A revision of the pronouns, . . E dinar d T. Ov^en^ 1

Ice ramparts, . . . . . E. R. Buckley^ 141

Discussion, ..... C. R. Van Rise, 158

The plankton of fresh water lakes, . C. Dvnfjht Marsh, 163

An economic and social study of the lead region of Wiscon-

sin, Illinois, and Iowa —

Introduction, . . . . . 0. G. Libby^ 188

Ch. I. The lead region of Grant, Iowa, and Lafayette

Counties, Wisconsin, . . . 0. G. Libby, 191

Ch. II. The lead region of Grant and Lafayette Counties,

Wisconsin, ... F. Belle Stanton^ 197

Ch. III. The lead region of Illinois, Bernard M. Palmer, 208

Ch. IV. The lead region of Dubuque County, Iowa,

Allard J. Smith, 222

Appendices, ........ 231

Spiders of the Phidippus group of the family Attidae,

George W. Peckham and Elizabeth G. Peckham, 282

On the determination of chlorine in natural waters, its ac-

curacy and significance, . . Erastus G. Smith 359

Household words: their etymology, James Davie Butler^ 366

A problem of longevity, . . Charles H. Chandler, 384

The Gothenburg method of regulating the liquor traffic,

1892-8, ..... George Thompson, 387

Some pseudo-histories of the American Revolution,

0, G, Libby, 419

A REVISION OF THE PRONOUNS.

WITH SPECIAL EXAMINATION OE RELATIVES AND RELA-

TIVE CLAUSES.*

EDWARD T. OWE 2^.

I^ro/ensor of the French Language and Literature in the University of Wisconsin ,

CHAPTER I.— GEXEEAL SURVEY.

THE PEONOMIXAL MEDLEY.

With a stone that sparkles, an Indian aiTow-head, a spitted

•dragon-fly, the farm-lad begins a ''collection of curiosities,''

which grows in bnlk only to grow also more incongruous. With

hardly more definite purpose Grammar has selected the mem-

bers of the pronominal word-class. Amused by here and there

a verbal oddity, the pseudo-science also may be said to have

formed a collection of linguistic curiosities; and these in dis-

parity match the objects assembled by boyish caprice.

Into this aggregation are entered '"some," which stands at

times for any persons whatever, and ^^I," which is perhaps the

most exclusive element of speech. ''Who" (relative), although

it requires an antecedent, is fraternized with "this" and "that,"

Vfhich do not. Words said to ask a question are grouped with

others used to answer questions. In this field the lion and the

lamb lie do\\Ti of a truth together.

Indiscriminable admission is offset bv undeserved omission,

partly inadvertent, it would seem, and partly arbitrary. It

usually is not seen that "few" and "many," being quite as truly

*A dissertation for which the degree of Doctor of Philosophy was awarded

by Yale University. A selection from Chapter III. of this article was read be-

fore the American Philological Association, at the meeting of July, 1900.

2 Wisconsiii Academy of Sciences^ /Ms, and Letters.

indefinite as "some," mav quite as justly claim the rank of in-

definite pronouns. Again it must be seen that "here" and

"there" are fully as demonstrative as "tliis" and "that;" but

pronominal rank is withheld from "here" and "there," because

they are not also substantive. That is, the pronominal group,

already in^ational because both incongruous and incomplete, is

further irrationalized to fit it for a place in the larger absurdity

known as the Parts of Speech.

In forming these it has caught the notice of Grammar that

this or that word is alwavs used to name the same thouffht-ele-

ment;-^ and no doubt a language might bo so constructed that

every word, whenever used, would thus express a particular ele-

ment of thought. As a matter, however, of fact, such regular-

ity is not obtained by any language.^ To attempt then a classi-

fication of words by what may be called the function of their

ideas is hardly more encouraging than to venture a classification

of the fowls by their position in the barn-yard.

The unavailability of function as a basis for classification is,

however, no derogation to its importance. The understanding

of speech consists, it is true, on the one hand most obviously in

obtaining right ideas, but not less truly, on the other hand, in

rightly putting them together. Correct perception of function,

then, is indispensable. Its emphasis, even in a misguided effort,

might therefore have been helpful, were it not that function, in

the differentiation of the parts of speech, has been hopelessly

confounded with other matters. Thus, the adverb being de-

fined by function as an adjunct (of various sorts), the adjective

is, by an altogether different criterion, distinguished as a word

with a qualitative meaning. Still another ground of distinc-

tion is found in what a word is said to do, the conjunction being

defined as "a word which joins." It might be als-o proven that

^Thus "exceeds" will never be used to name a first term (point of thought-

departure, subject), or a last term (point of thought-arrival, object, predicate) ;

it will always name a relation, an impression derived from a pair of ideas r

that is, it will be used as a mid-term.

*Thus of a spliced rope it may be said that "The overlap of the two parts is

three feet ;" or "The two parts have an overlap of three feet ;" or "The strands

of one part overlap those of the other." That is, in these examples the word

"overlap" names an idea successively used as subject, object and mid-term, be-

ing twice therefore a noun and once a verb. It may also even be said that "The

overlap factor is ten per cent.," the same word being in this case made to func-

tionate as adjective.

Owen — Bevision of Pronouns. 3

words are further sometimes differentiated by association, that

is, by the company which they keep.^ To classify by criteria

so shifting is hardly more rational than to divide the animal

kingdom into camivora, aquatics, vertebrates, and plantigrades;

say flesh-eaters, water-dwellers, back-boned and flat-steppers.

The candidates for pronominal rank are, however, obliged to run

the gauntlet of this classification, those only being accepted as

pronouns which reach the substantive line.

In further grammatical treatment these substantive sur\dvors

are subjected to further ^-iolence, being forced into sub-classes

painfully distingTiished as personal, demonstrative, reflexive, in-

definite, relative and interroa'ative. The distinctions indicated

by these grou}>names are, however, plainly inadequate. For in-

stance, the indefinite "some," as in "Some say," is also distinctly

personal ; while on the other hand the personal "they," without

an antecedent, as in "Thev sav that France will fiii'ht," is also

distinctly indefinite. "Who," again, is regularly personal,

whether relative or interrogative.

Such procedure is the more surprising in view of the wisdom

shown in choosing a point of departure, the characteristic, that

is, put forward as distinctively pronominal. A hint of this

characteristic is oifered in the pronoun's name and definition.

By the word "^^ronomen" it is immediately suggested that

something is conceived as for something. ISTow, if what bo

meant is a something "pro nomine," or "for a word," that some-

thing is obviously itself a word; for no other kind of substitute

is under consideration. So also if what be meant is a "nomen

pro," or "a word for something," this something must either be

a word or an idea, since onlv ideas and words are under consid-

eration. But an idea is not intended; for to stand "pro" or

"for" an idea is the usual ofiice of words, and no peculiarity of

the prou'oun. Yvliichever, then, be the syntax hidden in "pro-

nomen," the meaning is "a ^vord for another word."^

^Thus iu (1) "The flag is red" and (2) "Scarlet resembles red" the ideas

named by "red" (1) and "red" (2) are the same, being distinguishable only by

the different relations in which they stand to "flag" and "scarlet," respectively.

"Is" means, in this case, the relation of an object to its own quality, thereby

obtaining for "red" (1) the rank of an adjective. "Resembles" names another

relation, thereby losing for "red" (2) the adjective rank.

-That "nomen" is actually used by Grammar in the more restricted meaning

of "noun" is ground of objection on p. 28.

4 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters.

This interpretation is confirmed by abundant definitions and

descriptions which agree in this, that the pronoun is a sort of

proxy, and not a linguistic principal; in other words, it presents

ideas by an indirect or mediate process. To illustrate, using for

convenience the conversational forms, suppose you enter my

room as I utter the words ''He is going to Europe."^ It is

plain that you will not know of w^hom I am thinking. But had

you come in a moment sooner, you would have heard an ampler

statement, namely, ''Brown says he is going to Europe." In

this foiTQ of mv example vou know without a doubt of whom I

am thinking, and that I think of him twice, once as saying, and

once as going. My first thinking is indicated by the word

"Brown," my second, by the word "he." But the powers of

these words are veiy different. The symbol "Brown" reveals

the subject of my thought without recourse to the aid of any

other word. The symbol "he" can not, on the other hand, ex-

press my meaning except as a proxy, taking the place of

"Brown," its linguistic principal.

That the exploitation of this distinction has been attended by ex-

treme confusion is perhaps suflBciently shown by illustrations already

offered. That the distinction itself is eminently just and will ration-

ally differentiate the pronouns I shall endeavor to show in the follow-

ing Section. Meantime this distinction may be used to aid the further

appreciation of Grammar's extraordinary achievement, of which I of-

fer the following objective illustration: Having on my farm a con-

siderable number of animals, I find it convenient to classify them by

structural differences. I thus obtain two classes, the equine and the

bovine. The latter, as it happens is somewhat numerous, while of

the former there are very few. Indeed this obvious difference in num-

ber, and therefore in commonness, rather supplants in my attention

the structural difference first utilized. The horses come to impress me

most conspicuously as exceptions. Of my cows, too, the most indeed are

Jerseys; a few, however, are black, that is again, exceptions. So I fall

into the habit of grouping the black cows with the horses in what I

cannot properly now distinguish as anything but an exceptional class.

But the nucleus of this class was, after all, the horses, originally known

as the equine class. Noting merely that this nucleus has been aug-

mented, but overlooking the change of criterion which allowed the aug-

mentation, I continue the use of the title equine with a class which

now contains not only horses but also cov/s. Developing the possibili-

^I bar the occasional use of "he" to name the person par excellence of com-

mon acquaintance. This usage will be examined under another head.

' Owen — Revision of Pronouns.

ties latent in systematic zoology of this sort, I arrive at ultimate

groups as follows: first, the equine, containing the horses, the black

cows, the spotted calf, the bull, and the cow with the crumpled horn;

second, the bovine, containing other cows and calves.

The procedure oi! Grammar is quite analogous, though carried

further, developing first a proxy class, correct, but never adequately

understood. The vast remainder, the linguistic principals, have hardly

been more than subconsciously recognized as such. The words of the

proxy class, or pronouns proper, being few in number, readily come

to be dominantly regarded as exceptional. Whether under this aspect

or some other,^ they do as a matter of fact, admit to fellowship the also

exceptional personals, demonstratives, indefinites and interrogatives,

the work of primary differentiation being so far undone. For as will

be amply shown, the personals, demonstratives, etc., so far as merely

such, are not proxies but principals.*

Grammatical classification may, at this stage, be indicated by the

following diagram, the members of the now no longer exclusively proxy

class (as conceived by Grammar), being put in italics or in capitals.

Words

-I

' Tme Prosies

True Principals

HE, SHE, etc.

Pers. Dem. Indef.

r I THIS SOME

. His (= suus)

Addition, life, death, etc. = Noun

Add, live, die, etc. = Verb

Our Hiesig Quelque Additional, live, dead, etc. = Adj.

Uiward Hier Somewhere Additionally, etc. = Adv.

Hence (thought connective) And, etc. = Conj.

The proposition of Grammar, then, is simply this: all words are of

two classes; those which do and those which do not require aid; yet

those which do, include a superior number of those which do not. By

cross classification the remainder of those which do not require aid

(e. g., the words in Roman type) are subdivided into nouns, verbs, etc.

Peter, having been robbed to enrich Paul, is now in part indemni-

fied; the pronominal class of proxies, previously extended to include

personals, etc., is now heavily reduced by the distribution of all but its

substantive members among the adjectives, etc., of the principals. That

is, the proxies having taken in many principals, the principals in turn

absorb the bulk of the proxies. At this stage Grammatical procedure

leaves only the capitalized words of the above diagram in the proxy

class, now no longer such either exclusively or exhaustively.

^The appendixes further show that personals, demonstratives, and indefinites

have also, at times, a vicarious value.

^In the meantime observe that in "Some say," "I am glad to see you," "This la

my brother," "Who is there?", the italicised words perform their duties fully

without the aid of other words, that is, as principals.

6 Wisconsin Academy of ScienceSj Arts, and Letters,

The final act in the farce is the recognition of the remaining, the

substantive proxies, as a new part of speech. To diagram this result,

the capitalized words of the diagram should be entered among the prin-

cipals, say under the word ''addition," abreast of the new title "pro-

nouns." In other words, of the primary classes one is coordinated

with the sub-classes of the other. Thus is completed a system already

accused in a general way of capricious selection, careless omission, ar-

bitrary rejection, inadequate sub-division — a system now specifically

charged with repeated acd bare-faced violation of its prime criterion —

a system which may in a sense be known as Grammar's second Babel

or "confusion of tongues."

In view of what has thus far been brought to lighl, it is hardly too

much to assume that to an orderly mind the grammatical conception

of the pronouns is untenable. But an effort to mend this conception

can hardly be cheered by the hope that its results, even if good, will

generally be preferred. He who likes the European oyster is rarely

brought to like the American. It is not to be expected that the votaries

of Grammar will welcome any substitute for what it offers.

It must be admitted, too, that in the very nature of the case, the lin-

guistic method of one mind can hardly be proven to be that of others;

for as one door gives exit both to the great and the little cat, so also,

and notoriously, a given set of v»'ords may be used by different minds

to open passage for thoughts conspicuously different. Thus to me the

phrase "if you please" is synonymous with "if you like (or prefer),"

"you" being my subject, and "please" having a meaning very different

from what appears in "This pleases me." This opinion I defend by

the sister phrases "If I please, he pleases, we please, etc." But to a

grammarian oblivious of these, saturated with syntax genealogy, in-

tensely conscious for instance of "si tibi placet," I doubt not that, as is

often claimed, my illustration has the meaning, "if to you be pleasing."

Speaking for himself alone, no doubt the grammarian is right. Speak-

ing only for myself, I believe that I also am right. Without attempt-

ing to determine which interpretation is better or more common, I

merely emphasize the fact that what is linguistically true of one mind

may be quite untrue of another. Believing thus, I must, in much of

what follows, be understood as offering a merely personal contingent

to the little total of our present observation; as describing the thought-

forms of my own mind, without claiming that those of other minds

must always be the same; as appreciating that the views to be ad-

vanced can acquire authority only so far as shared by many and able

thinkers.

The presentation of these views is further attended by this practical

difficulty, that the same linguistic means are employed, even by the

same persons, now for one and now for another linguistic end. Thus

"who" is used on one occasion as a relative, on another as an inter-

Owen — Be vision of Pronouns. 7

rogative, and in some languages even still otherwise, meaning "one"

or the "other," "this one" or "that one." More objectively, the jack-

knife serves its owner in turn as gimlet, hammer and tooth-pick. Such

activities I can easily differentiate ; but I can not so easily express my

results. Language is not lavish of names for groups of distinctive

characteristics, especially those of the accidental or ephemeral order.

For the total of distinctives, whereby a knife is ranked for the moment

as a hammer, I need such a word as "hammerness;" but it does not

exist. Also, even if I had such words, they would be very ineffective,

an argument upon abstractions being notably hard to follow. Finding

it thus impracticable to discuss the different characteristics of words,

I must make my discussion, in form at least, one of words differently

characterized. This involves me at once in a formal contradiction. My

jack-knife is ranked as a gimlet, a hammer and a tooth-pick. The

word "v.ho" is classed as a demonstrative, a relative, and an interroga-

tive. I may indeed laboriously stipulate that neither knife nor word

is in three classes at the same time. Or I may resort to the clumsy

expedient of calling "who" three different words, or my knife three

different objects. But neither course is satisfactory. The best I can

do, to avoid wrong understanding on the one hand and no understand-

ing on the other, is to say that, while for convenience I shall seem to

classify words, I shall really be aiming to differentiate their functions,

their meanings and their methods of meaning-presentation.

EEDIFFEEEXTIATIOX.

In the efiort to bring order into tlie confusion wrought by

Grammar, I invite increased attention to the fundamental dis-

tinction between proxy and principal, reviving the illustration

^'Brown says he is going to Europe.'^ As I utter the word

^^Brown," it suggests to you an idea essentially the same as my

own, and this without the aid of any other word, being, it may

be argued, self-explanatory. The same is true of every element

of my sentence except the element '^he,'' which can not suggest

my idea except for explanatory aid, afforded in the present case

by ^^Brown."

This simple distinction, of the highest value in word-study,

though strongly emphasized by Grammar, has been curiously

misapplied. Words of the ^'he" class have been isolated from

others on the ground that they revive an idea already suggested

by another word or, in grammatical parlance, " refer to an ante-

cedent.'' But such revival confers no distinction, being effected

8 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences^ Arts, and Letters,

by miiltitiides of other words. Tlius, suppose I say ^^Brown saw

Mr. McKinley today. The president is looking welL" Lik&

the word ^^he" the word ''president" reviyes an idea suggested

by a preceding word, doing all, in short, that can be done by

''he/' and merely doing it better. It is therefore not in what

the word ^^he" can do, bnt in what it can not do, not in its

powers bnt in its limitations, that we must find the gronnd for

isolating it from others. And what it can 7iot do, as previously

shown, is to suggest without aid an intended idea.

The difference then between other words and words like '^he'^

is roughly that of candle and mirror. The one emits a light of

its own ; the other is a mere reflector. Such a difference may

safely be used as primary; for it is absolute and fundamental.

It is also psychologically initial. The process by which I call up

inyourmindan idea is necessarily prior in time to its appearance

in your mental field. Before you can cook or even have your

hare, you must catch it. In comparison, then, to the question

how an idea is obtained, all other questions are actually subse-

quent and may plausibly rank as subsidiary ; by these I mean the

questions of the idea's nature, of its use in thought-structure

(function), of its sentential neighbors (association), of what in

grammatical parlance it is said "to do" — the tests, in short^^

which Grammar has applied in distinguishing the other parts of

speech and the pronominal subdivisions.

Seeking now to prepare the way for a suitable terminology, I

slightly change my previous form of statement. In the exam-

ple ''Brown says he is going to Europe," I prefer to put it that

"Brown" is able to take the initiative in the complete suggestion

of an idea. Self-sufficient words of this order may therefore be

kno^^Ti as initiatives.

The word "he," on the other hand, is unable to perform the

initiative act. AVhen, however, this act has once been per-

formed by "Brown," the hearer, looking mentally backward to

the idea suggested by "Brown," can use it as the meaning of

"he." Indeed, the use of "he" is a virtual order to the hearer

thus to look backward, to find a previously used idea, and to use

that idea again as part of a present thought. Words of this type-

may be known as retrospectives.

Owen — Revision of Pronouns. 9

It would be natural to suppose that the self-sufficient meaning-

namer must always thus stand first in the sentence, and that the

word which needs its help should defer appearance until that

help is present, and therefore available. Such, however, is not

always the case. Thus, "Though he is very busy, Brown is go-

ing to Europe." In this example you can not know who is

meant by "he" until you reach the later "Brown." It might

seem that in this case "he" should be called initiative, and

"Brown" retrospective. And so indeed they should, were mere

order the criterion. But the actual criterion is the powder to pre-

sent in full an intended meaning, or, otherwise phrased, ability

to take the initiative in idea-naming. Now the word "he" may

seem to make an effort in this direction. But even if it does, it

scores no success; and therefore it cannot justly be called in-

itiative. As a matter of fact, however, "he" makes no such ef-

fort. For surely you do not credit me with trying to show you

whom I mean by the aid of so helpless a word as "he." And I

am very certain that I do not so intend the word myself. Judged

then, by my intention, by your acquiescence, and by results, the

word "he" can not be called initiative.

Its actual use is as follows : it expresses very inadequately, in

a purely provisional way, an idea which I intend to express with

more exactness bv a later word. In fact, the use of "he" in

this case is a virtual order to you to look forw^ard mentally to an

idea yet to be distinctly presented. As such you accept the

"he" and, tolerating its momentary inadequacy, you do look for-

ward in mind to the adequate idea which it vaguely prefigures.

Judged then by my intention, by your acquiescence, and by re-

sults accomplished, words employed thus may be known as an-

ticipative or prospective.

The prospective and retrospective words are characterized

alike by incompetency, except so far as aided by the self-suf-

ficient initiatives. They may therefore be grouped together un-

der the common title of insufficient or vicarious. The prime

divisions then of words, based upon their method of presenting

meaning, are the initiatives and the vicarious, th-. latter being

subclassed as prospective and retrospective.

Initiatives compose the main body of every vocabulary, the

10 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters.

signs of what I mean ontniimberino:, as might be expected, the

signs of what I have meant or what I am about to mean. The

forward and backward looking words are indeed but prologue

and epilogue of the sentential drama. Few in number^ and

unique in tactics, they form a sharply isolated class to which our

special attention will be given. In the meantime I Vv'ish, for the

sake of the side-lights oifered, to pass in review the other so-

called pronominal groups, which Grammar has established by

the aid of further characteristics, more or less distinctly appre-

hended. As, however, any effort spent upon them is in my own

opinion a digression, it is consistent and helpful to the clearness

of exposition to designate them as pseudopronouns^ recognizing

the vicarious words alone as strictly pronominal.

Among the different characteristics which Grammar has uti-

lized in establishing the pseudopronominal groups, I elect, as

most convenient to start with, indefiniteness in the meaning ex-

pressed. The effort to separate tlie definite and the indefinite

is not, to be sure, especially hopeful. But, assuming that it can

be successfully accomplished, I subdivide the initiatives into

definites and indefinites.'^

The definites are subject to further differentiation, according

as the ideas which they exhibit do or do not change with change

in the speaker. The difference between them appears most

clearly in spatial relations. Suppose for instance that you and

I are facing each other, you looking southward. Directly be-

tween us stands a tree, and a little to one side a bush. Of this

bush I remark, '^'It is east of the tree". The relation between

bush and tree is quite definite ; it is correctly expressed by the

word ^^east" ; and the expression perfectly fits my personal point

of view. Moreover, if you wish yourself to express this rela-

tion, you may also say with perfect truth, ^'The bush is east of

the tree". That is, the word ^'east" fits your point of view no

less exactly than it does my own. This is but saying that neither

of us, in using the idea expressed by "east," puts into it any

element peculiar to himself. Self, indeed, so far as may be,

^The same subdivision may be effected with the vicarious words; but aa it is

unnecessary and not suggested by Grammar, it is not attempted. For the same

reason other possible subdivisions invited later are not carried out.

Owen — Revision of Pronouns. 11

is eliminated. East ic in mj conception ''cast", no matter who

I am or where I am or how I face or what may be the status of

any other person. The idea, as far as it can be, is objective and

absolute. The points of compass could hardly change, were the

race removed to another planet. Such ideas assume, it is true,

and must assume, a standard of comparison ; and this standard

no doubt is recognized by man alone; but the standard is not

man himself, the species or the individual ; and it is not a sec-

ondary standard, reckoned from man as a primary. Be it the

^North Star or the sun or the path of the sun across the sky ; be

it the meridian of Greenwich, as for longitude ; or be it an origin

of co-ordinates, as in analytic geometry; in ideas of the pres-

ent class the standard is never self.

With numerous other words the standard is always self.

Given again the objeets of my last illustration, I may elect to

say, ''The bush is on the right of the tree". With the same rela-

tion of bush and tree in your mind as in my owti, suppose that

you yourself now wish to make a statement equivalent to mine;

you will say, "The bush is on the left of the tree". Our differ-

ence in statement of the same actual relation indicates that we

conceive the relation differently. In other words, the relational

idea changes with the change in the relation-thinker. This co-

variance is occasioned by the fact that something of the thinker's

self enters or affects the relation. The categories "right" and

"left" are not obtained, like "east" and "west," from the ex-

ternal universe; they are obtained directly from the material

self. Were my body symmetrical in all directions, or were I

a disembodied spirit of the conventional type, it is difficult to

imagine how such ideas could arise. Constituted even as I am,

these ideas vary with the changes of my position. They may be

valid not only for self alone, but for the self only of the moment.

Hence their passage from my usage to your own involves some

taking out of my personality and some putting in of yours.

Their peculiarity may be indicated by saying that they are ego-

centric. That is, the individual self affects the nature of the

idea. Self is the point of departure, the center from which the

mental outreach proceeds.

Egocentric ideas may be obtained from phenomena different

12 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters.

in themselves and difPerentlj exploited. The words used thus

far in illustration, namely ^^right" and ^^left," express ideas de-

rived from the "universe of things. But other egocentrics deal

with what may be called the universe of speech. To illustrate,

suppose I do my thinking for a while without reference to the

possibility of exchanging thought with others. As a prelimi-

nary move I find it convenient to differentiate myself from all

else, establishing self as the prime factor of all that is. The

vast remainder I further easily disting-uish into what is near me,

namable by ^^this/' and what is more remote, namable by ^^fchat."

But I do not imagine how, on such lines, I should ever reach

the idea named by "you.'' So long as I class you by your dis-

tance only, it seems to me that you must be to me that only which

your distance implies, that is, a '^this man" or a "that man,"

according to your position.

If on the other hand I think of you as a possible hearer of

what I say, your proper designation is "you" ; and this I use

without reference to your position. Whether he whom I ad-

dress be next me or across the room, able to hear ray whisper

or just within the range of my loudest shout, in my presence

or reachable only by the longest telephonic wire; whether he

be my hearer or my reader; whether he understand by watch-

ing my lips or fingers, if deaf, or by personal contact, if also

blind ; in all cases I think of him as "you." The value of this

"you" is also in all cases the same. It names one specially re-

lated to the complex act of speech. Such a conception is clearly

quite without the category of space and, barring figurative

usage, exclusively within the category of thought-exchange.

Ideas of this nature and their symbols, being obtained from

the act of speech, should properly derive their designation from

that act. At this point, however, there rises the usual diffi-

culty, that the best verbal materials have been preempted for

other purposes. Gleaning therefore after others' reaping, I

note that the present class of words, being occasioned by the

fact of speech, are ex causa linguae. With no great stretch of

verbal capacity they may accordingly be known as lingua-

causate. The egocentrics of this special type correspond, though

not completely, with the personal pronouns of Grammar.

Owen — Revision of Pronouns. 13

The remaining egocentric words are not developed from the

act of speech. Being assumablv developed in the interest of

something else, it is sufficient to know them as aliocausate.

They will be found to include the demonstratives "this/\ "that/'

etc., and other words which Grammar has overlooked.

The egocentrics, then, including linguacausates and alio-

<3ausates, comprise such definites as change their meaning with

the change of speaker. The I'emaining definites do not change

in meaning with the change of speaker. As such words require

no examination, being none of them cited as pronouns, thev may

be filed awav for future reference under the rubric absolute.

Turning now to the indefinites, I find that they also differ,

as appears in the following illustrations. If I tell you that

^^Somewhere I have a book which treats of eastern birds,'' it

is plain that the location of the book is quite indefinite ; yet,

as far as mv statement shows, the indefiniteness is to me a mat-

ter of indifference. Suppose, however, I say to you, "AVliere

is that book V it is obvious in the first place that my idea of

the book's location is quite as indefinite as before. It is further

evidenc that your knowledge of this indefiniteness must be de-

rived from the word "where", and not from any other. It

seems then safe to sav that the idea expressed bv "where" is

that of indefinite place. It also is clear that from the word

"where" you learn something further. In fact it is from this

word that you also learn my desire to know location more ex-

actly.^ For the purpose of the moment it is enough to note

that question-asking differs from mere expression of indefi-

niteness, by the addition of desire for its relief. Strict fidelity

to this difference would require that the total of words which

express indefinite ideas should be divided into such as do, and

such as do not further express the desire that the indefiniteness

be relieved. As, however, such a division involves a very cum-

brous terminology, I content myself with regarding the expres-

sion of such a desire as rouo'hlv so much unendurance or in-

toleration of the indefinite idea. I am thus able to differen-

tiate the indefinites more conveniently as the tolerated and the

^I overlook order and rising inflection, as botli are quite equivocal.

l-i Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, ArtSj arid Letters.

untoJerated. These subdivisions coincide with the gi-ammatical

classes known respectively as ''indefinites" and ''interrogatives/^

Grammar has further created a special pronominal group for

what are known as reflexives. In the fuller discussion of the

vicarious words it will appear that the reflexives are members

of that class, distinguishable from the others merely by the

somewhat restricted range of their employment. They require,

therefore, no immediate examination.

The last of the grammatical pronoun-classes, the relatives,

offer, on the other hand, peculiarities so extreme as to embarrass

any merely introductory characterization. Deferring, there-

fore, their examination, I offer, in resumption of results thus far

obtained, the following table of word-classes.

Words.

Self-sufficient or

Initiative.

Insufficient or

Vicarious.

Deflnitej

Indpfinites

I I

Absolutes. Ecocentrics.

Pseu-

do-

pro-

nouns

Pronouns.

I

Alincau-

Linguacausate sate Tolerated Untolerated

or or or or

"Personal." "Demon- "Indefinite." "Interrogative."

ptrativo "

Proepective,

Retrospective,

including Reflexive.

To a careless view this table might suggest the inference that the

words of the several ultimate groups (linguacausate, etc.) outnumber

the members of the single division of absolutes, the single title of the

latter tending somewhat to mask their number. But were the abso-

lutes also put to the torture, to wrest from them the secret of their dif-

ferences, an overwhelming multitude of subdivisions would develop,

each including an ample membership.^ The absolutes comprise, in fact,

the vast majority of every vocabulary; the half dozen grammatical pro-

noun-classes, and especially the true pronouns, contain but an insignifi-

cant minority.

Proposing now a more detailed examination of the word-

classes thus far roughly sketched, I follow the order of con-

^For illustration examine any general classification of words according to

their meaning, e. g., Koget's Thesaurus of English Words and Phrases.

Owen — Revision of Pronouns. 15

venience, beginning ^vith the vicarious. On the back-ground,

afforded by these I will project the strongly contrasting rela-

tives, following their examination with some discussion of the

peculiar clauses which they render }x>ssible. The word-classes

designated as pseudopronominal will be relegated, to appendices,

except the interrogatives, which I omit, it being my purpose to

examine them in another paper, v\uth the other means of inter-

rogative expression.

16 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Aiis, and Letters.

CHAPTEE II.— VICAEIOUS WORDS OR TRUE PRO-

NOUNS.

I. THOUGHT PHENOMENA IX WHICH THEY FIGURE.

It may be assumed of any thought, as "A exceeds B", that if

any element, as "A'', retires from my consciousness before I

think of ^'exceeds B", I fail to form the thought expressed by

"A exceeds B". That is, the elements of a thouoht must exist

in the mind together; and this is true not only of myself

but also of him who seeks to understand me. The success of

the latter being first of all conditioned on attention, this is com-

monly accentuated as the hearer's duty. His duty is, however,

plainly much more onerous. Not merely must he attend to my

words and thereby attain their meanings ; but further, what he

thus attains he must retain, till all the factors of my thought

are assembled in his mind.

It is less generally recognized that, were retention excessive,

continued thought-reception would be impossible. To illustrate,

having said that ^'3479 exceeds 1958", I wish further to inform

you that "9x73 = 657". I venture to predict that you will

be quite unable even to harbor my second proposition, until you

are mentally disencumbered of all that belongs to the first. Your

duty as a hearer is then double. You must hold each element

of thought presented, until all are delivered ; you must also dis-

miss all, before attemipting the reception of another thought.

You must indeed hold fast ; you must as truly also lay aside.

I do not mean however that, before the reception of a later

thought, the elements of a prior thought retire beyond recall.

If not too late, they may be brought back. By such a phrase a3

"the first mentioned number" I may still revive in your mind

what I first suggested by "3479". This idea, it is true, with-

drew from vour mental stae:e, Avhen the thou2;ht of which it

formed a part was completed. But it did not go far ; though

what may be called the first scene of the colloquial drama was

Owen — Be vision of Pronouns. 17

ended, the actors remained behind the flies, awaiting a possible

encore.

Using a homelier figure, conceive the hearer's mind as a slate.

Upon it the speaker writes a mental equation, that is, a thought.

This thought another thought shall follow. But the slate is

small. Its room is fully occupied. To meet this difficulty, the

sponge is run over the surface, giving room to write anew — not

however the wet sponge ; merely the dry. The old waiting does

not entirely disappear. It is only blurred. The new writing-

appears with great distinctness ; yet the old continues legible.

Another use of the sponge may be followed by the writing of a

third equation. The slate may then contain such third equation

fully distinct, a legible second equation, a first equation whose

terms may still be deciphered. How many erasures a given

idea may thus survive, it is needless to inquire. In actual men-

tal practice the nature of the idea (abstract, concrete, etc.), its

rank in thought-structure, the retentive power of the individual

mind, contribute each a modifying influence.

The receiving mind is then a sort of palimpsest, ever fading,

ever reinscribed. Each writing (except the first) is entered on

a surface already covered by another but a faint and vanishing

inscription. The new is much brighter than the old; but the

old may yet be read, if the effort be not too long delayed.

II. THEIR DIRECTION TROM THE PRINCIPAL.

Examination thus far indicates that, in usual mental sequence,

a vivid presentation of each idea is followed by a somewhat pro-

tracted fading, the idea becoming comparatively dim, before the

expression of a new thought is begun. Conversely, just as sun-

set and succeeding twilight are inversely paralleled by daw^n and

sunrise, so also it is possible for the more vivid appearance of an

idea to be heralded by an obscure prefigurement : vicarious words

may faintly suggest an idea before its full revelation. Such

symbols have already been distinguished as anticipative or pro-

spective. They are illustrated by the sentence ^Though he is

very busy. Brown is going to Europe", ^^he" being a sort of lin-

guistic X until its latent value is developed under the influence of

''Brown".

2

18 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letter's.

It appears then that the proxy may take its place as well be-

fore the principal as after. The former usage, being somewhat

imfreqnent and rather artificial, may be neglected, as its exami-

nation reveals only results, I think, which are corollary or con-

verse to those obtained by studying the more normal retrospec-

tives. To these, accordingly, attention will from now on be spe-

ciallv directed.

III. TIIEIE DISTANCE YIRO^L THE PRINCIPAL.

In reckoning this, the sentence-end affords a convenient land-

mark. ]^o doubt, before this be reached, ideas begin to fade or,

changing figure, to withdraw ; yet, until it be reached, they must

be clear enough and near enough to permit association with their

fellows. Otherwise, the thought of the moment would be im-

possible. But, after the sentence-end, they must be so faint or

so distant that they will not, unless invited, associate themselves

with the ideas of a following thought. Otherwise such following

thought would be confused.

Suppose now that an idea, under the stimulus of an initiative

word, say ^^Brown", effects a first appearance in your conscious-

ness. This mind-picture may be called an original. Of this

original a copy may be needed, producible by ^'he". Further,

as a matter of linguistic fact, this copy may be needed either be-

fore or after the sentence-end. Two cases therefore offer:

Case I. Principal and Proxy in Different Thoughts — Peirvx

statement.

To illustrate, ^^I just met Brown. He is going to Europe."

It is plain that these sentences express tv,^ thoughts.-^ The

first is self-sufficient v/ithout the second. The second requires

no element of the first. It is true that "He'' is inadequate,

except so far as there be a prior idea for it to revive, an idea

already adequately expressed by ^'Brown." But this inade-

quacy of ^^He" is a mere incident of its special symbolic na-

ture. So soon as I substitute ^^Bro^vn" for "he", mv second sen-

tence has no further need of my first. The second thought is

^The discussion of thought singularity and plurality is deferred, being much

more necessary elsewhere.

Owen — Revision of Pronouns. 19

complete and would remain so, were its predecessor quite for-

gotten. Whether I say, then, ^'Ile is going . . ."or

■^^Brown is going . . . ", my second thought and all its fac-

tors are the same ; and this second thought in both cases is dif-

ferent and separate from the first. I may then safely say that

the idea expressed by Brown (1) belongs to one thought ; the idea

expressed by Brown (2) or by "He" belongs to another thought.

The odea named by Brown (1) fades at the sentence-end to such

:an extent, that it will not appear in the second thought, unless

recalled. Having said, "I just met Brown", if I continue with

^'1 was wearing: mv new coat", you hardlv think ae^ain of Brown.

But if, instead, I continue by saying "He is going to Europe",

the idea named by "Browm" is revived and serves again as part

-of my second thought. This idea serves then twice, once as part

of one thought, and again as part of another. But it ended the

first service before it beo-an the second. Between the two it

lost thought-membership. It was first established in attention

by the initiative "Brown". At the sentence-end it w^as dises-

tablished. It was reestablished or reinstated in attention by

"He". Yfords which thus restore lost status, may conveniently

be known as reestablishers or reinstatives.

Case 11. Principal and Proxy in the Same Thought — Coin-

statement.

That a given idea may be twice used in the same thought

is indicated by the algebraic ".r^ = 2x'\ Wishing, in the ex-

amination of this usage, the advantage of comparison with the

preceding, I use linguistic illustrations of both and j)ut them

side bv side. Accordin2:lv, as before,

Case I. "I just met Brown. He is going to Europe", and

Case II. ''Broion has bought him a horse."

In several aspects these examples are alike. In both, the

proxy is retrospective. In both the idea named by "Brown"

begins at once to fade and continues to fade until revival. This

revival is accomplished in both cases by the same means and

with the same success. That is, the idea is restored to its origi-

nal freshness.

They differ somewhat in this, that the idea revived by "He"

20 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts^ and Letters.

requires revival — cannot otherwise serve witli "is going to Eu-

rope". On the other hand, the idea revived hy ''him" does not

require revival. It is still fresh enough, as presented by

"Brown," to associate with it-s fellows, notably with "horse",

although the latter appears upon the scene even later than "him".

Accordingly the use of "him" cannot be explained by the neces-

sity which leads to the use of "He". Although, then "him",

as a matter of fact, revives the idea named bv "Brown", this re-

vival may be regarded as merely incidental, and not the special

purpose of the speaker.

That purpose is rather as follows: having formed in your

mind an original picture under the influence of "Brown" ; hav-

ing established this original in thought-membership (say as sub-

ject) ; while still maintaining this original in this membership,

I wish you to form a copy of it, and to use this copy in a second

membership (say indirect object) of the same thought. That

is, while in Case I. I use principal and proxy in different

thoughts, in Case II. I use them in the same thought.

The proxy as used in Case I., I have called a reinstative, that

is, a vicarious word which gives back status to an idea which has

lost it. Meaning now, per contra, a vicarious word wluch gives

a second status to an idea still retaining a first status, I suggest

the designation cumulative or coinstative.

Of words of this type a few have been ranked by Grammar as a

special pronominal group under the title "reflexives." To illustrate,

"Brown has hurt himself." In this sentence it is plain thai "himself"

cannot alone inform you who is meant, but requires the aid of a prin-

cipal, namely, "Brown." That is, "himself" is vicarious. Again, the

proxy and the principal serving in the same sentence, the former is

what has been described as coinstative. As a reinstative, moreover,

it cannot serve. I may not say, "I just met Brown. Himself is going

to Europe," or "I was glad to see himself." To this rule exceptions are,

I think, apparent only. Thus, "I just met Broivn. He professed Jiim-

self glad to see me." In this sentence "himself" might seem to re-

instate "Brown." But the only actual reinstative is "He;" it is this

word that "himself" regards as its principal, without regard to "Brown."

The action of "himself" is then as before coinstative.

Even as coinstative the use of "himself is further restricted and,

I think, to service of a first term, as in "Broicn has bought himself a

house," or "has hurt himself." I may not say, " Broivn' s house suits

himself' (unemphatic), or "To Brown the house of himself is pleas-

Owen — Revision of Pronouns. 21

ing." Details and apparent exceptions I omit, as also any effort to

settle how far, as claimed, those actions alone be reflexively expressed

which recoil upon the actor. My interest ends with the proposition,

that reflexives are coinstatives (possibly even sometimes reinstatives),

which differ from others merely in the narrower range of their usage.

Another formally coinstative usage, commonly served by the same

words as the last, is the emphatic. To illustrate: ''Brown paid for

the house himself." In this sentence it is true that I invite your at-

tention to an idea a second time; but I do not do this because I

wish this idea to obtain two thought-memberships; I wish it rather,

in a single membership, to be in some way more effective. I may

desire to make sure that you think of Brown, and not some other

person; of Brown in his own personality, and not in that of some

agent; of Brown in all his character, and not in any fractional exhi-

bition. In short, I am merely extending the effort distinctly to sym-

"bolize my idea. So far as you think my idea over again, you do so

merely to make sure of its being right. Such re-thinking does not

concern thought structure; as it also is attended by no new mode of

symbolization, it may be neglected in the present examination.

Principal, proxy, and their mental interim cannot be regarded as ade-

quately examined without some notice of a peculiar usage, illustrated

by the following words of the New England Primer:

"Zacliactis he

Did climb a tree

His Lord to see."

The primitive aspect of such phraseology invites consideration of the

difficulty encountered by primitive minds in the reception of a mental

message. To exhibit this, suppose my barber to be linguistically back-

ward, not indeed in talk, but in understanding the talk of others. As

he begins to shave me, I remark "You have a new razor". I merely re-

call repeated experience, in supposing him to ansv/er "Who, me?" Now

it is perfectly plain to my questioner vrhom I mean; and his question is

hardly put for the sake of obtaining further assurance. He asks it, I

think, for the sake of gaining time; and he wants time, because I have

rushed ideas upon him vvith a rapidity for his mind excessive. To be-

come intelligible, I must reduce the speed of exposition.

In doing this I will omit the commoner expedients such as slower

utterance, the use of bulky synonyms or paraphrases, the intercalation

of what is unnecessary or may safely be inferred, the makeshifts, in

short, of the embarrassed extempore speaker. I will merely meet in

turn, by legitimate and strictly linguistic means, what may be ranked as

legitimate needs of a mentally torpid hearer. I begin, then, my attempt

upon the barber with "Ahem!" or "Say!", the latter being in this case

not a superfluous hint to say anything, but the announcement that I

am about to say something myself. My utterance corresponds to the

22 Wisconsin Academy of ScienccSj Arts, and Letters.

military order "Attention!" Proceeding circumspectly, I next say

"John!", from which, vocative my hearer learns that what I am yet to

say will be directed to him; that it is time to put on his thinking cap.

My warning, now double, being both general and personal, answers to

the specialized "Attention, Company A!" I next ejaculate "Razor!",

thereby indicating that what I am to say will concern that tool of the

barber's art. So, too, in military practice, a considerate captain might

amplify the ordinary "Attention, Company A!" by hinting the general

nature of the order about to follow. The barber is now aware that I

am going to talk — to him — about a razor. He is amply prepared for the

statement "You have a new razor". I mas'- look with some confidence

for an immediate answer.

Of all such preliminaries I invite especial attention only to the last,,

the one which advertises the coming topic, the precursory or prodromie

theme-namer, the colloquial "mise en scene.". The import of this may

be expressed by the sentence "Razor is to be talked of" or "I am going

to talk of a razor". But economy or brevity commonly reduces the

sentence to a phrase or even a single word, as for instance, "Speaking of

razors", "apropos of razors", or merely "Razor'". Such reduction of

course establishes no sentential fellowship between the precursory

theme-namer and the utterance which follows. That is, "Speaking of a

razor" has nothing more to do with "You have a new razor" than did

"I am going to talk of a razor". Yet, just as weaker men of old became

the vassals of feudal superiors; just as words of scanty meaning, volume

or importance join their betters as proclitics or enclitics; so also the

mutilated sentence, or say the residuary phrase, unites itself with its

unimpaired neighbor.

The same is true of a single residuary word. Thus the sentence "I

am going to speak of Zachaeus", used as a preliminary namer of my

coming topic, may be reduced to the single word "Zachaeus". This

word, unable thus alone to functionate as a sentence, formally allies

itself to the following sentence, producing "Zachaeus he did climb

etc." The alliance is not however structural; for, given "he" as oc-

cupant of the subject-place, no other place remains for "Zachaeus". In

fact "he" is "Zachaeus", which is but saying that "Zachaeus" is already

in the only place that "Zachaeus" can occupy. It seems therefore just

to say that in "Zachaeus he did climb, etc." the presence of "Zachaeus"^

is purely adventitious; that the word is properly a mere residuum of a

prior sentence.

The different relations of a principal to the sentence containing its

proxy may be illustrated as follows:

(1) "Zachaeus saw Ms Lord." The principal is in the proxy's sen-

tence and of it.

(2) "Zachaeus hr saw his Lord." The principal is in the proxy's

sentence but not of it.

Owen — Bevision of Pronouns. 23

(3) "I am going to speak of Zachaeus. He saw his Lord." The prin-

cipal is neither in the proxy's sentence nor of it.

In (2) the principal is held by Grammar to be of the nominative case.

Experience, however, justifies the interpretation of this verdict as mean-

ing merely that the word is spelled with the same letters as when it

names the subject. It surely has no other claim to nominative rank. It

attends in fact to none of the duties performed by the different cases.

In particular it gives no hint of how its idea will be used in the struc-

ture of any thought. For if the thought of which that idea is a con-

stituent factor, were what I express by "Zachaeus is my topic", no doubt

Zachaeus would be planned to serve as subject and would properly rank

as a nominative; but if that thought were rather "I am going to discuss

Zachaeus," no doubt Zachaeus would be planned to serve as object and

could not rank as nominative. Again, of the thought whose expression

begins with "he", "Zachaeus" does not foretell the subject or the object.

I may indeed be about to say that "he climbed"; but I may also be

planning "a tree upheld him", etc., etc.; in fact I may not even myself have

determined the structure of this thought.

The use of nouns in book and chapter titles is much the same. In

these the nolm does not, indeed, by force make room for itself in the

following sentence, and its forewarning purpose is not so special; it

does, however, suggest the general nature of what is to follow. It is

also true of every principal that it may be taken as a warning of its

proxy's meaning. When such becomes its special purpose, through the

renunciation of other purposes, it may be recognized by a special desig-

nation, such as propositive, introductory or titular. As indicated above

it is really a caseless form, a proposition of an idea, that is, in blank,

without any of the various further conceptions which Grammar has

grouped in the category of case. Yet, if that must be known as case

which really is no case, it would be less confusing to call the principal,

in the now considered usage, a titular or propositive case, than to call

it nominative.

If it be conceded that "Zachaeus he did climb" is a mere curtailment

of "I am going to speak of Zachaeus. He did climb," it is obvious that

after "Zachaeus" a breach of thought occurs in both expressions.

Strictly then the former should be written "Zachaeus. He did climb

etc." It would be the merest corollary to add that "He" is reinstative;

that is, an idea named by Zachaeus disappears at the end of a first

thought or rather a fragment thereof; the idea reappears in another

thought under the infiuence of "He".

I feel however that the usual thought-procedure is different. The

mind of the people seems to persuade itself that what it seeks to ex-

press by "Zachaeus he did climb" is a single thought. That such is

indeed the popular persuasion, is indicated by the popular utterance of

the sentence. This may be indicated in writing as follows: "Zachaeus he

did climb." What may be the actual structure of the thought so oddly

24 Wisconsm Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters.

expressed, I am peculiarly unfitted to say, as the phraseology has never

been part of my expressional outfit. I have therefore no attendant

thought to name as even my individual meaning. All that I can offer is

a suspicion, as follows: From a mere propositive, "Zachaeus" has be-

come legitimate subject. From the rank of subject, "he" has descended

to that of an explainer, distinguishing the subject as a person (an-

tagonized to "it"), as masculine (antagonized to "she") and as nomi-

native (antagonized to "him"). That is, this usage merely exhibits a

stage of the process by which the personal pronouns, first appositively

associated with nouns and next emptied of their meaning, finally an-

nex themselves as case-endings. The present phenomenon, thus con-

strued, is merely a case of arrested encliticism. A vicarious word,

primarily reinstative and later coinstative, is in value somewhere on

the line of development into an inflectional sufiix.

I have thus far adhered to the plan of examining proxies only

in their retrospective aspect. As a mere snggestion of the com-

pleteness with which such examination might be carried out,

I note that also the anticipative proxies may be differentiated,

according as the idea rudely prefigured by the proxy dees or

does not lapse before its completer exhibition by the following

principal. Thus, suppose you enter my r6om as I utter the

words ''He is very ill". The word ''He" is reinstative to an-

other auditor, possessed of my previous utterance ; but in your

case the word must be treated as anticipative, if you are to un-

derstand my meaning. I accordingly add "I am speaking of

Brown". To you, then, "He" is a proxy of the prospective or-

der. Also, if you think as I do, the idea expressed by "He" is

allowed to lapse (to the degTce at least of clearing the way for

ideas possibly yet to come) before the appearance of the princi-

pal "BrO'\\Ti." The office of "He" may be distinguished then

as predictive, preinstative or annunciative.

In "His illness alarms Smith," the "He" contained in "His"

appears again as a proxy and again prospective. Its idea does

not, however, lapse before the appearance of "Smith." It may

be distinguished as inceptive or inaugurative.

The two prospective usages may be illustrated as follows:

the annunciative office is that of Isaiah the prophet, long fore-

telling the Messiah's coming; the inaugurative is that of John

the Baptist, accompanied by the One foretold. The annuncia-

tive is an advance agent, the converse of a reinstative. The in-

augurative is rather an usher, the converse of a coinstative.

Owen — Eevisiofi of Pronouns. 25

IV. TPIEIR SIMULTANEOUS SEBVICE OF DIEFEKENT PRINCIPALS.

Suppose a series of ideas to be expressed in turn by successive

initiatives ; it lies within the power of one vicarious word to

serve as simultaneous proxy to them all. To illustrate, "I just

met Brown, Jones and Eohinson. They were on their way to

the Court-House''. In the latter sentence ^'Thev" reinstates

at once each one of the ideas expressed in turn by ^^Brown",

^^Jones," and ^'Robinson".

In doings of this sort the vicarious words accommodate their

scruples to the service of masters not only many, but also differ-

ent in sentential status. Thus, "A year ago I (subject or first

term) introduced you (object or last term) to Brown (indirect

object or adjunct of mid-term). ^Ye were rather gay that

night." 1

Such difference of principals may be even greater. Thus,

^'Blue is the color of Yale. The Harvard flag's are crimson.

These are famous colors." ^'These" presents vicariously and in

substantive function the ideas expressed by "blue" and "crim-

son". But of these ideas the former was, as principal, a noun,

and the latter an adiective.^

V. THE COMPLEXITY OF THEIR PRINCIPALS.

I have in mind at present the case in which two or more

ideas, structurally built together, are treated as a unit, and pre-

sented a second time by a vicarious word. In the previous case

the proxy might be said to serve one or more individuals. In

the present case it may rather be said to serve a society. To

illustrate, "The physicians declare the daughter of Brown to be

insane. He, is greatly depressed. She is his youngest child.

It is verv sad." In this sentential series "He" reinstates

"Bro^vn" and "Brown" only. "She" reinstates "the daughter

of Bro^vn". "It" reinstates the plexus expressed by "the daugh-

^It will furtlier be noted, in the appendix on personals, that also the lexical

values of principals are, in this case, very different.

2 This inaccuracy is repeated and extended in the interest of brevity. Strictly

the ideas noted have in thought that function v^-hich gives to their corresponding

words the sentential rank of noun and adjective.

26 W{sco7isin Academy of Sciences, Arts^ and Letters.

ter of Brown to be insane". Differentiating by another figure

of speeclij I may say that ''He'' pulls out a single stone from

previous thought-masonry, to use it in succeeding structure.

"It"j on the other hand, cuts from previous thought-masonry a

section made ujd of several stones and moves it in block, without

disintegration, into a succeeding structure.

VI. THEIK FIDELITY TO THE PEIXCIPAL.

By this I mean the exactness with which the proxy repre-

duces the idea suggested by the principal, either in extent (that

is, its quantitative aspect) or in content (that is, its qualitative

aspect). Fidelity, in other words, may have to do with either

number (or bulk) or kind. Confining examination to the for-

mer as more tangible and as showing all the variations found in

the latter, I note that the strictly faithful proxy presents an idea

in the same nmnerical aspect as its principal. Thus, having

said that ^'I just met three soldiers'', if I add that ^^They were

in uniform", you assume that I mean the original three, no more

and no less. Such vicarious service may be known as complete

or equivalent.

The vicarious word, however, sometimes augments the scope

of its principal. Thus, ^'I saw a tiger yesterday. In fact I

have seen a great many of them.'' ''A tiger" distinctly contem-

plates a single animal. "Them" reinstates this individual, but

adds thereto the remainder of the species. ^ Such uses of vicari-

ous words may be kno\\m as excessive or augmentive.

The vicarious word on the other hand may diminish the scope

of its principal. Thus, ''Birds are bipeds. Tliey have been

known to be also bicephalous." By "Birds" all individuals of

the order are plainly intended. "They," however, includes as-

suredly some birds only. Again, "'Brown ovei^slept. I expected

he would do that." "That" reinstates the idea of oversleeping,

but not the idea of past time or the personal belief (assertion)

expressed by "overslept". Vicarious w^ords of this sort may be

known as incomplete or reductive.

. . . — - ... - ■- — ■ <

1 Again " I just met Brown. His son is- ill." "His" reinstates "Brown" and does

this business accurately ; but at the same time " His " goes into business on its own ac-

count, presenting initiatively an idea of say possession, expressible by "of." As thus

presenting more ideas than its principal, " His" also may be ranked as in a sense aug-

mentive.

Owen — Bcvision of Pronouns. 27

The proxy of this type may rednce the number of the ideas

expressed by its principal to unity or even to zero. To illus-

trate, ^^ There was a bridal couple on the train. They seemed ill

at ease. She was dressed in Avhite. Neither was very young."

Of the proxies employed ^^They" is equivalent, having exactly

the scope of ^'couple". '^She" is reductive, reinstating a single

member of the original pair. "Neither," strictly taken, is

what may be called exclusive; that is, the number of conceived

persons, describable as very young, is zero.-^

The proxy may even both reduce and auginent, in a single vi-

carious act. Thus, ''x\n elephant's trunk is a useful member.

With it they perform the most delicate operations.'' AYithout

discussing the elegance or expediency of such usage, I note that

"elephant's" presents initiativeh' a single individual and further

the idea say of possession. "They" omits the idea of possession

and expands the individual into the species.

VII. THEIR FALLIBILITY.

Where many eligible principals occur in close succession, it

may or may not be evident, which one a proxy is intended to

serve. There is, indeed, a tendency to regard the dominant

word as principal ; but this is offset by another tendency so to

regard the nearer ; and either tendency may be abrogated in fa-

vor of a word neither near nor dominant. This embarrassment

may be relieved when the principals differ, as in number and

gender. Thus, given "Brown's sister has bought a horse. He,

she, or it is in the country", each proxy is available for a single

principal only. But given "Brown's brother has heard from

Smith's nephew. He, by the way, is going to Europe," "He"

may reinstate the idea expressed by either preceding noun ; and,

barring special knowledge of the speaker's linguistic methods, it

cannot be determined which possible principal is actually served

by "He".

This difficulty, which may be known as that of the which, is

matched by another, which may be known as that of the how

^The policy of ranking words lil^e "neither" as negative (in the sense in which

"not" is negative) is matter for interpellation in a special review of linguistic

negation.

28 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters.

much. When the proxy serves a plexus of icleas^ it is often

quite impossible to determine the extent of that plexus. Thus,

^'The papers declare Brown to have announced himself to be

unable to pay his debts. I didn't expect that.'' In this exam-

ple ^^that" may stand for the whole or a part of the preceding

sentence ; and the ]3art may be large or small. Thus by ^^that"

I may mean ''Brown to have announced etc.", or ''Bro"\^'n to be

unable etc.'', or even ''Brown to be able etc."

VIII. THEIR SERVICE OF VARIOUS PARTS OF SPEECH.

In this section I invite an effort to find, if it may be, with

Grammar's own eyes, the reinstated sentence-elements (or parts

of speech) which grammatical vision has overlooked. Conform-

ing then, so far as in me lies, to Grammar's categories, and con-

fining myself for the moment to vicarious substantives, since

Grammar recognizes these alone as pronouns, I first recall that

the use of such vicarious words to reinstate preceding nouns,

has already been amply illustrated. Similar reinstatement of

substantives classed as p7^onominal may rank as the merest corol-

lary. Thus, ^'That is my hat. It can't be yours."

Some tendency Grammar shows to the opinion that other parts

of speech are not thus reinstated. That, however, which words

(grammatically ranked as pronouns) do actually reinstate, is

often an adjective. Thus, extending illustrations beyond that

which perhaps alone ought to be and including what linguisti-

cally is, ''Bed rags enrage bulls. That is unfortunately the color

of my hat," or "The flag is red. That (or it) is a beautiful

color.'^

Even the idea expressed by the enfeebled ego-centric known

as the definite article (derived from that) is not unfrequently

reinstated. Thus, suppose you utter the word "Bro^vns" ; it

may suggest to me a considerable number of families. But if

you say "The Brow^ns", I at once restrict the scope of the word

to the particular family foremost in our common acquaintance.

Let now vour statement be ''The Broiuns have sailed for Eu-

rope". I reply: "They are great travellers". By "They" I

mean not merely what I have learned from the word "Browns",

but also what I have learned from the word "The" ; that is, I

Owen — Be vision of Pronouns. 29

reinstate by ^^They" the idea initially expressed by ^^The". The

further reinstatement of what was sncwsted bv "Browns" is

merely so much ordinary multiple symbolization. Again, if my

answer be ^"Those Browns are gTeat travellers", the reinstativo

action of "Those" appears to be conlined to what was expressed

by "The." My example however suffers now in cogency from

the fact that Grammar commonlv fails to note the vicarious and

therefore strictly pronominal value of "Those."

The reinstated idea is often primarily verbal. For instance,

"He said that he hurried. But he never did it in his life."

That the verbal adjective or 'participle should also be rein-

stated is a foregone conclusion. Thus "Hurrying people are

subject to accident. You needn't worry about Brown ; he never

does that (or t^)."

The verbal substantive or gerund is also subject to recaU.

Thus : "Brown's hurrying caused his accident. He is not

often guilty of that (or i^)."

The vicarious presentation, in substantive function, of an idea

initially adverbial is less common and should perhaps be noted

merely as a possibility. Thus, "Brown is v^alking very rapidly.

That (or it) does not often characterize his movements."

Much the same may be said of ideas initially prepositional.

Their reinstatement in substantive function may be illustrated

as follows. Suppose you ask me, "Is Brown in the house or in

the barn ?" I may answer, "He is that (or it) in respect to

neither." Thus guarded, my statement seems to bar the appli-

cation of "that" to any other idea than -what was expressed

bv "in. "

To reinstate an interjection by a recognized pronoun seems

a rather unlikely feat ; yet it is performed at least with quasi

success. For instance, speaking of a notorious public enemy,

suppose you say: "Alas! He is dead." I answer: ''That

is not my feeling."

Conjunctions are unfortunately much confused with preposi-

tions and adverbs ; I think, however, that I respect grammatical

opinion in giving the conjunctive rank to the word "but" in the

following illustration. Meeting me in the guest-room before a

dinner, you remark: "Miss X. is to be here. But I have

30 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arls^ and Letters.

come." To this I answer: ^'That doesn't describe your com-

ing at all. It is because she is to be here.'' The thonght ex-

pressed by remark and answer seems to me to be as follows:

"But" expresses addition of a discordant type, addition of the

preceding thonght, addition to ''T have come." The full mean-

ing, then, of the second sentence is, "I have come in S2:)ite of

Miss X's prospective presence." Condensing and redranghting

thonght perspective, I obtain "My coming is huf^ or antagonis-

tic (to her expected presence). In the same way my answer

resolves into the follovv^ing: "That (namely, antagonism)

doesn't describe yonr coming. It is resultant" (or because of her

prospective presence). While this use of "that" may stretch

conventionality, it does not seem to overtask the powers of the

reinstative. I therefore think it not too much to say that the

reinstatement of a conjunction by a pronoun is at least a lin-

guistic possibility.

IX. THEIR SERVICE AS VARIOUS PARTS OF SPEECH.

The following section aims to observe the reinstatives in their

use as different sentence-elements (parts of speech), including,

therefore, many uses to which Grammar has closed its eyes, re-

fusing to recognize as pronouns any but substantive words.

That the vicarious word may be used as a noun has been

abundantly shown in Section viii. That in such usage it is

separately ranked as a pronoun, has been noted as a mere vagary

of Grammar.

That it is also used as an adjective appears in the following

illustration: "Are the flags red? They are that/'^

Its use as an article is somewhat less assured. But suppose

you ask, "Where are my shoes?" and I answer, ''The shoes

are under the table ;" it is possible at least that "the" be taken

as reinstating the idea expressed by "my." For, had I said:

"They are under the table," "they" would surely be regarded

as reinstating "my shoes." Xow this possible "they" and the

actual "The shoes" of my answer seem to be synonymous.

^French Grammar lias been much embarrassed by such failure of usage to

abide by the dictum of syntax, sometimes ranliing "that" (le) as a pronoun and

sometimes, tbr reasons not easy to imagine, as an adverb.

Owen — Revision of Pronouns. 31

^^Tlie shoes" may then, as well as ^*thev," be regarded as a re-

instatement of '^mj shoes." In such reinstatement obviously

^'shoes'' reinstates ''shoes only;" accordingly the reinstater of

the remaining ''my" wonld seem to be the article ^'The."

The verbal use of the proxy is well-nigh theoretical only.

To the question vrhether Brown sawed or chopped his Avood,

language might provide an intelligible answer of the form, ^^He

thissed it," or "He thatted it." But, so far as I am aware,

approximations only to such usage have been noted in actual

practice. Thus, if you ask whether my son stammers, I may

answer, "He does/' and while it mav be aroaied that "stammer"

is understood, there is some reason for believing that it is not,

or at least not alwavs. Latin sometimes allows a similar usa2:e

with '^facere ;" but "f acit bulbutire" would not be tolerated in

the sense required. ■'■

Obviously such verbal usage of the vicarious word may read-

ily become particiinal or verbally adjective.

It may also plainly become gerundive or verbally substantive.

The adverhial use of the proxy is very common, though not

always recognized by Grammar. To illustrate, suppose you

say of your horse that "He walks rapidly/' I answer that ^^My

horse walks so too."

Prepositions are constantly repeated without linguistic squeamishness.

Thus if you ask whether I was in the house cr in the barn, I answer

that "I was in the house", without fear of giving offense by using so

soon again the unobtrusive "in". The reasons of this exceptional tol-

eration need not be demonstrated. The fact itself discourages the

search for prepositional proxies. The possibility of reinstating by a

preposition may be suggested, however, as follows: Suppose you enter

my room as, in answer to a previous question, I utter the words "By

me". To your mind the word "by" suggests no doubt an idea; indeed

it is likely to suggest several. It may mean "near", as in "He sat by

the fire; it may mean "alongside of", as in "The path runs 61/ the river";

it may mean "past", as in "He walked ty my door". As a matter of

fact I use it in the present case with none of these meanings. While

then it can, it is true, make abundant suggestions, it is unable of itself

to specify the right idea. If however this right idea be previously

presented by an initiative, the word "by" can reproduce it exactly. To

iConf. "He does not stammer: but he bids fair to." In such expressions it

has been claimed that "to" has the value of "to stammer ;" that is, "to" is re-

garded as vicarious and is verbally employed.

32 Wisconsin Academy of 8cien,ces, Arts, and Letters.

show this, I expand my illustration as follows: "Through the agency of

whom was the glass broken? By me." In this expression it appears

that "by", though unable alone to suggest intended meaning, succeeds

In accomplishing the expressional purpose through the reinstatement

of the idea initiatively named by "through the agency of." That is,

"By" may be said to illustrate the possibility of reinstatement by a

preposition.

The reinstative use of the intei'jection is also essentially theoretical.

Its possibility may be illustrated as follows: The isolated "Ah!" sug-

gests many possible emotional S/tates. If the extra-verbal aid of vocal

tone, facial expression, etc., be excluded, "Ah" alone is unable to ex-

press a particular emotion. But by the aid of initiative words it may

do so. Thus "Brown alasl is dead. Ahl" The emotional status, ex-

pressed by "ah!" unaided, might be that of joy, or sorrow. As a re-

instater of what was meant by "alas!" the word "ah!" is entirely ade-

quate. Again, to your "Hallo!", meaning "I want your attention", I

answer "Aye!", meaning "You have my attention". That is, the in-

terjection al "Aye!", in part at least, reinstates what was expressed

initiatively by "Hallo!"

The vicarious use of the conjunction is clearly sho\\Ti in

French by one of the uses of ''que." While no doubt this word

may often imply an ellipsis (as of ^'lors/' when standing for

'%rsque"), and while it may strictly even imply a new con-

struction (as vvdien taking the place of "si"),^ nevertheless the

grammars no doubt are right in claiming that, to the average

mind, the value of ''que'' is merely that of a repeater, that is,

a reinstative, bringing in a second time an idea initiatively ex-

pressed by another word.

X. EXTENT OF VICARIOUS USAGE.

Under this caption I invite a moment's attention first to several

strict!}" vicarious uses of words which Grammar has ranked as

personals. Of these the words "I" and "thou," as indicated later,

commonly stand directly for the person intended, without the aid

of any initiative presentation. In written or, say, epistolary

language they may, however, be regarded as vicarious. Thus,

in a letter which you have written, finding the word "thou,"

I do not know whom it intends, unless I read the preliminary

"J. B. Smith, Dear Sir." It is possible, therefore, in this case

to rank your "thou" as vicarious and of the retrospective type.

^Conf. "Si vous venez et (suppose) que je ne sois pas cliez moi."

Owen — Bevision of Pronouns. 33

Also, if there be in the letter an ^'T," it is uncertain whom it in-

tends, until I read at the letter's end, ^'Respectfully yours, H. C.

Bro^^Ti." It is possible, therefore, in this case, to rank the "I"

as vicarious and of the anticipative type. ^'ITe,'' ^'she," and

•^^it,'^ as also "we," "you" and "they," are almost always vica-

rious, as in the frequent illustrations already given. The ex-

■ceptions are treated in the appendices.

The vicarious use of so-called demonstratives has been, I

think, sufficiently indicated. That words regarded by Grammar

as indefinite pronouns may serve in fact as proxies appears in

the following sentence : "A sower went out to sow his seed, and

as he sowed, some fell by the way-side." That the reflexive is

always vicarious has been already argued. That the usually

relative word may be vicariously employed is apparent in th-e

sentence: "lis chercherent , qui d'un cote, qui d'un

autre" (Balzac). That even the interrogative may be in part,

at least, vicarious Avill probably be conceded in "Here are two

apples. Which will you have ?"

The following sentences exhibit a cluster of words, whose

powers, though distinctly vicarious, are more or less in danger

•of being overlooked. "Brown and Smith can't agree. The

former dislikes the latter. Each distrusts the other. Neither

has reason. I would trust either. Both deserve confidence,

one as much as the other.^^ Speaking, again, of a larger group

of persons, I might remark: ^^All are my acquaintances.

Many are my friends. Few dislike me. None are my enemies."

The vicarious symbol is also readily overlooked, when dis-

,^ised, as often happens, in a compound. Thus : "Brown gave

me a hooh. Therewith (= with it) I was greatly pleased.

Therefrom I have learned much. Thereto my thoughts recur.

^ Therefor I have thanked him." The differentiation of these

words being a lexical matter, involving no fundamental principle

of idea-presentation, may be neglected.

Much deeper suggestion is offered by the frequent vicarious

use of "such." To illustrate, mv bookseller writes: "You ask

for novels. I send you a dozen such." In this example the

vicarious action of "such" is of the ordinary, simple type. On

the other hand, in the phrase. Soldiers, sailors and such," the

3

34 }'Visco?isin Academy of Sciences^ Arts, and Letters.

idea-presenting jDOwer of ^^sncli" is only in part vicarious. That

power, in fact, is the same as that of ^^persons like them," in

which "soldiers" and "sailors" are a second time presented by

"them," while "persons like" are presented initiatively. Again,

"Suffer little children to come unto me For of such is the

kingdom of Heaven." "Such" in this case stands, I take it,

for two groups : first, by simple reinstatement, for "little chil-

dren" ; second, for "persons like little children," this latter

group being obtained by a second reinstatement of "little chil-

dren" simultaneous with the initiative presentation of "persons

like." That is, "such" accomplishes one initiative and two

vicarious presentations.

The multiple activity of the vicarious word is even more note-

worthy in the folloAving illustration : Suppose that two children

have just figured at a school commencement; one is a boy and

the other a <2:irl ; thev belonc* to different families : the mother

of one and the father of the other are present. I may ^then

very well say, (1) "Mr. A. has witnessed the graduation of his

boy,"^ using "his" at the same time to reinstate "Mr. A." and

initiatively to express a relation hardly possessive, indeed more

strictly parental; (2) "Mrs. B. has witnessed the graduation

of her girl," in which "her" reinstates "Mrs. B." and initiatively

indicates the parental relation. The two parental relations are,

however, quite independent, as each concerns a different pair

of terms ; indeed, we strongly tend to differentiate them qualita-

tively. I am hardly hair-splitting when I specify the former

relation as paternal and the latter as maternal. Assuming this

differentiation to be conceded, I note that what I have expressed

in two sentences is commonly put in one, as follows: ''Mr. A.

and Mrs. B. have witnessed the graduation of their boy and girl,"

a sentence in which Hheir' accomplishes all that was effected

by 'liis' and 'lierf' that is, ''their'' makes two reinstatements,

while initiatively expressing two different relations. The com-

plexity of the feat performed by "their" may be emphasized in

the following algebraic paraphrase: given a > h and c < dy

it is required to express a, c, > and < by a single symbol.

Other sjanbols, though conspicuously vicarious, are sometimes

^I avoid the word "son" in order to throw all relation indication upon "his."

Owen — Revision of Pronouns. 85

overlooked by Grammar, ^vlien tliey chance to be adverbial.

That the adverb may indeed be vicarious was intimated on p.

31. In further illustration I offer the following sentences. Sup-

pose you say: "Jones acted impolitely." To this I answer:

^^I don't think he acted so at all." ''So" reinstates ''impolitely."

Again, answering your question, "Does BrowTL dine here ?" I

answer: "He dines elsewhere/' that is, I name by ''elsewhere'^

place distinguished as different from this place ("here") ; in

other words, the symbolic value of ''elsewhere" is partly reinsta-

tive and partly initiative. So, too, in "BrowTi eats wdth a fork.

Jones eats otherwise,'' the last word indicates a method differ-

ent from that indicated bv "with a fork." A2:ain, to vour state-

ment that "Bro\\^l is rich," I answer, "He is handsome, too,

Ukeiuise, also, withal, besides," meaning by "too" (or any of its

successors) '*in addition to rich."

It has already been remarked that the pronouns, instead of

reviving a single idea, may revive an ideal plexus. It is nat-

ural to expect that such a plexus should sometimes have the

nature and the fullness of a thought. So far as the vicarious

word is in such a case conceived as a "thought-connective" or

sentence- joiner, it has been examined in another paper, in which

it is argued that the thought of a first sentence is substantively

reconceived and put by the connective in oblique or adverbial

association with the verb of the second sentence. To illustrate^

"He invited jrq. . .Therefore I came." "Therefore" dissects

into "for (= from) that," the latter being a reinstative and the

former a relation-namer, the two together forming an adverbial

adjunct of "came." That is, "my coming" is conceived as

"from (= on account of) his inviting me."

The thought vicariously presented may enter the structure of a sec-

ond thought in several ways, for instance, as its first term or subject.

Thus, to your statement: "Brown is ill", I answer "That (i. e.,

Brov/n's being ill) surprises me". Again, the first thought, being rein-

stated in the second, may be its last term. Thus, answering again

your "Brown is ill", I say: "I regret ^Tiaf. " Je n'2/ crois pas" pre-

sents the illness of Brown as an indirect object or dative, "Ten suis

fache" offers it as genitive of source or ablative of cause. In short,

the various relations indicated by case forms are assumed by reinstated

thought.

The vicarious presentation of thought thus far considered has beea

36 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts^ and Letters.

of the retrospective type; it may also be anticipative. To illustrate,

"Wishing to put before you the proposition that France will fight, and

wishing further to put it that people say this, I am likely to begin with

the expression "People say". At this point I find it convenient to in-

troduce a provisional object, namely "that". This object has the ad-

vantage of being accustomed to objective function, whereas the ex-

pression "France will fight", though my actual object, Is accustomed to

rank as a sentence, and does not readily resign itself to being the mere

object of another sentence. The word "that" is no doubt inadequate,

because indefinite; but this very indefiniteness is so extreme as to give

sufficient assurance that it does not express all that I intend. The sen-

tence "They say that" is surely far from worth the effort of expression.

You safely argue that more is yet to follow. You accept my "that" as

a quasi promise of further and more definite expression. In other

words you recognize my "that" as a mere prelude, as an anticipative

proxy. And when I continue with "France will fight", you readily ac-

cept these words as the proxy's principal — as the definite expression,

promised by "that".

Such I mean is the original and clearer conception of "that," as in-

dicated by its history in several languages. In time the word has been

largely emptied of meaning and has sunk to the level of a sign that the

following thought is merely a substantive factor of another thought.

Occasionally in Spanish, the equivalent "que," having many other pos-

sible values, is reinforced by the article. Such usage renders obvious

a structural displacement of "that", which has passed from an earlier

full membership of "People say that" into ancillary membership of

"that France will fight". This change too is further accompanied by

change in punctuation. The sentence, as originally constructed, would

be written "They say that — France will fight". As now construed it is

written, w^hen at all protracted, "They say, that France will fight".

In the present illustration the anticipative "that" is last term or ob-

ject. In "That France will fight is commonly believed" it is subject.

In "They do evil that good may follow" it is indirect object or say a

dative of purpose. In "I am sorry that he is ill", it may be regarded

as ablative of cause. It is in all cases the result of mere neglect, that

the anticipative "that" is uninflected.

When the original anticipative value and the full structural signifi-

cance of "that" have once been forgotten, the purpose of its introduc-

tion naturally seems to be unfulfilled, and therefore may be carried

out a second time. Thus primarily one would naturally write "That —

(namely) France will fight — is generally believed" or "That is gen-

erally believed — (namely) France will fight" or even "Is generally be-

lieved that — (namely) France vdll fight." But so soon as such inter-

pretation of the last is reached, as may be expressed, with change of

punctuation, by "Is generally believed, that France will fight;" that is.

Owen — Revision of Pronouns. 37

80 scon a5 "that" is regarded as a mere sign of substantive usage, the

main sentence is left without apparent subject. The bla,nk may then be

filled by the anticipative "It", with the following result: lb is gener-

ally believed that France will fight." Also rearrangement permits suc-

cessive use of both anticipative and retrospective proxies as follov/s:

"As for this, that France will fight, it is generally believed". That is,

historically rendered, the fighting of France is anticipated by "i/tis"

and by "that'' as well as retrospectively repeated by ' it".

The conception of "that" as a "conjunction", required to connect the

following clause v/ith the principal, is obviously untenable and actually

losing favor. If saying needs joining to v/hat is said, I see no reason

to doubt that eating needs to be joined to vrhat is eaten. And con-

versely, given "The boy ate the pudding", if I can dispense with a bond

of union between the boy's eating and the pudding, so also in "They say

that France will fight" I doubt not that I can do without a conjunction

between "their saying" and "France's fighting". The error of Grammar

lies however deeper than these suggestions indicate, and deserves a

moment's attention in view of its bearing on the general problem of

conjunction. It lies in conceiving the saying and the fighting as in a

condition to be joined, that is, as separate. In fact they arc members

of a single sentence, one utterly unfaithful to my purpose, if either

member be omitted. "They say" does not tell you what I mean or any

self-suflicient part thereof; the same is true of "France will fight".

These two are parts of one whole and accordingly as closely joined as

thought and speech can make them. For the utmost union that any

factor of thought or sentence can establish with its fellows, is attained

so soon as it is recognized as indispensable to what is intended. Union

and junction are really the merest figures of speech. The reality of

the case is indispensability. Now of all the words in my illustration

one only can be omitted without injury to my thought or its presentar

tion, namely, "that".^ Yet on this word, of all my words the least

necessar5% Grammar lays the burden of performing the conjunctive act.

That is, in extremely objective parlance, the word "that" does not stick,

itself, to either part of my sentence; yet one of the parts thereof it

shall, as Grammar will have it, stick to the other. It is, in other v/ords,

expected to glue two things together, without itself adhering to either.

The vicarious function is somewliat more obscure in "Yes"

and "JSTo." To illustrate tliis^ suppose you ask me, "Is Brown

ill?" and I answer, "Yes." I think it will generally be ad-

^When "that" is left out, it is the merest begging of the question to claim

that it still is present in thought. No such claim is made with a direct quota-

tion. Yet such quotation consists of the same thought as the indirect, being

merely further conceived as in the words of a particular individual. In short

the direct quotation, as the larger addendum, should require the stronger bond

of union, and presumably can least dispense therewith.

38 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences^ ArtSj and Letters.

mitted tliat ^^Yes" means ^^Brown is ill." In expressing this

meaning, ^'Yes'' might reinstate preceding thought as a total,

in two parts or in three. If the last, the most difficult method,

be the one pursued, I must find in ^^Yes'' three factors, say (1),

(2), and (3), which respectively reinstate "Brovsoi," "is,'' and

"ill.'' But the "is," being easily supplied, is therefore often

omitted. It may be, then, that "Yes" contains only (1) and

(3). Assuming such to be the case, let "Hoc" take the place

of (1) and "illud" the place of (3), developing "Hoc— illud,"

with the understood value of "Hoc est illud," namely, "This

(i. e. Bro^vn) is that (i. e. ill)."^ This combination, historically

familiar, produced by successive changes, "o — il," "ou — il,"

"oui." That is, and I argue nothing more, the "oui" is con-

ceivable as a simultaneous reinstatement of those preceding

thought-factors, which are regarded as most necessary.

That "hoc" may rather reinstate the whole preceding thought,

being merely reinforced by "illud," or vice-versa, I should not

seek to disprove ; I would even admit that different minds may

have used this linguistic mechanism differently ; I imagine, too,

that minds have utilized other expedients for reaching the re-

sults accomplished by "yes" and "no." For instance^ such a

word as "truly" may add to the power of initiatively suggesting

truth the power of reinstating what is conceived to be true ; and

such procedure would justify, so far as it goes, the grammatical

practice of ranking "yes" and "no" as affirmative and negative

adverbs. All that I wish to emphasize is that the affirmative

and negative idea, to be of use, must be juxtaposed in mind with

what is affirmed or denied. In the case of "yes" and "no"

this requirement involves the reinstatement of preceding

thought. In the absence of other means, this reinstatement

must be effected by these words themselves. That is, the so-

called affirmative and negative adverbs express all that is ex-

pressed by affirmative or negative propositions. They properly

rank then, as others have noted, not as parts of speech, but as

sentences.

XI. THEIR ORIGIN.

This may very well have been of many kinds. For instance, the ini-

tiative may have changed into a vicarious symbol. Conceived as a mere

>Conf, "That's it.'

Owen — Revision of Pronouns. 39

possibility, such a change may be illustrated as follows: given "this"

and "that," meaning initiatively the near and the far of space, by a

well-worn path of idea transition they become the near and the far

of time, and these have but a line to cross to become the near and the

far of consciousness. Accordingly "this" coincides with an idea of

which I am thinking or am vividly conscious; "that" by antagonism

associates itself With an idea already distinctly thought and now wan-

ing, or yet to be thought distinctly and now but dawning — an idea

then, in either case, of which I am at this moment conscious but dimly.

Many reasons might be alleged in favor of a preliminary leaning in

favor of what has been thought already; that is, the use of the vica-

rious word was at first presumably retrospective. Suppose then I say:

^'Brown was married on Christmas. That is my birthday." My

meaning is as follows: That (of which I icas thinking, i. e., Christmas)

is (this of which I am thinking, necessarily specially symbolized as)

my birthda5\ "That," being primarily used of things, tends to over-

look an idea so unobjective as marriage; the choice between "Brown"

and "Christmas" is settled by number, gender, adaptability to context,

-etc.

XII. THEIR MOTIVE.

The vicarious word is rather a liniriiistic liixiirv than a ne-

cessity. It may always be replaced by its principal ; but such

use of the latter involves an obtrusive repetition, and to this

a dislike is early developed. Thus I may, with perfect exact-

ness, tell vou that "Brown savs Brown's brother has sold Bro^vn

Bro^vn's brother's horse ;" but the fastidiousness of speech is

offended. Preference is ffiven to '"Brown savs his brother has

sold him his horse."

XIII. THEIE i:^CIDEXTAL ADVAXTAGES.

A suitable corps of idea-repeaters aids correct understanding.

As soon as they are fully recognized as such, they give notice

that what they name has been named before. Initiatives, on

the other hand, create an expectation of the new. Thus, sup-

pose I say, "I have been talking with Broivn. I learn that my

neigJihor is ill." As a matter of fact ''my neighbor" and

^'Brown" are one person; but this you do not expect, because

neighbor" is usually employed to name an idea different from

4i

40 Wisconsiji Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters.

its predecessors. To use initiative words for old ideas is, then,,

to thwart expectation, I shonkl do better to sav, ^^I have been

talking with BrowTi. I learn that lie is ill." When old ideaSy

then, are intended, their reception is aided by the use of rein-

statives, words, that is, which announce the old as snch. The'

gain attending the nse of idea-repeaters is accordingly this : the

speaker is able to announce each idea in its turn as okl or new,

thereby reducing the field in which the hearer is to seek the

idea. ^

The use of idea-forerunners may aid the receiver of thought-

elements in their right assemblage. This advantage, already in-

timated on p. 36, may be illustrated more completely as follows r

^Trance w^ill fic'ht is thous^ht bv manv." In this sentence you

are embarrassed bv difficult v in determining what my subiect

is, until mv sentence has been half concluded. This embarrass-

ment may be relieved by a prospective. Availing myself of its-

aid, I tell you, "It is thought by many France will fight." "It"

is obviously not my actual subject, but rather a promise of a

subject. Accepting it as such, you realize that what immedi-

ately follows must be what I have to say of my subject; and

when that saying is ended, you recognize the remainder as my

actual subject.

To their inferior prestige, whether used as idea-repeaters

or as forerunners, the vicarious v/ords exhibit physical con-

formity, being weak in bodily presence. By this I mean that

they are comparatively small and inconspicuous, thereby making

a double practical gain. In "Montgomery says his brother-in-

law has sold him his horse," the shortness of the proxies brings

me on the one hand quicklv to mv sentence end and on the other

somewhat beguiles your sense of repetition. This double gain

is more conspicuous, if the above sentence be compared with the

followino;: "Monta'omerv savs Monta'omerv's brother-in-law

has sold Montgomery Montgomery's brother-in-law's horse."

In the discussion of vicarious usage I have rejected current phraseol-

ogy, because it tends to offer uncertain and even deceptive suggestions.

Grammar, for instance, calls a pronoun's principal its "antecedent.""

^This advantage may be compared to that afforded, in the game of twenty

questions, by the Initial establishment of the unknown object as animal, vege-

table or mineral.

Owen — Revision of Pronouns. 41

The fact that the so-called ct^^ecedent is often really a posfcedent, is

alone sufficiently embarrassing to invite the use of another name. The

suggestion offered by the grammatical term is also quite illusive, tend-

ing to reverse the prestige of principal and proxy. To call the former

the antecedent, that is, the preceder, offers somewhat such a slight as

to call the kite the forerunner of its tail or the Sistine Madonna the

precursor of its chromolithographic effigy.

Again, the vicarious word is said, like the relative, to "refer" or

"relate" to its initiative original. Without emphasizing the fact that

the proxy, in its frequent precedence of its principal, strictly /);-olates,

I raise the fundamental objection, that referring and relating give no

hint of what in fact linguistically happens. To illustrate, suppose that,

having said to me "Brown is ill," you add "He is going abroad,"

Grammar will have it that "He" "refers" or sends me back to "Brown."

But in thought I cannot go backward. The succession of my mental

states and activities runs in one direction — forward. It is impossible

for me really to return to one of them, v\fhen once it has lapsed. My

"breakfast today may be exactly like my breakfast of yesterday,

but in eating it I do not go backward or revert; at most I repeat.

So, too, I may think today essentially what I thought yesterday, but

I do not really go back even in thought; I do not revert; I merely

think again today what I thought the day before. There Is, then, no

sending backward of the thinker and no going back, of course, on the

part of the word.

The presentation of an idea hj a vicarious word is a mere in-

cident of symbolism. This incident, of extreme importance to

the study of symbols, is unimportant to the study of thought.

Whether I say ^^Brown thinks he is ill," or ^'Brown thinks Brown

is ill," my thought may be regarded as the same. Concentrat-

ing attention now on thought, and in particular on the thought-

element illustrated by ^^he," I note that the idea presented by

such a word is used as a thought-factor once when presented

initiatively and again when presented vicariously; that is, the

idea symbolized by principal and proxy appears in the minds of

speaker and hearer twice at least. The following theory of

"relatives" consists essentially of the proposition that, so far as

an idea be sjTnbolized by merely an ^^antecedent" and a "rela-

tive," that idea is thought but once.

42 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, ArtSj and Letters.

CHAPTER III.— RELATIVE WORDS.

These are described by Grammar as words which relate to

an antecedent, that is, to a principal. But, even if such be the

fact, it does not sensibly differentiate them from the already

examined vicarious words. Like these the relati 'cs are also a

linguistic luxury; they assume both retrospective and prospec-

tive attitudes ; they vary in nearness and fidelity to their prin-

cipals and in the certainty of their service; they enter the sen-

tence now as one and again as another part of speech. Their

principals also vary in number, complexity and thought-factor-

ship, being sometimes single and sometimes multiple, present-

ing sometimes a single idea and sometimes a plexus, and being

at no time confined to appearance as any particular part of

speech.

Turning from characteristics shared by relatives with other

words, I wish to find a characteristic, if such there be, which

distinguishes relatives only. Such, being found, may show

whether Grammar is right in ranking relatives as a special pro-

nominal class ; whether, to question more deeply, the relatives

after all are pronouns ; whether indeed they are properly rated

even as words.

The following inspection, necessarily somewhat microscopic,

I wish to appear as part of a broader survey of mental phe-

nomena, for the sake of making sure, if possible, that nothing

indispensable is overlooked. Conceding then to mental activ-

ity the greatest fullness conceivable, I offer as my initial topic,

I. MULTIPLE THINKING,

supposing that a mind may work on several lines of thought at

once; that two such lines of thought may be parallel, each fail-

ing to coincide in any part with the other ; that they may be con-

vergent, passing from* parallelism to coincidence; that con-

versely they may be divergent; that two lines of thought, one

Owen — Revision of Pronouns. 43

more dominant than the others may converge for a moment and

then diverge^ the other becoming more dominant than the one;

that is, two lines of thought may cross each other, or exchange

supremacy.^

In normal thought-expression, which is all I wish at present

to consider, it is not required to take account of these various

forms of multiple thinking. I can tell you and you can success-

fully listen to one thought only at a time. Even in exchange of

thought-supremacy the presenting effort of the moment is single.

Written and printed language, being, as thus far developed, mere

transliterations of oral speech, are subject to its law, which may

therefore be more broadly formulated by saying that, howsoever

many thoughts occur together in the speaker's mind, he must

present them to the hearer one at a time. That is, simultaneous

thoughts must be made successive before linguistic presentation.

Attention may therefore be confined to

II. SINGLE THINKING.

•It is obvious that in a single series of successive thoiights one

member may or may not be linked to its neighbor. That is,

single thinking may be

(a) Incoliei^ent.

Thus, given "I just met Brown. Peace is concluded with

Spain," it may provisionally be admitted that the two thoughts

of this series do not cohere or, in other words, are incoherent.

(h) Coherent.

Given, on the other hand, "I have a book will please you,"

it may be assumed that the thoughts expressed, namely, "I have

a book" and "a book will please you" are coherent.

III. EXPRESSION OF INCOHEKENT THOUGHT.

(a) Interrupted.

This mode of expression was followed in "I just met Brown.

Peace is concluded." Such expression only is in such a case

^Thus in the French "Je crains qu'il ne vienne" a fear that he will and a hope

that he will not come may be regarded as exchanging supremacy at "ne." But

such change in mid-sentence from fear-expression to hope-expression may be

relegated to the special field of sentence pathology.

44 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences,, Arts, and Letters.

completely natural. Incolierent tliouglits should be expressed

by unconnected sentences. Sometimes, liowever, the expression

of incoherent thought is

(h) Continuous.

Thus, "I played, he sang, she danced." This mode of expres-

sion, common enough in actual conversational style, is in this

case plainly unnatural. My thoughts not being coherent or

connected, I should not make my sentences even formally contin-

uous. As neither this nor the preceding case will be found to

make use of relatives, both may be neglected.

IV. EXPRESSION OF COHERENT THOUGHT.

(a) Continuous.

This method appears in "I have a book will please you."

Such may be regarded as the normal expression of coherent

thought ; in such the relatives figure ; such will form the special

object of examination. It is meantime useful to recognize the

occurrence of the other method of expression, namely the

(h) Interrupted.

To divide the expression of coherent thought m.ay seem as use-

less as to make two bites of a single cherry. To say "I have a

book'' and again "A book v/ill please you", is plainly quite un-

natural. That sometimes, however, such a method must be fol-

lowed, appears as follows :

V. LIMITATIONS OF CONTINUOUS EXPRESSION.

To express continuously an unlimited amount, even of co-

herent thought, is quite impracticable. Aid to such expression

is amply furnished indeed by relatives, as also by tantamount

expressions (see p. 104, later), each of which in turn may form

the point of attachment for additional relative or similar ele-

ments. The linguistic possibilities thus developed are amus-

ingly shown by the nursery phrase-chains introduced by ^'This

is the house that Jack built." E'or are such abuses merely im- •

aginary. I quote from a college daily the following sentence,

Owen — Revision of Pronouns. 45

which, being part of an obitnary notice, may be taken as seri-

ously intended: ^'The sad ending of the beginning of a life

full of promise of all that is held dear in this world, was that

of young , affectionately liked by his fellow-students and

impressing all with whom he came in contact with his sterling

qualities of character, modest, unassuming and conservative,

dignified and imposing in appearance, yet allowing an air of con-

viviality and alertness to hover about him, that readily made him

a most companionable fellow, an acquaintance to be desired by

those who had not the pleasure of his friendship and hospitality,

which was always lavish, yet in such good taste as never to be

conspicuous." This example proves perhaps too much, indicat-

ing the possibility of avoiding sentence-rupture indefinitely. Yet

the reader's fatigue may be accepted as showing that bounds have

been overstepped. A thread indeed may be spun without a

break, as long as spinning mechanism and materials endure.

But for the convenience of both seller and buver it is cut into

lengths. So too the mental output, though it might indefinitely

continue unbroken, as a matter of linguistic fact, is delivered by

installments.

*

VI. THE BULK OF THOUGHT-INSTALLMENTS.

(a) How Influenced.

Of all the causes which tend to modify the length of the men-

tal message, the most important is no doubt the capacity of the

speaker. A successful ca]3tain may be a failure, if required to

act as general. He who has the linguistic strategy needful to

the command of a short sentence, may utterly lack the general-

diip required for a long one. The capacity of the hearer is also

properly consulted by the speaker. The size of a verbal army

is conditioned on the ability of the invaded region to support it.

With a child the thought-installment must be very small; with

an adult it may be greater ; with an adult German it may be ex-

tremely great.

(h) How Measured.

The individual thought-installment will be found to contain

all that this investigation must consider. Since much depends

46 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts^ and Letters.

on the length of snch instaUment^ it is desirable to establish a

scale by which it can be measured. I therefore invite an ef-

fort to determine the proper

VII. rXIT OF THOUGHT-MEASUREMENT.

Snj^pose that in addressing nie you utter merely the phrfise

"The sun" ; and suppose further that you successfully rouse in

my mind the idea for which this phrase is connnonly used ; sup-

pose too that from your utterance I infer that you also are think-

ing of the same idea. It must still be admitted that the ideal

total common to our minds is very meager, too small indeed to

be worth your labor in expression or mine in apprehension. The

price "for your thoughts" being currently quoted as " a penny,"

the market value of a single thought-factor can hardly be great

enough to warrant the expense of transportation.

Suppose now you go further, saj^ing "The sun, the moon."

My mind is now enriched by two ideas, which otherwise I might

not enjoy. I may furtlier correctly infer that you also have

both in mind. But the market value of your mental output is

presumably only doubled. It is safe to say that, were language

able only to deal with pairs of ideas, it would not exist in a form

deserving the name. Two ideas thus summoned together may,

it is true, induce us both to perform upon them mental opera-

tions. But nothino' assures us that these would be the same or

that, even if they were the sailie, we should be sure that they were

so. Such operations, the essentials of thought, are not sug-

gested by the words of my example. These words indeed give

only thought-data ; and these data alone have not sufficient value

to justify expression.

The passage of attention from one idea to another is con-

veniently known as a mental transit. That you have made such

a transit from the idea of the sun to that of the moon, I raay

of course infer. But my knowledge, even thus augmented, is

quite unsatisfactory. I care little to learn that you have merely

experienced a succession of ideas, or where the succession began,

or where it ended. If anything in such an experience can in-

terest me, it will be the impressions of the mental traveller.

You must give me something of the personal element that sat-

iirates the "Sentimental Journey."

Owen — Eevlsio7i of Fronouns. 47

Suppose now you say ^Tlie sun exceeds the moon," or "is be-

hind the moon." You give me now not only two ideas, but also

a relation between them ; in other words, I know that you have

made a mental journey, where it began, where it ended, and,

most important of all, your impressions by the w^ay. You re-

veal in short a complete experience. Such alone is worth the

effort of telling and that of learning.^

Such an experience, commonly called a thought, consists of

two ideas and their relation. Its expression does not always con-

tain a special word for each of its terms. Something is oft^i

left to inference. Extra-linguistic aid, for instance that of

gesture, is sometimes invoked. The sam.e word even may sim-

ultaneously stand for more than one thought-factor. But, how-

ever expression be effected, if it be indeed effected, these three

elements of thought, a pair of ideas and their relation, all

are present. Xothing less w^ll answer. Given "The sun

exceeds the moon," if a single term be omitted, the value of

the remainder to a receiving mind is essentially nil. !Nor

wdll anv substitute suffice. "The sun, the comet, the moon"

*J 7 7

is worthless ; so also is "The sun exceeds equals" ; the same would

be true of anv other variation from the combination described

as a thou£:ht, that namelv of two ideas and their relation. ISToth-

ing less indeed is attempted by speech.^ This total then may

be recognized as the lingaiistic minimum and therefore, with

special propriety, the linguistic unit. So often then as we find

this combination of two ideas and their relation, w^e tally one

upon the thought-score.

VIII. COHEEENT UNITS HAVE A COMMON FACTOR.

This truism merely calls for illustration. Suppose I tell you

that "I just met Brown — Smith is ill." Measuring by the unit

just established, I find two thoughts, namely my meeting with

^Tbe question whether thought results imprimis from analysis or from

synthesis need not be raised. In any language using words as signs of single

ideas (not as signs of whole thoughts) the speaker necessarily analyzes his

thought, however first conceived, into ideas. These ideas the hearer forms into

a thought by synthesis.

21 overlook interjectional utterance, the more or less unmodified survival of

the purely reflex cry, originally a mere leakage of the expressional mechanism,

void of that purpose essential to the genuinely linguistic act.

48 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts^ and Letters.

Brown and the illness of Smith. These are plainly incoherent ;

or, in popular parlance, they have nothing to do ^vith each other ;

that is, they have nothing in common ; that is, again, no element

of one is also an element of the other.

Suppose, however, I say "I have a book you will like." My

total thought again consists of two units, first my possession of

the book, second vour likino- the book. But this time one ele-

ment is indispensable to each thought, namely ^'the book." That

is, the two thought-units have a common factor. This commu-

nity is plainly the condition of their coherence. It seems in-

deed entirely safe to generalize as follows: If two units have

a common factor, an element, that is, which is indispensable to

or inseparable from each, they cohere.

As the common factor is the key to relative usage, it is well

to distinguish sharply between strictly common and merely

equivalent factors. In doing so it is convenient, how^ever, to ac-

cept a usage which indiscriminately ranks them both as common

factors and, using this phrase with admitted inaccuracy, to re-

differentiate them as common factor varieties. Of these I take

up first

IX. THE SUCCESSIVE OR TWICE THOUGHT COMMON FACTOR.

The common factor of this type occurs when coherent thought

is, in its expression, interrupted. Thus "I have a book will please

you," expresses a coherent thought continuously expressed.

The expression of this thought may however be interrupted,

as in "I have a book. The book will please you." In this ex-

pression, so soon as I have finished saying "I have a book", all

ideas mentioned withdraw from your immediate attention. ]^one

of them will reappear without a special invitation — that is, if

you be a faithful listener. Wishing you now to think of one

of them as factor also of a second thought, I must recall it to

your attention. Accordingly I continue with ^The book will

please you". The idea named by ^^book" appears, then, twice

in your mind, once as a factor of each thought presented. That

is, it is a twice-thought factor. It is merely speaking from a

different point of view^ to say that) this idea appears later on the

Owen — Revision of Pronouns. 49

second occasion than on the first. That is, it is a successive-

factor.

The same is true if I substitute a reinstative for ^^hook" in its-

second usage. ''T have a book. It will please you" differs from

my last expression merely in a minor incident of symboliza-

tion. ^ Thought is the same. Generalizing on this example, I

venture the proposition, that the special office of reinstatives is

the formal restoration of thought-coherence, when that coher-

ence is formally broken by the interruption of expression.

X. THE SIMULTANEOUS OR ONCE THOUGHT COMMON FACTOE.

The sentence "I have a book will please you" plainly contains

tw^o thoughts, expressible by ^'I have a book" and "Book will

please you." It also is plain that the idea named by '^book" is

a member of each of these thoughts. It seems to me olso plain

that this idea, although a factor of tvv-o thoughts, is conceived

by the mind but once. I claim, that is (what many minds may

rank as self-evident) that a single idea is in two simultaneous

thought-memberships.

That such a claim is not inherently absurd is shown by its validity

even in the most trying application, namely to objects in space. Thus,

the northeast corner-stone of my house is at the same time a member

of the north wall and of the east wall. The validity of such a claim in

the structure of thought may be tested as follows: If the idea named

by "book" in my example be twice (or more) conceived, it is plain that

its double conception may occur either with "I have" or with "will

please you"; or it may oe once conceived with "I have" and again with

"will please you."^

Suppose then first that I doubly conceive the book in connection

with "I have," expressing myself by the words "I have the book (1) book

^It may be noted that "It" even more certainly indicates the particular book

of the preceding sentence than a repetition of "book" itself.

^In examining these cases let it be understood at the outset that the question

is one of facts and not of possibilities. That the simultaneous factor or indeed

any other idea can be thought of twice or even more, if the mind be so disposed,

must be admitted. Such repetition I will, for the sake of illustration, perpe-

trate, announcing frankly each appearance of the idea, by a separate use of its

word. Accordingly "I I I I I have a book." Such sentences, however, I do not

in actual practice employ. Just as at a dinner I do not offer you course after

course of soup or oysters, so the mental banquet to which speech invites you is

not likely to be of the type illustrated, nor of the type "I have have have have

a book" nor of the type "I have the book book book."

4

50 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters.

(2)." In this expression it is plain that book (2) must be in relation

with some other element of my thought or else out of relation with each,

that is, irrelevant. If it be irrelevant, it has nothing to do with my

thought and requires no consideration. If it be related, it must be

with book (1) and in the relation of identity; otherwise there is no

repetition. Letting this relation be roughly expressed by "is," and

expressing thought in Tull, I obtain "I have the book (1) is the

book (2)". But this sentence itself is the expression of two thoughts

with a common factor, namely "I have the book (1)" and "Book (1) is

book (2)." That is, the present expression is precisely analogous to

"I have a book will please you", itself divisible into "I have a book"

and "Book will please you." The same result would be reached by a

double conception of book with "will please 5''0U." I may as well then

dismiss these cases and center attention at once on "I have a book

will please you."

In this sentence suppose then that "book" is thought of once with

"I have" and again with "will please you." Tabulating the total I obtain

"I have the book (1) book (2) will please you." In this total it is more

necessary even than in the preceding ease to find a relation between

some term of one thought and a term of the other. For, if none such

be found, it is plain that one thought has nothing to do with the other,

a status which absolutely violates my conscious purpose. Also there

is no relation except between book (1) and book (2) ; and their re-

lation must again be that of identity. Otherwise the two thoughts

are after all concerned with different books; that is, on the one hand

the thoughts have still nothing to do with each other and on the other

hand there is no repetition.

If there be then repetition, there must be an identity of book (1)

and book (2). The thought total may therefore be represented, with

the aid again of "is", as follows: "I have a book (1) is a book (2)

will please you."

If, however, I adopt the policy of repetition, consistency requires me

to go further. Book (1) should be thought of once in "I have a

book (1)" and again in "Book (1) is a book (2)". Also book (2)

should be thought once in "Book (1) is a book (2)" and again in

"Book (2) will please you." Relations being supplied as before, my

thought in full would be "I have a book (1) is a book (1) is a book (2)

is a book f^) will please you." This, hovv^ever, is the merest begin-

ning. Each idea named by the word "book" is still a common factor,

inviting double thinking as before, with still further expansions as its

corollary. V/ere I to respond to all such invitations, my thought would

take the form "I have a book (1) is a book (2) is a book (3) is a

book (n)." That is, my imaginary library would overwhelm me; my

thought would never be completed. It seems accordingly rational to as-

sume that, in some cases at least the common factor of two thoughts is

Owen — Revision of Pronouns. 51

not repeated; that is, it is single; that is, its functions or member-

ships are simultaneous.

Such usage is extremely extensive, being, in fact, by no means a sen-

tential exception, but rather the rule. For thought, in the elementary

form of two ideas and their relation, is comparatively rare. In most

thoughts one or more of these elements is modified, that is, attended

by an adjunct, the modified element being the simultaneous factor

of two thoughts. Thus, in "I have a new book" th'^ elements "I" and

■"book" are plainly in the relation say of owner to property, indicated

by "have." But certainly "book" and "new" are also in some rela-

tion. For, if not in relation, they are out of relation; and this is but

another way of saying that "new" is irrelevant to "book" or has noth-

ing to do therewith. Now as "new" has surely nothing to do with "I"

or with "have" or with their combination, it has nothing to do with

the thought in which it appears. But this conclusion is obviously un-

true. It must therefore be conceded that "new" is in some relation

to "book." Whether such relation be indicated by the speaker and,

if so, how, is for the moment unimportant. It must be in the thought

of speaker and hearer, sub-consciously perhaps, but as an indispensa-

ble factor of the mental total. "Book" then is a factor both of "I

have a book" and of another thought which might be asserted by "The

iDOok is new."

The singleness of the common factor is in this case more evident.

So far as introspection may be trusted I feel sure that, in saying "I

have a new book", I do not think of the book once as "had" and again

as "new." I should also credit you with a most plodding intellectual

gait, if I assumed that you were obliged in such fashion to follow

my linguistic lead. I do not doubt that you can in fact perform more

difficult feats. If I ask you to "bring me a fresh, long-stemmed, red,

Japanese rose," I assume that your mind is able to associate the "rose"

with "bring," with "fresh," with "long-stemmed," with "red,"' and

with "Japanese," — and all this without separately conceiving the rose

in each association. In fact I should almost as soon expect you to

iDring me five roses.

Were the common factor in such cases doubly thought, the purpose

of adjunctive usage would often be imperiled. Thus, in "Ripe apples

are wholesome," the purpose of the adjunctive "Ripe" is to restrict

your attention to a particular class of apples, alone conceived as whole-

some. That is, I do not want you to think, in this connection, of ap-

ples that are decayed or immature. Now, my only safety lies in your

using my idea in its restricted scope at once. If you let it lapse in

the least from your attention, I do not know in what shape it will re-

appear. That it may come on to the mental stage the second time

in greatly modified shape, has been shown in examining the fidelity

of reinstatives. To illustrate again, "The carefully selected apples of

52 Wisconsm Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters.

my orchard were barreled with those of the neighboring farmers." I

have in this sentence used, to be sure, not the reinstative, but the

much more immediate coinstative. But obviously the apples suggested

by "those" may be a very indiscriminate lot. The restrictive force of my

epithet "carefully selected" has been dissipated. It appears then, that

if I wish to subject an idea used in one environment to the restriction

of another environment, I must, to be sure of my purpose, put the idea.

in both environments at once. If I dress up an idea for a verbal party

and then let it loose to play with chance companions, I may hardly hope

that, when the party begins, my idea will be presentable. It is safer

lo extend the cares of the dressing-room upon the scene of the party

itself. That is, the common factor is made simultaneous.

It is obviously with simultaneous factors that relatives

are employed, as in the form, "I have a book which will please

yon." Two symbols, being however associated with the same

idea, Grammar makes the facile assumption that the idea is twice

thought. To prepare the way for showing what actually hap-

pens I take up next the

XI. DOUBLE FUNCTION OF THE SIMULTANEOUS FACTOE.

Though thought but once, the simultaneous factor has a mis-

sion, a part to play, in each of the thoughts of which it is a

member ; and this part is what I mean by its function. Thus,

in ^^I have a book you will like," ^^book" is at the same time

last term in ^^I have a book" and in ''you will like a book." In

^'Here is a book will please you," "book" is first term in either

thought. In "I have a book will please you," "book" is last

term in one thought and first term in the other, or, in gram-

matical parlance, object in one case and subject in the other.

The embarrassment likely to arise, when the two functions of

the simultaneous factor are not the same, suggests some com-

ment on

XII. THE CONVENIENCE OF INDICATING FUNCTION.

This is considerable, even wdien function is single. To il-

lustrate, using the poetical order, to avoid the hints afforded

by usual order, suppose I say that "George the dragon slew."

You cannot be sure whether George slew the dragon or the

dragon slew George, unless you have some means of information

Owen — Revision of Pronouns. 53

other than my statement. If, however, some sign were added

to '^George'^ or ^'the dragon" or both, by which you could know

what place the idea named by each should occupy in the struct-

ure of thought, your knowledge would be complete.

XIII. ruisrcTio^s" ixdicatioi^ by inflection.

This it is most convenient to illustrate first in the case of

single function. Thus, suppose I tell you that "Universities

teach.'' Into this valuable thought I v^ish to inject the idea ex-

pressed by ''thorough." Realizing your need of knowing what to

do with this idea, and abrogating, as before, the aid of order, I

guide you by the termination of the idea's symbol.* If I wish

you to use the idea as an adjunct of teaching, to conceive, that

is, that the teaching is thorough, I add to my symbol the ending

^'ly," obtaining '^Universities thoroughly teach." If the idea

is to be an adjunct of "universities," I let the word remain

without a termination and say that "Universities thorough

teach." If I wish the idea to appear as a term, I use the ending

^'ness" and tell you that "Universities thoroughness teach." ^

The indication afforded by inflection may be even more pre-

cise. In "Lunam sol excedit" the inflection "am" exhibits not

merely gender and number, but also the use of "Lunam" as last

term of thought ; at the same time "sol" is by its ending an-

nounced as first term. That is, whatever be the order of actual

mention, to build my ideas into the intended whole, it is neces-

sary to begin with the sun and end w^ith the moon. For if

you begin with the moon and end with the sun, you will need

an entirely different relation, not that of superior to inferior,

I)ut that of inferior to superior ; not that expressed by "excedit,"

but that expressed by "exceditur."

Whatever else be expressed by such infiections may for the

present be overlooked, special attention being concentrated on

the momentarily important fact that inflections can and some-

times do announce the function of the inflected idea. The

bearing of this fact on the interpretation of relatives can best

I)e seen in the li^ht of

^On the incompleteness and the imperfection of this method I do not stop to

insist, or to justify the merely convenient use of the word inflection to include

all kinds of word-variation, those even usually ranked as derivative.

54 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences^ Arts, and Letters.

XIV. THE HISTOEY OF INTLECTION'S.

It is the accepted doctrine of philology that these are the

mere debris of words at one time in every way complete, origi-

nally nsed as the s^mibols of thought elements. In illnstration

it is best to make use of sentences containing verbs of action,

these being for many reasons the most frequent. Of these, too,

those known as active or transitive are the most striking, deal-

ing as they do with an action of which not only the source, but

also the eifects are regarded. With the active verb it is also

conspicuously important to know which of its attendant terms

is point of thought-departure or subject and which is point of ar-

rival or object. Indeed, it is a priori probable that any scheme for

announcing a so-called subject (actor) or object (actee) as such,

would originate with the active verb, the verb, that is, with

which, both being employed, the distinction between the two is

of special importance. To illustrate, suppose that a phenomenon

occurs describable by the statement '^A strikes (ferit) B." Sup-

pose it further uncertain, from this form of statement, whether

the striking is done by A or B. ISTote also that the relation ex-

pressed by "ferit" is that between a striker and one struck, be-

tween an actor and, say, an actee; for the reverse relation be-

tween one struck and a striker would be expressed by "f oritur."'

Given, then, the relation named by "ferit," if you are to con-

struct a thought like m.ine you must put "A" as first term and

"B" as last. If you should reverse the process, you would form

a thought conspicuously diif erent from my own.

To avoid such an error, suppose I characterize "A" as an

active person and "B" as inactive. From such general char-

acterization you infer that in this particular case also "A" is

active or the actor, and "B" inactive or the actee. If, now,

"A" be actor, he must appear as first term, in order to fit the-

relation named by "ferit," that of actor to actee. For I can-

not, by thinking say from actee to actor, obtain the relation

of actor to actee, any more than I can obtain the sensation of

descent by climbing from a low point to a higher. Accordingly

the designation of "A" as active shows the function of "A" in

thought construction.

Owen — Revision of Pro7iouns. 65

As a matter of historical fact a subject sign was so de-

veloped. A word meaning active was used with the subject

of the active verb. Activity being, however, but an indirect and

probably subconscious means for suggesting subjectivity or use

as first term, the original meaning was lost ; and the word at

one time meaning ^'active" came to mean "used as subject."^

At the outset, no doubt, "activity" was used as an actual part

of the speaker's thought; but "subjectivity" regarded merely the

putting together of thought factors. The value of the word for

"activity" sank accordingly from the structural to the instruc-

tional rank, from that of a sign of meaning to that of a sign

of function. Morphologically speaking, it was "emptied of its

meaning," or became "an empty word," that is, in the present

case, a function-sign.

ITow the number of such signs is in lingnistic practice small.

Each mav therefore reduce its acoustic bulk or shrink in vol-

ume, becoming even a single letter, without material danger of

confusion with its fellows. Such a sign, moreover, would natur-

ally stand beside the name of the idea whose place in thought-

structure it determines. I^aturally, also, the order of the two

would be, first, the name of the idea ; second, the sign of what

to do with it. These two, again, the idea and what to do with

it, marking a single stage of expressional progTcss, would nat-

urallv combine in a sinsrle sentence-member or word. Such, in

fact, is the history of an Indo-European subject-sign, the "s"

ending of the nominative case, first a separate word naming an

idea or thought-element, later the indication of another idea's

function, afterward reduced in volume, at last united to the

name of the subject-idea.^

^That such is the fact appears conspicuously when the subject-sign is used

with the eminently inactive subject of the passive voice.

2 That this same 's' may also have the idea-naming value of singular number

and masculine gender, is no derogation to its value as a function-sign ; it is a mere

illustration of what may be known at pleasure as linguistic economy or linguistic

poverty. Separate inflections might uniformly have been used for number, gen-

der and case ; but as a matter of fact they were not.

It is notev-'orthy also that the nominative and the subjective categories do

not exactly coincide, as appears in the occasional use of the last term or predi-

cate in the nominative, that is, the case peculiarly appropriate to a subject or

first-term case. The grounds of this inconsistency do not here require examin-

ation, attention being invited merely to the general fact that language does pos-

sess a method, somewhat clumsy, very inconsistent and quite incomplete, yet an

available method for distinguishing idea-function.

.S6 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters.

Generalizing on the offered illustration, I note two central

facts in the history of functional inflection: (1) function-signs

or inflections have lost original ideal value; (2)_ function-signs

have generally lost original isolation. In the light of these facts

it is worthy of note that (3) some function-signs retain their

isolation.

XV. ISOLATED INFLECTIONS.

To illustrate these, observe in the first place that in "He urged

me to eaf ' the word "to'' may be taken with ordinary preposi-

tional value. I may indeed, without change of value, substi-

tute "He urged me toward eating," building ideas together by

the same plan as in "He pushed me toward the table." When

now, in a large number of similar cases, the preposition has thus

been employed with a verbal idea in substantive usage, the prep-

osition comes to create an expectation of such usage ; that is, it

becomes a sign that a verbal idea enters structure as a noun.

At the same time its prepositional meaning may disappear, as

happens in "He ceased to eat ;" for a statement retaining such

meaning, say "He ceased toward eating" is hardly tenable.

That is, the meaning of the preposition forms no part of my

thought. "To," in short, like "zu," "a," "de," etc., has become

an "empty word;" it stands for no thought-element; it is the

mere sign of the substantive function of a word commonly ver-

bal onlv — a function clumsilv called infinitive. "To," in other

words, is, broadly speaking, an inflection. Yet it maintains

its isolation.

Further illustrations of isolated inflection abound ; and much

more might be said of the field, the aims, the nature and the

methods of function-indication. I have hovrever noted what

seems indispensable to the immediate purpose of guiding the

student of relatives. I therefore pass at once to the special oc-

casion for relative usage, which may be sought in

XVI. THE INDICATION OF DOUBLE FUNCTION.

In section XII. it was observed that function, even when sin-

gle, may be difiicult of apprehension. '\Mien now the function of

an idea is double — when, that is, it is at the same time member

Owen — Revision of Pronouns. 57

of two thoughts — the chance of misunderstanding function is

naturally multiplied. To illustrate, abrogating as before the

aid of order, 'The man the dragon slew the lion wounded.''

Erom this statement you do not even learn which factor is sim-

ultaneous. Assuming this however to be the dragon, I note

that, in ''The man the dragon slew" you do not know whether

"man" or ''dragon" was the victim; and, in "dragon the lion

wounded," you do not know w^hether "lion" or "dragon" did the

wounding. Clearly then, whatever language does in the way

of indicating function, is specially desirable, when function ia

double. Once committed to the policy of function-indication,

language may be expected to attempt such indication hi the case

in which it is most of all needed. Obviously, too, such an at-

tempt will fail of complete results, unless it indicates each func-

tion of the doubly functionating idea.

That the indication of each function is actuallv felt to be

important, appears in the follow^ing examples. In Bulwer's

Kienzi 2, 1 (so Maetzner), occurs the phrase (1) "defense

against w;7iosoever shall aspire," In the same volume, 2, 6, the

same author writes "control of wdiomsoever should be elected."

The structure of these phrases being the same, I substitute in

the latter, for greater ease of comparison, the ideas of the for-

mer, obtaining (2) "defense against ivJiomsoevev shall aspire."

It is obvious that, in (1) and (2) alike, some one (or any one)

is conceived at the same time as the object in a defense, and the

subject in an aspiration. In (1) the subjective aspect of this

some one is indicated bv the form "who," the behavior of "who-

soever" toward "shall aspire" being irreproachable. But "who

soever" is guilty of ignoring the claims of "defense against,

which requires the form "whomsoever." Per contra in (2) the

objective aspect of the some one is indicated by "whom," the

conduct of "whomsoever" toward "defense against" being quite

beyond reproach. But "whomsoever" utterly neglects its duty

toward "shall aspire," which requires the form "w^hosoever."

That is, collectivelv stated, the cited author recognizes the need

of indicating each function of a some one, although he fails to

meet both needs at once.

The actual method by which these needs are commonly met,

though transparently simple, is so obscured by gTammatical

7?

58 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences^ Arts, and Letters.

misconception, tliat it can hardly be examined to advantage till

the mind is freed, so far as may be, from existing preconcep-

tions. Digressing therefore from the actual method, I offer, as

a help to breadth and clearness of view, a brief examination of

a priori possibilities. Snch examination will reveal a consist-

ent method of indicating double function — one the more worthy

of note, that the actual method will be found to be its merely

formal adaptation — a method which may be designated as

(a) The Consistent Method.

It has already been observed that the function of an idea in

one thouo:ht is indicated bv one inflection. The functions of

an idea in two thoughts w^ould self-suggestively be met by two in-

flections. The simultaneous thought-factor would be inflected

once to indicate its function in one thought, and again to indi-

cate its function in the other.

In some languages, notably in Greek, inflections are applied,

as is the case with a part of the tense-signs, to the word's begin-

ning. More commonly inflections appear at the end. When

now an idea is simultaneous factor of two thoughts, an earlier

and a later, it would be distinctly proper to exhibit function in

the earlier thought by an inflection of the earlier part of the

idea-symbol or word, and to show function in later thought by

inflection of the latter part of the word.

Remembering that the merest possibilities are in considera-

tion, suppose I have in mind a thought expressible by "The Bi-

ble teaches whosoever (or any one or the man) wishes to learn.''

The idea expressed by "whosoever," "any one" or "man" is at

the same time last term or object in "The Bible teaches the

man," and first term or subject in "the man wishes to learn."

Wishing novf in illustration the aid of a very distinct inflec-

tional system, I put my example into somewhat imaginary

Latin. Let then the idea named by "man" be expressed by

"hom." Inflecting my new symbol in its earlier part, to indi-

cate objective function in the earlier thought, I obtain "Biblia

decent nem-hom." Inflecting the word again in its later part,

to indicate subjective function in the later thought, I obtain

"hom-o vult discere." In combining the two sections of my to-

Owen — Revision of Pronouns. 59

tal thought, I remember that, as argued, the idea named by

^^man'^ is thought but once. Accordingly I use the symbol

^^hom" but once, obtaining "Biblia docent nem-hom-o \^ilt

discere.'^ In this expression the imaginary ^^nem-hom-o'' be-

haves itself with perfect propriety in both its memberships. It

performs its duty to "docent,'' without in the least neglecting

what it owes to "vult."

To make my example even more suggestive, I will slightly

change its form. Eecalling the fact that function-bigns were

at one time independent words, entitled to be written separately,

I restore the "o" to its ancient rights, obtaining "Docent neni-

hom o vult discere." Noting also that noun-inflections, whether

showing function in preceding or following thought, affect the

terminal position, I conform to custom by changing my illustra-

tion into "Docent hominem o vult discere.''

In fact it is in such a form that the effort to indicate double

function would be expected to find expression. For language,

so far as I have learned, has not conceived the expedient of

uniting to one word two functional inflections. Such being the

case, whichever need of showing function is sooner felt, is met

by the use of a single inflection, which is suffixed to the idea-

sign or word. The function-indicating power of the word is

then conceived to be exhausted. When now the need of show-

ing another function is also felt, and the sign of that function,

being made ready, seeks to join itself also to the word, it finds

its natural place pre-empted. What would consistently appear

as part of the word remains therefore, so to speak, a verbal out-

sider.

This accident however does not seem to imply any change of

values, "^em" as appearing in "hominem" is still a mere sign

that "hom" is to be taken as object of "docent." "O" as before,

though now separately written, is merely a sign that "hom" ia

also subject of "vult." "O" then, although at present separately

written, is still a mere inflection of "hom." Also, what is most

of all important, the idea named and functionally twice de-

scribed by "hominem o" is necessarily no more twice thought

than was the case with the mentally equivalent "nem-hom-o."

60 Wiscojisin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters.

(h) The Actual or Relative Method.

To conform to linguistic fashion, I offer one more improve-

ment in my illustration, obtaining "Decent liominem qui ^^It

discere.'^ Although this change is formally somewhat striking,

I claim that in values there is no change whatever. As I read

my own thought and expressional purpose, the idea named by

"hom'' is still conceived but once; its objective function with

"docent" is still shown by '^nem;" its subjective function with

"\ailt" continues to be shown by "qui." Generalizing on the

value of "qui,'' as thus interpreted, I reach the following propo-

sitions : The relative is a function sign. It differs from other

function-signs in the fact that, while such others become parts

of the idea-sign or word, that is, inflections, the relative main-

tains its formal separateness or isolation. Also the relative is

employed only when it is desirable to indicate two functions of

a simultaneous thou a'ht-f actor. In such case one function is

indicated by an ordinary inflection. To indicate the other is

the special duty of the relative. Accordingly the relative is

merely a specialized and isolated function-sign.

To illustrate more objectively the situation met by the relative, con-

ceive a wedding ceremony and a funeral service to occur simultaneously

and so near together, that a woman present may be regarded as form-

ing part of the group attending each. Thus situated she may cherish

the laudaBle wish to conform her dress to each of her two environ-

ments. She is in somewhat the predicament of a simultaneous sen-

tence factor, which might advantageously also suit itself to each of

two verbal companies. A harlequin costume, partly festal and partly

funereal, is forbidden by accepted usage. Could she, hov/ever, duplicate

herself in form, while remaining personally one; could she in short

make use of a dummy; or could she, in theosophic parlance, project

alongside of herself an astral body or fictitious self; this illusory second

self she might harmonize in dress with one environment, while her real

and primary self conformed to the other. That is, without repetition

of her actual self, her individual significance, or say her meaning, she

might be in formal accordance v/ith her two surroundings. So too of

the relative pronoun it may, very figuratively, be said that it is the

verbal dummy, on which we hang the drapery of inflections suitable to

a second verbal environment.

That the action of the relative word is analogous is suggested by

some uses of the definite article. Remembering that the article is

Owen — Revision of Pronouns. 61

in some languages unemployed, we are prepared to believe that even

when employed it may, so far as meaning is concerned, be quite super-

fluous. Thus in "Er hat den Himmel erreicht," I am unable to associate

any suitable idea with "den." It does not distinguish the Heaven con-

sidered from other possible Heavens nor add to the idea of Heaven any

other idea. It does, however, as admitted by a recent German gram-

mar, serve and serve only to indicate that Himmel is last term or say

the object. That is, it is an isolated accusative inflection. On the other

hand, in "Der Himmel erwartete ihn," "der" is an isolated nominative

inflection.

It is further worthy of note that "der" v/as originally demonstrative.

From this value it varied along two lines. On the one hand, weaken-

ing in value, it followed the procedure of other languages and came to

be ranked as an article; and further weakening, becoming indeed an

empty word, it sometimes reached, as shown above, the value of a mere

inflection. On the other hand the demonstrative, by sacrificing its

initiative power, became vicarious, dropping from the value of an ini-

tiative "that" to the value say of a reinstative "that;" also it further

sank from the value of "that" (reinstativej to the recognized value of

"that" continuative or say "which," and came to be ranked as a "rel-

ative."

Seeking to show the significance of these facts by combining my il-

lustrations, I somewhat violate the usual order of German words, ob-

taining "Er hat erreicht den Himmel der erwartete ihn." In this sen-

tence Himmel names an idea once conceived, the simultaneous factor

of two thoughts. The function of "Himmel" in the first thought is ad-

mittedly shown by "den;" its function in the second is obviously shown

by "der." * Den Himmel der" is then exactly synonymous with "nem

hom o." More especially "den Himmel" is equivalent to "nem horn" or

"hominem;" and "der" is equivalent to "o." But "der" is a fully de-

veloped relative pronoun, recognized as such by Grammar; and "o" is

the purely imagined isolated sign of function. By the interpretation of

this illustration it appears then anew, that the relative is merely an

isolated function sign, a conclusion in this case the more iiatural, that

the same word with the same original value appears in the same sen-

tence to perform the duties vainly differentiated by Grammar as those

of case-signs and relative pronouns.

The form "Der" suggests the process by which the relative was de-

veloped. To illustrate: Let my thought in the first place be planned

for interrupted expression. I may crudely verbalize it as follows: "Er

hat erreicht Himmel. Himmel erwartete ihn." Preferring, however,

to avoid formal repetition, I substitute for "Himmel" (2) a reinstative,

obtaining "Er hat erreicht Himmel. Der (=that, it, or Himmel) erwar-

tete ihn." In this expression "Himmel" initiates an idea; the idea

lapses; it is reinstated by "Der." Now "Der" has in fact two values;

62 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Ai^ts, and Letters.

one is ideal, reinstating "Himmel;" the other is functional, showing

that "Himmel" reinstated is subject of "erwartete." Let now my

thought be planned for continued expression; that is, let the idea ini-

tiated by "Himmel" not lapse, but remain in mind as a simultaneous

factor. TlJis idea is accordingly no longer twice used, once as an orig-

inal and again as a copy, but once only, as a persistent original. SucH

being the case, "Der" can no longer have any power to present this

idea, which has already appeared, which still remains, and of which no

copy can be utilized. There remains only then to "Der" the opportun-

ity for its secondary value, that of showing that "Himmel" is subject

of "erwartete." That is, the reinstative, itself an adaptation of the

demonstrative (egocentric), being emptied of its meaning, becomes an

isolated inflection or relative.

XVII. SUBSIDIARY VALUES OF RELATIVES.

While emphasizing the function-naming value of the relative, I have

not meant to suggest the impossibility of co-existent values. The rela-

tive, indeed, may be expected to do what is done by other function-

signs. These by linguistic economy are often called upon to accomplish

multiple aims. The ending of the word "victor," contrasted with that

of "'victorem," is an obvious sign of nominative function. But this end-

ing, contrasted with that of "victoria," is a sign of meaning, namely

agency; and juxtaposed with that of "victrix" it is the sign of another

meaning, namely sex. So, too, even in the inflectional poverty of

French, the relative may at the samSe time exhibit function and initiate

an idea. Thus in "avoir (ce) a quoi penser" the simultaneous object

of "having" and "thinking" is by "quoi" exhibited as a thing; but in

"avoir a qui penser" the simultaneous object is revealed as a person.

On the other hand "cui," "cujus" and "quo" express initiatively ideas

namable by "to," "of" and "from."

The relative also, and very commonly, has an associative value.

Thus, in "The tailor made a suit for Miss X is very beautiful," some

factor of "The tailor made a suit for Miss X" is obviously also a factor

of "is very beautiful." When now I come to indicate that this simulta-

neous factor is the subject in the latter thought, I find two available

function-signs, namely "who" and "which." Of these "who" is used to

fihow the function of persons only and "which" of things. Accordingly

If, to indicate function in second thought, I use the word "which," you

assume that the idea whose second function I have in mind must oe a

thing; that Is, the simultaneous factor must be "suit." In other words,

the simultaneous factor is indicated by the associative value of the rela-

tive.

Owen — Bevision of Pronouns. 63

XVIII. DEGRADED RELATIVES.

In feeblv inflected languages it often happens that the rela-

tive exhibits no power of indicating meaning, association, or

any particular function. To illustrate, in ^'The ship of Mrs.

X's husband that you met is lost,'' some idea is plainly simul-

taneous factor of two thoughts. But the word "that" is unable

to exhibit this idea as certainly either a person or a thing, mas-

culine or feminine ; that is, it has no meaning value. It is also

unable to show which preceding idea is simultaneous factor ;

that is, it has no associative value. It also does not show you

whether this idea is =ubject or object of "met ;" that is, it has no

specific functional value. The question rises. What is the use

of "that" ?

Overlooking the ambiguity attending the further employ-

ment of "that" as sometimes a "conjunction" and sometimes a

^^demonstrative," suppose that from context and situation it be

satisfactorily understood that the word "that" is the object of

"met," and "refers" to "'ship." Though these important data

be as supposed inferred, that is, in no way indicated by "that",

some opportunity yet remains for "that" to be of service. In

showing this I take as my jDoint of departure the fact that the

relative "that" is the habitual si£:n of a simultaneous factor's

function. As such a sign it is the sigTi also that simultaneous

factorship occurs ; it serves as a warning that some part of the

thought "The ship of Mrs. X's husband is lost" is to be at the

same time part of the thought incompletely rendered by "you

met;" that is, it shows that an idea, used already amid given

surroundings, is to stand its ground while new surroundings

^^ather about it ; though ceasing to serve the hearer as a guide,

it still does service by putting him on his guard.

XIX. PROMOTED RELATIVES.

By these I mean a number of words which have graduated

from an ordinary relative value into one of higher sjTiibolic

rank. In following their advancement, I find a favoring in-

fluence, I think, indeed, the originating impulse, in the conten-

tiousness of the averaa'e mind. To illustrate this, the statement

64 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, ArtSj and Letters.

that A is B, in tlie absence of any possible antagonism, is at the

most but tamely gratifying ; but to bold tbat A is B, against the

attack of even a single opposition, is a bait to tlie controversial

impulse ; and to defend this proposition against all comers, chal-

lenges a knightly instinct in matters of speech as well as in

those of the lists.

The antagonistic element cited in connection with a statement

is commonly called a concession. From what has been noted

above it follows that, when a concession is made, it is rhetorical

to make it big. I shall hardly say that "I can thrash Brown,

though he is an inch the taller.'' Better make it a foot, or add

to his superiority in height advantage in years, strength, weight,

and knowledge of pugilistics. Or better yet, make B's superi-

ority quite indefinite ; leave its determination to your imagina-

tion; and stimulate that imagination by making the indefinite-

ness intense. Accordingly, ^^I can thrash B, though he is taller

to any decree whatever." As a matter of fact, when con-

cessions are made, they are as a rule in some way intensified.

It now, it be true that concessions are attended by intensifica-

tion, it holds conversely that to some extent intensification is at-

tended by concession. The door is therefore open for intensi-

fication to become the sieii that concession is intended. Thus

the phrases "for a truth," "indeed" and "forsooth" are obvious

intensifiers of reality; as such they have become unmistakable

signs of concessive intention. If I start by saying that "My

nephew is forsooth industrious," you are well aware that I shall

continue with something: like "He nevertheless is unsuccessful."

These tendencies proved extremely useful in the develop-

ment of concessive particles. He who first endeavored to ex-

press concession must have been considerably puzzled, for how-

ever adept he might be in the invention of symbols naturally

suggestive of objects, qualities and actions, he could hardly

invent a word suggestive per se of a relation so subtle as the con-

cessive. The best he could do was what is still done even to-

day. He would name what was conceded and also w^hat held

in spite of the concession, leaving the concessive (antagonistic)

relation to be inferred.-^ The limitations of inference on the

one hand would restrict him to such concessions as miffht read-

o

^Conf. "He might come at any moment. He would always find a welcome."

Owen — Revision of Pronouns. 65

ily be taken for sucli ; on the other hand the belligerent impulse

noted above would lead him to intensify his concession. The

intensifier, once become the habitual attendant of concession,

■would soon be taken as a hint of its occurrence, and would even

become in time the recognized sjonbol of the concessive rela-

tion.

Reviewing in this light the development of an illustrative word

originally relative, I note that "He lies (there) where he fell"

means that ^^He lies in the place (which) he fell in," the idea

of place, except so far as defined by his fall, being merely in-

definite. On the other hand, ''He lies wherever he fell" means

that ''He lies in any place (which) he fell in;" that is, the in-

definiteness of the place-idea is now intensified. "Wlierever

he fell he lies" may have exactly the same meaning ; but there

begins to be felt a suggestion of antagonism between his falling,

conceived in any place, and his present lying, somewhat more

distinctly conceived as in a place imrticulav, though unknowm.

You presumably take me to mean "In spite of the location of

his fall" or "Never mind what place he fell in," "in that place

he lies." That is, the word which intensifies the indefiniteness

of his fall's location begins to suggest the concession of the fall

itself. If now I say "Wherever he fell, he lies here," the con-

cessive suggestion is fully developed. I mean that "In spite

of his falling in any place Avhatever, he lies (not in that place,

but) in this jdace."

In fully acquiring the power of hinting a concessive relation

between two thoughts, the intensified indefinite renounces its

double membership. The obscurer reasons of this fact may be

overlooked in favor of the obvious reason that it is not well for a

single word to perform at once too many duties. Accordingly,

in "Wherever he fell he lies here," it appears that the originally

relative "vfherever" has abrogated its membership of the state-

ment "here he lies." It is therefore no longer relative, but

solely an intensified indefinite adjunctive to "fell." In this

capacity, according to the above noted tendency, it is able to hint,

at least, at the concessive relation. That is, it suggests that one

thought is felt to vainly antagonize another.

As this relation is of a high intellectual order and in lingiiistic

practice extremely important, the means of its indication are nat^

5

66 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences^ Arts, arid Letters.

urally perfected. Their development is clearest perhaps in orig-

inal relatives of manner. Thus '^ ^However he lies he doubtless

fell" may mean that he fell in any way (which) he lies in. But

in "However he struggles he will sink/' the case is different. I

no longer mean that his sinking will be marked by any peculiar-

ity which characterizes his struggle. I certainly mean that in

spite of his struggling he will sink; and the conception of his

struggling as of any sort you please is a mere intensifier, agree-

able to me as showing the range of antagonism that my final

clause will bear^ and helpful to you as suggesting the concessive

character of mv initial clause.

The rhetorical force of concession is augmented when it is pre-

liminarily put in the form of isolated statement, as in "He strug-

gles bravely." In this form the concession has the further force

of being vouched for as true. In order now that you may clearly

perceive the antagonism between my concessive and my final

statement, I reinstate the former in the statement of the latter,

thus : "He struggles bravely. However, he will sink." Examin-

ing in this expression the whilom relative, I find its value to

be as follows: Its original relative power of double thought

membership has totally disappeared. Its indefinite and intensive

powers are also essentially lost. Per contra its power of hinting

at antagonism has become a power of complete symbolization.

"However" has all the meaning of "though" (in spite of), as ap-

pears in the exact equivalence of "He will sink, though." Again

"However," for the more perfect performance of its new duty,

has further taken on the power of reinstating a preceding

thought. The meaning of my second sentence in full is, accord-

ingly, "In spite of (trotz) his struggling bravely he will sink."

That is, from an earlier rank as instructional sign of second

thought membership,^ "however" has attained the rank of a

'^^thought-connective," a word, that is, with the power of rein-

stating a previous thought, and at the same time naming its rela-

tion with a following thought.

^Conf. "I don't know how (=the manner in which) ever (become an intensi-

fier of "how's" indefiniteness) it happened."

Owen — Revision of Pronouns. 67

XX. PSEUDOBELATIVES.

The fact that a linguistic implement was elected to serve a

given purpose does not always save it from being put to other

uses. In "Is your horse a trotter? He is that/' the word

"that" is plainly vicarious. In "The horse that I bought is a

trotter," it is quite as plainly relative. This change of value is

so frequent as to obtain a general recognition. Its converse,

overlooked so far as I have noted, may be illustrated as follows :

Closing a geometrical demonstration, I say that "A B equals

C D, which was to be proven." In this expression "which"

informs you that the whole thought embodied in "A B equals

C D" is subject of "was to be proven." That is, the simul-

taneous factor of two thoughts is so extended as to become the

whole of the first. Except for this common extension, "which"

is a normal relative. I am a2)t, however, to express myself

as follows: "A B equals C D. Quod erat demonstrandum."

That is, I force the "quod" or "which" to perform (or perhaps,

in view of the history of the word, I should say it continues to

perform) the symbolizing office usually assigned to "this" or

"that." In other words "which" is in this case not relative at

all, but pseudorelative and, in particular, vicarious and of the

retrospective type.

Much rarer is the correspondent use of "which" in the antici-

pative aspect. To illustrate, "Which I rise to remark — ^^and my

language is plain — that, for ways that are dark and for tricks

that are vain, the heathen Chinee is peculiar." It is indeed pos-

sible to construe this sentence as merely inverted and equivalent

to "The Chinee is peculiar, which I rise to remark." But

abundant similar cases suggest that probably the meaning is

rather as follows : "I rise to remark this : the Chinee is pecul-

iar." That is, "which," as above, is vicariously used, but this

time in the anticipative aspect.

The reinstative use of the relative seems to be growing in

favor. Its very infrequency makes it felt to be a relative out

of place, or rather a relative whose place is out. That is, being

taken as relative, the hearer feels that it should not be preceded

by an expressional break. Thus, having said "This is Miss X'*

and having let my sentence end, if I continue with "Whom I am

68 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters.

going to marry", jou feel that I either ought to have suhstituted

"her" for "Whom" or put my two sentences in one. The pre-

dominance of the latter view gives my second statement the

aspect of the supplementary, the overlooked, a sort of post-

scriptal flavor considerably utilized with humorous intention.

The use of the pseudorelative is most remarkable in expres-

sions which exhibit that combination of several ideas under a

single symbol, for which I have used the name of multiple sym-

bolization. Such expressions are frequent in Latin, a conven-

ient type being offered by "Helvetii legates mittunt qui dice-

rent." In this sentence Grammar interprets "qui" as contain-

ing, either by incorporation or inferentially, an "ut." Now "ut"

itself, whatever its original value, has come to mean, in such a

usage, "for" (in the sense of "pour," "um," etc.) ; that is, it

names the relation which holds between an act and its intended

result ; in brief it names what may be called a purpose relation

and ranks sententially as a preposition.^ Utilizing this mean-

ing in diagram I obtain

The Helvetians — send — ambassadors

for (in order that)

they — say — etc.

Now, as will appear in the following chapter, if I maintain the

connection between upper and lower clauses which is established

by "for," I shall not also connect them by making "Caesar" and

"he" simultaneous. That is, it is unlinguistic to say "I wrote to

Caesar in order that who should come to me." If, therefore,

"qui" contains an "ut," either by incorporation or inferentially,

it must be that "qui" is not also the bign of simultaneous factor-

ship. This conclusion indeed is endorsed by Grammar, v/hich

interprets "qui" as meaning "ut ille" and not at all as meaning

"ut qui." That is, the word "qui" is interpreted as uniting with

"ut," not indeed a relative element, but rather a demonstrative

or, to speak with more exactness, a coinstative. The actually

*How far "ut" has also anticipative power, presenting substantively the fol-

lowing thought, with the force originally resident in the phrase "in order that,"

"for that," or for ]> y, may be neglected.

Owen — Revision of Pronouns. 69

present formal ^'qiii" may accordingly be ranked among the

merely apparent relatives, that is to say the psendorelatives.

It should also be remarked that clauses of tliis nature, being

not at all relative, have no claim to that adjective value which be-

longs to so many clauses genuinely relative. Clauses of the pres-

ent type are substantive, governed, to use the terminology of

Grammar, by the prepositional force of "ut." From the later dis-

cussion of relative clauses they may accordingly, for reasons

forthcoming, be excluded.

XXI. MISINTERPRETED RELATIVES.

I

To illustrate these, suppose I say, "It was Brown who gave (me) tho

book." Wnatever might he meant by these words, as a matter of fact

I use them to express a thought which may also be rendered by the

following words: "The giver of the book was Brown." o fit my ex-

ample to the expression of this thought it must be construed in viola-

tion of several strongly urged grammatical principles. The book-giver

is in the first place obscurely heralded by "it," my subject pro tem.

This "it," though not ranked by Grammar as an indefinite. Is in fact so

extremely indefinite that it may stand provisorily, not only for any

thing, but also for a person of any gender or number. (Conf. in French

"Ce sont mes amies.") This indefini'te provisory subject it is which is

made definite by the clause "who gave me the book." That is, "who"

"'refers" to "it."

That, however, "who" is felt by many a speaker to refer to "Brown,"

I do not deny, admitting rather that in many cases such a feeling is

proven. Thus, in "It is I v/ho am the fastest runner," it is plainly "I"

that is felt to be the antecedent of "who." For if a verb agrees with its

subject in person and number, conversely also v/hen a verb has a given

person, it must be because its subject is felt to be of that person. By

this law the subject of "am", continued by "who", must be conceived as

first personal. Since now the relative and its antecedent deal with the

two memberships of a single thought factor, it can hardly be supposed

that they would disagree as to the person of that factor. If "who," an

obvious relative, regards this factor as of the first person, its antecedent

cannot be a word which presents this factor as of another person. By

this law "It" is excluded; for it distinctly puts an idea as of the third

person. The antecedent therefore can only be "I." The speakers, then'

who are responsible for such phraseology, plainly conceived that the

simultaneous thought-factor, secondarily described In its function by

^'who," had been primarily symbolized by "I."

Such a conception is, however, obviously false. In "It was Brown

70 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters.

who gave the book," "Brown" needs no help in showing who is meant>

"It," on the other hand, is in need of very much help. Without such,

help the word "It" is so extremely helpless, that you can hardly sup-

pose I designed to tell you what I meant by the use of a word so im-

potent. For practical purposes I may quite as well substitute its al-

gebraic synonym and tell you that "a; was Brown." Nor does this

worthless statement make any important gain in value, when I specify

that "x was the book-giving Brown" or "re was Brown-who-gave-the-

book." To add to its value, I must put the specification where it will

do some good. If I tell you that "ic-who-gave-the-book" or the "book-

giving-a?" or the "book-giving person was Brown," you learn something

possibly worth the effort of telling.

The actual structure, better illustrated by "It is I who am the fastest

runner," is the presumable result of inattention, occurring also in the

following example: "Not a single one of his uncles, his aunts, his

nephews or his nieces were there." In the enumeration of my plurals-

I have simply forgotten that my subject was singular; and for that rea-

son I have used a plural verb. In "It is I who am," etc., the nearer "I"

has come between me and the remoter "It;" and I have the more

readily^ overlooked the true dominance of the "It," from the

fact that the relative commonly stands immediately after its antecedent.

The absurdity of the structure, so carefully indicated by the usual ex-

pression, is revealed by the grammatical trick of turning it end for end.

"I who am the best runner is (or am) it" does not tell anything that I,

for one, feel any impulse to declare. But "I am it (or he) who is (not

"am") the fastest runner" announces a claim which I might be induced

to enter.

XXII. LATENT RELATIVES.

By these I mean tlie strictly relative words which Grammar

has failed to recognize. To illustrate in crescendo, in ^'He lay in

the place in which he fell/' 'Svhich'' is clearly recognized as rel-

ative. In "He lay in the place where he fell/' this clearness is

hardly diminished, "where" being plainly synonjTuous with "in

which." In "He lay there where he fell," it is further felt that

"there" is synonj^mous with "in the place," the only sign of con-

fused perception being the use of the special designation "cor-

relatives" which seems to isolate the merely pregnant "there"

and "where" from the mass of word-pairs employed to exhibit

simultaneous factors. In "He lav where he fell," the "where"'

continues to be felt in its full equivalence to "there, where,"'

Owen — Revision of Pronouns. 71

miicli as ^Svliat" is felt to express by multiple sjinbolization all

the value of ''that" and 'Svhich."

So far then so good. But, instead of dealing with place, as

above, let the simultaneous factor deal with attitude. Accord-

ingly, "He lay in the attitude in which he fell." Substituting as

before a somewhat indefinite synonym for ''in the attitude," and

another for "in which," I obtain "Thus he lay as he fell." This

sentence, on the one hand, closely resembles the preceding even

in meaning. I have merely substituted the mutual space relation

of body members for the space relation of the body itself to other

objects. That is, I mean that "He lies in the arrangement, so to

speak, in which he fell," instead of "He lies in the location in

which he fell." On the other hand, in structure the two sen-

tences are exactly similar. But in "Thus he lies as he fell," I

think that Grammar does not distinctly recognize the relative

character of any word. Indeed, if I let the "as" express by mul-

tiple symbolization all the meaning of "thus as," obtaining

"He lies as he fell," the "as" is commonly put by Grammar in

the obscure category of conjunctions.

Reserving closer examination of relative procedure for special

sections under that caption, I merely claim for the moment that

"as," in the present class of cases, is distinctly relative. I be-

lieve, indeed, though without exhaustive examination, that all

of the so-called correlatives which are employed without an inter-

vening thought-break, will be found to be twin servants of a sim-

ultaneous thought-factor, the first member of the pair effecting

that thought-factor's initial nomination and the second serving

merely to adjust it to a second environment.

In further illustration I note that "A is as great as B" is an ob-

vious equivalent of "A equals B (in magnitude)." The indirect-

ness of the first expression might well excite astonishment, were

it not adopted by many cultured peoples. For, my intention b&-

ing to compare two magnitudes, I strictly ought to say that the

greatness of the one is ecjual to that of the other. But, making

a false start, I put it centrally that "A is great." This announce-

ment, futile in itself, I may utilize by developing it into "A is

great to the degree to which B is great.'* Of this expression I

propose to show that "A is as great as B" is the exact equivalent.

In the first place the phrases "aussi gi'and que/^ "so gross

72 ^yisco7lsin Academy of Sciences^ Arts, and Letters.

wie,' "tarn quam/' etc., arouse at once the suspicion that the

second '^as" may be of relative value. Moreover, history reveals

the original formula '^A is all so (=just so) great. All so great

is B." This pair of statements can hardly express a comparison

of equality unless the ^'^all so" of the one has the meaning of ^^all

so" in the other. Such meaning is that of some degree not fixed,

say ^^the degree," to distinguish it from other possible degrees.

For while this degree is far from definite it is not interchange-

able. It is indeed an x, but it may not be replaced by a y.

The meaning then of the original formula is ^'A is great to the

degree. To that (same degTee) gTeat is B."

In that formula ^^all so" is plainly a common factor of two

statements, the first ''all so" being initiative and the second rein-

stative. By successive formal reductions each '^'all so" becomes

the modern "as" At the same time the two sentences coalesce,

producing (if all elements be retained) the single sentence "A is

as great as great is B." This coalescence, it should be noted, en-

tails an important change in thought procedure. My former

two installments of thought are condensed into one; and since

I may be supposed to conform my plan of thinking, for conven-

ience's sake at least, to my plan of exposition, it may be assumed

that mv thinking: itself is unbroken. That is, the idea of deo:ree

is not twice thought, with an intermediate lapse from attention,

but once thought only. In other words the idea of degree is now

a simultaneous factor. The second "as" can no longer be para-

phrased by "to that (same degree)," but must be rendered by "to

which (same degree)."^ Accordingly

"A is as great as great is B" is equivalent to

"A is to the deaTee areat to which areat is B."

With a slight inversion the upper expression takes the form of

"A is as great as B is great." By ellipsis of terms readily in-

ferred, this form is changed to "A is as great as B — ." That

such inference occurs in fact, is hinted by the French equivalent

"A est aussi grand que B Test," in which "1" is the obvious

equivalent of "grand." Also even in English, whenever the

comparison is no longer between degrees of the same attribute,

^The change from "demonstrative" to "relative" value is too common to ad-

mit of comment.

Owen — Revision of Pronouns. 73

iDut between degrees of different attributes, ellipsis fails to occur.

Til us, *'A is as yellow as B is blue."

In illustration of an even greater linguistic curiosity, suppose

tliat my acquaintance with Brow^n and my regard for him are

both increasing; that, further, the rate of one increase is that of

the other. The case is roughly that of two progTcssions, the

ratio of one of which I perceive to equal that of its fellows In

expressing this perception, much more delicate than the one I

last considered, I am more likely than ever to make a false start;

this I do by stating that ^^I like Brown increasingly" or ^'better."

This announcement, futile in itself, I may utilize by developing

it into "I like Brown better to the degree to which I see him

more." Of this expression I propose to show that "I like Bro^vn

the more, the more I see him'' is an exact equivalent.

Putting history again to the question, I find that "the" (or ]>J

in Anglo-Saxon) means "by thus much," or again, as above, to

"a degree."^ Also in close analogy with the former case, the

original expression is presumably this, "I like him the more. The

more I see him," which the purest paraphrasing renders into

"I like him to a degi-ee more. To that (same degree) more I see

him." But the two former sentences have coalesced, producing,

if all elements be retained, "I like him the more the more I see

him." In this coalescence, also as before, an important change

of meaning has occurred. I may no longer paraphrase the sec-

ond "the" by "to that degree," but only by "to which (same) de-

gree." That is, "I like him the more the more I see him" is

equivalent to "I like him to that degree more to which degree

more I see him."

Bemembering that the relative may be anticipatively used, I

interchange my clauses in both expressions, obtaining "The

more I see him, I like him the more," and "To w^hich degree

more I see him, I like him to that degTee more." With another

change in the order of the second clause I obtain the conventional

form "The more I see him, the more (or the better) I like

him. ^

^The difference between the former degree of intensity and ttie present de-

grcKi of difference may be overlooked.

' In support of the above interpretation I may lay some stress upon its recon-

ciliation of the English formula to the corresponding "je, desto," "d'autant,

d'autant" and especially "tanto, quanto."

Y4 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences^ Arts, and Letters.

Of presumable latent relatives the most remarkable, perhaps^

appears in the expression "A is greater than B," an expression

not merely curious, but also difficult to such a degree, that I ven-

ture only to indicate the possibility of applying to its solution the

methods thus far utilized. That in this expression a relative ele-

ment is really hidden, may be suspected from the occurrence of

quam and its derivatives in the equivalent expressions of Latin

and the neo-Latin languages. Moreover history reveals the orig-

inal value of " than" (Anglo-Saxon Jeanne) as '^that" accusative.

Kemembering the constant passage of demonstrative into rel-

ative values, I feel that the door at least is open to a relative-

value of ^^than."

Again in ''A is greater than B" it is plain that I do not express-

myself directly. The direct expression of my thought is ob-

viously ^'The magnitude of A (not, e. g., its color-intensity)

exceeds the magnitude of B." In departing from such direct-

ness, I first have overlooked, for the instant, my genuine subject

^^magnitude (1)," and substituted ^A." Continuing my ob-

liquity, I have centrally announced that ^^A is great." For

"greater" expresses the idea of greatness subjected merely to aug-

mentative determination. That is "A is greater," does not mean

that A possesses greatness of any type you please, but only of a

major type. In other words, the announcement made by my

first three words amounts to this, tluit "A is great to a degree

surpassing." This announcement, futile in itself, I may utilize

by developing it into "A is great to a degree surpassing that de-

gree to which B is great." ^

In showing the possible equivalence of this expression to "A is

greater than B," I need the aid of a rare expressional method il-

lustrated in ravTa 'exoVrws, that is, ^^tlie same things havingly."

In this, an adverb, derived from a verbal adjective (participle),

retains the verbal power of governing an object. In short, there

is such a thing as a verbal adverb. ^ Availing myself of this ex-

^The somewhat figurative use of "surpassing" is nearly allied to the figure

believed to be employed in the Latin ablative, when quam is omitted. In the lat-

ter case it is felt that the ablative is the point of departure in reckoning, or

that the major degree is reached by a withdrawal "from" the minor. In the

present case the major is felt to overtake and pass beyond the m'inor. , A dif-

ference is in one case figured as a shunning, and in the other as an outstripping.

2 Even in English the same construction appears in compounds, thus, "She

Bang ear-splittingly,"

Owen — Revision of Pronouns. 75

preesional implement, I replace the phrase ^'to a degree surpass-

ing" by its equivalent ''surpassingly;" and in doing so I retain

for ^'surpassingly" the object-governing power of its parent

form ^'surpassing." Following then my Greek original, without

flinching, I develop ^^A is great surpassingly that degree to which

B is great."

In further approximation to '^A is greater than B," let ^'gTeat

surpassingly" be replaced by the essential equivalent ''greater;"

and let the latter retain, as such equivalent, the governing power

of the former. My sentence now becomes "A is greater that de-

gree to which B is great." "Greater," with the meaning "great

surpassingly," or "great beyond," should be able to govern "that

degree" in the accusative, quite as well as the Latin "major" can

manage it in the ablative. Or, from another point of view, "is

greater," with the obvious value "exceeds," can take an object

quite as well as "schuldig ist" with the value of '^owes" can take

an object in German.

To bridge the remaining gap, let "that degree" (accusative)

be replaced by the historically accusative "than," employed in

the sense of "that" (somewhat vaguely suggesting the idea of

degree, which is inherent in "greater"). My sentence now be-

comes "A is greater than to which B is great," meaning "A is

great to a degree surpassing that to which B is great." 'Now just

as "that," with possible aid from inference, may stand for "that

which" in "Pay me that you ow^e me," so also with no important

stretch of power, "that," or its inflected e^quivalent "than," m-^ay

stand for "that to which," especially as, after all, "to w^hich"

might possibly be replaced by "which" alone, the common ac-

cusative of degree. Accordingly I may change my sentence

again, obtaining "A is greater than B is great" with the value,

as before, of "A is great surpassingly that degree (to) which B is

great." By ellipsis of terms readily inferred, I finally reach the

conventional expression "A is greater than B." That the indi-

cated inference of terms is an actual fact is hinted by the French

"A est plus grand que B (ne) Test." Also even in English,

whenever the comparison is no longer between degrees of the

same attribute, but between degrees of different attributes, all

of the thought, as formulated above, is necessarily expressed.

Thus, "A is redder than B is blue." This last example also

76 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters.

clearly shows that A and B are not at all compared, nor even

their respective qualities, but solely the intensities of these. For

it may be assumed that were A and B compared or their respec-

tive redness and blueness, the discovered difference would not

be expressed in terms of either color. That is, I should hardly

tell you that an A is redder than a B which is not red at all,

or that the redness of an A is redder than the blueness of a B.

The current interpretation of "than" as "then" I have slighted be-

cause it does not appear to be historically defended, because it does not

seem to fit the requirements of English context and because it is ap-

parently unavailable with the correspondent expressions of other Indo-

European languages. These expressions bear so strongly the marks of

original equivalence, that any explanation of a single one is open to

suspicion, unless it applies to all. Such general application must, I ap-

preciate, be proven of my own explanation before it can be accepted;

and, as I have not the means for a complete verification, this explana-

tion must rank as a pure hypothesis, useless till confirmation except

for working purposes, and ultimately, perhaps, at most, as a mere sug-

gestion that existing explanations are inadequate.

Once started in the formation of comparisons, the mind pro-

ceeds to astonishing feats. Beginning with separate manifesta-

tions of a single quality, it readily notes them, as indicated

above, either in their equivalence or in the contrary. It easily

also deals with separate manifestations of diiferent qualities,

and even compares with ease the rates at which diiferent degrees

are acquired. It establishes a norm of quality and compares

amounts of deviation therefrom, as in ^'A's intemperance is as

great as (or more so than) that of B.'' Deviations in oppo-

site directions appear as merely plus and minus aspects of ex-

tension in a single dimension. In "A is as tall as B is short"

comparison is made between positive and negative departures

from a nomi. Comparison is even effected between terms es-

sentially incomparable. Beauty and wit pan no more be put in

comparison, which resembles subtraction of one from the

other, than they can be added or multiplied. Yet I shrink not

from saying that ^'He is as handsome as she is witty." If the

claim be made that after all it is his departure from a norm of

beauty that is compared with her departure from a norm of

wit, the difficulty is little relieved. For I have but an imaginary

Owen — Revision of Pronouns. 77

common unit of measure. I am doing much the same as if I

said ^^This saucer's departure from flatness equals that tardy

student's departure from punctuality" ; or "It is as spherical as

he is late." The results also of comparisons are thems'^ives com-

pared, as in "lie is as superior to her as she is superior (or infer-

ior) to her sister ;" or "He is as superior to her as she is better

than her sister ;" or "He is more superior to her than she is su-

perior (or inferior) to her sister ;" or, with more confusion, "A

is more redder than B, than C is bluer (or less blue) than D."

Such comparisons obviously present the merest extensions of the

mathematical conception known as proportion. "A :B : :0 :D" (or

A:B=C :D) is a manifest preparer of the way to "A:B> C :D"

etc. Also the scope of reality or its imaginary degree is subjected

to comparison. Thus, "The more (truly) A equals B, the more

(truly) C equals D." Opportunity is thus offered for the occur-

rence in a single proposition of still further complication. A

comparison may be made between the realities of two proposi-

tions, each of which compares the results of preceding compari-

sons. Thus, "The more (truly) A is as much larger than B as

C is than D, the more (truly) E is as much larger than F as Gr is

than H." And examples of still greater complexity may be

made by comparing degrees of truth and untruth, or of inferior-

ity and superiority, and by substituting irrelevant qualities.

Thus, "The more truly A is as much yellower than B as C is

less magnetic than D, the less (truly) E is as much broader than

r as G is heavier than H."

These illustrations, partly imaginary, I have not form.ulated

with any purpose of reviewing in their wearisome solution the

principles already indicated. I note them only as suggesting

that, however imperfectly those principles be established, the

effort to establish them lies in the right direction; as indicat-

ing that something more than the facile relegation of words

to "conjunctive" and "relative" categories must be attempted,

before the sentence as the picture of thought can be adequately

understood.

78 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters.

XXIII. LINGUISTIC RANK OF RELATIVES.

Answering now the question raised in the second paragraph

of this chapter, I find that the relative not only lacks the vicar-

ious powers which would give it rank as a pronoun proper, but

also is so weak in symbolizing any part of a thought, that it can-

not even rank as what is ordinarily meant by a word. To its

centrally intended exhibition of a thought-factor's thought-mem-

bership it sometimes adds, it is true, the indication of accessory

ideas such as gender, number and case relations expressible by

prepositions. But even in these bona fide idea-symbolizations it

does that only which is done by forms regarded as mere infleo-

tions and not at all as words. Barring the accident of formal

isolation, the relative is characterized as an idea-namer by noth-

ing which does not characterize the endings of victoris, vic'

tricis and victorum. With these then it should strictly rank.

Or if it be insisted that "whose," for instance, contains what is

expressed by -"of" and that "of" is a word, it may be conceded

that the "se" of "whose" is a word, but not the remainder.

Apart from such occasional idea-naming, the relative is quite

analogous to the isolated infinitive signs to, zu, a and de. These

I should personally not invest with the rank of proper words, to

give, zu geben, and a donner being but so many split synonyms

of donare.

XXIV. RELATIVE TERMINOLOGY.

The view of the relative thus far upheld presents it as a mere

inflection, distinguished from others by its isolation. These

others, which have abrogated their formal independence, may,

with some extension of a grammatical figure of speech, be de-

scribed as leaning upon the words which they inflect, sometimes

at the front and sometimes at the rear. They may, that is, be

ranked as, in a larger sense, proclitics and enclitics. In con-

trast to these, the function-sigTis which maintain their isolation

may be known as aclitics or inflections which do not lean.

Again the incorporated inflection is known, according to its

place in word-formation, as prefix, infix or suffix. Analogously

the isolated sign of an idea's function might be called, when

Owen — Revision of Pronouns. 79

it precedes the sign of the idea itself, a profix; and when it fol-

lows the sign of that idea, it might be called a postfix.

Yet another, and I think a better designation, is suggested by

comparison with vicarious words. To illustrate, given ^^The

Bible teaches him who will learn," it is plain that 'Svho" does

not indicate that the idea expressed by ^'him" is to be reinstated

(taken up in a second thought after being dropped at the end

of a fii*st) or coinstated (duplicated in the same thought before

being dropped) ; the duty of ^'who'' is to show the second func-

tion of a factor which has two simultaneous functions. But

also, inferentially at least, it tells you more generally that a sec-

ond fimction will occur. When now, as usual, the idea in its

first function has already been presented, the relative warns you

to keep it in mind for further use.-^ It accordingly somewhat

resembles the musical sign which directs the musician to hold a

given note.

Comparing now it and its linguistic neighbors, I note that the

implied order of the reinstative is to recall ; that of the coinsta-

tive is to repeat ; that of the relative is to continue or retain.

Such being the procedure of the relative, and its special service

being the maintenance of continued expression, it is perhaps

most of all convenient to contrast it with reinstative and coin-

stative by calling it continuative.

^Even when such idea, as sometimes happens, is yet to be presented, the rela-

tive, showing in the meantime one of its memberships, warns you to IooIj out for

the exhibition of a second membership at the same time with the presentation

of the idea itself. Thus, in '"Who claims me first that man I serve," you ob-

tain from '^who" a warning to watch for an idea of which "who" might tell you

nothing but the former of two functions. That is, you are warned to maintain

an attention which in this case takes the form of expectation instead of the com-

mon form of retention.

80 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters,

CHAPTER IV. RELATIVE CLAUSES.

I. SE]SrTET<rCES IN WHICH THEY APPEAR.

Of these, which may in brief be known as relative sentences, I

note as more or less axiomatic that,

(a) They must express two or more thought-units.

An expression of one thought-nnit, as "Men are happy," af-

fords no opportunity for a relative ; but an expression of two

thought-units, such for instance as "Men are happy" and "Men

are virtuous," permits the use of a relative, as in "Men ivho

are virtuous are happy." Also, as the number of units in-

creases, such increase permits the use of several relatives, as in

"Men ivho are virtuous enjoy a. happiness that well repays the

pleasures ivhich they renounce."

(h) Two units must have a common factor.

To illustrate, "Men are virtuous" and "Angels have wings,"

being without a common factor, do not admit the formation of a

relative sentence. But "Men are virtuous" and "Men are

happy," having a fact-or in common, namely "Men," allow the

use of a relative sentence, as above.

(c) Their common factor must he simultaneous, not successive.

Suppose, for instance, I say that "Men are virtuous" and again

that "Men (human beings, they) are happy." Obviously I have

expressed two thought-units ; and these units have a common fac-

tor, namely "men." But this factor has been once conceived in

"Men are virtuous," has then lapsed from attention, and has

again been brought to attention by "Men (2)" or an equivalent,

in "Men (human beings, they) are happy." So long as men-

tal operatio^i is of this sort, a relative sentence will not be formed.

That is, a reinstated common factor is not available for relative

usage.

Owen — Revision of Pronouns. 81

Again, in "Brown has lost his horse/' there are pLainly two

thought-units, namely "Brown has lost a horse/' and what

might be more fully expressed by "The horse is Brown's." These

units have two common factors, namely "horse" and "Brown."

Of these two the common factor "horse" is also simultaneous

and would permit, for instance, the relative sentence "Brown has

lost the horse which is Brown's (or his)." But as this possi-

bility is not utilized, it need not further be considered. On the

other hand, the common factor "Brown" is not simultaneous.

It is successive, being twice thought, once in "Brown has lost a

horse" and again in what might be more fully expressed by "The

horse is (Brown's, his or) of Brown." This factor, however,

has not meantime lapsed from attention. In other words the

symbol "his" presents the idea of Brown coinstatively. Now I

may not say that "Brown has lost luhose horse." That is, not

only a reinstated, but also a coinstated common factor is unavail-

able for relative usaire.

These propositions apply as follows : A given idea must ob-

viously be thought either once only or more than once, say twice.

Again, between two thinkings it must either lapse or not lapse.

That is, the second thinking, if it occur, must be either rein-

stative or coinstative. If now in relative usage it can be neither,

such idea cannot be thought of more than once ; or in other words

it is thought once only. If then, as in relative usage (see b)

such idea be a common factor, it must be of the simultaneous

type, as announced at the head of this section.

Obedience to this law requires an analysis of the relative sen-

tence different from the one adopted by Grammar, which latter

may be illustrated as f ollovrs : Given "I met Brown, who is ill,"

Grammar conceives "who is ill" as the relative clause, and the

remainder of the sentence as the principal. If the latter be ob-

literated, Grammar further notes that the residuary "who is

ill" is inadequate, observes that "Avho" is void of meaning, as-

sumes that it ought to have a meaning, believes that it would

Tiave a meaning, were "I met Brown" restored, and accordingly

claims that the relative clause depends upon the principal in the

vital sense of needing it in the interest of its own meaning.

In argiiing against this opinion, w^hich quite obscures the truth,

T revive in the first place the claim that "who" is the mere sign

6

82 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters.

that a simultaneous factor of two clauses is, in tlie relative clause^

the subject; that it has no meaning; that it is not the subject in

the relative structure ; that the actual subject of the relative-

clause is "Brown," simultaneously object in the principal. That

is, the true analysis is not [I met Brown] (who is ill), but [I

met (Brown] who is ill.)

If now one of these clauses be abolished, the question rises, what be-

comes of their common property? Passing to an extremely objective'

illustration, suppose that you and I are common owners of a horse.

If I am killed, that incident does not destroy the beast or abrogate your

ownership. You are no less and it may be even more the owner of

the horse than before. Returning to matters of thought, in the phrase

"a tall slender tree," I might indeed conceive a tree as once character-

ized by a pair of qualities. But I may also think of it as twice char-

acterized and each time by a single quality; that is, the tree may be

the simultaneous factor of two thoughts. If now I omit the conception

of the tree's tallness, I do not find that, in disappearing, it tears from

my mind the idea of the tree or even that it makes off with the proper

word for that object. That is, given

( characterized by tallness

Tree -J

( characterized by slenderness

I do not find that either phrase is mutilated by the disappearance of

the other.

In striving to show that the same is true of the strictly relative.-

clause, I wish to avoid multiplicity of issues, such as number and

gender. Accordingly let the Latin stem "Homin" stand, in a contem-

plated illustration, for men; let "es" stand solely for use as subject, or

first term, in principal thought; let "qui" stand solely for use as sub-

ject in relative thought. In diagramming my illustration, I will write

the principal clause downward on the left, and the relative downward

on the right. As I shall think of men but once, though in two thoughts,.

I write the symbol "homin" once only, indicating the sequence of each,

thought by downward lines. "Qui," as sign of function in the right-

hand clause, will naturally stand at the right of "homin." "Es," being

sign of function in the clause on the left, I will for convenience write

it on the left of "homin." To indicate the functional parity of these-

signs, I will join each to "homin" by a hyphen. Accordingly

es-Homin-qui

/ \

sunt sunt

/ \

mortales animales

Owen — Revision of Pronouns. 83

Suppose now I elect to omit the principal thought, namely, that men

are mortal, expressed by "Es-Homin sunt mortales." As I have sought

to indicate, its disappearance does not involve the loss of the idea

named by "homin" or of the symbol "homin" itself. That is, the drop-

ping of the principal clause has not affected any structural element of

the relative clause. Far from disappearing, "homin" steadfastly holds

its place.

It cannot then be said that "qui" or "who" is left without a meaning.

In the first place "who" never had a meaning. In the second place the

meaning required by Grammar is present in "homin" or "men,"

which does not disappear from either my thought or my sentence.

That "men" may be forced to disappear must be conceded. All of

my example might no doubt be suppressed except "who are animals."

But to such suppression I object as excessive. The severance of the

principal, including its share in a common subject, is no doubt legiti-

mate. But such amputation, like that proposed by Shylock, must draw

no blood. Much more then must it not cut off any member of the rela-

tive body. It must leave to the relative clause its share of the common

subject. Properly then the relative clause consists of "Homin-qui sunt

mortales."

It appears accordingly, that the relative clause as well as the

principal contain the simultaneous factor. The symbols of all

other required meanings it also sujDplies. It does not therefore

depend upon the principal for any part of its meaning. While

the relative word is a convenient formal means of recognizing

the relative clause, the latter in strict analysis consists of what

Grammar calls the antecedent, plus the isolated inflection, plus

associated words. Thus in ^'I met Brovvm, who is ill," the

relative clause is ^'Bro\^Ti (who) is ill," ^*who" being merely the

nominative case ending peculiar to the secondary membership

of a simultaneous factor.

(d) Ttvo units may have more than one common factor, but one only

is made simultaneous.

Given "A stone struck Brown" and "A stone hurt Brown," I may say

that "A stone which struck Brown hurt him," or "A stone struck Brown

whom it hurt;" but I may not say that "A stone struck Brown whom

which hurt;" and much less may I say "A stone struck Brown yester-

day on the shoulder, which hurt whom when where."

It is obvious that a simultaneous factor directly links the wholes of

which it is a part. To this proposition it is merely corollary to add

that two thoughts, if linked directly each by a simultaneous factor to a

third, are indirectly linked each to the other. It is further conceivable

84 Wisco7ism Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters,

that three thoughts be so constituted that two of them may be linked

either directlj-, each to the other, or indirectly through the medium

of the third. Accordingly

(e) Two units may have a factor in common and also, each, a fac-

tor common to a third unit. In this case either the factor covimon to

the two or the factors common to the third may he made simultaneous^

"but not both.

To illustrate, let three thoughts be diagrammed as follows:

(1) Men — suffer — pain.

Suffering

(3) -( is because of

I I

(^ disobedience.

(2) Men — disobey — laws.

Of this trio (1) and (2) have the common factor named by "men."

Further, (1) and (3) have the common factor named by "suffer" and

"suffering;" also (3) and (2) have the common factor named by "dis-

obedience" and "disobey." As indicated, I may follow either one of two

linking processes. On the one hand I may make "suffer" and "suffer-

ing" simultaneous, and also "disobedience" and "disobey;" I may at the

same time reduce the causal relation of (3) from declarative to merely

suggestive form, obtaining "men suffer pain because men (or human

beings or they) disobey laws." On the other hand I may make men (1)

and men (2) simultaneous, obtaining "Men who disobey laws suffer

pain." I may not, however, follow both these methods at once. That

is, I may not say that "Men suffer pain because who break laws."^

^ After linking two thoughts by one of these methods I may, however, again

by the other method link one thought to a repetition of the other thought. Thus,

(1)' Men — disobey — laws.

(2) Men — suffer — pain.

r suffering

I I

(3) -l is because of

I I

[disobedience.

CD' Men — disobey — laws.

Let now fEe "men" of (1)' and (2) become simultaneous, developing "Men

who disobey laws suffer pain." It is practicable further to reduce (2), (3), and

(1)'' as before, obtaining in toto "Men who disobey laws suffer pain because men

(or human beings or they) disobey laws." It is common in this operation to

replace the word "because," etc., by the single word "therefore," which, as I have

elsewhere striven to show, is equivalent to "because of that," or, in full, "be-

cause men disobey laws." The fact of momentary importance is my ability to

use the rcinstative relation namer, as in "Men who disobey laws, therefore

(hence, on that account), suffer pain." I may not, however, use the contin-

uative relation namer ; that is, I may not say "Men who disobey laws, icherefore,

whence, on which account) suffer pain."

Owen — Revision of Pronouns. 85

The substance of (d) and (e) may be resumed by saying that

when one thoue*ht is linked to another, to draw it into the se-

quence of exposition, a single point of attachment is elected;

each car of the mental train is dra^^Ti by one coupler. For this fact

a psychological reason may be suggested as follows: While I

may think two thoughts at the same time, I must, in oral com-

munication and in its thus far current written or printed substi-

tutes, express them in succession. This of course implies their

successive appearance in the mind of my hearer. Also my o^vn

thinking, under the in^^uence of the successive expressional pro-

cess, will adopt the successive method. In other words I shall,

while speaking, think my thought in the shape in which I mean

to tell it ; for to tell it in one shape, Avhile thinking it in another,

is a feat unduly difficult, if not indeed impossible.

Successive thinking being then adopted, the use of a simul-

taneous factor implies the holding in my mind of a factor of

one thought, during its service as factor of another. This alone

is not difficult ; but thought-building further implies the appre-

hension of the factor's structural position in each of two

thoughts ; and this apprehension of the factor's position implies

again some perception of its field or, in other words, the two

thoughts of which it is a part. That the mental effort involved

is somewhat difficult is indicated by the notorious frequency of

error in the use of relative words.-^ This difficulty may be com-

pared to that of looking at the same time after the doings of an

Alice and those also of an ^^Alice in the looking-glass." When

now the speaker undertakes the management of two simultaneous

factors, direct or indirect, his difficulty may be compared to that

of looking at the same time after the doings of two actual and

two reflected Alices. Happily such a task is never prescribed.

Instead of making each of two common factors simultaneous, in-

stead that is of continuing two factors of one thought into an-

other, the speaker may always drop one or even each of them

and pick it up again at his convenience. Thus, declining the

effort involved in "A stone struck Brown whom which hurt,"

I am allowed the less perplexing forms, "A stone struck Brown

whom it hurt" or ^^which hurt him ;" and if further indisposed

^Conf. "The enemy tchom he thought would injure him." "The enemy who

they were sure they had defeated."

86 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters.

to complex cerebration, I may even say "A stone struck Brown.

It liurt him.'' The linguistic law of single simailtaneoiis factor

is then but a special application of the general law that energy,

in this case mental, tends to follow the line of least resistance.

(/) Of the relative sentence the relative clause may he infor-

mational.

This proposition, being generally admitted, may be merely

illustrated as follows: ^'I have met Brown, who is ill.''

By this sentence I wish you to understand both that I have met

Brown and that Brown is ill. That such is mv intention is in-

dicated by my ability, without thwarting that intention, to sub-

stitute "I met Brown. Bro^oi (he) is ill." My sentence then

contains two statements ; or my apparently single sentence is

really two. It may be knovv^n as polyphrastic.

(g) Of the relative sentence the relative clause may he re-

strictive.

This proposition merely substitutes the term restrictive

for the currently accepted term ^'determinative," and again

requires illustration only. Accordingly, ^'I want a horse which

can trot in 1 :30." Applying again my previous tests, I find

that if I say ^^I want a horse. He can trot in 1 :30," my inten-

tion is defeated. Postponing rigid examination, I confine

myself, for the moment, to noting that, in associating a horse with

a 1 :30 gait, I desire solely to guide you to the mere conception of

a particular equine type. I am far from wishing to assert that

any horse can trot so fast. My relative clause is accordingly not

informational, but restrictive, excluding horses otherwise think-

able. The sentence of which it forms an essential part, con-

taining but a single statement, may be known as monoplirastic.'

^The difference between the informational and the restrictive clause may be

emphasized as follows : Given the word "men," the idea which it will rouse in

your mind is obviously variable. You may think of all men in all that consti-

tutes their manhood — of less — or even of more. The restrictive relative leads

you to think of less. Thus, "who are virtuous," excluding "wicked." leads you to

think of less men and less qualities. It resembles a numerical coefficient of the

fractional type, e. g., i. On the other hand the informational clause, for in-

stance "who are God's creatures" leads you to think of men in a broadened

range of characteristics. Such a clause is, in a sense, augmentive ; it resem-

bles a numerical coeflacient of the integral type, e. g., 5.

Owen — Revision of Pronouns. 87

(7i) Of the relative sentence the relative clause may he hoth informa-

tional and restrictive.

Such a clause is merely a peculiar illustration of that economy of

speech, which leads the linguistic marksman, when able, to kill two

"birds with a single stone. To illustrate, suppose that I wish to intro-

duce to you an acquaintance; in doing so I might employ the sentence,

"This is Mr. Brown." But suppose again that, knowing several per-

sons of that name, I wish to distinguish this one from others; in doing

so I may use the expression "This is the Mr. Brown met by me in

London."- Suppose also that, never having mentioned this meeting

before, I wish to inform you of it; I tell you that "This is the Mr.

Brown whom I met in London."

Such usage is comparatively rare; and as it obviously carries with

it the peculiarities of both restrictive and informational usage, it may

\)e neglected in favor of these latter pure and simple.

(i) Of the relative sentence the relative clause may he equivocal.

By this I mean that the hearer may be uncertain whether the relative

clause be intended as informational or as restrictive. To illustrate,

■"The strawberries which were ripe were greatly enjoyed," This sen-

tence may be taken as meaning either "Such strawberries as were ripe

(no others) were greatly enjoyed," or "The strawberries (incidentall;?

declared to be ripe) were greatly enjoyed."

An effort has been made to differentiate such clauses by the scope

(content or extent) of the simultaneous factor, as it appears in the

relative clause. It is indeed obvious that, if the scope of this factor

in the relative clause be universal, that clause must be unavailable for

restrictive purposes. Thus, strawberries being all of them larger than

currants, it would be useless to say, with any restrictive intention, that

'"The strawberries which were larger than currants were enjoyed."

That is, I have no chance to distinguish berries from berries by their

superiority to currants. But it by no means follows conversely that,

if the simultaneous factor has only partial scope in the relative clause,

it is therefore unavailable for purposes of information. To illustrate,

"Strawberries, which arc very wholesome, are larger than currants."

In this sentence "which are wholesome" is plainly informational; to

construe it as aiming to indicate what berries are larger than currants

would be simply impertinent; it plainly expresses collateral informa-

tion. Yet in my statement that strawberries are wholesome you must

not suppose that I mean them all. I sRould wish to make a reservation

in the case of the unripe and the decayed.

The scope of the simultaneous factor in the principal clause is an

equally unsafe guide. It is doubtless true that, if the scope of that

factor be universal, I shall not seek to restrict it. But it does not fol-

low that, if it be partial, I must restrict it; for I may even leave it as it

2 1 use the past participle to avoid any appearance of assertion.

SS Wisconsin Academy of Sciences^ ArlSj and Letters.

is. Thus, in "Strawberries are wiiolesome," though I do not mean all

strawberries, I leave to you entirely 'the elimination of such as I da

not mean. It also does not follow that I cannot use an informational

clause. Thus I am likely enough to say that strawberries, which are

larger than currants, are very wholesome." That is "strawberries,"

viewed as wholesome, means certain berries only, the unripe and the

aecayed being excluded; but "strawberries" viewed as larger than cur-

rants may even mean all berries of the species.^

The scope then of the simxUltaneous factor cannot, in either of its

functions, settle the question whether the relative clause be restrictive

or informational. This is settled purely by the speaker's intention.

This intention is usually known from mode (when reliabl-3), context,,

situation and the other available extra-linguistic aids. When it re-

mains unknown, the relative sentence merely presents a case of that

ambiguity with which language abounds. Such ambiguity of the rela-

tive clause, comparatively rare and of minor importance, I have noted

merely in the effort to avoid oversight, reserving all more careful ex-

amination for relative clauses of unequivocal value.

Of these the informational clause, so far as I have observed, presents

no difficulties which do not also appear in clauses either principal or

restrictive. The last indeed so exceed the first, both in number and de-

gree of ditliculties, that I may in the interest of brevity, confine m.yself

in the main to restrictive clsAises. As a convenient background on

which to project them, I offer a few observations on

II. THE INFORMATIOXAL RELATIVE CLAUSE.

The distinctive features of this appear to best advantage, when

its services are compared with those of the principal clause. Ac-

cordingly, given ^'I have met Brown, who is ill,'' it is plain that

each of my clauses diligently attends to the business of giving

its own contingent of information ; and each neither aids nor

meddles with the business of the other. The information that I

met Brown is not made, in any one of its elements, either more

or less clear, certain or comprehensive by the mention of his

being ill ; and the information that he is ill is quite unaitected

by the mention of the meeting. The business of the relative

clause is then, when informational, exclusively its o^m, a fact

of multiple significance.

In the first place it is obvious that, of two things one: either

a given relative clause is needed to restrict some element of the

^My change in the scope of simultaneous factor is hardly flattering to my

mental precision, but does not, I think, outdo the practice of average minds.

Owen — Ee vision of Pronouns. 89

principal clause or it is not. If now it be not so needed, then

and then only is it free to attend to business exclusively its own.

In other words the special condition or say the 02)porlunity (oc-

casion) of the informational clause is the adequacy of the prin-

cipal, without its aid.

Looking now from external conditions to conditions inherent

in the relative clause itself, I note that, the business of principal

clause and that of informational relative, being mutually quite

independent, the relative obtains no countenance from the prin-

cipal. It need not allege activit}^ in the interest of the princi-

pal as a raison d'etre. Its own business offers ample justifica-

tion of its existence, without being also the business of the prin-

cipal. It is not a means to an end but rather an end in itself.

In the strongest sense of the word it therefore may be said that

the informational clause is self-sufficient. Its warrant, like that

of the principal, is the intrinsic value of what it expresses.

This value is primarily dependent on reality. For, if w4iat

I tell you be not true, it alone can hardly help you* Yet some

leniency must be shown when the informational clause ex-

presses what is not true. Such untruth or unreality may be

explained either by deliberate falsification on my part or by

self-deception. The former possibility may be dismissed as,

strictly speaking, extra-linguistic. That is, it isn't the j)urpose

of speech to express wdiat speakers do not think. As to self-

deception, it should be remembered that the purpose of speech

is not to express external fact. It aims to embody solely in-

ternal or subjective fact, wdiat the speaker thinks he knows, what

in other words he believes.^ Though, as sometimes happens,

this belief be not in accordance with external fact, such an in-

cident is the mere misfortune of human weakness, and is again

strictly extra-linguistic. So long as I successfully express my

^Thus from my assertion that "A equals B" you learn my subjective status

only, my belief in the equality of A and B, but by no means the truth of my

proposition. Such belief indeed you also learn from sentences not as a rule

perceived to be assertive. Thus even the imperative assures the hearer that

the speaker desires or commands ; that is, it asserts or expresses a belief, not

indeed in what is desired, but in the mental state of desiring. Again interroga-

tion, it is true, is a solicitation of knowledge. But it takes the form of infor-

mation-giving ; for it informs the hearer that the speaker desires to be told

something. That is, it does not assert that something, nor that telling, but only

the mental status of desire, being therefore a pregnant imperative, just as the

imperative itself is a pregnant indicative.

90 Wisconsi7i Academy of Scieiices, Arts, and Letters.

belief/ I am doing all that the linguistic mechanism was in-

tended to perform. Accordingly an informational clause may

be recognized as having primarily the necessary value, if only it

expresses what the speaker believes to be true.

This value is secondarily dependent on the hearer's previous

ignorance of what the informational clause expresses. As a

reasonable person, I shall not waste my breath in telling you

what you already know. And passing from my personal view-

point to that of my hearer, I must perceive that he will not wel-

come speech which merely reviews for him the items of his knowl-

ed^re, but only such as augments it. If, knowing you to be aware

of Brown's illness, (and also who is meant by Brown), I never-

theless declare that "I have met Brown, who is ill/^ I am guilty

of a linguistic impertinence second only to falsehood. Indeed

it may be questioned whether a stale truth be not on occasion

more offensive than untruth. It must indeed be admitted that I

may err in supposing you to be unacquainted with what I tell

you ; but such an accident may be overlooked. So long as the

speaker thinks that he is going to augment the hearer's knowl-

edge the requisite condition is fulfilled.^

Overlooking, as unnecessary, the aesthetic, utilitarian and

ethical aspects of value, I resume as follows : the warrant of the

informational clause is the supposed reality and novelty of its

import.

As the relative clause of the informational type is active, like

the principal, solely in its own interest, it may be said to be ego-

istic. Its purpose, like that of the principal, and like that of

an isolated sentence, is to give information of its own.

In tactics the informational and principal clauses offer further

1 Disbelief, bein;? merely belief in the unreality of what is mentioned, may be

fncluded in this stipulation, thus extending its application to negativi sentences

proper.

2 The tentative review of facts in argument is merely a form of exposition

adopted, in protracted reasoning, for the sake of greater ease and clearness.

Thus, assuming you to know that a=& and that 6=c, but not to have perceived

the relation of a and c, I say to you "a=b. l}=c. Therefore fl.=c." Of these

announcements the first two may be interpreted as inviting objection to prem-

ises, being equivalent to '■a=b? J)=c?" Or the whole may be regarded as merely

a paraphrase of "Because of a's equality to 6 and b's equality to c, a is equal

to c." Again, while aware that you know the equality of a and 6, as well as

that of b and c, I may think it likely that you have forgotten these facts or at

least are not thinking of them at this moment, that is, that you are in a state

of momentary ignorance, in which case the use of informational expressions is

justified by their momentary novelty.

Oiven — Revision of Pronouns. 91

agreement. To illustrate, in ^^I have met the Browns, who are

going to Europe" I will suppose that you know perfectly well

whom I mean by ^^the Browns/' without the help of anything

but the word itself. AVith the idea which it suggests, by means

of suitable words I induce you to associate other ideas, so as to

form the thought expressed by ^'I have met the Browns." Also

with the idea expressed by ^'Browns," by means of other suita-

ble words, I induce you to associate still other ideas, so as to form

the thought expressible by ^'The Browns are going to Europe."

This, too, I believe is all that you do, either by my inducement

or independently. That is, whether the principal or the infor-

mational clause be examined, one form of procedure appears.

In particular, then, it may be said that the lyrocedure of an in-

formational relative clause is this : by means of terms associ-

ated with a term occurring in the principal it formulates a propo-

sition.

As both the principal and the informational clauses aim, as

expressions of the speaker's belief, to increase the hearer's

knowledge, both are properly put in the form of assertions.

Thus, in ^'I have met Brown, who is going to Europe," there can

be, I think, no question that I assert not only my meeting with

Browm, but also Brown's going to Europe. iSTow assertion is

the distinctive characteristic of a sentence. (See IvTote, p. 89.)

As a sentence, therefore, the informational relative properly

i^anks, diiferins: from others merelv in the circumstance that

one of its factors is simultaneouslv a factor of another sentence.-^

This circumstance, it is moreover obvious, is characteristic also

of its principal.

In the examination of the restrictive clause an effort will be

made to show that it enters the principal clause as one of its ele-

ments, or in other words as a part of speech, i^ow the informa-

tional clause is not a part of speech at all, but, so to speak, a

speech in itself. In other v^ords the function of the informa-

tional clause is that of a sentence.

The exact opposite, in most cases, of the informational clause

in opportunity, warrant, purpose, procedure, and function I ^^lan

to exhibit in

^Or, in other words, principal and informational clause together form a

polyphrastic sentence. See Section I, f.

02 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, AriSy and Letters.

III. THE EESTEICTIYE SELATIVE CLAUSE.

(1) Its Opportunity.

To illustrate this, if ^'^vlen die yearly of cholera" expresses to

my satisfaction what I intend, I shall let well-enough alone and

use no other words of any sort. But if my statement is inade-

quate, if for example I further wish you to know what kind of

men or how many or which, I am likely to use linguistic means

to effect my desire. Of these, which are many, the restrictive

relative clause alone is of momentary interest. Of it in par-

ticular it may then be noted, that its opportunity is the inade-

quacy of the principal clause.

(2) Its Warrant.

Supposing such an opportunity to exist, the right or warrant

of the restrictive relative to utilize it may be illustrated as fol-

lows. Suppose that, meeting you at a social gathering, I wish

to tell you that one of its members, a Mr. Brown, is the son of my

brother. My natural impulse is to say that '^Brown is my

nephew." But I recall that you do not know his name. His

specific designation being therefore unavailable, the best remain-

ing single word for him is possibly ''guest," which at least ex-

cludes the host, the family, servants, reporters, and all beings

not human. But from this word vou cannot learn which one of

many persons I intend. Casting about me for a remedy, I note

an exchange of salutations between mv kinsman and one Smith,

at the very moment when your eyes are on the former. I solve

at once all difficulties by designatino; the person I intend as "The

guest who bowed to Smith."

In doing so I am not to be understood as attaching special im-

portance to the salutation. Any other distinctive act would have

served as well. Thus, overlooking a mere aesthetic preference

for the comely, I might with equal clearness say ''The gniest who

stretched his legs" or "The guest who yawned so dangerously

is my nephew." But had any other person bowed to Smith or

yawned or stretched while Brown Avas doing the same, I should

have neglected each of these acts, for the reason that no one of

Owen — Eevision of Pronouns. 93

them "would have served to show you the person of whom I wish

to speak.

To generalize, given in a principal clause a need of determi-

nation, a particular restrictive clause is admitted only in case

it can meet that need. Given also several restrictive clauses

able to meet that need, the choice among them is guided first of

all by their respective ability. The restrictive clause has no in-

dividual raison d'etre. It cannot justify its existence by the

unaided value of what it mentions. This is not itself an end,

but onlv a means to an end. Far from beinc; like the informa-

tional relative self-sufficient, it is in itself conspicuously insuffi-

cient ; it is merely ancillary or auxiliary ; it is dependent in the

sense of needing another clause in justification of its own exist-

ence. Its warrant for entering the sentence is by no means the

intrinsic value of what it expresses, but the availability thereof

in the service of the principal.

Such being the case, it is strictly irrelevant to consider at all the

question of its intrinsic value. Yet the confusion prevalent at this

point is so great as to invite some development of the following axio-

matic proposition; the intrinsic value of a restrictive relative may be

what it will, either in reality or novelty.

Examining in turn the elements of value already noted on p. 89,

! find, in the first place, that the import of the restrictive clause might

be either already known or unknown. That the already known should

be available in the clarification of a statement has been already shown

in "The guest who bowed to Smith is my nephew." In this example

I utilize your knowledge of the bowing, to help you understand what

guest I mean. The contrast between the restrictive and the informa-

tional clause is in this case at a maximum. The latter is a gift added

to that of the principal. The restrictive is rather a draft upon your

acquisitions to pay the expense of transporting the principal. The in-

formational embodies what you don't know, because you don't know it,

and in order that you may know it. The restrictive embodies what

you do know, because you know it, and in order to help you know some-

thing else.

That the unknown should also be available in restriction is not so

obvious. To illustrate, I choose, among many possible cases, the ex-

treme one, in which neither speaker nor hearer knows that which the

restrictive mentions, and neither has ever even heard or thought of it

before. I assume accordingly that the thought of men's eating rats has

never appeared in your mind or mine, and that much less can either

of us know that they do so. Wishing now to indicate the gastronomic

94: }Visconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters.

fortitude required at our boarding-house, I tell you that "We need th&

stomachs of men who live on rats;" and this I do with perfect confi-

dence that you will think of such men and thereby of such stomachs

as I do myself.

Again, that what is true should offer available aid in the acquisition

of truth, is sufficiently illustrated by "The guest who bowed to Smith

is my nephew," the salutation being supposed to have occurred. That,

however, the acquisition of truth may be aided by untruth, is not so

plainly apparent. A complete examination of the different forms of

this possibility would lead too far. Contenting myself on that account

with a single crucial test, I suppose that my servant has worn to a fire-

men's ball a pair of trousers, which at the time he believed to be mine.

But later he has learned that what he actually wore was the similar

garment of a guest who has since departed with all his belongings. To

make the illustration even more effective, let it be conceded that I also

know this and that each of us is aware of the other's knowledge.

Suppose now that I say to my servant, "Bring me the trousers that you

wore to the firemen's ball." Bringable trousers including assumably

only my own, it is plain that none such can truly be characterized as

worn to the ball. Yet I do not hesitate so to characterize the desired

pair; and, guided by such characterization, my servant thinks of the

right trousers; he wastes no time in psychologizing on the reality, prob-

ability, possibility, or plausibility of the characterization; he gets the

trousers.

Be then the intrinsic value of the restrictive what it will, it will be

used for restrictive purposes, if only it be able to restrict.

(S) Its Purpose.

To illustrate, suppose that, as above, I use the sentence ^'The

guest who bowed to Smith is mj- nephew;" my motive needs, I

think, no demonstration. Recognizing that, without the clause

"who bowed to Smith," my contemplated statement would be

inadequate, I intend that by the use of this clause such inade-

quacy be relieved. My motive is even more conspicuous in ex-

amples offering a severer test. In "All men who live in Eng-

land are called English," and again in "I don't know any man,

w^ho is perfectly happy," the inadequacy of the isolated princi-

pal clause becomes untenability. Unless my principal shall ab-

solutely contradict me, I must relieve its inadequacy by a re-

strictive. The relieving purpose of my relative clause is em-

phasized on the one hand by glaring need. On the other hand

Owen — Revision of Pronouns. 95

it is emphasized by the completeness with which it meets that

need. The restrictive chnise is not, then, used for its own sake,

but for the sake of the principal It is not, like the informa-

tional, egoistic ; it is altruistic. Its purpose is to aid the inform-

ational effort of the principal.

(Ji) lis Procedure.

In examining this it is convenient to begin with cases in Avhich,

to use the words of Grammar,

(a) The relative word is subject of the relative clause.

Let such be illustrated bv ''The c:uest who bowed to Smith is

my nephew\'' Reviving the doctrine proposed on p. 60 that

the value of ''who" is not structural, but only instructional (like

that of plans and specifications), and assuming that the instruc-

tion offered by "who" has been duly utilized, let attention be con-

fined to structural elements only. Such elements may be pre-

sented, and their simultaneous factor indicated, by the diagram,

rpi ^ ( — bowed to — Smith (relative)

Ihea-uest -^ . ^ , • • ^^

( — is — my nephew (prmcipal)

t)'

The psychological reactions attending the presentations of

ideas in the above tw^o clauses are by no means alike. In "The

guest is my nephew" (principal), since you regard ideas named

as mutually suitable to thought-formation, you accept my sug-

gestion to combine them into a thought. On the other hand,

in "The guest bowed to Smith" (relative), since you perceive

ideas named to be put by me as forming a thought, you infer

that they are mutually suitable for thought-formation. That

is, in the principal clause, because ideas are mutually suitable,

you combine them into a thought ; but in the restrictive clause,

because ideas are combined into a thought, you accept them as

mutually suitable.

To complete my purpose, you must comply with two condi-

tions. In the first place, while conceiving the ideas named by

"The guest bowed to Smith" as in a general way mutually suita-

96 Wisconsiji Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters.

ble, joii must in particular conceive the ^%iiest" as suitable to

"bowed to Smith;" and this yon cannot do of each and every

gnest. Yon mnst not therefore think of any gnest who did not

perform that act. That is, in order that the idea named by

'^gnest" may snit the ideas named by "bowed to Smith/' it must

be the idea of only one, and a particular one, of the persons as-

sembled. In the second place, having thought of the right guest

in connection with "bowed to Smith," you must hold fast to him,

and not allow him to be displaced in your mind, or accompanied

by any other, as you pass on to his being my nephew That is,

in the relative clause of restrictive type, the simultaneous factor

must be conceived suitablv to the other ideas with which therein

it is associated ; and in the principal clause that simultaneous

factor must be conceived exactlv as in the restrictive. In other

words, the scope of the simultaneous factor is, in the relative

clause, adjusted to suit its fellows; and in the principal clause

this scope is maintained. The simultaneous factor, it may then

be said, is specially fitted for its service in the principal clause

by its service in the relative clause; and, as this special fitting

is a reduction of possible scope, it may very well be said that

the simultaneous factor, in its use as part of the principal clause,

is restricted, determined, or limited bv its associates in the rela-

tive clause ; or, in particular, "giiest" is limited by "bowed to

Smith." 1

In order to feel this limiting, this adaptation of the scope

of the relative to its fellow clause-members, the mind is obliged

to view the relative clause as made up of a limited and a limit-

ing part — to analyze it, that is, in the present case, into its sub-

ject (the simultaneous factor) and its predicate or remainder.

"Guest," the true subject of the relative clause, is juxtaposed

^By Grammar, however, the limiter of "guest" is said to be ''who bowed to

Smith." The utter untenahility of this proposition will appear, I hope, in

further examination. For the moment it may be enough to note that if, as I

argue, "who" is merely an instructional element, it cannot be recognized as nam-

ing one of the ideas restricting "guest," but if. as Grammar will have it, "who"

stands for an idea or thought element, that idea can only be that of "guest ;"

that is. such idea is twice thought of, once as symbolized by "guest," and again

as symbolized by "who." But the moment "the guest" is thought of twice, it

ceases to be a simultaneous factor, becoming successive ; that is, a breach occurs

in thought continuity, and the actual value of my sentence becomes "A guest

bowed to Smith. The guest is my nephew ;" that is, I have no longer a single

monophrastlc sentence, but two sentences or, at tlie least, a sentence of the

polyphrastic type.

Owen — Revision of Pronouns. 97

to ^'bowed to Smith," as predicate. Between the two there is

perceived a fellowship, a mutual belonging, a relation of part

to part (of a single mental whole), the relation expressed by the

60-called copula, as holding between subject and predicate.

Now, gi'anted this predicate, plainly the subject, in order to

maintain this belonging, must adapt itself to whatever the predi-

cate requires. Conversely, the predicate, forcing the subject to

do this, may be regarded as its liniiter, determiner, or restricter.

Accordingly the ordinary subject-predicate analysis, constantly

urged by Grammar and Logic, fits the present case. But the

present case is one only of many, with the remainder of which

this analysis w^ill not avail. These remaining cases I will bring

together under

(b) The relative word is not the subject of the relative clause.

This case presents itself in many varieties, of which I propose

to examine a few only of the more conspicuous. To illustrate,

'^The guest whom Smith saluted is my nephew." In this sen-

tence also I think it undebatable that my purpose in saying

"whom Smith saluted," is the same as it was in savino; "who

bowed to Smith," namely, to confine jour attention to a partic-

ular giiest, although in the present illustration "guest" is no

longer subject in the relative clause. The usual analysis, how-

ever, no longer meets requirements. If I regard my relative

clause as consisting of a subject "Smith" and a predicate "sa-

luted the guest" (here again by no means "whom"), I not only

receive no aid, but am actually hindered from seeing the opera-

tion of restrictive elements. For the blending of "saluted" and

"guest" in a single total precludes that discreteness of "guest"

which I require in order to feel its adaptation of itself to its fel-

lows. So also the separation of "Smith" and "saluted" breaks

the totalitv in which I wish to view them as a restricter of

"guest." I must plainly conceive the analysis of thought more

largely than is customary either in Logic or in Grammar. I

advance accordingly these general propositions: A thought

mav be analvzed into any one of its ideas and the remainder;

betweeen that one and the remainder may be conceived that

7

98 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters.

mutual belonging indicated by the so-called copula ; in any such

analysis the remaider may force the one idea to maintain this

mutual belonging by self-adaptation. That is, to any element of

a thought the remainder may be a restrictive predicate ; or, in

other words, any thought-element may be restricted by the total

of its fellows :

In illustration, suppose that a given orange is larger than a

given lemon. Were I to analyze my thought historically ; were

I, that is, to regard the method of its actual development, I

might very well find that I had seen first the orange; that I

had next observed the lemon; that I had, in passing from the

one to the other, been conscious of a difference or relation ex-

pressed in "The orange exceeds the lemon.'' That is, my analy-

sis would develop three factors, an orange, a lemon, and a quan-

titative relation. But I can, no doubt, re-analyze this thought

into a pair of parts related merely as the mutual complements

of one whole. In so doing I may elect either of my three orig-

inal terms as one part and regard the others as its complement,

my analyses taking the follo^^dng forms :

Oranere — exceeds lemon.

Exceeds — orange, lemon.

Lemon — orans^e exceeds.

Also any chosen part may be noted as adapting itself to the

requirements of the others. Thus,

The orange must be of such a size that it will exceed the lemon.

The excess must be such that it will suit the lemon and the

orange.

The lemon must be of such a size that the orange will exceed it.

In other words, the orange, the excess and the lemon may be

successively determined, each by the total of its fellows.

The determination of a relation, sav that of excess, bv this

method is not, to my knowledge, directly accomplished in speech.

I may indeed make use of such an expression as '^^The plum ex-

ceeds the cherry to the degree in which the orange exceeds the

lemon." But I do not use a relation simultaneouslv as factor

of two thoughts, for the purpose of letting the use in one thought

fit it for use in the other. That is, I do not use expressions of

ii

Owen — Revision of Pronouns. 99

the type ^'The plum exceeds the cherry, wJiiches the orange the

lemon." In other words, we have not yet developed relative

verbs. Such verbs, being then merely an unrealized possibility,

require no consideration.* Accordingly the present case (b), in

which the relative is not the subject, excludes both the case in

which the relative is subject and the case in which it might be

the middle term or verb.

Among the varieties of case (b) I take up first the one in

which the simultaneous factor appears in the relative clause as

its direct object. Reviving the illustration ^'The guest whom

Smith saluted is my nephew,'' I note that my meaning is as fol-

lows: The guest suitable to ''Smith saluted" is my nephew.

That is, just as with "who bowed to Smith" the simultaneous

factor was determined bv its fellows "bowed to Smith " so also

with "whom Smith saluted" the simultaneous factor is deter-

mined by its fellows "Smith saluted."

What holds of the direct object holds also of the indirect. In

The guest to whom Smith bowed," the simultaneous factor

guest" is determined by "to Smith bowed." That such

is the fact is vividly suggested by the antigrammatical tendency

to range all the idea-naming words of the relative clause together,

as in "The guest (whom) Smith bowed to." The motive

for this arrangement seems to be that, the simultaneous factor

"guest" being put by itself, and the remainder of the relative

clause appearing as an unbroken total, the necessary juxtaposi-

tion of such factor and such total is made more easy.

The adjunct of the subject is similarly treated. Thus, in

^'The dancer, of whom the partner bowed to Smith, is my

nephew," "whom" is merely the sign that "dancer," in the sec-

ond of two simultaneous thought memberships, is governed by

of;" moreover, the prepositional phrase, "of whom," that is,

of the dancer," is in one aspect obviously a restrictive adjunct

of "partner ;" but, in a momentarily more important aspect, "of

the partner bowed to Smith" is a restricter of "whom,"

that is, of "dancer," as suggested again by the popular form "the

dancer (whom) the partner of bowed to Smith."

The adjunct of the object forms no exception. In "The

dancer of whom Smith saluted the partner," "dancer," in its

second membership, forms with "of" an adjunct of "partner/'

4(.

100 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters.

the object of the relative clause. But here again it is also and

more sis'nificantlv true, that dancer is restricted bv ^^of

Smith sainted the partner," as again is strongly hinted by the

popular form, ''The dancer (whom) Smith saluted the partner

of." Indeed, if strict account be kept of the double value of the

so-called possessive 'Svhose," an even stranger construction may

be developed. For 'Svhose" unquestionably means ''of whom"

and may, indeed, be analyzed into the elements "who (the mere

sign of second membership) and "se" (synonymous with "of").

The merely instructional value of "who" being once noted, it

mav. in the consideration of thouirht-elements, be allowed to dis-

appear. Thought-architecture may accordingly be faithfully

indicated either by

"The dancer (whom) Smith saluted the partner of," or

"The dancer — (who) Smith saluted the partner se/' That

is, by either notation, the clause beginning with "Smith" is a

restricter of "dancer."

The simultaneous factor may serve in the relative clause as

verbal adjunct, or, more strictly, as part thereof. To illustrate^

in "This is the place in which Lincoln fell," the prepositional

phrase "in which" is grammatically ranked as the adjunct of

"fell ;" and of this adjunct the relative "which" is a part. But

in this example my aim in using the relative clause was to re-

strict the idea expressed by "place." I wish you to conceive a

place distinguished from all others by Lincoln's in-falling.

That such indeed is the usual intention is indicated by the popu-

lar "This is the place (which) Lincoln fell in," the purely in-

structional value of "which" being further hinted by its frequent

omission.

The structure of thought in such usage is commonly disguised

by multiple symbolization, the duties of both "in" and "which""

being performed by the single w^ord "where." I may accord-

ingly say, "This is the place where Lincoln fell." In this ex-

pression "where" is commonly styled a relative and an adjunct.

But strictly speaking, "where" possesses two values, namely, "in"

and "which;" and of these one only is relative, while both are

required to form an adjunct.

The place-idea may be combined as above with the same re-

lation (e. g. "in") in both clauses; and also each combination

Owen — Revision of Pronouns. 101

may be expressed by multiple symbolization, as in "A stain of

blood remains there (in tlie place) where (in which) Lincoln

fell." In such case the function of the simultaneous factor be-

ing in both thoughts the same, the need of indicating it in the

relative clause is little felt ; accordingly the relative word might

be omitted. But at this point confusion arises. In substantive

usage of 'the simultaneous factor it is, as properly, the relative

itself that disappears, as in "I have met the man (whom) you

seek,'' etc. But, in the case of a verbal adjunct, what disappears

is more commonly the so-called antecedent, as in "A stain of

blood remains (there) where Lincoln fell." Whether in such

case there be a supplying of ^'there" or an exchange of mean-

ing between "there" and "where" or an incorporation of both

meanings in "where" (Conf. "what" = "that which"), it is

needless and possibly useless to inquire.

That the simultaneous factor may appear not only as part of

an adjunct in the relative clause, but also as part of an adjunct

of an adjimct, and so on to the nth degree of remoteness, is an ob-

vious possibility. The actual retirement of this factor into the

more distant background of the relative clause may be illustrated

as follows : "Bring me the trousers for the pocket of which you

were sent to ransack the shops to find a button." That is, in

diagram :

You — were — sent

I

(was for)

(you) to ransack the shops

I

(was for)

I

(you) to find — a button

I

(was) for

I

the pocket — (was) of — ( which )

Bring ( trousers )

Accordingly "trousers," in its membership of the relative

clause, is part of an adjunct of "pocket," which is part of an

102 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters.

adjunct of "button/*' wliich is part of an adjunct of ^"ransack,"

which is part of an adjunct of "sent;" or, roughly speaking,

"trousers/' in the above membership, is in the fourth degree

adjunctive to "sent/' That all of this intricate relative clause,

except "trousers," is however used as a restricter of "trousers,"

is indicated by the fact that popular arrangement juxtaposes

"trousers" with the gathered troop of its fellows, thus : "Bring

me the trousers (which) you were sent to ransack the shops to

find a button for the pocket of."

Generalizing on cases examined, I contrast the restrictive

clause again with the informational, noting that the procedure

of the restrictive clause is this : By means of terms associated

with a term occurring in the principal, it occasions an adapta-

tion of that term, in scope, to its associates.

(5) Its Function.

E-eviving the substance of (2), I note that the restrictive is

a mere auxiliary. It always determines an otherwise inadequate

element of the principal clause. It is not in itself a speech,

but a "part of speech." What part of speech it is depends in

grammatical classifiv^ation, largely at least, upon Avhat part of

speech that element is which it determines. But such elements

themselves are classilied as parts of speech by conflicting criteria

(see p. 2). Also, in the exposition of Grammar, many restrict-

ive uses of the relative clause are overlooked.^ To state the

functions of restrictive clauses in ,2;rammatical phraseology,

that is, to rank them as parts of speech, is largely, therefore, to

arrange what Grammar has not seen by categories which Gram-

mar cannot justify. To be consistent, then, v/ith the grammati-

cal system thus far developed, would be like solving on a larger

scale the kill-joy problem: "If a third of six were three, what

would a fourth of twentv be ?" That is, the extension of the

grammatical system must be conformed in error to the parts

already developed. From a task so embarrassing and also, I

think, so needless, it is perhaps no shame to recoil. Assuming

*Thus, in "A government of the people in the sense which you employ in

'if the doctrine be of God,' " the relative clause is adjunctive to "sense ;" and

"in the sense" is itself adjunctive to "of" (1) ; that is, the restrictive clause is

adjunctive in the second degree to a proposition.

Owen — Revision of Pronouns. 103

therefore, that the operation of restrictive clauses has been suffi-

ciently exhibited in the preceding illustrations, I content myself

with the following generalizations : The purely restrictive

clause is an adjunct, auxiliary to some element of the principal

clause ; it may, at least in theory, be adjunctive to any such

element and in any degree of remoteness ; its function is never

that of a sentence, but always that of a subordinate sentence-

factor ; accordingly it does not make a statement.-^

From what has thus far been noted it appears, as many think-

ers indeed have conceded, that whenever thought is extended

beyond the minimum of the type "A = B,'' it must be by the

methods followed in forming that minimum. Some element of

'^A = B,'' as for instance ^^B," must appear in relation with

some new element, as in '^B> C." If the increment is to be

felt as structurally one with the original, the common factor of

the two, namely B, must be once thought only, or simultaneous.

JSTow thought, at least as expressed in the language of cultured

peoples, exhibits extension as a rule, and usually very miany ex-

tensions. The venerable propositions, "Men are animals,''

"John is a man," "John is an animal," are rarely encountered

outside of philosophy. It is much more common to meet with

statements such as "That smug Jolin Smith, who just bowed so

deferentially, with all his conciliatory manner, is a sly fox/*

What may be called the minimal sentence is, then, the linguistic

exception. In actual practice the sentence is almost always ex-

tended ; and, as above indicated, extension implies the occurrence

of a simultaneous factor.

The problem of the simultaneous factor (which is the prob-

lem of the extended sentence) is, accordingly, far more fre-

quent than that of the minimal or elementary setitence. It

may indeed be conceded that this is the problem of speech.

To exhaust this problem, in the present investigation, would

require time and effort quite excessive. Yet, the relative clause

being only one of many forms in which the simultaneous factor,

lit must be admitted, as implied on p. 87, that a given relative clause, while

aiming on the one hsind to aid the informational effort of another clause, may

occasionally be at the same time intended to give information of its own. Such

a clause, though restrictive, will be asserted because also informational. On

p. 110 will be found some indication that assertion by purely restrictive clauses

is apparent only. The exhaustive discussion of the assertion problem in relative

usage seems to belong of right to a special investigation of mode.

104 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences^ Arts, and Letters.

Proteus-like, appears, tlie adequate compretiensioii of such, a

clause requires at least some illustration of the equivalence

which obtains between it and fellow forms of expression.

Indeed these fellow forms themselves deserve at least a brief enu-

meration. As closing topic I therefore offer

IV. THE EELATIVE CLAUSE COMPAEED WITH TAI^TAMOUI^T

EXPRESSIONS.

Confining attention to restrictive usage, but mindful that its compre-

hension provides a key to the minor diSBculties of informational clauses,

I note that the tantamount expression nearest of kin to the relative

clause is, perhaps, the adjective. To illustrate, "Apples which are ripe"

and "Ripe apples" are commonly recognized as essential equivalents

in meaning.

For the adjective a participial phrase is often substituted; and in this

the participle may or may not be transitive. Thus, "Active men" is

readily replaced by "Men exercising," and this again by "Men taking

exercise." Each expression, moreover, may be paraphrased by a rela-

tive clause, thus, "Men who are active," "Men who exercise" and "Men.

who take exercise."

The prepositional phrase is also often adjective in function; and in.

such usage it also is readily expanded into a relative clause. Thus,

"The book on the box" becomes v/ithout difficulty "The book which is

on the box."

Of the adverb proper or immediate adjunct of the verb I can show

no exactly equivalent relative clause, because, as indicated on p. 98, no

verbal relatives seem to have been developed. That is, I am unable to

use a simultaneous factor as verb in a principal clause, and follow it by

a verbal dummy, of which latter a special subject, etc., form together

a restricter. Thus, meaning that "Brown does his hearty eating at

six," I may not say, "Brown eats, he whiches heartily, at six." But

I might say, with some stretching of relative powers, "Brown

eats which is hearty at six." In this expression "(which) is hearty"

is no doubt a restricter of eating; but the eating is conceived for the

moment as a substantive. Now I can hardly regard "which is hearty"

as overlooking this nearer substantive aspect of eating, in favor of the

remoter verbal aspect presented by "eats," ^Vhile therefore "eats" no

doubt obtains restriction from "is hearty," it does not do so in its ver-

bal aspect; and perhaps I can not strictly designate "is hearty" as ad-

verbial in its function.

On the other hand, a secondary or mediate verbal adjunct (adjunct

of a verb's adjunct) is not unfrequently replaced by a relative clause.

Thus, in "He comes on the occasions on which he is invited," it is ob-

viously my intention to declare of my subject a coming, not universal.

Oiven — Revision of Pronouns. 105

Taut quite restricted. Both my meaning and the structure of my

thought I may vaguely suggest by "He comes invitedly." But the ad-

verb being hardly adequate and altogether unconventional, I resort to

tne expression "He comes (then) when he is invited," in/ which it is

clear that "lie is invited" determines an idea of times or occasions

(continued by "when"), v/hich is itself applied (by "then") to "comes*"

Such restrictive clauses of plainly relative structure imperceptibly

shade into clauses of a strictly prepositional order, especially known

as adverbial sentences. Thus "He comes if he is Invited" m.ay be para-

phrased by "He comes in the cases in which he is invited." But in

*'He will come if he is invited" the "if" expresses rather a relation of

condition and conclusion between the inviting and the coming. Though

inexpressive, I think, by any single word, this relation is a single idea,

and one of the sort as a rule expressed by a preposition. I should

therefore regard "he is invited" as merely a substantive clause, which

unites with "if" to form a prepositional phrase of adverbial rank. This

view is supported by my abilit5% without loss of any thought-element,

and with no material change of structure, to substitute "in-case-of his

"being invited, in which "in case of" is merely a verbal plexus with an

essentially prepositional value.

The equivalence of the relative clause to a conjunction, or rather to a

phrase in v/hich a conjunction is used, is much more obscure, being

made so in part by Grammar's confusion of several radically different

forms of thought construction. It is, to illustrate, one thing to join

"apples" and "ripe," by furnishing to them the element necessary to

their union in a complete mental trio or thought. Such an element is

furnished by "are" in "Apples are ripe." Such a joiner, known in

Grammar as a copula, may be specially ranked as an organizer or

uniter. It is quite another matter to join by "and." In "Six and four

are ten" the duty of "and" is plainly to lead my hearer to the forma-

tion of an idea-group, to be used as subject of "are ten." Joining of

this sort may be specially known as grouping. Joining is of yet an-

other sort in "Brown dresses fashionably, as does Smith." By this I

do not mean to compare the dressing of one man with that of another,

but, having made my statement of the one, to repeat it with the other.

That is, I make two statements with a simultaneous factor, as appears

in the diagram [Brown dresses (fashionably] dresses Smith). If this

factor, remaining common, were made successive, my utterance would

take the form "Brown dresses fashionably. So does Smith." The ef-

fect of making this common factor simultaneous by the use of the

merely contlnuative "as," is to combine what would otherv/ise be two

statements into one. Joining of this sort may be specially known as

linking.

Of copulative joining nothing needs to be said. "Whichever element

of an idea-trio or thought be conceived as indispensable to its fellows,

that element may be ranked as the copula of the other two; and plainly

106 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters.

such rank may be given to a simultaneous factor as well as to any other

factor of a thought.

Of grouping little must be said, as the subject is broad enough and

deep enough for a special thesis. I merely note in the first place that,

in "Six and four are ten,*' "and" historically means "in addition to'"

or "added to." Among the possible methods of thought structure the

following is perhaps more plausible than others. Consciously intend-

ing "six"' as a partial subject, the speaker can however present the

same, according to observed linguistic methods, only as if it were his

whole subject. The same is true of "four." He can, however, indicate

that these subjects are to be taken concomitantly or cumulatively; and,

in so doing, he might either indicate that the two are to be taken to-

gether, or that one is to be taken with the other. As the latter

method is psychologically somewhat easier, it is more natural to suppose

it to have been elected, as words like "and" date back to extremely

early stages of mental development. Again the speaker, within the lim-

its of this method, may elect to add either the first group-element to the

second or the second to the first. Here again, it seems more natural to

suppose the latter alternative. To add the first to a not yet men-

tioned second, requires a greater mental effort, both in exposition and

in comprehension, than to add the second to an already mentioned first.

I accordingly assume, without attempting proof, that in "Six and four'*

I mean that "four" is added to "six." Accordingly my thought is as

follows: "Six" is partial subject of "are ten;" "four" is also partial

subject of "are ten." Between "four" and "six" there further holds

the relation algebraically expressible by "plus," linguistically expressi-

ble by "in addition to" or by "with" or by "and." But this relation

reads backward and not forward. That is, "four" is in addition to

"six" (not "six" to "four"), as indicated by the arrow in

^ <r

"six and four."

"Six" being now a common factor in this last expression and "Six are

ten," I may indicate its function in "Six and four" by a relative word.

In so doing I elect the word for group-suggestion most tolerant of a

relative, namely, "with," obtaining "Six, wherewith (is) four, is ten."^

That is, the relative clause and the conjunctive phrase are quite equiv-

alent.^

Further, in all my effort to show you that "four" is taken with "six"

in the formation of my subject, I do not forget that the very aim and

^In such phrases Grammar has distinctly missed the really conjunctive word.

"And" or "in addition to" or "with" is merely an indispensable element of the

idea-trio (thought) expressed by "Six and four." As it advances "Six" and

"four" to a new thought-membership it may be said in a sense to join them.

But such joining, as indicated, is not distinctive of any thought element, being

conceivable of each. The true joiner is "Six ;" for it is at the same time a full

factor of "Six and four," and a partial factor with "are ten."

Owen — Revision of Pronouns. 107

object of this grouping ia to put both "sis" and "four" before you as

actually, each, in part, a subject. Accordingly, I put both "six" and

"four" in the nominative. Also, having shown you that my partial sub-

jects form indeed a group, I use that form of the verb which is cus-

tomary when the subject is in the plural number, or consists of more

than a single individual. ilccordingly my verb is of the so-called

plural form.

Linking v/as illustrated above by "Brov/n dresses fashionably, as

does Smith." In this sentence Grammar recognizes that "does Smith"

is joined by "as" to "Brov/n dresses fashionably." In this case, then,

the joining regards two thoughts. As previously argued, it is effected

by their simultaneous factor, the idea oi manner expressed in the first

place by "fashionably," and continued by "as." I do not, in this case,

need to show that the conjunctional clause is equivalent to a relative

clause; for, as already indicated, (pp. 71-2) the so-called conjunction

"as' is itself a relative.^

The equivalence of expressions noted as tantamount, thus far roughly

assumed, deserves more careful verification. In attempting this, I wish

to avoid, if possible, the inexactness of Grammar. To illustrate, given

"Men who are virtuous are happy" and "Men are happy if they are

virtuous," the bewildering statement is made, that the relative clause

and the "if-clause" are equivalent.

Such equivalence 1 am ready to admit, provided only its special na-

ture be clearly recognized. To illustrate this, suppose that "The

French king befriended the Pope." If now the befriending be of the

tenth century, the king can hardly be of the eighth and the Pope of the

twelfth. It may indeed be still more broadly affirmed that, subject,

object, or action being, any one of them, conceived as of a given time,

the laws by which phenomena seem to be governed, may compel me to

conceive the others also in time coincidence. The same is true of

space. The same is true in some of the other categories. That is, it

may on a given occasion make no essential difference what element of

my thought I choose to restrict; the restriction, once applied to either

element, may extend to the others. In my initial example I may ac-

cordingly saj'- either "Men-who-are-virtuous (leaving out other men) are

^As already noted, the simultaneous factoi* may appear in any function of

either principal or relative clause ; that is, it varies greatly in structural im-

portance. As I shall farther indicate, the simultaneous factor also varies in

volume. It viould accordingly be natural to suppose that, the bigger and the

more important such common factor, the more actual would be the junction ef-

fected. Given tv;^o calves with even a tail in common, I should no doubt admit

their junction. If their common element were the muzzle, I should concede

their junction even more readily, recognizing this muzzle as of structurally

higher rank than the tail. If the vastly larger and more important trunk or

torso were theirs in common, I should regard the proof of junction as over-

whelming, and the joining common element as effective in the highest degree.

Oddly enough, however, Grammar reverses such interpretation, recognizing

as conjunctions only smaller and inconspicuous common elements. Thus in

"There you have the large slice of rai-e roast beef you are so fond of," it is

108 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters.

liappy" or "Men are-if-they-be-virtuous (leaving out other cases)

happy." That is, the two expressions are in a sense equivalent.

The special nature of this equivalence may be indicated as follows:

Being unready to risk the unrestricted proposition that "Men are

happy," I discover two available restrictive methods. I may, by an

if-clause, confine the scope of relation between men and happiness

(that is, the scope of "are") to the cases in which men are virtuous.

Or, by a relative clause, I may confine the scope of "men" itself to such

persons as are distinguished by virtue. Either method develops a

thought which agrees in substance with external fact, to a degree suf-

ficient to meet the unexacting requirements of speech. In such sub-

stantial agreement the methods noted may accordingly be ranked as

equivalent. But in structure the two are very different; for in one I

have restricted the first term of thought, and in the other the mid-

term. This difference between substantial and structural agreement

may be reinforced by algebraic illustrations. Thus given "6 a;> y,'

let the coefficient of the first term be transferred to the last, developing

'*ir> 62/." These two expressions may be equivalent in the sense that

both are true to external fact; but they exhibit widely different inner

facts, by which I mean subjective phenomena produced by external

fact; that is, they are structurally very different. The equivalence of

relative clause and tantamount expression may however be not only

substantial but also structural.

Such equivalence I will exhibit by a single illustration, choos-

ing the relative clause in "Apples which are ripe" and its ad-

jective substitute in "Eipe apples" or, in the order common with

other languages, "Apples ripe."

In this relative clause the word "which," being not the sym-

bol of any thought-element, but merely the instructional indi-

cation how to use an element already furnished to thought, may

be omitted. The programme of a procession, even of ideas, is

no part of the procession itself. Islj expressions to be compared

reduce then to "Apples are ripe" and "Apples ripe."

■■ ■— — .., •«-——■ •- ■■•— -..^ ■ ... - , . ' ' -..-■—■■ — — >~<m

obvious that "the large slice of rare roast beef" belongs in structure at the

same time with "There you have" and "yon are so fond of;" that is, it is a

simultaneous factor of large dimensions and of great importance in each of my

thoughts ; it surely joins the wholes of which it is a part no less effectively than

would a common element of minor bull? or importance ; yet Grammar does not

recognize it as conjunctive. Again, in "I have the b'oolc you want," while the

simultaneous factor ("booli") is much reduced in magnitude, it remains an ele-

ment of major importance, being no less than the immediate object of both my

clauses ; yet it it not conceived by Grammar to be conjunctive. But let the

simultaneous factor, retiring from the sentential foreground, appear as merely

an adjunct, that is, a common element of minor importance ; it may at once

be recognized as a conjunction, as in "Brown dfesses fashionably as does Smith."

So also in "He lay as he fell," the common manner-naming factor "as" is usually

ranked as conjunctive.

Owen — Revision of Pronouns. 109

In the adjective expression ^^Apples ripe" the association of

ideas named can be justified only by the existence between them

of some recognized relation. Given "Apples" and "ripe" alone,

the ideal trio required to make a thought is incomplete. Unless

there be between them a relation, they are simply unrelated in

the mind ; that is, again, they have nothing to do with each other ;

accordingly the idea expressed by "ripe" cannot have a place as

part of my thought. Since, however, this idea, as a matter of

fact, does obviously make good its claim to such a place, it must

be in relation with the idea expressed by "apples." This rela-

tion, I may add, is by no means merely that of an object and

a quality ; for such relation would hold between horses and

"ripe" or "apples" and "blue." It is the relation of an object

and its ovrn quality.

How this relation is learned by the hearer is a matter of minor

importance. It may be merely inferred. It may be even ex-

pressed by the adjective ending.^ It may be understood from

the very association of objective and qualitative words. The im-

portant fact is its being there, its actual presence in the minds

of speaker and hearer alike.

It appears accordingly that "Apples which are ripe" contains

no term or relation which is not expressed by "Apples ripe,"

either directly or by implication. It also appears that "which"

as a mere function sign may be neglected in the comparison of

thoughts and their architecture. The subsidiary ideas expressi-

ble by verbs, such as beginning (inchoation), continuation or

completion, and repetition or singleness of action, do not appear

in "are." Even the time-element of the verb, in any case in-

ferrible, is in the present case, no doubt, excluded. "Are" is

valid for present, past, or future, being used in this example as

a "tenseless" form of the verb. There remains, however, the

question whether in "are" there be an assertion, an element of

personal belief, which fails to appear in "Apples ripe." The

answering of this question will be aided by a momentary exten-

sion of our view.

1 While I do not personally believe this to be the case, the adjective ending

being otherwise amply occupied, some indication that it is the case is offered by

the use. in German, of the adjective endings on those occasions only in which re-

lation is not expressed by a verb, that is, in the attributive position. Conf,

"Gute Miinner" and "Die Milnner sind gut."

110 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters.

To the distinction between relative clauses^ informational and

restrictive, a parallel is found in the distinction between re-

strictive and informational adjectives. The latter type is il-

lustrated in ^'My sick wife." In a monogamic country, you

recognize that the sickness of my wife is quite unnecessary to

her differentiation from others possibly my wives. My purpose

in mentioning her illness being therefore not restrictive, you,

crediting me with some purpose, assume that purpose to be in-

formational, ^ow, informational relative adjuncts, as pre-

viously indicated, are treated like independent information ;

that is, they are asserted. It may therefore be said that with

*^sick wife" there is inferred an asserted relation of object to

its own quality. That is, ^^sick wife" means ^/wife, who is sick,"

in which an assertion is present.

On the other hand in "Perfect men do not exist," which il-

lustrates the restrictive adjective, the case is very different. Re-

placing "Perfect" by "who are perfect," I find in the latter no

assertion. For, if there be one I am in the untenable position

of denying by "do not exist" what I affirm by "are."^ ISTow,

such an exploit is beyond the daring of even a veteran liar. If

I am flatly to contradict myself, you may expect me to put my

conflicting statements well apart in time and also in space. You

may be quite sure that I will not invite their comparison by

putting them in a single sentence. You may safely infer that

my "are" is not designed to be taken assertively.^ So also, in

"'Apples (which) are ripe," restrictively taken, there is no as-

sertion.

^I am aware that the non-existence or unreality of "men," coupled even with

that of "perfection." is not in itself a bar to an existent relation between the

two. Thus 1 may say, analogously, "Centaurs antedate sea-serpents," asserting

their time relation, while ready to deny the existence of either "centaurs" or

"sea-serpents," and without any feeling of contradiction. But, in "perfect men do

not exist," it is not such unreality that I have in mind. I do not commit my-

self to the denial of either "men" or of "perfection," but me'rely to the denial

of the combination, "perfect men." And this combination I deny, either rely-

ing on or at least implying the absence of a combining element, namely, a par-

ticular relation. In "Perfect men do not exist" I do accordingly vouch for the

unreality of qualitative relation between "men" and "perfection." If now, in

"Men who are perfect," the "are" be assertively taken,_ I am obviously made to

contradict myself.

2 Such use of assertive forms instead of the solely proper unassertives may be

charged in English on the general renunciation of the effort to distinguish by In-

dicative and subjunctive between assertive and unassertive thought. The sub-

junctive being practically lost, both indicative and subjunctive duties fall to

Owen — Revision of Pronouns. Ill

It appears accordingly that there is in "Apples which are

ripe'' no element which is not at least inferred from "Ripe ap-

ples." Any difference between them is then explained by a

purely formal word-ellipsis. Grammar, therefore, is right in

ranking the relative clause as equivalent to an adjective. The

informational relative clause and the informational adjective

agree in the nomination of a term betweeen which and a term

of the principal clause a relation is recognized, and either

actually or inferentially asserted. The restrictive relative clause

and the restrictive adjective agree in the nomination of a term

between which and a term of the principal clause a relation is

recognized, but neither actually nor inferentially asserted.

When a minimal thought, consisting of two ideas and their

relation, is increased by the service of one of its terms as simul-

taneous term of another thought, the latter thought or increment

may, as has been shown, appear in several forms of expression.

Of these the relative clause has been seen to be peculiarly ef-

fective, when the functions of the simultaneous factor in differ-

ent thoughts are themselves conspicuously different. It is also

of the utmost convenience in the lack of single words or phrases

to express a required meaning. For the relative allows the de-

tailed formulation of a thought complete, being in this particu-

lar no wise inferior to a sentence. ]^ow, a sentence is the em-

bodiment of the powers of speech. Whatever power of expres-

sion, therefore, resides in a language may be utilized in the rel-

ative clause. To illustrate, wanting a servant, and in particu-

lar one distinguished from others by the thorough currying of

horses, and having no adjective to express this conception, I say

that "I want a servant who curries horses thoroughly." In this

particular case I might indeed do measurably well by using the

virtually adjective phrase "distinguished by thorough currying

the indicative mood. The modal value of tlie latter is accordingly equivocal ;

the forms entitled by English Grammar indicative mood should rather be

designated as indicative-subjunctive. In other languages such inconsistency may

be explained by the supposition that this modal distinction has sometimes proved

a bit too subtle for the average mind, the type of mind by which, of necessity,

linguistic usage has mainly been determined. Sometimes the irregularity may

be placed to the account of a common inability to let well enough alone, which

reveals itself not only in formally double assertion (e. g., "I believe that he Is

honest," which says no more than "I believe him to be honest"), but also in for-

mally double negation (e. g., He isn't honest I don't think).

112 Wisco72sin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters.

of horses.'' But, in yet more amplified restrictive conceptions,

I feel the positive need of a full sentential structure. To illus-

trate, 'The man who, expecting to find him absent, called on my

greatly esteemed guest this afternoon, with his son, in order to

square his social account without the loss of time involved in a

personal meeting, has lost my good opinion." In this example

the primary elements of my adjunctive thought are expressed

by ''man" (of which the second function is indicated by "who"),

"called on" and "guest." What-ever be then the multitude of

further, secondary elements, in dealing with them I have the

great advantage of three visible terms, among which I can ap-

portion their government; while, even if I could replace these

three by an adjective, I should be left Avith but a single term

available for governing purposes, namely the adjective itself.

Generalizing, I may then say that the relative clause has this

advantage over tantamount expressions, that in it the labor of

marshallinc: reinforcements is divided anions: three terms.

Of these three terms moreover the verb, I think, is the most

competent ; that is, it can handle more adjuncts and more effect-

ively than either its subject or its object. It also has uncom-

mon instructional powers, showing by its number and person

what is its subject, and indicating by its modal inflection its

own function as term or adjimct.-^ Incidentally, too, as a sin-

gle word, it can express more ideas than any other sentence-ele-

ment: it adds to its fundamental meaning, by mere inflection,

useful accessories such as time (in the sense of either Zeit or

Mai), and such as initiation, continuance, or completion; also

it chooses by its voice between the proverse and reverse aspects

of the same relation.-

It appears accordingly that, when a sentential increment is

small in bulk and simple in structure, almost any one of the

tantamount adjunctive expressions is adequate; but, when the

bulk and complexity of the increment imperil its structural clear-

ness, relief is sought in a form of adjunctive expression, in

which all the powers of speech may be exploited, that is, in the

1 Compare "amat," *'(ut) amet," and "(qui) amet."

^Thus in "Homo occidit urgum" "occidit" shows relation to be that of slayer

to victim, while "occiditur" would show relation to be that of victim to slayer.

Oiven — Revision of Pronouns. 113

relative clause or, in other words, the adjunctive expression

which has the sentential structure.

In comparing the tantamount forms of sentential increment,

I accordingly feel justified in ranking the relative clause as the

'highest species ; it presents a thought with the fullest analytic

completeness and commonly provides a special symbol for each of

its elements; it alone distinctly recognizes the double function

inherent in simultaneous factorship. It is also, no doubt, the

most effective, especially when the increment is bulky or com-

plex. It is, however, more than others, dangerous in the use

of the unskilled, being often used on wrong occasions, and also

often wrongly constructed, even on right occasions. It is of all,

moreover, the least necessary, as appears by its total absence

from several languages, its comparative infrequency in many,

and its not uncommon neglect in all.

8

114 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Ai'ts, and Letters.

APPENDIX A— PERSOiSrALS.

HOW THEY DIFFER FROM OTHER WORDS.

This has been suggested in Chapter L, and will be emphasized

again. Words like ^^I" are imprimis initiative and not, as a

rule, vicarious. As initiatives they are further distinguishable

from the indefinite members of the initiative class, being ob-

viously definite.-^ Again, as definites, they are distinctly of

the egocentric type. To the most superficial observation it is

plain that the values of ^T," ^Hhou," etc., change with the change

of their user. But this peouliarity is shared by '^this" and

^^that," by '^come" and "go ;" to separate the personals from

these, a further distinctive is required.

Such a distinctive has been found for the personals in their

restriction of the egocentric view to the phenomenon of speech,

it being held that such an idea as that expressed by "thou" could

not be developed, except in the field of thought-communication.

It therefore seems sufficient to designate the personals as words

which egocentrically distinguish the participants in thought-

communication.^

HOW THEY DIFFER OlS^E FROM ANOTHER.

The fact that the personals change their value with the change

in the user forces our examination to elect one user as a guide

and to abide by his point of view. For convenience I adopt the

view-point of myself, rejecting the Pharisaic formula "I am not

as other men." It is true that our ego-centric ideas are very

^For the occasional indefinite use of "they," "you," etc., see appendix C.

2 In carrying out this view some difficulty offers in the case of "I," which ap-

pears as common term of the spatial series "I," "this," "that," and the colloquial

series "I," "thou," "he." It is plain that "this" and "thou" are very different,

as also "that" and "he". The question rises whether the "I" of one series be

also different from the "I" of the other. Frankly admitting that the question

is too deep for my own psychology, I merely suggest that they seem to me the

same, a change of category not appearing to require change in idea. The same

point may be a part of two lines, without assuming a double character. The

sr.xne self may be differentiated from persons (or things) In other places and

Owen — Revision of Pronouns. 115

different, your "right" and "left" of space or yonr "before" and

"after" of time being, it may be, opposite to mine. Yet, so to

speak, by a turn of the wheel, our categories coincide ; and I as-

sume that also in the field of thought-exchange the case will be

the same; that is, our categories tally, though we apply them

differently.

I further confine myself to oral speech, regarding written lan-

guage as a mere transliteration, a trifle different from the oral

in its use of personals, because the colloquial participants are

not in mutual presence. But I assume that such difference is

the easy corollary of mutual absence and will not essentially

modify conclusions drawn from the study of oral speech. For

analogous reasons I mainly neglect the examination of solilo-

quy, of speech "in concert," of the figurative address to that

which can not answer or understand, and of the use of language

as a mere notation.

Used as a means of oral thought-communication, language re-

quires two participants at least. Choosing in illustration the

leading role for myself, to avoid entanglement otherwise im-

minent, I note that, while speaking, I am active; you are com-

paratively passive. In thought formation I am an originator;

you are at best an imitator only; you merely "think my

thoughts after me." I give; you receive. The source of a

stream of energy is in me ; in you it discharges. Without you,

indeed, the message is not received ; but without me there is no

message.

Indeed my every statement contains me by implication, even

"when I am not mentioned. For instance, suppose I say that

'^The moon exceeds the sun." It is true that my sentence con-

tains no mention of myself; yet you appreciate that this sen-

tence does not stand of necessity for a fact, but for an opinion,,

and that this opinion is mine. Fully rendered, my statement

would take the form: "I believe in the reality^ of the moon's

again from persons otherwise implicated in speech, without being modified In

my conception. It is possible, no doubt, that the "I," as antagonized to "this"

and "that," is conceived especially as having location and that the "I," as an-

tagonized to "thou" and "he," is conceived as colloquially active. But it seema

to me that the "I" is rather absolute and invariable, an origin of coordinates,

unaffected by the point of view because itself the point of view. I shc^uld ac-

cordingly tabulate: "I" (absolute), "this" and "that" (spatially related to-

"I") ; "I" (absolute), "thou" and "he" (colloquially related to "I").

^My belief in unreality, etc., would be expressed by "The moon not exceeds

the sun," or an equivalent.

116 Wisco7isi7i Acadeiny of Sciences, Arts, and Letters.

superiority to the sun." In the business then of speech I am,

when speaking, ever conspicuous. The fact that you are also a

sharer in this business may or may not be specially indicated ;

and, even when it is so indicated, it is only as a minor associate

that I recognize you. I rank myself as the senior partner.

A moment later our respective rank may change. In answer-

ing me you are in turn, in your ovm estimation, the speaker, the

first person, the protagonist, the leading actor on the stage of

thought-exchange. That is, your estimate of yourself will tally

with my previous estimate of myself.

But I shall not fully accept your estimate. Though I cease

to speak and become a listener, I do not forfeit, in my own esti-

mation, my linguistic prestige. Putting myself in your place,

I assent indeed to your use of the "I," to designate yourself.

But this assent is based upon a mere hypothesis. From my

point of viewing the actual, I alone am ^^I." I do not speak of

myself as "thou'' or recognize that another is really ^'I." The

fact that a converse view is taken by every other person, the fact

that is, that no one calls me "I" except myself, and that every

one appropriates the "I" in self-designation, is merely the fact

that the egocentric view-point is, in matters colloquial, not pe-

cular to myself.-^

The other required participant in thought-communication is

a hearer. Of the several sorts of hearers, I have in mind for the

moment the intended hearer only. There may indeed be more

than one such hearer, but this case of mere plurality may be neg-

lected.

My intended hearer is such, of course, from the special view-

point of myself. The person addressed by me, it is true, may

coincide with the person addressed by you or by another; but

this is the merest accident. He is to me a person addressed,

so far alone as I address him. The aims of others than myself

are to me irrelevant. ^^Intended hearer of what I have to say''

may be accepted as expressing what I mean by ^^thou."

^This essential immutability of "I," even when the role of speaker is ex-

changed for that of hearer, further indicates the absoluteness of self-conception.

The speaker, it is true, uses the "I" only when speaking of himself, that is, of

a speaker ; but his reason for using it seems to be, not that he is the speaker,

but that he is self ; whether this self be speaker or hearer seems to be at least

of very secondary importance. "I," then, is the name for self in the absolute,

whether speaking or hearing— being, thinking or acting— in "splendid isolation"

from all else that is.

Owen — Revision of Pronouns. 117

While I may or may not expect from you an answer, the pos-

sibility of an answer seems to be always contemplated. Even

while I speak, you are the condition of thought-communication ;

a moment later you may become its cause. While I then am

the actual senior partner of the moment, you are the potential

senior "oartner of the moment to come. In your present par-

ticipation, you deserve at least as high a rank as that of junior

partner.

Besides the speaker and the intended hearer, there may be an-

other hearer (or several), present, perceived, accepted, but not

intended. Such a one it is simplest to conceive for the present

as also not expected to assume the lead. You and I then, in the

alternating role of speaker, have no objection to his hearing

what we say ; but neither of us is talking for his sake. If you

or I w^ere absent, what either now is saying for the other's sake

w^ould not be said at all.

The colloquial rank of such a hearer is plainly quite inferior

to our own. Far from being indispensable, he is distinctly su-

pernumerary. Our thought-exchange may be not more com-

plete, because he is present, nor less so, be he absent. His par-

ticipation in the act of speech concerns not us at all, but him-

self alone. He does not even merit the name of a hearer. He

is rather an overhearer, or a silent partner.

If now I wish to mention such a hearer, I may speak either

to or of him. The former alternative merely makes him a jun-

ior partner, suggesting nothing new to our examination. The

latter allows me to designate him absolutely by his name (a

method foreign to the present inquiry, or egocentrically. But

even egocentric design a tion^ to deserve our notice, must not be

merely in the broader meaning egocentric. "That man" and

"this person" are egocentric in such broader meaning ; but they

lie without the present field. To lie within this field, the desig-

nation must be an egocentric of the specially colloquial type ; it

must name the overhearer by a word suggesting a colloquial par-

ticipant, but not a speaker or an intended hearer. Such a word

is "he" (or "she").

I do not mean that this is the only or even the common mean-

ing of "he." Indeed this meaning is somewhat rare. From

the usage of the polite it has disappeared, for the very obvious

118 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters.

reason that it slights the person mentioned. But as one of the

names for colloquial jDarticipants or strictly ^^personal pro-

nouns/' ^^he" must in this meaning be emphasized and, I think,

alone recognized.

So far as "it'' is concerned, I do not remember any usage in

which it is personal in the present restricted sense, except as

word of either gender, applied for instance to a babe or child

of unknown sex.

By extension "he" is made to name any person present, even one by

deafness excluded from the rank of hearer. Such usage begins an ob-

vious transition to the demonstrative category, "he" in this case ap-

proaching the meaning of "that person." However, distinction from

the senior and junior colloquial partners still is dominant, rather than,

spatial relation to you or me.

With the colloquial trio, composed of speaker, hearer and over-

hearer, the list of participants in thought-communication may be re-

garded as complete. It is true that in the act of speech there may be

other quasi participants. These may be distinguished, in a sense, as

secret partners, including the hearer whose unnoted presence is acci-

dental, as well as the intentional eaves-dropper. As such, however,

figure only in their own consciousness or, if perceived, take rank at

once as participants of the already mentioned orders, they may safely

be neglected.

THEIR SO-CALLED PLURALS.

Grammar will have it that "we" is the plural of "I." In striv-

ing to reduce this proposition to absurdity, I naake at once the

somewhat difficult concession, that "we" may have developed

from "I," somewhat as "cows" or "kine" developed from "cow ;"

that is, the "we" may have the form appropriate to a plural

word and be moreover derived from "I." I contend however

that the meaning of "we" is not a plural meaning, and that, even

if it were, it could not be plural to the meaning of "I."

Overlooking the artificial use of "we" by royalty, the editor

(collaborator) and him who deems it more modest to speak

of himself as many than as one, I first observe that plurality

is something more than multiplicity. Thus a cow and one or

more other cows assuredly constitute a plural, while a group

made up of a cow, a horse, and a goat, is only a multiple. By

modification it is doubtless easy to make it a plural. If you

Owen — Revision of Pronouns. 119

•choose to overlook the mutual differences between group-mem-

bers; if you are content to conceive those members as merely

so many animals ; the group becomes at once undifferentiated,

homogeneous, and accordingly a plural. But this plural is by

no means that multiple. Original differentiated constituents

bave been discarded ; others undifferentiated have been substi-

tuted. The fact that the substitutes form a plural does not

■even suggest that their originals do the same.

The case of ^Sve'' is closely parallel. This appears most

plainly when ^Sve," as recognized by Grammar, has the value

of "he, thou and I.'' The persons designated form indeed a

multiple group, but one by no means plural. By modification

they may no doubt become a plural. Thus, if you overlook the

mutual distinctions of "I,'' "thou" and "he" (as speaker, hearer,

•and overhearer), and merely conceiv^e the three as so many

colloquial participants, ideas named, being now undifferentiated

and accordingly homogeneous, form no doubt a plural gToup.

But, in this case also, original group-members have beeen dis-

carded; others very different have been substituted. The fact

that the substitutes form a plural offers not even a hint that

their originals do the same.-^

Again, were "we" a plural, it could not be the plural of

■^^I." To illustrate, speaking of the soldiers' voting in the early

sixties, I might say that "The regiment voted mainly for Lin-

coln." It is plain that "regiment" stands in this sentence rather

for a number of individuals than for their total conceived as

a unit; that is, "The regiment" names a group. Suppose it

now to be claimed that "regiment" is the plural of a particular

captain. It would be difficult to show why this particular cap-

tain should be preferred to any other captain, or to some other

officer, or even to a private. Yet, as the regiment does contain a

number of captains, such a claim might be tolerated ; for it does

not, at least, insult the quantitative instinct. But were it

^In other words "we" can become a plural only by losing the meaning of "he,

thou and I," and assuming the meaning of "three undifferentiated speech-par-

ticipants." That "we" might do exactly this, I regard as neither impossible nor

«.bsurd. But, as a matter of fact, I believe that even a "thou" and a "he," as

■constituent factors of a "we," maintain their mutual differentiation — to a degree

at least much greater than two "hes" or two "thous" in a "we" consisting, say,

•of five persons : e. g., myself, two Smiths addressed and two Robinsons not ad*

"dressed.

120 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, ArtSj and Letters.

claimed that the regiment is plural of its colonel, a halt would

surely he called, on the ground that a plural of colonel must

contain more colonels than one.

So, too, were it claimed that "we" is a plural of "thou" or

of "he," it might indeed be hard to see why it is more a plural

of one than the other. Yet the claim might sometimes have

a quasi plausibility; for sometimes a "we" contains more than

one "he" or more than one "thou." But when summoned to ac-

cept the doctrine that "we" is the plural of ^'I," the powers

of faith are overtaxed. For the idea named by "I," is from the

user's view-point, absolutely unique. A plural of self is ac-

cordingly a mystery even more difficult than that of the Trinity.

There simply cannot be a plural (that is, many) of that of

which there is but one. The triumvirate is not the plural of

Antony ; nor the ox, of his lights, pluck, or liver ; nor the regi-

ment, of its colonel ; nor United States, of Wisconsin ; also "we"

is not the plural of "I."^

To redefine the "we" is by no means easy for one embarrassed

still by mental habits formed in a long acceptance of false teach-

ing. The scope of the word, moreover, in literal and figurative

use, is so wide and varied, that the danger of an oversight is

extreme. I therefore make a tentative effort only, in venturing

to define the "we" as the name of any group in which the "I"

is a member.

In the case of "you," I neglect the vagaries of colloquial eti-

quette, which make even a single "thou" appear in various lan-

guages either as singular or as plural — of the third as well as the

second person. Considered in its normal value and in rela-

tion to a normal "thou," the "you" may be defined as naming

any group including "thou" but not including "I."

The use of "they" is even further restricted, the word (in

its now considered value) being definable as the name of any

group including the colloquial "he" ("she" or "it"), but not in-

cluding "I" or "thou."

^ Since reaching this view I find it adopted by Kern and one or more others.

In further illustration, compare the procedure of Grammar with that of the ex-

military mendicant, who invites charity by a placard inscribed as follows : Bat-

tles 4, wounds 5, children 6 ; total 15."

Owen — Revision of Pronouns. 121

THEIR SENTENTIAL EANK.

The "^^'ords thus far examined, though somewhat peculiar in

meaning, being specially characterized by their purely egocentric

validity and by their restriction to the act of speech, are merely

nouns.

In seeking their mutual differences, I note that the use of

"thou'' is somewhat analogous to that of "grandfather." Each

may name a person in his relation to myself, their difference

being merely that relation is in one case colloquial and mo-

mentary, in the other ancestral and permanent. Each may be

applied to different persons ; each may be used by many per-

sons ; indeed, in either aspect "thou" is much the broader

word. The same may be said of "he." I see no reason there-

fore why "he" and "thou" as well as "you" and "they" should

not be ranked as common noims.

The case of "I" is very different. To illustrate, suppose my

name be Cicero, and that no other person bears, or ever bore,

this name. Examining "I" and "Cicero" from the special view-

point of self, I find that each, in my personal usage, means

myself alone. They differ merely in this, that "I" is my ego-

centric, naming me from the special view-point of self, while

"Cicero" is my absolute, naming me from no special view-point

of my own. "I" names me as part of the universe in its special

conception by myself; "Cicero" as part of the universe in its

conception by anyone. The difference is essentially that which

obtains between "here" and "Xat. 43° :N"., Long. 90° W.

Prom the view-point of my individual usage, I think both "1

and "Cicero" should rank as proper nouns.

Looking now from the view-point of others, I can strengthen

my comparison by including an intermediate term, for instance,

"Smith," which, although a proper noun, suggests a formidable

portion of the race. Accordingly, "Cicero" may be used by

one man only, to name himself ; "Smith," by many men ; "I"

by all men. "I" is, in a wa}-, an intensified "Smith." The

three designations are respectively unique, generic and uni-

versal. In passing from "Cicero" (and "Smith") to "I" we

have indeed forsaken the field of absolute designation and en-

tered the egocentric; and so I do also in replacing "614

122 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences^ Arts, and Letters.

State Street'' by ^*liome." But, just as in ^^I aiu going home'^

I use the word "home" with an individual value and by no

means generally (as in "The homes of the working classes") ;

and just as in "Grandfather is ill" I name to my friends a par-

ticular person even more distinctly than by "Mr. Bro^vn ;" so

also in using the "I," it appears that I name a single particular

individual; and other persons, in using the same word, do the

same. The fact that this individual varies in the usage of dif-

ferent speakers cuts no greater figure than similar variation

in other ego-centrics. "Mother" and "Father," as used in the

family circle, I have always felt to be proper nouns and have

always written them with a capital. I am merely consistent,

in expressing the opinion that "I" should also rank as merely a

lexically somewhat peculiar proper noun.

The adjective use of personals has been to Grammar, as might

be expected, the source of some embarrassment. While "whose"

in many languages is recognized as merely a genitive of "who"

relative or interrogative; while "one's" is consistently grouped

in declension with the nominative "one;" "my," "thy," "his,"

etc., are wrested from their cognates "I," "thou" and "he," and

marshalled in a separate division, commonly known as possessive

adjectives.

The motive for their isolation may be sought in the fact that,

in many languages, they are adjectively inflected. But such

inflection is an accident, without reliable value. In "Er ist

ein zu liebender Mann" "zu liebender" is merely an adjectively

inflected oblique infinitive. In "Elle est toute bonne," "toute"

is merely an adverb falsely invested with adjective inflection.

In "eine nach-haiisische Fahrt," "nach-haiisische" would merely

be an adjectively inflected prepositional phrase. This phrase

and the oblique infinitive both, no doubt, deserve to rank as of

adjective function ; that is, their ideas enter the structure of a

thought precisely as do the adjectives themselves. But as

Grammar commonly means by an adjective something more than

this, it is necessary, to avoid confusion, to examine a little

further.

Given "wolf," the noun, and "wolfish," the adjective, it is

plain that the latter has lost the objectivity of the former, shrink-

ing to the expression of quality alone. "Wolf," again, suggests

Owen — Revision of Pronouns. 123

with more or less distinctness not only an individual being, but

also quite an outfit of qualities. In "wolfish" the tendency of

these is to become less numerous ; in a "wolfish appetite" one

only may be conceived; indeed even this may lose everything

except intensity. Vv'hat is more important still, no idea foreign

to "wolf" is grafted on the idea expressed by "wolfish."

In the word "my," on the other hand, there is no abatement

-of self; and no quality connoted under "I" is lost; ]3er contra

the important idea of possession is added. "My" differs from

■^^I" or "me," much as "Indian-owmed" (in the sense of owned

by Indians) differs from "Indians," for instance in "Indian-

owned lands." As "my," with the value of "by me o^vned,"

is ranked as the adjective of "me," consistency requires that

"^^Indian-owned" be ranked as the adjective of "Indian." So

also, by strict analogy, "shark-eaten" and "man-eating" rank

as adjectives, the one of "shark" and the other of "man." Ob-

viously the initial move of Grammar leads to much that is be-

yond the grammatical purpose. It is better, perhaps, to admit

that "my" is not the adjective of "I" in the usual sense employed

by Grammar.

It is also but a part of the truth that "my" is possessive.

"^^My" has doubtless the meaning "of me;" and "of" may cer-

tainly name the relation of owner to property; "of," that is,

may have a possessive value, as in the "book of me" or "my

book." But "of" may have and often does have other values,

many and very different. Conceiving myself a boy again, I

lament "my punishment by a teacher." "My," as usual, stands

also here for "of me ;" but this time the protean preposition ex-

presses the relation of action (punishment) to its actee (sufferer,

object), myself; or, in other words, "my" is the objective geni-

tive. Or, letting the teacher speak, "My punishment of that boy

was proper." Again "My" stands for "of me ;" but this time also

^^of" expresses not at all the possessive relation, nor that indeed

of action to actee, but the relation of actor to his act, "My" be-

ing now a subjective genitive.

Grammar seems, moreover, to misconceive the sentential rank

of "mine." To illustrate, in "This book is mine," the value

of "mine" being taken as "my object," "mine" itself is rated

J>

124 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences^ Arts, and Letters.

a noim.^ It is however wortliy of notice that ^^mine" is even

today much used with the value of ^'mv ;'' that many languages

have but a single form for both f that the difference in their

usage tallies with, a difference always made in German between

the adjective as adjunct and the adjective as term.^

The grammatical opinion is merely a special application of

that advanced by some logicians, who deny the use of the ad-

jective as term. Its holders will have it that "The rose is red

is at least an impropriety; that the careful thinker must con-

ceive that "the rose is a red object." ITo\^^ver convenient such

structure of thought may be in a purely logical notation, it seems

to me self-evident that it is not followed in thought, as prepared

for ordinary linguistic expression. Much argument to the

contrary, I may think no doubt by the method indicated in the

expression "Redness (by no means a red object) characterizes

the rose ;" I may also reverse my mental current in "The rose

is characterized by redness (by no means a red object) ;" and

this latter sentence expresses exactly what I think I mean by

^'The rose is red." That is, the rose and its redness only are

put before you in the relation of an object to its own quality.

I do not accordingly find that "object" is to be supplied either

in "The rose is red," or in "The rose is mine." I therefore

rank the "mine" as a predicate adjective, (or, more strictly, as

the predicatively employed genitive of I) somewhat dis-

tinguished from the attributive, as in German, by a different

termination.

In "Lieutenant Brown of ours" a closer approach is made to strictly

substantive usage. So far as "ours" shall mean "our regiment," it is,

no doubt, a noun. If it be admitted that an ellipsis has occurred, and

that "regiment" is supplied, then "ours" remains an adjective. This

purely lexical question may be dismissed with the remark that com-

ment similar to the above may be made on "thy" — "thine," "his" —

(his'n), etc.

It has apparently escaped the notice of Grammar that the use of

pronouns adverbially is at least a linguistic possibility. So far indeed

as "my" is the adjective of "I," so far "usward"^ is the adverb of

^E. g., in French grammars.

*Conf. mens, tuus, leur, loro, etc.

^Conf. "Die schone Frau" and "Die Frau ist scbon,"

■•Thiii word, so far as noted, is preceded in English by a superfluous "to." as ini

"God's mercies to usward." But in German dialect "unserwarts" appears un-

aided, as an adverb.

Owen — Revision of Pronou7is. 125

■^'us." The addition of new matter to the primary idea expressed by

■"us" is surely no more important than the addition in the case of "my."

Plainly, however, both "my" and "usward" go far beyond the ideal

reach of their primitives. The immediate adjective of "I" would be

expressed in German by a theoretical "ichisch," Thus, what you or I

would call a "Napoleonisches Gesicht" the emperor himself might have

called an "ichisches Gesicht." And obviously the same imaginary

word might also be adverbially used. Thus, "Das hat er recht Napo*

leonisch getlian" would take in imperial parlance the form, "Das hat

er recht ichisch gethan."

The gist of ^^possessive'^ peculiarity may then be put as fol-

lows: So far as structure of thought is concerned, "My coat"

is the same as ^^The coat of me;" the latter is structurally on

a par with "The coat on me;'' and this, again, exactly tallies

in structure with "The coat on the chair." The "possessive,"

then, is but a prepositional phrase, expressed by multiple sym-

bolization in the form of a single word. This word, moreover,

often assumes, but by no means always, the adjective inflection.

This inflection, accordingly accidental, may be the more safely

overlooked that it is neither ideal nor functional but purely

associational ; see p. 62.

THE SENSE IN W^HICII THEY AEE PEESONAL.

Words of the present class are sometimes defined as pronouns

which stand for persons. Overlooking the fact that some of

them almost exclusively stand for things, I note that "who,"

in either interrogative or relative usage, is claimed by Gram-

mar itself to stand for persons, though not admitted to personal

rank; and many indefinites, for instance "some" (as in "Some

say, etc.,"), as also the reflexive "myself" and others, have

equal claim to personal rank. Plainly the definition includes

too much. Again, in figurative usage, all the personals extend

their scope beyond the range of persons. The definition there-

fore plainly includes too little.

Personality indeed, in the given sense, is quite beside the

question. When of my horse, my dog or my pipe I use a

^^thou," it is in spite of their not being in such sense personal,

and because I am talking to them. And when, in talking to

a man, I address him as "thou," it is solely because I am talk-

126 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters.

ing to him, and not at all be<3ause tie is a person. That is,,

whatever I have in mind, its presentation by a ^^personal" de-

pends by no means on its rank in my classification of things

animate or inanimate, but on my classification of participants

in the act of speech. If then I wish the word personality to

suggest the true distinctive of the personal words, I must define

it as meaning egocentricism of the specially colloquial type;^

and this I take to be the meaning of ''person" as used by Gram-

mar in the more special sense.

HOW FAR THEY ARE PRONOMINAL.

To the strictly personal words, as noted in the second para-

graph of Chapter IL, Section 10, a vicarious value is sometimes

superadded. Such occasional double value has presumably

helped grammarians to regard the personals as pronouns, to

infer, that is, that personality entails pronominality.

Without exhaustive examination, I will merely test this in-

ference by bringing, so to speak, a suit against a single one of

the personals, choosing as defendant the so-called pronoun ''I,""

the usual leader of the pronominal list. Suppose then that,

meeting you for the first time, say in a stage-coach, I remark

that ^'I am glad to have a companion." It surely will not be

claimed that, in this sentence, ^^I" is in any sense a substitute

for any other word or phrase. In the first place ^^I" is not a

replacer ; that is, it does not, as sign of an idea already men-

tioned (or yet to be mentioned), take the place of any word

that is actually used and might be used again. "I," in the sec-

ond place, is not even a &placer ; that is, it does not, as sign

of an idea in its only mention, take the place of any word that

might he used. The word "I" stands for myself, not only

immediately, but also with such perfection, that no other word

or combination can advantageously take its place. Even my

legal name is comparatively uncertain. If you do not already

know me, and if another be present, you readily take that name

^It goes without saying that such "personality" may appear In other symbols

by no means recognized by Grammar as personal pronouns. Thus, in "Our

Father, who art in Heaven," no doubt the "who" (while serving as an order to-

continue "E'afher," and as a sign that "Father" is, in second function, nomina-

tive), contemplates the "second personality" of "Father" in its second function.

Owen — Revision of Pronouns. 127

as standing for that other. Such laborious circumlocutions,

too, as "your humble servant," "your prospective fellow-trav-

eler," etc., are felt to be at best extremely clumsy substitutes.

If any of these words or phrases shall be reckoned as taking an-

other's place, it can hardly be the "I," but rather my name or

any circumlocution. To rank the "I" as a verbal deputy is,

then, to misconceive the procedure of speech completely.

The fact that a genuine personal is occasionally used with

added vicarious value, does not justify the inference that every

personal is a pronoun. Though Democrats are sometimes Bap-

tists, I may not therefore rank the former as a sub-class of

the latter. So also, though personals be sometimes further

used vicariously, that is, as pronouns, it is only their vicarious

usage that admits them to pronominal rank. As merely per-

sonal, as egocentrics, that is, of the colloquial type, they are

not also vicarious ; that is, by the definition of Grammar itself,

they are not pronouns. Per contra, when they are not only per-

sonal but also vicarious, their personality ranks, in a strict pro-

nominal classification, as merely a lexical accident.

128 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters.

APPEXDIX B— DEMOXSTHATIYES.

It was indicated on p. 13 that these express the egocentric

ideas which are not developed under influence of the act of

speech. Eew of them are recognized at all by Grammar, and

even these so indistinctly as to remain effective stumbling blocks.

Their determination and mutual differentiation form a strictlv

lexical problem, of which I can offer only the merest outline.

Examining first

THEIR CATEGORIES,

I note that the condition of every egocentric idea — every

idea, that is, which takes its departure from self — is obviously

the establishment of self, as point of departure. Egocentric

thought of any kind assumes a prior distinction between the self

and all else — the I and the not-I. To this distinction the con-

stant presence of self in consciousness may be noted as an

excitant. For linguistic purposes the "I am always with you'^

may be reformulated as ^^I am always with myself.'' Other

ideas are occasional ; the idea of self alone is ever present. That

the one abiding idea of self should serve as landmark for other

ideas is a foregone conclusion.

Such a landmark is available in many fields of thought. In

the category of space it is plain that all that is not ^T' may

be subdivided according to its distance from self. Thus, in

English, what is near me I designate by "this," and what is

more remote by "that." Spanish recognizes three degrees of

distance marked by "esto," "eso" and "aquello." Indeed a

larger number of such degrees is possible and entirely practi-

cable.^

^ Under colloquial influence the regions of remoteness or of nearness somewhat

tend to use the hearer as a landmark, "that" inclining to confine itself to what

is near to you. and the "yonder" affecting what is far from us both. But evea

in conversation such a tendency is merely a putting of myself in your place,

that is, an application of my own egocentric classification to your point of view

(in soliloquy my personal point of view is unchanged) ; the definition of "that"

as what is near to you. must accordingly be rejected as giving neither its pri-

mary nor even its commoner meaning.

Owen — Revision of Pronouns. 129

'Next to the question how near an object is, may rise the

question which way it lies or, in other words, what may be

called its hearing^ To illustrate, while the phrase '^this hat'^

denotes an object near to me, it gives no indication whether

it be 071 my head or under my feet, before or behind me, at my

right (reclits) or my left (linhs). But each of the italicized

words refers the hat to one of three dimensions of egocentric

space and further, using self as a center, shows the section of

that dimension to which the object belongs. There is indeed

some tendency to confine these words to objects somewhat near ;

but in ^^above" and ''below" this tendency fails to appear and,

even in the others, bearing itself is distinctly and, I think, pri-

marily indicated.

Passing now to the egocentric indication of motion, I can

suggest it best by reference to a line conceived as the path of

the moving object. On such a line it is plain that opposite

motions may occur. That is, in addition to given terminals,

motion has what may be specially known as direction. For in-

stance, of motion on the line A B, there are two kinds, one from

A to B and the other from B to A. It is obvious also that one

at least of these terminals must be somewhat definitely con-

ceived. A motion from ''here" to "there" I readily grasp in

its antagonism to a motion from "there" to "here." So also I

easily differentiate a motion from "here" to "anywhere" and

a motion from "anywhere" to "here." But a motion from

"anywhere" to "anywhere" is not in itself sufiiciently fixed to

permit me to conceive an opposite.^ JSTeglecting motion thus

unavailablv indefinite, and examining first the case in which

both terminals are somewhat definitelv fixed, I note that "for-

ward" means along a line from myself to a point in front o£

me.^ "Backward" means along the same line, but in the oppo-

site direction. Also "backward" means along a line from my-

^This awkward technicality I use to avoid confusion with direction, which is

examined later.

*In egocentric usage the terminals of the motion line (e. g., from "here" to

"there") are either self or determined from self as a landmark. Contrast there-

with the absolute "northerly," "southerly," northeasterly," etc.

3 It is true that in "Forward Co. A!" I reckon direction from the view-point

of my hearers. But this point of view, again, I merely adopt for the moment.

In such a phrase as "on your right" I advertise such adoption. In "Forward

Co. A!" I let this adoption be understood. Conf, "Sind Sie da?" and "Ich bin

da." (=I'm what you call da.).

9

130 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters.

self to a point behind me, and "forward" the opposite. Turn-

ing to the case in which one terminal only of the motion line

is fixed, I note that ''hither" means along a line from anywhere

to at, or near, myself, while ''hence" denotes the opposite.

"Thither" denotes a motion from anywhere (but with a little

preference for self) to a point "there,'' that is, a point deter-

mined by self as a landmark; "thence" denotes the opposite."^

In the above illustration direction is an abstraction from mo-

tion, conceived as an attribute of motion, while motion itself is

expressed by another word. But sometimes the motion per se

and its direction unite under a single designation which may be

roughly known as course. Thus "to come" means to move along

a line, one end of which is at or near myself. By "to go" is com-

monly meant a motion along the same line, but in the opposite

direction.

By the usual transition egocentric distinctions pass from the

field of space to that of time. What is "now" belongs to the

actual self, as distinguished from the self remembered or an-

ticipated. Time remote from the "now," but not distinguished

in direction, may be iudicated by an equivocal word such as the

Latin "olim." Or the two divisions of time not "now" may

be indicated, as in English, by "once" and "some time," which

indicate respectively the past and the future.

ThougM-near7iess is also egocentrically distinguished. ^'This

kind" (e. g. "this kind of men") and ''that kind" m'ay both in-

clude what lies within my mental horizon of the moment, what

lies without being expressible by ''other kinds ;" and ''this kind"

again may stand for what is focal in consciousness, while "that

kind" names an idea comparatively marginal."

^By an easy transition many spatial words become entirely indefinite. The

Ideas expressed by "lience" (from this place) and "thence" (from that place) are

grouped wFth their possible kin under such words as "off," "away," "hin."

Again, when once incapable of expressing alone an even approximately definite

direction, they are ready to enter vicarious service. Thus, in "Brown used to

live here. But he has moved elsewhere," the last word means "a place different

from here." conceived as term of a motion from here. That is, the "elsewhere"

is partly reinstative and partly initiative.

2 Somewhat similar is the use of "he" to denote the person par excellence of

common acquaintance. To illustrate, " 'He cometh not,' she said." The idea

expressed by "He" is obviously that of an individual likely to assume the focal

position in tlie minds of speaker and hearer. This focality may be regarded

as normal with the speaker and recognized as such by the hearer. When it be-

comes estabTished to a sufficient degree, such "he" acquires a footing inferior

only to that of the "I," with which I think it may be classed rather than else-

where, ranking essentially as a proper noun.

Owen — Revision of Pronouns. 131

Manner, too, is the subject of egocentric distinction. To il-

lustrate, noting your method of tying a knot, I remark that "I

cannot do it so (in the manner shown by you) ; I do it thus

(in the manner now shoT\Ti by me or yelt to be showTi)''.

Family relation is commonly viewed in the egocentric aspect,

"^Tather," as used by me, standing for one who may be to you a

nephew, cousin, etc., or an entire stranger.

Professional status is also at times a matter of purely ego-

centric determination, my lawyer being, it may be, your doctor

or your spiritual adviser.

To call upon the science of linguistics to present completely

the egocentric categories, plainly would be unfair and useless,

particularly since at present even the simpler categories are far

from being adequately understood. As a merely interesting

suggestion of the extent to which the egocentric tendency enters

idea-formation, I offer an illustration from what may be called

the social category. In a society made up of a ruling class (in-

cluding, say, nobility, clergy, and military), a middle or bour-

geois class, and a laboring class, the prestige of the bourgeois

depends entirely upon the class view-point from which he is

regarded. Suppose now that you are a noble and I a laborer.

As used by me the epithet "bourgeois" is an expression of es*^

teem, while in the usage of yourself it is an expression of con-

tempt. In fact, in certain styles in French, the designation

"bourgeois" (or middle class) has discarded the absolute value

and adopted that of "above me" or "beneath me," according to

the social status of the speaker.

THEIR SENTENTIAL EANK.

Assuming my reader to be no less weary than myself of

verifying in actual usage the obvious ability to use any idea

as any element of thought, I confine myself to the merest sug-

gestions. Preferring an epistolary illustration, because it al-

lows a variation in time which does not occur in oral thought-

exchange, and using poetic phraseology, to avoid an embarrass-

ing auxiliary, I imagine that you write me in the evening a note

as follows: "Came you here today?" My answer, dated the

following day, is this : "I went there yesterday." In this ex-

132 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters.

change of tlioiiglit, what you express is a desire to learn my

opinion about an act; what I express is my opinion of that

act. But as neither your desire nor my opinion materially af-

fects the description of the act, we may neglect them both and

merely regard the letters as act-descriptions. Xow it is some-

what striking that in these descriptions, though the act is the

game, the words elected to describe it are, without exception,

different. That is, we both of us abide, in every element of

thought, by the egocentric point of view. And in our sentences

we hold to our view-point in every sentence-element or "part

of speech" employed. The "I" and "you," indeed, are special-

ly linguacausate ; but in "Kam jener hier diesen Tag?" and

"Dieser ging dort jenen Tag," all words but "Tag^' are alio-

causate, that is, demonstrative. Examining their rank as parts

of speech, I find in each sentence an adjective (diesen, jenen),

an adverb (hier, dort), a verb (kam, ging) and a pronoun (jener,

dieser), or, as I ha^'e previously urged, what should in no

way be distinguished, in substantive usage, from a noun.

Passing to more difficult parts of speech, I note that Avhat is

''a house" from your point of view may very well be 'Hhe house"

from mine, the article, or weakened demonstrative, assuming,

as would be expected, the egocentric aspect. Verbal nouns and

verbal adjectives follow the lead of the verb itself. Preposi-

tions are even specially prone to presuppose an egocentric point

of view, as abundantly illustrated above. That such at least of

the so-called conjunctions as name a relation between two

thoughts should deal with that relation from the special view-

point of self, is a foregone conclusion. In illustrating this, I

must first make sure that your view-point is actually different

from my own. Accordingly I imagine you to be a physician and

myself a teacher. Of your patient. Brown, who is also my

pupil, you say, following your medical tendencies : "He is

ill; for he cannot study," deducing his illness from his men-

tal incapacity, and putting the former in a sort of effect-to-cause

relation with the latter. But I, as his teacher, following very

different tendencies, may also say: "He is ill; hence he can-

not study," deducing from his illness his mental incapacity,

and putting the former in the cause-to-effect relation with the

latter. That is, illness being our common point of departure

Owen — Revision of Pronouns. 133

and incapacity our common point of arrival, from your view-

point the latter is to the former a sort of cause, while from

mine it is an effect. What to you is ^%r/' to me is ^^hence"

and vice versa.

The interjection may be merely extra-sentential, expressing

irrelevant thought. In this activity, it obviously has the same

egocentric opportunity as thought which is relevant. And When

the interjection is strictly extra-linguistic, being almost a re-

flex cry, the associated emotion again may obviously be purely

egocentric.

From what has occasionally appeared in this examination,

it is obvious that a given word may be at the same time vica-

rious and an egocentric of the particular order now in mind.

Thus, imitating the methods of the neo-Latin languages, sup-

pose I say: ^'The house and the barn are mine. Tliat (= the

house) is of brick. This (= the barn) is of wood.'' In this

sentence ''That" and ''This" respectively reinstate "the house"

and "the barn." At the same time these reinstatives, being

synonymous with "the former" and "the latter," distinguish

their principals as the nearer and the further of thought, the

thinking self of the moment being the landmark from which

their nearness and re-moteness are reckoned. While this simul-

taneous occurrence of different values is both familiar and far

from difficult in itself, it is perhaps desirable, in view of Gram-

mar's confusion, to emphasize their difference and their inde-

pendence. Accordingly I note that in "That (meaning yonder

schooner) is my yacht," "That" is fully egocentric, but without

a trace of vicarious value. On the other hand in "Is your dog

a collie ? He is that" I find in "that" a reinstative value, but

nothing any longer consciously egocentric. When accordingly,

in my example of the house and the barn, I find a "that" which

is at the same time vicarious and egocentric, I see no occasion

for embarrassment. Looking merely at the nature of the idea

presented, I rank my "that" as egocentric or demonstrative.

Looking at the method by which the idea is presented, I call

my "that" vicarious or pronominal. But I call it egocentric

because its idea is what it is, and vicarious because its idea

134 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters.

is presented as it is; I certainl}' do not call it vicarious from

any peculiarity in the nature of its idea. Above all, it does not

occur to me to argue that, because a vicarious word appears on

this occasion to be also egocentric, the next time I meet a mere-

ly egocentric word I am to rank it as vicarious, and hence a

pronoun. I am further not at all surprised that the same

word may on occasion simultaneously rank in two categories;

for no effort was made to render these categories mutually ex-

clusive. The egocentric category is concerned with the forma-

tion of an idea in the mind. The vicarious category has to

do with the idea's presentation by a word. The two are as

irrelevant as the gi'owing of wheat and the method of its ship-

ment. The same grain may be at the same time of my rais-

ing, and sent to London by your steamer. But its production

by me does not necessarily locate it in your vessel. So also the

egocentric grO'"\\i:h of an idea does not make its presentation vica-

rious. In other words, the special type of egocentricism known

as demonstrative does not per se entitle an idea's presentation

to rank as pronominal. That is, barring the expressional ac-

cident of vicarious presentation, the demonstratives are not pro-

noims in the sense of being vicarious. Their study is foreign to

the field of Grammar, and belongs of right in the domain of Lex-

icology.

Owen — Revision of Pronouns, 135

APPENDIX C— INDEFINITES.

THEIR l^UMBER.

This is plainly vastly greater than Grammar indicates. With-

out attempting to complete what seems to me an idle begin-

ning, I will merely suggest a few of the unrecognized indefi-

nites. As point of departure note the following illustration:

'^In carving I reserved something, somewhat, somedel (del =

Theil) for myself." In this sentence ^'something^' is recog-

nized by Grammar as an indefinite and ranked as a pronoun;

(Conf. "etwas"). But for ''something'^ I may substitute "part/'

'^a portion/' "a slice/' etc., and this without essentially chang-

ing the corresponding idea, the method of its presentation, or

the part which it plays in sentence-structure. "Someone," too,

is hardly more indefinite than "John Doe" or his rival "Richard

Roe /' and in "If a hody meet a body comin' through the rye"

we recognize the same familiar though dimly outlined physiog-

nomy. In '^TJiey say you can't make me criminate m^yself

I use each one of the italicised words as fully the peer of "on"

(French) or "Man" (German). The "Chose" and "Machine"

(masc. "Machin") of French argot are quite analogous ; and once

without the pale of classic parlance we find a throng of "Ful-

anos," "Zutanos," "Thingimibobs," "What's-his-names," which

may well diminish confidence in Grammar's effort to form the

indefinite word-class.

THEIR VARIETY.

There are moreover other grounds for questioning Grammar's

wisdom. Of indefiniteness there are several sorts. To illus-

trate, suppose I send you an oral message. It is plain that

you may fail exactly to understand me, either by reason of my

original inexactness, or through the inaccuracy of my messen-

ger. Now in thought-communication my messengers are my

136 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters.

words. The iiidefiniteness of any idea which vou receive may

be the fault of either myself or my messenger, that is, my word.

In the sentence ^'The post needs repairing," the word ^^post'' is

in a sense indefinite : you do not know whether I mean the Post

Office or a hitching post. But my own original idea, though

ambiguously expressed by "post," was entirely definite ; and even

the ideas, between which you are unable to choose, are entirely

definite. Any existing indefiniteness characterizes the symbol

and not the symbolized idea. It is better to call such symbols

uncertain, ambiguous, or equivocal, reserving the term "indefi-

nite" for ideas themselves.

The indefiniteness of ideas mav be the result of different

ft/

causes. In using the phrase "a group of men," I may be actu-

ated by the fact that I do not know their number. Again it

may be that what I perfectly know I do not care to tell.

Such indefiniteness mav also be of different kinds. To il-

lustrate, "Something lay in the darkness across my path." This

"Something" answers the question "how many ?" That is, it is

numerically definite. The question "Of Avhat kind ?" it can-

not answer, being valid, for instance, for a stone, a dog, or a

fallen tree ; that is, it is categorically indefinite. Xor can it an-

swer the question "Which?" for, even if it specially suggested

dogs, it would fail to indicate a particular individual ; that is, it

is selectively indefinite. "Man" (German) and "on" (French)

are categorically definite but indefinite selectively and numeri-

cally. The same is true of "Some" in "Some men are vir-

tuous."

Indefiniteness, moreover, varies in degree. "Some," in the

notation of logic, is forced to cover every meaning from "one"

to "all" inclusive. In actual practice, "some" includes neither

"one" nor "all," but may include approximately any other

number. "Several" is a good deal more restricted, standing,

I should say, for never less than three and, at the most, for

less than half of all. "Most" affects the upper; "many," a

middle ; and "few," a decidedly lower numerical range. Transi-

tions even offer to the exactly definite. In "A dozen sprang

to their feet," I should say that eleven and thirteen are contem-

plated possibilities. In "Twelve arose," it seems to me that

Oiuen — Revision of Pronouns. 137

other numbers are positively excluded. In fact a sufficiently

careful examination would doubtless here and there reveal a

continuous series of ideas, in which the completest precision

of which the mind is capable, would pass by imperceptible

gradations into the utmost vagueness.

To draw a line of satisfactory demarcation between the defi-

nite and the indefinite would, accordingly, even in the single

case of number, be quite embarrassing. Suppose, however,

that such a line be satisfactorily established. Another line

must be determined between the definite and the indefinite as to

kind; and consistency requires that one such line should, so to

speak, be abreast of the other — that both be equally far from

the absolutely definite. But who will tell me whether the

categorical indefiniteness of ^'something" is equal in degree

to the numerical indefiniteness of ^'some" or the selective in-

definiteness of '^someone ?" Or how shall I compare the spatial

indefiniteness of "somewhere" with the temporal indefiniteness

of '"^once upon a time ?" Or what is my common unit for meas-

uring the indefiniteness of what I know, as in "Some liked my

dinner,'^ and that of what I want to know, as in ''Who are com-

ing to dinner ?"

THEIE SENTEiq^TIAL RANK.

Their use as nouns appears in the following sentences : ''Peo-

ple say one should not praise himself." ''They say much,

little^ numbers of things." "For aught I know they say any

thing/' "li you don't go it with all your might, it will go hard

with you; it is raining already." "^'Who is it?'' (in the phrase-

ology of children's games.) Among the virtual indefinite nu-

merals I should rank, besides those already noted, flock, bunch,

herd, drove, bevy, flight, school, crowd, party, constellation,

swarm, shoal, covey, cloud, etc. In the quantitative field I find,

beside such definites as inch, foot, yard (linear, square or cu-

bic), a throng of indefinites, for instance, mass, batch, heap,

deal, lot, morsel, sip, sprinkling, dash, taste, etc.

Their adjective function, as in "Some animals are men," has

been amply illustrated. Of this indefinite adjective plural, the

so-called indefinite article is merely the nearest possible singu-

138 ^Y^scot^sin Academy of Sciences, Arts^ and Letters.

lar. ''Some/' whicli is indefinite as to individuals and num-

ber/ becomes of necessity definite in number, in order to be

a singular. It is by the merest accident that English has de-

veloped the special "a" or ''an" for indefiniteness of the singular

number. The actual correlation of "a" and "some" is shown by

the Spanish "uno," "unos," etc. Moreover, when numerical

degree is displaced by degree of bulk, as happens in the case of

m.ass-words, the range of degrees expressed by singular "a" and

plural "some," is covered by a "some," itself now singular, as

in "some flour," "some powder," etc.

The true significance of the indefinite article is sho^m by

languages possessing more than two numerical inflections. In

such languages the noun occasionally offers inflectional series

of the following values : "one man," "two men," "three men,"

"four men," (more than four or) "many men." All these

forms are indefinite in selection, but the last alone in number.

Whether now the numerical elements be expressed by separate

adjectives, or incorporated in the nouns by inflectioUj the value

of the series is the same. According to the point of view it

may be claimed, with prior attention to number, that "one" is

the singular of "two," "three," "four" and "many," that is^

three definite plurals and one indefinite. Or, wdth prior atten-

tion to numerical definiteness, "many" may be ranked as the

indefinite corresponding to four definites, of \Vhich one is singu-

lar and the others plural. Or, with exclusive and closer atten-

tion to number, the successive forms may be knowm as Grammar

knows them, namely, as singular, dual, trial, quatrial and pliis

quam quatrial or plural.

The adverbial indefinites present a categorical range of un-

usual interest. The "somewhere" of space becomes, by an easy

transition, the "sometime" of temporal position. This, moreover,

leads readily to the "somehow" of manner, which again becomes

a word of indefinite cause, as in "Somehow I fell." Such in-

definiteness of kind is paralleled by indefiniteness of degree, as

in "Somewhat imcommon," "Rather imusual," etc.

A tendency at least to verbal indefinites appears in the exces-

sive range of meanings employed wdth "to get," a phenomenon

^Category it renounces in favor of its accompanying noun.

Owen — Revision of Pronouns. 139

"by no means peculiar to bad Englisli, bnt duplicated, more or less

exactly, throughout the range of language.

The use of strictly indefinite conjunctions, especially those

distinguished as thought-connectives, is notoriously the stum-

bling block of many writers.

The interjections, meaning now particularly the words for

emotion, are frequently of the most non-committal type.

The indefinite preposition is specially interesting as showing

with special clearness the occasional indefiniteness of even the

simplest relations. To illustrate, the relation expressed by "at"

in "at the intersection of two streets," while definite enough per-

haps with respect to distance, is quite indefinite as to bearing

(see p. 129). I may for instance have in mind a house on either

corner, an electric light above the central line of either street, or

a cistern directly heloiu. Again the extremely variable "of," in

some of its uses, seems to be as completely indefinite as any

element of speech. In "The things of this life," I can hardly

define the "of" as standing, even to my own mind, for anything

more special than "related to in any way."

THEIR NOK-PEONOMIITALITY.

By this caption I invite the question : Can the indefinite be

also a pronoun, or, can a single word be not only indefinite, but

also vicarious ? That it can, is to my own mind so nearly axi-

omitic as to invite no comment. But, to make sure of the mat-

ter, suppose, in illustration, "I bring you a box of roses. Some

are red and others are white." In this sentence "Some" is no

doubt indefinite ; but it is also reinstative (vicarious) : it re-

vives in mind a part of an idea already expressed by "roses,"

but meantime allowed to lapse; and in the present usage it is

helpless without its principal.

The fact, however, that the same word is at the same time

vicarious and indefinite, should hardly entail confusion of these

attributes. The case is merely parallel to that of personals (p.

127) and that of demonstratives (p. 134). It does not even

suggest that what is indefinite should therefore be ranked as

also pronominal. Accordingly I deny that indefinites are pro-

noims, meaning that mere indefiniteness does not constitute pro-

14:0 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters.

nominality. That is, indefinites, so far as they are merely such,

must be ranked as pseudopronouns ; in other words they are

not pronouns, except so far as they may claim the pronominal

rank by ^^rtue of something more than their indefiniteness.

Madison, Wis., January, 1900,

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ICE RAMPARTS.

E. R. BUCKLEY, PH. D.

Assistant Superintendent Wisconsin Geological and Natural Hiatory Survey.

The diurnal and weekly changes of temperature during the

winter months cause a sufficient expansion and contraction of

the ice covering the inland lakes of Wisconsin to shove up

the sand, gravel, boulders, and sod along the shores into peculiar

ridges, known as ice ramparts. These ridges are of various

shapes and sizes, but ordinarily the longer direction extends

approximately parallel to the shore. The ridges are discontin-

uous, of variable length, and range from a fraction of a foot to

several feet, in height. Observations have shown that they are

not ordinarily an accompaniment of ve?^ small or very large

lakeSj, although their formation is not entirely controlled by the

size of the lakes, depending in the region under discussion

mainly upon the prevailing climatic conditions. In this state

the temperature conditions are such that the formation of ice

ramparts is limited to lakes of moderate size, and they are best

developed during seasons when the snow-fall is very light.

During the winter of 1898-99 the precipitation and tem-

perature conditions in south central Wisconsin were exception-

ally favorable to the formation of ice ramparts by the moderate

sized lakes. During this season ridges were shoved up at many

places along the shores of different lakes in this region.

The ice ramparts which attracted the special attention of the

author were formed along the shores of Lakes Mendota and

Monona. These lakes are located in the south central part of

Wisconsin, immediately adjacent to the city of Madison. The

general shape and outline of the lakes are sho^vn in Plate L

Lake Mendota has an area of 15.2 square miles, and the area

of Lake Monona is about 3.9 square miles. The volume of

water in Lake Mendota is roughly 16,880,000 cubic feet; that

of Lake Monona is very much less. The coast line of both lakes

142 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters.

is irregular. In some places the lakes are bordered by low

swamp lands, while at other places the land juts out into the

lake, forming vertical, or nearly vertical escarpments, thirty

or forty feet in height. The bank is in some places vertical, or

even overhanging, while in other places it slopes very gradually

to the lake. The banks of the lakes consist of horizontal beds

of limestone and sandstone, sand and gravel, boulder clay,

and marly ooze and weeds which pass shoreward into marsh-

grass meadow-land. At many jDlaces the banks are covered with

trees down to the water's edge. This great variety of shore con-

ditions furnishes a corresponding variety in the shape of the

ice ramparts, resulting from the shoving of the ice.

According to the records of the Madison Democrat,^ Lake

Mendota closed on the 7th day of December, 1898, while Lake

Monona remained open until the 12th. During the winter

which followed very little snow fell in the region under consid-

eration, and during a greater part of the season the ice on the

lakes was bare. The temperature changes during the months of

December, January, and February were very great, as is sho^vn

by the accompanying table, which was compiled from the rec-

ords of the Washburn Observatory. The season was one of al-

ternating warm and cold spells. Several warm spells were fol-

lowed by periods of intense cold ; the changes being very rapid

and extreme for this region. During three days of the latter

part of December, the thermometer fell 54° F., or from +42^

to — 12° ; during four days in the latter part of January, the

temperature changed 55° F., falling from +30° on the 26th to

— 25° on the 29th; from the 12th to the 15th of February the

temperature changed 61°, rising from — 30° on the former day

to +31° on the latter. Many other temperature changes occurred

during this period but these were the most marked.

^This record is taken as authority because it corresponds with observations

made by the author.

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143

Table I. — Maximum and minimum temperatures during the months

of December^ JS9S, January, 1899, and February, 1899.

In degrees Fahrenheit.

144 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters.

During the periods of low temperature the ice increased in

thickness until it attained a maximum of from thirty to forty

inches. Shallow portions of the lakes were frozen to the bot-

tom, and in many of the especially shallow places the bottoms

of the lakes were frozen beneath the ice.

Turning our attention from the conditions prevailing at that

time to the resultant shore phenomena, we distinguish three dif-

ferent forms of ice ramparts, which depend for their peculiari-

ties largely upon the size, shape, and composition of the bank.

The first kind occurs along a sand or gravel beach of gradual

slope; the second kind occurs along an abrupt shore, adjacent to

which the water is somewhat deep ; and the third kind forms at

the head of bays where the shore is low, marshy meadow-land,

adjacent to which the bottom of the lake is composed of mud,

marl, and weeds. There are all gradations between these forms.

Examples of the first kind were observed at many favorable

places along the shore of both Mendota and Monona. In many

of the especially shallow places, as stated above, the bottom of

the lakes had frozen to a considerable depth below the water.

During the periods of expansion the frozen lake bottom, consist-

ing of boulders, pebbles, and sand, together with the ice sheet

above, to which it was welded, was shoved up the gradual incline

of the beach. The boulders, pebbles, and sand composing the

lake bottom maintained the same relative positions which they

had before they were moved, and when the ice melted later in

the season the boulders, pebbles, and sand were left as a thin

mantle, often extending six or eight feet beyond and above the

edge of the water, (See Plate 11.) The best example of this

phenomenon was observed along the beach an eighth of a mile

east of the Mendota Hospital for the Insane. (See A, Plate I.)

The same was also observed along the southeast side of Picnic

Point (See B, Plate I), and at one or two places along the south

shore of Lake Monona. (See C, Plate I.)

The second form of the ice rampart occurred where the shore

line was abrupt, forming steep banks of variable height. The

result of the ice shoving against such banks depends upon the

thickness of the ice and the character and composition of the

shore. In some places the bank was uninjured by the ice-shove,

relief taking place by the breaking up of the ice near or at some

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Buchley — Ice Ramparts. 145

distance from the sliore. Where this occurred, the ice was ordi-

narily piled lip in irregular blocks forming what is commonly

known as an ice ridge. ( See Plate III. ) In some places the re-

lief occurred near the shore, on account of which the bank was

nearly covered with a mass of broken ice. In this way, boulders,

which were originally at, or even below the surface of the water,

were carried ujDward and deposited on the top of the bank,

where they frequently remained as perched blocks after the ice

had melted in the sj)ring. The best illustration of this phe-

nomenon occurred along the south shore of Lake Monona, where

a heavy bank of glacial boulders effectually resisted the pressure

of the ice. ( See D, Plate I. ) Similar examples were conspicu-

ous along the shore of Lake Mendota bordering the University

grounds (See E, Plate L), and also along the steeper and more

resistant portions of Picnic Point.

In some places the expansion of the ice resulted in elevating

and pushing over almost vertical banks of boulder clay. The

most striking examples of this phenomenon occurred on Lake

Mendota at Picnic Point and in front of the Mendota Hospital

for the Insane. The bank on the east side of Picnic Point (See

R, Plate I. ) , composed of sod, boulders, and clay, was shoved up

into a ridge having an average height of about four feet, a breadth

of base of about eleven feet, and a breadth at the top of about

four feet. At one place the band had a height of not less than

eight feet and carried on the top a tree of considerable size.

(See Plate IV.) In many places the ice-shove was made more

effective by numerous boulders and large quantities of gravel

which had been caught up and frozen into the ice along the

shore. These boulders were in many places actually rammed

into the bank, where they presented much the appearance of

plums in a pudding. A larger part of the rampart on Picnic

Point was nearly vertical, although in one or two places it had

been partly overturned.

The shore of Lake Mendota in front of the Hospital for the

Insane is bordered close to the water's edge with many trees.

(See P, Plate I.) The bank is in many places vertical or even

over-hanging and large masses were raised up and overturned

by the ice-shove. Trees twelve inches and more in diameter

were dislodged and overturned. (See Plate VII.) In one place,

10

146- ^y^sconsm Academy of Sciences, Arts^ and Letters.

the sod covering the ground between the lake and a small lagoon,

a distance of about twenty feet, was dislodged throughout the en-

tire distance by the force of the ice-shove. (See Plate VIII.)

The main ridge which was formed at this place had a height of

from three to five feet, but was not as continuous as the one

which occurred on Picnic Point.

This same form of rampart was observed along the shore of

Lake Monona. In a number of instances on this lake the ice

froze back under the bank and when the ice-shove came large

blocks of sod, carrying trees and underbrush, were elevated and

displaced. At other places the bank was torn up, forming

ridges resembling the one at Picnic Point. East of the assem-

bly grounds (See M, Plate I) the sand forming the beach was

piled up in a long symmetrical ridge, as shown in Plate IX.

In several places on Lake Mendota the ice came in contact

with small cliffs of sandstone and limestone, and in two of these

instances fragments of considerable size were broken off by the

ice-shove.

The third kind of ice rampart has the shape of more or less

symmetrical folds, which always occur near the shore, where the

water is shallow. As previously stated, the bottom of the lake

consisting of mud, marl, moss, and weeds, was frozen in the

very shallow places to a considerable depth below the ice.

Where the bank was abrupt, the folds were formed out from the

shore, but where the shore passed by a gradual slope into marsh-

land, the folds were formed on the landward side of the lake.

In several places where the lakeward and landward conditions

were balanced the folds formed on both sides of the shore line.

Where the above conditions prevailed there was formed either

a single fold or a series of consecutive folds resembling the Ap-

palachian Mountain structure.

The mxost characteristic and best defined folds of this class oc-

curred along the shores of University Bay on Lake Mendota.

(See S, Plate I.) The folds at this place were developed on two

sides of the bay. The expansion of the ice apparently resolved

itself into two components acting approximately at right angles

to each other, on account of which the longer axes of the folds

on the two sides of the bay were nearly normal to each other.

The positions of several of the folds are shown on a small scale

in Plate X.

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Buckley — Ice Ramparts. 147

Beginning at the east end of the bay, a single fold was devel-

oped which extended uninterruptedly for a distance of one hun-

dred yards. Twenty-five yards from the west end of this fold

two other folds were formed, parallel to the first. These were

normal folds, having limbs dipping at angles of 71° south and

50° north. The largest of these folds, of which one-half was

destroyed by a sharp re-entrant angle, is shown in Plate XI.

The radius of this fold was five feet, and the length of the por-

tion, which is sho^vn in the figure, measured fifty feet. When

first observed the fold was normal ; but later in the season it be-

came slightly overturned, as shown in the illustration. The dip

of the south limb was 73° south, and that of the north limb 55°

north. The arch w^as hollow^ and the limbs had a thickness of

about twelve or fifteen inches.

The main fold continued west for about 375 paces and then

died out. Xear the middle of this fold, and outside of it, a sec-

ond fold was developed, which had a length of about thirty-five

or forty yards. At the east end, these folds were so near to-

gether that they almost coalesced. Toward the w^est they di-

verged until they were about fifteen feet apart, measured from

crest to crest. The small outer ridge was normal, each of the

limbs being symmetrical Avith respect to the axial plane. The

fold nearest the shore w^as overthrust at the east end, having

limbs dipping 49° north and 79° north. As it was followed

west, the form changed until it had the characters of a normal

and then of an underthrust fold. That portion of the fold

which was parallel and adjacent to the second fold was normal,

having limbs which dipped, respectively, 85° north and 50°

south. The limbs of the underthrust portion of the fold

dipped respectively, 65° south and 50° south, also 55° south

and 75° south. The limbs of the overthrust portion at the west

end dipped, respectively, 55° north and 75° north. The promi-

nent underthrust and overthrust sections of the main fold each

continued for a distance of about fifty feet.

The main fold was fractured along the entire length of its

crest, while numerous less conspicuous fractures occurred across

the fold at various intervals throughout its entire length. These

fractures w^ere all so sharply defined that they had much the

appearance of having been cut with a huge knife.

148 }Yisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters.

The best developed folds were formed on the west side of the

bay and are illustrated in Plate X. (See also S, Plate I.)

Twentj-seven distinct and separate folds were formed at this

place. Fifteen of these appeared to be successive, one being

outside of the other. The size of the folds, and the distance of

those along the south half of the shore from one another, are

given in Table II.

Table II.

Trans. Wis. Acad., Vol. XIII.

Plate \

FIG. 1.

View of ice rampart on Picnic Point from the shoreward side.

FIG. 2.

A close view of the ice rampart shown in Fig. 1.

Buckley — Ice Eaniparis. 149

The limbs of these folds dipped in various directions, and at

different angles. The limbs of one of the folds dipped respec-

tively 38° west and 38*^ east; the limbs of another dipped 65°

west and 78° west, and a third had limbs which dipped 70° east

and 60° east. In this small area all classes of folds were repre-

sented, normal, overthriist, and imderthrust. Each of the folds

was sharply fissured nearly the entire length of its axis. Cross-

fractures were of common occurrence, and in a number of in-

stances they were accompanied by conspicuous faulting, as

shoAvn in Plate XII. In this instance the fold has parted in

the middle, one-half having moved horizontally past the other.

Faulting had also occurred along the crest parallel to the axis

but the movement between the limbs was not very great. In

many instances the fractures were open and the walls had sep-

arated for a space of one or more inches. Many of the arches

were hollow, although some appeared to have very little vacant

space between the limbs. Some of the folds died out gradually

at the ends, but in many cases their termination was quite

abrupt.

It was evident that the anticlines had risen much more than

the synclines had been depressed. In fact the synclines had, in

only a few places, the appearance of having been depressed be-

low their former level.

It was observed at this locality, and elsewhere, that the char-

acter of the folds and the rigidity of the shore line were closely

related to each other. Wherever the folds were near a rigid

shore line they were almost invariably overthrust. Where the

rigid bank was absent, or distant, the folds were generally nor-

mal or underthrust. These relations existing between the bank

and the folds were observed in a sufficient number of places

along the shore of both lakes, to show the interdependence of

the two.

CAUSE OF ICE RAMPARTS.

The cause of ice ramparts as expounded by G. K. Gilbert in

his classical monograph on Lake Bonneville, is well known to all

students of geology. It is as follows :

^'The ice on the surface of a lake expands while forming, so

as to crowd its edge against the shore. A further lowering of

temperature produces contraction, and this ordinarily results in

150 Wisco7isin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters.

the opening of vertical fissures. These admit the water from

below, and by the freezing of that water they are filled, so that

when expansion follows a subsequent rise of temperature, the

ice cannot assume its original position. It consequently in-

creases its total area and exerts a second thrust upon the shore.

Where the shore is abrupt, the ice itself yields, either by crush-

ing at the margin or by the formation of anticlinals elsewhere ;

but if the shore is generally shelving, the margin of the ice is

forced up the acclivity, and carries with it any boulders or other

loose material about which it mav have frozen. A second lower-

ing of temperature does not withdraw the protruded ice margin,

but initiates other cracks and leads to a repetition of the shore-

ward thrust. The process is repeated from time to time during

the winter, but ceases with the melting of the ice in the spring."

This explanation is the best and most satisfactory of any I

have yet read. However, the observations made during the last

two seasons have added a number of interesting details, espe-

cially concerning the manner in which the ice behaves while pro-

ducing these striking shore phenomena, which it may be profit-

able to discuss in the succeeding pages.

The entire phenomenon of ice ramparts depends upon the ex-

pansion and contraction of the ice sheet resulting from abnor-

mal fluctuations in the temperature of the ice. The deforma-

tion of the ice sheet itself is a much more complicated story than

the formation of the ice rampart. The ramparts which form

along the shore are only the more striking manifestations of the

forces resulting from changes in the temperature of the ice.

They occur only under exceptionally favorable conditions, while

the deformation of the ice sheet as a result of the same agency

occurs each winter.

At a temperature of 39° F. water is at its maximum density.

An increase or decrease in its temperature results in expansion.

When the temperature of water is lowered to 32° F. it solidifies,

and if free to move, linear contraction sets in at the rate of about

Toooofor each degree centigrade org^eooofor each degree Fahren-

heit.^ If the ice is not free to move the tensile stresses will ac-

' As determined by Struve, the linear coefficient of expansion is .000053 for each de-

gree centigrade.— See Pogrgendorffs Annalen ; Vol. 66, p. 298. Edward S, Nichols ob-

tained nearly the same result. See Phys. Rev. Vol. 8, pp. 184-186.

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Trans. Wis. Acad., Vol. XIII.

Plate VII.

i'lG. 1.

FIG. 2.

Trees dislodged by the ice shove alon,t< the shore of Lake Mendota in front of the Hospital

for the Insane.

BucJdey — Ice Eamparts. 151

cnmulate until the limit of elasticity is reached, Avhen relief will

take place. AVhenever the temperature of the ice is increased or

decreased forces will be set up tending to either expand or con-

tract the ice at the rate above given.

During the month of February, 1900, the temperature of the

ice at different depths from the surface was obtained by using a

thermometer especially adapted for the purpose. Unfortun-

ately I was able to obtain only five sets of observations. These

indicate that the temperature of the ice at the surface, when

uncovered with snow, is about that of the atmosphere up to zero

centigrade, while it increases almost uniformly with the depth,

until the lower surface is reached, where the temperature is that

of unfrozen water. ^ From the observations taken, it appears

that the mean temperature of the ice is about midway between

the upper and lower surfaces and this can be taken as the aver-

age temperature of the ice sheet as a whole.

As stated above the tensile stresses result from a lowering

temperature. These stresses are a maximum at the surface and

decrease with the increase in temperature as the under surface

of the ice is approached. The tensile stresses will be the same

for each unit of area in any one plane parallel to the surface and

different for every other plane. Each unit of a plane normal

to the surface, except those occurring in the same horizontal

plane as above stated, w^ill have stresses of different values.

That is to say, the tensile stresses are greatest at the surface and

decrease tow^ard the under surface of the ice sheet. If free to

move, the ice sheet would contract in all directions pai^i passu

with any decrease in temperature. However, the margin of the

ice sheet is attached to the shore in such a manner that im-

mediate contraction can only take place normal to the surface of

the ice sheet. The ice particles are free to move normal to the

surface of the sheet and the stresses in this direction, occasioned

by a lowering of the temperature, are immediately relieved by

the particles moving closer together. The contraction resulting

from stresses in this direction would not exceed one-twenty-

fourth of an inch for a thickness of thirty-five inches and a fall

1 1 expect during another season to obtain a contiuuouf series of observations which

•will more fully demonstrate these conditions.

152 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters,

of 49° F. in the temperature. This amount is so small that it

will not need further consideration.

The tensile stresses in the horizontal directions accumulate

until one or the other overcomes the strength of the ice and

cracks form. As stated before, the tensile stresses are greatest

at the surface and rupture will begin when these stresses over-

come the strength of the ice at this place. When once started,

the cracks will continue either part way or entirely through the

thickness of the ice.

The linear contraction of a field of ice four miles wide, pro-

vided movement took place with perfect freedom, would be 0.586

feet for each degree F. In a case similar to the one under dis-

cussion, where the temperature of the surface layer is hypothet-

icallv lowered 49^ F., the contraction of this layer would be

28.714 feet. On the other hand the layer next to the water hav-

ing a temperature of 32° F. Avould suffer no contraction.

Cracks that are once formed often open again and again, but

each time they reach the under surface of the ice they fill with

water. Tlie water rises about nine-tenths of the way to the sur-

face and there solidifies. (See Plate XVII.) As the ice in-

creases in thickness it is buoyed up higher and higher, on ac-

count of which the water in the cracks rises successively to a

point which is further from the surface. Each time the cracks

fill, the water is at a lower level. When it freezes, steps like

terraces are formed from the center to the margin of the vein.

During the entire period of lowering temperature, the ice

sheet increases in thickness by the solidification of the water at

the lower surface. It also increases in density through contrac-

tion. The amount of horizontal contraction is about equivalent

to the volume of new ice which fills the cracks that show at the

surface. As the ice sheet increases in volume it is buoyed up

by the water, increasing its general level. This increase in vol-

ume comes at a time when contraction is at a maximum and may

affect more or less the results.

The water which fills the cracks expands when it freezes,

resulting in inducing compressive stresses which neutralize in

part the subsequent contraction.

When the temperature has reached the lowest point the ice

sheet is a solid mass filling the entire lake basin. When the

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Trans. Wis. Acad., Vol. XIII.

Plate IX.

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Buckley — Ice Ilamparts. 153

temperature begins to rise compressive stresses are set up, which,

as in the case of the tensile stresses, are greatest at the upper

surface of the ice sheet, where the rise in temperature is great-

est. They are absent at the lower surface where the tempera-

ture is constant. These stresses find immediate relief only nor-

mal to the surface of the ice. The horizontal stresses occa-

sioned bv the expansive force of the molecules accumulate until

they are povv^erful enough to overcome either the rigidity of the

ice and the tensile strength of the lower layers of ice, or the rig-

idity of the bank and the tensile strength of the lower layers.

The enormous force with which water expands when passing

from a liquid to a solid state is well known, but must not be con-

fused with the force of expansion of ice due to a rising tempera-

ture. If the force in the case of freezing water and rising tem-

peratures can be said to be proportional to expansion, then the

force exerted by water upon freezing will be 666 times the ex-

pansive force of ice when raised 1° F. In other words it would

require a change of QQ%^ F. in the temperature of the ice, to

make the expansion caused therebv eaual to that of the same vol-

ume of water in passing from a liquid to a solid state.

If the rigidity of the banks is greater than that of the ice cap

relief will take place by the bulging or arching up of the latter.

If the banks are weaker than the ice cap, ramparts v/ill form

along the shore. The initial relief usually takes place suddenly,

as shown by observations on Lake Mendota. Ice ridge-s have

been known to form instantaneously on this lake, with a report

and shock resembling a miniature earthquake. After the ridge

or rampart has once formed relief takes place 'pari passu with

the compressive stresses. When the relief is once initiated it re-

quires but little force to keep the mass moving.

Owing to the greater compressive stresses in the upper than in

the lower layers of the ice sheet, when expansion takes place,

tensile stresses are set up in the latter which must overcome the

strength of these layers before relief can take place in any man-

ner. When the compressive stresses are powerful enough to

overcome the strength of these lower layers, as well as the rigid-

ity of the ice sheet or bank, relief takes place in the lower layers,

through the formation of cracks which begin at the under sur-

face and extend upwards. (See Plate XIV.) These cracks

154 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, AriSj and Letters.

from the under surface are always formed during a rising tem-

perature, and are in respect to form similar to those which form

from the upper surface downw^ard during a period of falling

temperatures.

When cracks form from the lower surface the unfrozen water

soon fills the spaces thus formed. If the temperature is still

one of freezing or if it soon changes from thawing to freezing,

this water will solidify, making the ice cap solid again from

bank to bank.

In general, all cracks, whether they form from the upper or

under surface, may be divided into two classes. The first con-

sists of those that penetrate the entire thickness of the ice and

the second comprises those that penetrate only part way. The

cracks of the first class often extend in straight lines over long

distances. Those of the second class are mainly short and dis-

continuous, and often form a veritable net work. The cracks

of the first class are sho^vn in Plate XV, and those of the second

class in Plate XIV.

The stresses on the ice sheet are very complex and the fissures

which result extend in many directions and are indefinite in

length. The fractures are frequently very complex, resembling

the spiral or feather structure shown in Plate XVI. Short

cracks, not over two or three inches long, were frequently ob-

served crossing the larger fractures at right angles. Where an

especially prominent fracture has formed it is common to find

several less important ones near by and parallel to it.

A number of cracks were observed in which the walls at the

surface were one-fourth inch apart, and yet which apparently

had not been filled with water from below, the ice being about

fourteen inches thick. Most cracks at the surface of less width

than this, however, w^ere filled with ice.

The theory that contraction is a maximum at the upper sur-

face and a minimum at the under surface leads to the assump-

tion that the ice filling a crack which forms from the upper sur-

face will have the shape of a wedge as shown in Plate XVII.

The ice filling a crack which forms from the under surface will

likewise have the same shape, except that the head will be down

instead of up.

An examination of a considerable number of ice cracks dur-

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BucMey — Ice Ramparts. 155

ing a period of lowering temperature neither corroborated nor

disproved this theory, on account of the difficulty in delineating

the boundaries between the old and the new ice. By means of

the lamination, which shows at the surface, the veins could be

traced about half way through the ice sheet, but at that depth

they were always lost. The shaded portion of Plate XVII repre-

sents that portion of the vein that could be delineated. How-

ever, I am very certain that this does not represent the total area

of new ice. The lamination which extends to this depth is prob-

ably due to very fine cracks caused by differential contraction

which is constantly operating during falling temperatures.

During a rise in temperature the ice veins can scarcely be de-

lineated to any depth below the surface. Apparently the com-

pressive stresses resulting from the rising temperature obliter-

ate by regelation the fine cracks formed by tensile stresses dur-

ing the time of lowering temperature.

The actual movement of the ice sheet is further shown by

faults, which may have either a horizontal or vertical displace-

ment. When relief takes place by the formation of ramparts

along the shore horizontal displacement takes place in the ice

sheet. When relief takes place by the arching up of the ice

sheet, both vertical and horizontal displacements result. Plate

XVIII. shows a fault with a horizontal displacement of about

two feet. The crack which formed normal to the first one and

along which the displacement occurred, as shown in the illustra-

tion, may have been initiated prior to the time of expansion, or

it may have resulted from the expansion of the ice at the time

of relief. The displacement of two feet in the above illustra-

tion is evidence that a corresponding relief must have taken

place, either by bowing up of the ice at another place, or by the

formation of ramparts along the shore.

In the detection of* faults in ice, as in rocks, one may easily be

led astray by other phenomena which have all the appearance of

faults. It often happens that a crack will terminate abruptly

against another cross fracture and continue again on the other

side at a distance of from two inches to two feet from the place

where it terminates. ^N^umerous secondary cracks are fre-

quently observed to end abruptly against one of larger size.

The most complex fracturing and faulting occurs when -relief

156 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters.

from expansion conies in the shape of a bowing up of the ice.

The ice sheet breaks either at a place where it is weakest or

where for some other reason it is arched before expansion be-

gins. Contraction, however, precedes expansion, and it has

been observed that where the ice ridges occur, there the widest

cracks have previously been opened. The ice shove which ac-

companies expansion often elevates the ice to a height of eight

or ten feet, in consequence of which the ice sheet on either side

is depressed. Through the cracks in the synclinals thus formed

water flows out at the surface, forming lakelets which have been

observed 150 feet long by 75 feet wide and eight or ten inches

deep. When the temperature changes, the water of these lake-

lets freezes, resulting in a thickening of the ice at this place.

It has been observed that during alternating warm and cold

periods the ice ridges do not form at the same place. This is

probably due to the thickening of the ice at the place where each

successive ridge is formed, as above noted. The increased

thickness adds to the strength and rigidity of the ice at such

places, and at the next shove the ridge forms where the ice is

weaker. This change in the location of the ice crack on Lake

Mendota occurred three or four times during the winter of 1899

and 1900.

The analoc:v between the deformation of a sheet of ice cover-

ing a lake and that of the crust of the earth is in some respects

very striking. The deformation in both instances is by both

tensile and compressive stresses, although the more marked

deformation is due to horizontal compressive stresses. The re-

sults of the expansion and contraction are in both cases very

nearly alike, representing a region in which movement takes

place by combined fracture and flowage. Faulting, folding,

jointing, and the welling up of liquid material from below

through cracks are pheaiomena common to both. In the case of

the ice sheet the student has the advantage of watching these

phenomena and noting their peculiarities. The cause is also

definitely known and the observer can measure relatively the

forces which are operating.

In conclusion I will briefly summarize the changes involved

in the process of ice rampart formation.

The 1st condition is one of lowering temperature owing to

which the water of the lake freezes.

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2nd condition. — Lake covered with the ice sheet and tem-

peratnre still falling. Kesult : — Ice thickens below, raising up-

per surface. Tensile stresses are set up, on account of which

cracks form at surface. The openings thus made penetrate

through the thickness of the ice and thej are filled with water

from below, which soon freezes. The cracks open repeatedly

until the temperature reaches its lowest point. The ice sheet

is then approximately adjusted, at the minimum temperature,

to the size of the lake basin.

3rd condition. — Temperature of ice rises. Kesult: — Com-

pressive stresses are set up, which cause the ice to expand. The

relief comes either through the formation of ridges in the ice

sheet, or the formation of ice ramparts along the shore. Cracks

also form from the under surface of the ice.

4th condition. — Free-zing temperature. Result. — Water wells

up into the cracks and freezes. Ice sheet becomes a solid

mass as before approximately adjusted to the size of the basin.

This completes the cycle of changes in the ice due to varia-

tions of temperature.

Madison J ^Yis.J January, 1900.

158 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts^ and Letters.

DISCUSSIOK

BY PROFESSOR C. R. VAN HISE.

Dr. Buckley's paper upon the behavior of expanding and con-

tracting ice and the resulting deformation of ice and shore is

of very considerable geological interest, because of the many

analogies that the phenomena present to the crustal deformation

of the earth. Many experiments have been made in the labora-

tory with various materials, the aim being to reproduce on a

small scale the phenomena of crustal deformation, in order that

inferences might be made as to the nature of the forces which

produced the phenomena. Laboratory experiments simulating

the phenomena of crustal deformation date back as far as Hall,^

the contemporary of Hutton. The much later experimental

work of Daubree^ is well known. In the last few years a num-

ber of men have been working upon the problem in the labora-

tory. Rotable among these are Willis^ and Prinz.*

The shore and ice deformation caused by ice expansion de-

scribed by Dr. Buckley stimulates more nearly many of the phe-

nomena of crustal deformation than have laboratory experi-

ments. Moreover the phenomena are on a much larger scale

and are of correspondingly greater value in judging of the man-

ner in which the phenomena of crustal deformation are pro-

duced. Dr. Buckley's work is of especial interest to me since

the phenomena described by him almost exactly illustrate a num-

ber of the phenomena which I have elsewhere discussed. These

will be separately mentioned.

First is the manner in which normal folds pass into over-

turned folds. It has been supposed in such cases that the

thrusts have come ^^more largely from one direction than from

the other, and the axial planes of the folds have usually been

1 Sir James Hall : Trans. Roy. Soc. Edinburgh, Vol. VI, 1805.

2 G6oloRie Experimentale, by A. Daubr6e: "Vols. I and II, 1879.

• Thfi Mechanics of Appalachian structure, by Bailey Willis: Thirteenth Ann. Rept.,

U. S. Geol. Surv., Pt. II, 1893, pp. 211-281.

*L'Echelle Reduite des Experiences Gfiologiques, by W. Prinz: Revi>e de I'Univ. de

Bruxelles, Tome II, 1896-97, p. 47. Bull. Soc. Beige d' Astronomie, 1899, p. 70.

Trans. Wis. Acad.. Vol. XIII.

Plate XIV.

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FIG. 1.

Cracks in the ice.

FIG. 2.

The ribbon like cracks have formed from the under surface and only

extend half way through the sheet.

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Buckley — Ice Ramparts. 159

regarded as dipping toward the force." ^ Such folds are over-

thrust folds. The reason that overthrust rather than under-

thrust folds commonly form is that the direction of easiest relief

is upward rather than downward.^ That is the manner in

which the forces have acted, as sho^\ai hy Dr. Buckley, in the

case of a majority of the overturned folds described by him.

He observes in reference to the folds along the shore that

^Vherever the folds were near a high shore line they were al-

most invariablv overthrust.'^

Another point of great interest is the successive development

of folds formed along marshy shores. I have explained that

parallel folds in the earth's crust are probably successive. As a

result of the formation of the first fold the strata are piled up

and thickened. ''After a time the increased thickness of ma-

terial is sufficient to present a larger total resistance to deforma-

tion than the thinner strata in advance. The stress will then

be transmitted forward. On account of the greater stress per

unit of area, a second fold similar to the first will then be

form.ed, but this results in again thickening the mass subject to

the force couple, and again the stress is transmitted forward.

A new inclined fold is then produced, and so on.''^ While par-

allel folds are largely successive, one fold does not completely

develop before the next begins to form. This sequence inferred

for mountains a number of years ago is exactly paralleled by

the manner in which the folds formed in the soft marsh as de-

scribed by Dr. Buckley.

Dr. Bucklev observed that in the successive ice and marsh

folds the anticlines are elevated much more than the synclines

are depressed. This upon theoretical grounds I have held to be

a general truth for the anticlines and sjaiclines of mountain

masses. *

Another very interesting thing in reference to the formation

of the ice and swamp folds is that where two sets form they are

at right angles to each other. (See p. 146.) This same phe-

nomenon is very characteristic of crustal folds, and the explana-

1 Principles of North American Pre-Cambrian Geology, by C R. Van Hise ; 16th Ann.

Rep., U. S. Geol. Surv., Pt. I, 1896, p. 621.

' Principles cit., p. 622.

' Principles cit., p. 622.

* Estimates and Causes of Crustal Shortening, by C. R. Van Hise : Journ, of Geol., Vol

6, 1898, p. 19.

IGO JVisconmn Acade^ny of Sciences, Arts, and Letters.

tion has been given tliat complex tlirnsts acting on strata are de-

composed into two directions at right angles to each other. One

of these is the direction of maximum thrust, and the other is the

direction of minimum thrust. At right angles to the maximum

thrust the more numerous and larger folds are formed, and at

right angles to the minimum thrust lesser folds are formed. ^

Another very interesting phenomenon is the combination of

folds and faults. When the ice or shore is first deformed, or is

deformed slowly, it often yields by bending or by flowage.

When, however, bending goes too far or the process of deforma-

tion becomes too rapid, faulting takes place. Faults form par-

allel to the axis of the folds, giving overthrust faults on the anti-

clines ; they also form at right angles to the folds, giving cross

faults. These phenomena precisely duplicate similar phenom-

ena shown by many mountain masses. As Dr. Buckley says,

the deformation of ice and shore illustrates very well, indeed, the

phenomena exhibited by rock deformation in the zone of com-

bined fracture and flowage.

In this connection a point of very great interest is the sud-

denness wdth which the rujotures frequently take place in the de-

form^ation of the ice. Dr. Buckley's explanation of this is that

the tensile and compressive stresses accumulate until the ultimate

strength or elastic limit of the ice is reached, when release must

come, either by tensile or compressive ruptures. Precisely the

same state of affairs takes place in rocks. They have consider-

able elasticity, and as the earth's stresses gradually increase the

molecules are pulled apart or brought closer together, until fin-

ally the elastic limit is reached, when tensile or compressive rup-

ture occurs. The evidence that the crust of the earth is under

compressive stresses within the elastic limit is conclusively

shown by the fact that ruptures are sometimes known to take

place by the layers of rock rising and breaking when there is re-

lease of load by excavation. As, for instance, in the Chicago

drainage canal, as noted by Salisbury, at the combined locks of

Appleton, as noted by Cramer, ^ and elsewhere.

Another of the interesting phenomena observed and described

1 Principles cit., pp. 626-627.

^Ona Recent Rock Flexure; by Frank Cramer, Am. Jour. Sci. iii, Vol. XXXIX, 1890»

pp. 220-225.

Trans. Wis. Acad., Vol. XIII.

Plate XVI

FIG. 1.

FIG. 2.

Cracks in the ice showing spiral and feather structure.

BucJcley — Ice Ramparts. 161

by Dr. Buckley is the manner in which pools and lakes of water

form on the ice along folds and fractures which occur within the

ice sheet itself. In this case it is well known that the water is

heavier than the ice, yet the water issues through the cracks in

great pools and even in lakelets upon the ice adjacent to the ice

ridges. The rise of this water is due to two causes. In the

first place on each side of an anticline is a natural place for syn-

clines to form, as result of the downward thrust of the limbs of

the anticline. Tims there is a direct tendency, due to the

thrust of the ice, for the ice to be jammed below the water, which

therefore rises to tlie surface through the cracks. As fast as it

rises its weight is added to that of the ice and thus there is an

added tendency for the process to continue. In the second place,

the weight of the piled-up mass of ice along the ice ridge is

transmitted to the adjacent ice, and this combined with the nor-

mal amount of ice above the water is more than sufiicient to

overcome the greater weight of the water, and the water rises to

the surface. So far as the rise of the water to the surface is due

to this second reason, it is caiised by gravity. Upon the lake it

is impossible to separate these two causes. In another place I

have held, following Dutton and others, that gravity is one of

the main factors which have caused lava to rise to the surface

and have compared the rise of the lava to that of water through

ice where ice ridges form. ^ In the case of the ice the thrust is

produced by another force than gravity. ^ However, in the case

of the earth the thrust of the crust is ultimately produced by

gravity, and therefore the dominating influence of gravity in the

rise of lavas. The relative sizes of the ice ridges and the pools

of water are very interesting, the latter being many times the

height of the former. The relations are somewhat the same as

those of the great volcanic plateau of the west to the adjacent

mountain masses.

Another notable point in this connection is that where an ice

ridge once forms and water exudes to the surface, this freezes ;

and this results in greatly thickening the mass of ice for that

belt. When expansion ceases and a cold period follows, the

1 Earth Movements, by C, R. Van Hise. Trans. Wis. Acad. Sci., Arta, and Letters, Vol.

XI, lo93, pp. 495-436.

«Loc. cit.,pp. 512-514.

11

162 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters.

water below the ridge also freezes. When at a later warm time

ice expansion again comes the ice ridges form at some other

place. This gives a cine to the manner in which new mountain,

ranges may be formed. After a first mountain mass with ac-

companying vulcanism has formed, and there has been a long

period of quiescence, in which the lava at the surface and filling

the openings in the crust has solidified, the rigidity of that por-

tion of the crust of the earth may be greater than at some ad-

jacent place, and when later thrust accumulates so that deforma-

tion is necessary it finds relief at some other area. However,

it is to be remembered that in many cases mountain-making

movements along the same axis have recurred repeatedly, and

this would be expected, provided there were not long periods be-

tween the successive movements.

Dr. Buckley notes that expansion producing ice ridges fre-

quently follows contraction. The contraction produces tensile

ruptures. When expansion follows, the ice ridges are located by

these tensile cracks. The question naturally arises whether or

not the same thing may frequently be true for crustal deforma-

tion.

In conclusion I may say that the phenomena which Dr. Buck-

ley has so well described seem to me to reproduce on a larger

scale than has been possible by experiments in the laboratory

many of the phenomena of crustal deformation ; and, moreover,

that the analogies are so astonishingly close as to lead to the con-

clusion that in most cases crustal forces have acted in a similar

manner to those in which the forces in the ice have acted, al-

though the ultimate cause of the force in the two cases is mainly

different, that of the ice being expansion or contraction due to

change in temperature, while that in the earth's crust is that of

gravitative stress caused by the earth's contraction, which comes

from various causes, including change in temperature.

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THE PLANKTON OF FRESH WATER LAKES,

ADDRESS OF THE EETIEING PRESIDENT, C. DWIGHT MARSH, A. M.

Professor of Biologu, Ripon, Wis.

For some years I have been interested in the subject of the

fauna of our fresh water lakes. This interest was first aroused

in regard to the animals of the deeper parts of the lakes. The

results of the explorations of the depths of the ocean were just

becoming known. I had read in the older works that while the

sea was densely populated along shore, and had what has be-

come to be known as a ^'pelagic" fauna and flora in the open sea,

remote from land, the depths were a barren region utterly de-

void of both animal and vegetable life. But later it had been

shown that there was, even in the greatest depths, a fauna, not

very abundant to be sure, but of great interest because of the

strange peculiarities of some of the forms. With others I was

profoundly interested in this work, and it lead me to conjecture

whether there was not a field for investigation in the deeper

waters of our lakes. At that time very little had been done in

the way of any systematic study of the deeper waters of the

lakes. I think the only extensive work on the subject was

ForeFs "La faune profonde des lacs Suisses," published in 1885.

Professor Forel had begun his researches on the deep water

fauna of Lake Leman in 18 GO, and had published various no-

tices in the intervening years. In this country, so far as I

know, the first publication in regard to the deep water fauna

of lakes was in the first volume of the Transactions of the Wis-

consin Academy, in a paper by Dr. Lloy, of Racine. He de-

tailed how he had become interested in the food of the whitefish,

and had examined their stomachs, finding animals that seemed

new to science. A company v^as made up for a dredging expe-

dition consisting of Dr. Hoy, Dr. Lapham, Professor Stimpson,

164 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters.

Professor Andrews and IMr. Blatchford, and pnt in a day's work

dredging on Lake Michigan in June, 1870. The result was the

collection of a considerable number of animals. Especial im-

portance was attached to the discovery of a Triglopsis and a

Mysis, as they are marine genera, and their presence was sup-

posed to indicate a former direct connection of Lake Michigan

with the ocean.

In 1874 Professor Smith published a paper on the "Inverte-

brate Fauna of Lake Superior," reporting the existence of the

same Crustacea in Lake Superior which Dr. Hoy had found in

Lake Michigan. The My sis there, however, occurs in somewhat

shallow w^ater as well as in the greater depths. In both lakes it

forms an important — perhaps the most important — constituent

of the food of the white fish and lake trout. As I was located

near a lake of considerable depth, a depth reputed to be any-

where between 400 feet and iniinitv, it occurred to me that I

had an opportunity to carry out similar researches.

My own work on lakes, then, originated in a desire to know

more about the abyssal animals. I soon found, hoAvever, that

the problem was a serious and complicated one, involving a com-

plete faunistic study of the lake. I was fortunate in finding on

the bottom of Green Lake the same My sis, which makes its home

in Lake Michigan. These animals have not been definitely re-

ported from any other lake in the United States, although Mysis

is said to live in a lake in E^cav York connected with the St. Law-

rence. Here was a pretty problem in animal distribution.

How did these animals make their wav into Green Lake-? Wa3

it by way of the Great Lakes, or did they come at some time by

a connection through the Mississippi Valley? I could not tell,

and I cannot today, for it becomes a problem for the geologist

rather than the zoologist. With this as a starting point I

attacked the problem of lake fauna?, and the battle is still in pro-

gress with no indications of a conclusion of hostilities for many

years to come.

During the decade in which I have been interested in limnol-

ogy there has been a very considerable advance in our knowledge

of the subject, and it will be my attempt tonight to siunmarize

this knowledge, and make as clear a statement as I can in the

Marsh —The Plankton of Fresh Water Lakes. 165

brief time at mj disposal of what is now known of the fauna and

flora of fresh water lakes.

Russell, in his work on !N^orth American Lakes, enumerates

ten agencies which, acting separately or in combination, may

produce lakes. So far as our Wisconsin lakes are concerned,

the most important of these agencies is glacial action. Most

of our lakes occupy the depressions caused by the unequal

distribution of the glacial drift, or by interference with pre-

existing drainage lines. Inasmuch as Wisconsin is not a

mountainous state, it follows that these depressions are no-

where of great depth, and that we have no lakes which com-

pare in depth \vith those located in mountainous regions. Most

of our lakes are extremely shallow, few being more than forty

or fifty feet in depth. Lake Geneva, 142 feet, and Green Lake,

237 feet, are our deepest bodies of water, while our largest lake,

Lake Winnebago, probably does not exceed twenty-five feet. All

lakes are temporary features of the topography. The outflow-

ing water is all the time deepening the outlet and increasing the

amount of drainage, while the inflowing water is bringing in

material which gradually fills up tbe lake bed. This process

goes on with comparative rapidity, and even in our new lake

areas there are numerous examples of dead lakes, where swamp

vegetation entirely covers what was formerly an open sheet of

water. The physical processes involved in the lives of lakes and

the relation of the lake vegetation to these processes are very in-

teresting, but this is not the time or place to discuss them, and

they can only be referred to in passing.

The subject of the fauna of fresh, water lakes has not been

especially attractive to zoologists. This is but natural when we

consider the great wealth of life in the ocean, and the compara-

tive poverty of fresh water. Of the more important divisions

of the animal kingdom the echinoderms and tunicates are en-

tirelv absent in fresh water, and the coelenterates and melius-

coidea are represented by few forms. Even the Crustacea, which,

form the greater part of the plankton, and are present in such

enormous numbers, have very few forms compared with the Crus-

tacea of the sea. It is to be expected that zoologists will be

attracted by this wealth of material in the sea, and that most of

them will in the future as in the past resort to the sea for their

166 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences^ Arts, and Letters.

study. It Tvas in the ocean that the ancestors of our fresh water

animals dwelt, and it is amongst those animals that the student

may expect to find the most information in regard to the devel-

opment of life on the earth.

But the lakes have their fauna, a fauna of great numbers if

not of great variety, and because of their isolation and somewhat

peculiar conditions, present a very interesting study in the dis-

tribution of animals. Of course the best known members of this

fauna are the fishes, whose numbers, habits, and food are fairly

well knoxvn. Fish are so important for human food that a study

of their habits comes to be a matter of commercial importance,

and our federal and state governments expend large sums of

money for this investigation and for the practical w^rk of rear-

ing and distributing spawn and young fish. In Wisconsin,

too, as well as in some of the other northern states, it is a matter

of great practical importance to maintain the numbers of game

fish in our lakes simply for the purposes of sport. Until one has

made the rounds of the summer resort lakes he has little idea of

the multitudes of people who come to our state in the summer

season, attracted largely by the opj)ortunities for fishing. Hun-

dreds of thousands of dollars are brought to us every summer

in this way, and it is a good business policy which leads us to do

all in our povv^er, and even spend large sums of money, if neces-

sary, to maintain our stocks of game fish.

It has long been known, of course, that fish are dependent for

their food upon smaller animals, and it has also been known that

a knowledge of these same small animals was necessary to any

accurate and complete knowledge of fish, but this study was so

difficult and involved so much drudgery that for a long time it

was neglected.

Anything like an exact knowledge of the Crustacea may be

said to date back only half a century to the ^vritings of Fischer

and Glaus, although some papers upon this subject had been

published previously.

In 1817 Say published a somewhat extended article on the

Crustacea of the United States, in which he speaks of one

Ostracod. two Daphnias and one Cyclops^ as inhabiting the

waters of the southern states. In 1843, in the "Natural History

Marsh — The Planldon of Fresh Water Lakes. 167

of New York," was published an article by DeKay on tbe Crus-

tacea, wliich was beautifully illustrated, but added little to our

knowledge of the fresh water Crustacea. In fact, though Cyclops

and Daphnia are mentioned, they are spoken of as "extra-lim-

ital," in spite of the fact that not a lake in New York would have

failed to furnish him countless numbers of these genera, had he

looked for them. To Professor Eorbes, of the University of

Illinois, is due the credit of making the first extensive collections,

of these animals in this country, and publishing accurate de-

scriptions of t'hem. His first paper was published in 1876, and

was followed by a series of very valuable investigations, cul-

minating within' the last few years in the establishment of a

floating labo^VJtory on the Illinois River for the continued study

of the fauna and flora of that river and the shallow lakes adjoin-

ing.

In Europe large numbers of investigators within the last few

years have devoted themselves to the study of fresh water ani-

mals and plants. Preeminent among them have been Porel and

his co-laborers on Lake Leman, and Zacharias and his fellow-

workers in the station at Lake Plon in Ilolstein. This station

at Plon was, I believe, the first permanent fresh water station in

the world. Since its establishment in 1S91, a considerable num-

ber of permanent stations have been established in various parts

of the world. It is not my purpose here to give a history of

these establishments, for that has already been exceedingly well

done by Professor Ward. I may call attention in passing, how-

ever, to the fact that the work in this country has been done

almost exclusively in our immediate vicinity, Illinois, Wiscon-

sin, and Michigan having published by far the most material on

this subject. Similar work has been prosecuted in Minnesota,

Ohio, and Indiana, but very little has been done in the other

states, if we except the exceedingly valuable work of Whipple.

In Wisconsin, work has been prosecuted on the Madison lakes

and Green Lake for many years, and now, under the auspices

of the Natural History Survey, a more extensive and systematic

biological survey of the lakes is being made, probably a more .

extensive comparative study than has been attempted elsewhere.

While this study is of especial scientific interest, as has been in-

168 Wisco7isin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters.

timated bef ore, it is of great practical interest in connection with

the problems of fish culture. It may not be likely that, as sug-

gested hy a recent writer in Forest and Stream^ the future

angler Avill carry with him a thermometer and chart with a

statement of the laws of vertical and horizontal distribution,

but such study does give a fundamental knowledge which is of

vast importance to the angler as well as to the fish culturist.

The terminology used in the study of the fauna and flora of

fresh-water lakes, as in the sea, was formulated by Hackel.

Under the term ^'plankton" is included all living things, animal

or vegetable, found in the water which do not move from place

to place by their own volition. Fishes are not considered a part

of the plankton. The life of the sea may be considered as ^'lit-

toral," "i^elagic,'' and "abyssal." To these terms Hackel adds

"zonary", to include those animals Avhich are supposed to occur

at zones of different depths in the ocean. In the littoral and

pelagic planktons Vv'e may have both animals and plants, but in

the abyssal no plants are found except bacteria. The study of

the pelagic and abyssal faunas has been entirely within the last

half century ; in fact the very knowledge of their existence dates

back hardly fifty years.

In the lakes we use a similar set of terms. The regions are

"littoral," "limnetic," and "abvssal." The characteristics of

these regions are somewhat known, but still our knowledge is far

from perfect.

A list of the plants and animals found in any one lake seems

quite formidable because of its length, but the species that are

present in any considerable numbers are very few. From a lim-

netic collection, for instance, we may find in abundance the fol-

lowing: four or five copepods, five or six cladocera, three or

four protozoa, and perhaps two rotifers. This would be a fair

average fauna in one of our lakes. Of the plants, we would find

two or three diatoms and as many alg'^e.

^ot only are the anin^als and plants of neighboring lakes

very much alike, but the same animals may be found distributed

over wide territories, and even over different continents. This

is true even of some of the higher animals of the plankton, like

the crust,acea. Of our fifteen species of Cyclops nine are found

Marsh — The Plankton of Fresh Water Lahes. 169

in Europe. In the case of one species it is not only found in

Europe, but in As 'a and in xVfrica, and literally does not vary

a hair in these widely separated localities. On the other hand,

the genus Diaptomus is very variable. We have not a single

species which is common to the European lakes. Not only that,

but there are many localized species in the United States. One

species occurs, so far as known, only in a few lakes in the north-

ern part of the lower peninsula of Michigan. A second is

widely distributed in all the smaller lakes across the continent

in the northern states. Another goes from the center of Wis-

consin north into the Arctic regions. In the Rocky Mountain

regions are several peculiar species. Through the southern

states two species are found which never come north. Mexico

has at least one peculiar species. Of the other organisms, both

animal and plant, most are world-wide in their distribution.

Erom this fact of the general uniformity of fauna and flora over

wide regions, it is clear that the study of a lake which simply

produces a farmal and floral list is of very little value. There

was a time when such lists were important, before this uniform-

ity of distribution was determined, but that time is long since

past, and those European authors w-ho continue to fill the pro-

ceedings of learned societies with lists resulting from desultory

explorations of one or more lakes are almost wasting printers'

ink.

In the littoral region we find usually an abundantflora. Those

plants which need an anchorage find it in the mud of the bottom,

and the unattached plants are protected by those that are sta-

tionary. Protected by these plants and living upon them is an

abundant fauna in which Crustacea are the most prominent,

although we find great numbers of rhizopods, infusoria, sponges,

hydrozoa, worms, true insects and mites, mollusca and bryozoa.

This abundance of the lower animals forms a rich supply of food

upon which the higher animals can live. It is in this littoral

region that the fish get the most of their food, and every fisher-

man knows that marshy borders are necessary to maintain the

supply of fish. The animals of the littoral plankton are opaque,

and generally are so colored that w^hen they are at rest they are

inconspicuous. Those that swim about and then drop to the hot-

170 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters.

torn to rest are ordinarily so colored that they are not easily dis-

tinguished from the mud. Frequently in littoral regions the

hottom is covered with a thick mat of Chara, which, in turn,

forms hiding places for enormous numbers of the invertebrates.

The flora of the limnetic region can be, of course, only of

floating plants. Among these are an enormous number of dia-

toms. Chloroplnjceae are present in larger or smaller numbers

and sometimes large numbers of the Cyanophyceae. Generally

speaking, the limnetic flora is not sufficiently abundant to attract

attention, but on some lakes they are sometimes multiplied in

such quantity as not only to attract attention but even to excite

alarm. The surface of the lake has a thick coat of bright green,

and as this is cast up on the shore by the waves it forms

ridges which in their decay become very offensive. This phe-

nomenon has been known in England as ^^the breaking of the

meres," in Germany as the ^'WasserblUthe," and in this country

as the ^'working of the lakes." The appearance is sometimes as-

cribed to the seeds of littoral plants. Only a few species of

plants are concerned in this phenomenon, and the species differ

somewhat in different lakes. Certain diatoms may be present,

too, in sufficient numbers to produce an unpleasant "fishy" smell

in the water. This exaggerated gTOwth of the limnetic flora is

most pronounced in shallow or comparatively shallow lakes, and

is frequently a source of great annoyance to cities which get

their water supplies from such bodies.

The limnetic fauna, as I liave said before in this address, has

but few kinds of animals, by far the most numerous and char-

acteristic being the Crustacea. These are beautiful, transparent,

and nearly colorless creatures. It is not true, as is sometimes

stated, that the limnetic fauna is entirely distinct from the lit-

toral. The general character of the limnetic animals is cer^

tainly different, and distinctly different, from that of those

found in the littoral region, but many individuals are common

to both. It is true, however, that while there is hardly a radical

distinction between the two faunn:^, certain species are common

to the limnetic regions and only rarely found in the littoral,

while some that are everywhere in littoral collections are rarely

found in those taken in the open water. There is, of course, no

Marsh — The Plankton of Fresh Water Lakes. 171

clear dividing line between the two regions, but one insensibly

merges into the other, while, under the influence of the winds

and waves, such limits as exist are continually changing.

In the species of Crustacea there is a certain distinction be-

tween the limnetic fauna of the deeper lakes and that of the

shallower. One species of Diaptornus is found everywhere in

the Great Lakes, but in only three of the Wisconsin lakes —

Lake Geneva, Green Lake, and Cedar Lake. The shallowest of

these lakes — Cedar Lake — is about a hundred feet in depth.

One of the species of Cyclops is very abundant in the Great

Lakes, but is seldom found elsewhere except in comparatively

deep lakes.

In a paper published in the Transactions of the Academy, I

made the suggestion that lakes might be divided according to

their faunse into the deep water and the shallow water, suggest-

ing as a possible limit between the two 40 meters. I have since

found that Elkhart Lake, 117 feet, and Cedar Lake, 95 feet,

have many characteristics of the deep water fauna, and it is pos-

sible that the dividing: line should be nearer 30 meters than 40.

The German authors make a distinction between "plankton-

poor'^ and "plankton-rich" lakes, which very nearly corresponds

to my deep-water and shallow-water lakes ; for the total amount

of plankton in the deep lakes is very much less than in the shal-

low lakes. This is easily explained. For the number of ani-

mals is, of course, dependent on the number of plants. Inas-

much as plants are dependent upon sunshine, they will grow in

water only in those places that are reached by the sun's light.

As the light of the sun penetrates in deep w^ater only to a lim-

ited distance, the deeper parts of our lakes are entirely devoid

of plant life. On the other hand in shallow lakes not only do we

find the floating vegetation as in the deep lakes, but as the light

reaches the bottom over a larger proportion of its surface, we

have in addition a very large flora flourishing on the bottom.

In some of the very shallow lakes nearly the whole bottom is

covered with a rank vegetation. This is true, for instance, of

Lake Vieux Desert. In Green Lake, on the other hand, inas-

much as the shores are somewhat precipitous, there is only a

comparatively narrow margin on which can be supported a flora

172 Wisconsi7i Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters.

growing upon the bottom, Avhile the larger part of the lake is so

deep that only the floating vegetation can exist. It is easily

seen, then, that a shallow lake wdll be "'^plankton-rich'' as com-

pared with a deep lake. Fishermen recognize this fact, and ex-

pect the shallow lakes to be better for their sport.

It is evident, then, that the living limnetic vegetation must

be at or near the surface, where it can have an abundance of

light. Animal life, h&w^ever, is not limited in this way. It was

long ago shown that in the sea there was an abundant surface

fauna and an abyssal fauna, but in regard to the condition of

the intermediate region there has been some dispute. Agassiz

has claimed that there is a region intermediate betw^een the top

and bottom, which is entirely devoid of life. This has been dis-

puted by some authors, and late explorations seem to indicate

that no region between the surface and bottom is entirely free

from animals. A similar condition exists in the lakes. By far

the most abundant fauna is at and near the surface, but animals

are found in greater or less numbers at all depths. The larger

part of the plankton is found within thirty or forty feet of the

surface ; but the same kinds of animals that form the fauna of

the upper waters may be found at all depths, altliough in small

numbers. Limnocalanus is an example of an animal which be-

longs to the intermediate regions. It, too, may be*found in small

numbers at anv depth from the surface dov\Ti, but it seldom

occurs in any considerable numbers outside the intermediate

region.

Limnocalanus and Daplmia pulicaria are perhaps the only

animals in fresh v/ater which belong distinctly to the zonary

plankton, although Cyclops hrevispinosus is much more abun-

dant between five and twenty meters than it is near the surface.

Collectors of plankton m.aterial have known that they could

ordinarily make much more abundant collections at night than

in the daytime. This has led to a belief that there is a verti-

cal migration of the plankton, tow^ards the surface at night, and

away from it in the daytime. It was supposed that the whole

body of the plankton moved up and down. This idea has been

proved to be false. What movement there is is within quite nar-

row limits near the surface, and all members of the limnetic

Marsh — The Planhton of Fresh Water Lakes. 173

fauna do not, by any means, behave in tbe same way. They

have most decided individual peculiarities, so that we cannot

speak of the movements of the fauna as a whole, but each species

must be considered by itself. Some of them do not move at all

vertically, but have the sam.e distribution from one end of the

day to the other. Others, like the larval forms of the copepods,

are more numerous at the surface in the daytime than in the

night. Some have a very pronounced migration. This is par-

ticularly true of Leptodora which is rarely found at the surface

in the daytime, but appears at almost exactly forty-five minutes

after sunset, remains at the surface during the night, and dis-

appears again at just three-quarters of an hour before sunrise.

Most of the larger Crustacea which form the great body of the

plankton do migrate in this way, and it was natural, perhaps,

to infer that the whole plankton moved up and down.

The limits of this vertical mi^rration it is verv difficult if not

impossible to fix. Most of the movement is within one meter

of the surface, the most marked changes being within one-half

meter of the surface, and below three meters the amount of

movement is very slight. Eight determining factors have been

listed by Professor Birge as controlling the vertical distribution

of Crustacea: food, temperature, condition of the water in re-

spect to dissolved oxygen and other substances, light, wind,

gravity, age and specific peculiarities. Of these factors, by far

the most important are food, temperature and light. Inasmuch

as the food supply is controlled by temperature and light, we

may speak of these two factors as, in the main, controlling tho

vertical distribution of the limnetic plankton. Of these two

factors, temperature is the most important, although light has

a marked effect on many species. In the winter season when the

waters of all the lakes are very nearly uniform in their tempera-

ture from top to bottom, the vertical distribution of the lim-

netic fauna is much more uniform than in summer.

In the smnm.er season the most marked changes in vertical

distribution are correlated with the vertical changes in tempera-

ture. This is most distinctly seen in the deeper lakes. In these

lakes it is a surface layer of greater or less depth w^hich is

warmed, the deeper layers feeling the effect of the summer's

174 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters.

sun only very slightly. In Green Lake below 40 or 45 meters

the temperature never rises above 6.11 degrees Centigrade,

although the surface may run as high as 26.67 degrees C. In

Lake Michigan the bottom temperature at depths of 360 feet is

4.2 degrees C, v^^ith a surface temperature of 18.3 C.

The change in the temperature from the top to the bottom is

not a gradually decreasing one, however. A layer of water at

the surface, which may be in midsummer some ten or twelve

meters in depth, is very nearly uniform in temperature. From

the lower surface of this layer there is a very rapid decrease in

temperature for a short distance, and then a gradual decrease

until a minimum is reached. This layer of sudden change in

temperature is known as the ^^thermocline," and its position

varies in depth with the season and the size of the lake. As the

summer season progresses the thermocline grows lower. In the

very shallow lakes the temperature during the summer season

is nearly uniform through the whole depth. In Lake Winne-

bago, for example,- there is seldom a difference between top and!

bottom temperatures greater than two degrees. In small lakes

the thermocline is considerably higher than in large lakes. This

is doubtless due to the influence of the winds, by which the small

lake is less affected. This was very prettily illustrated in a com-

parison of the V/aupaca lakes with Cedar Lake ancT Green Lake

about August 1st of this last summer. In three of the Waupaca

lakes — Rainbow, McCrossen and Beasley's, of which Hainbow

is the largest and Beasley's the smallest, the thermocline was re-

spectively at six meters, five meters and three meters. At the

same time the thermocline of Cedar Lake was at eight meters,

and the thermocline of Green Lake at eleven meters.

The vertical distribution of the plankton has a very close re-

lation to the thermocline, most of the animals being above it.

Limnocalanus, DapJinia longireniis and Daphnia pulicaHa,

however, are found below the thermoeline, and in some plankton-

poor lakes the proportion of the other organisms below the ther-

mocline is much larger.

It is evident that the circulation of the water is in the layer

above the thermocline, and that below the thermocline there is

insufficient oxygenation, and that this bottom layer must, too,

Marsh — The Flanklon of Fresh Water Lalces. 175

hold a great deal of the dead and decaying material falling from

the upper layers. It is a curious fact, first pointed out, I think,

by Whipple, that, the bottom waters of deep lakes are stagnant

during both winter and summer, but have a period of overturn-

ing in spring and fall. This overturning may come with con-

siderable suddenness when the waters have not been much agi-

tated by the winds. We ordinarily think that water is so mobile

that the heavier portions will immediately sink, and thus the

water of greater density will always be at the bottom. It may

happen, how^ever, as in the fall, that the upper waters will cool

off, and yet retain their position, so that the lighter water will

actually be below. The lake is in a condition of unstable equili-

brium. If, under these circumstances, there comes a heavy

wind, the whole body of water will overturn.

It is at these two periods of overturning, as shown by Whip-

ple, tliat the growth of diatoms is especially pronounced, and

they are found present in enormous numbers in the limnetic

plankton. The great growth of diatoms is explained in the fol-

lowing way : during the periods of stagnation diatoms or their

spores, if diatom spores exist, accumulate at the bottom of the

lake, inasmuch as their specific gravity is greater than that of

water. They do not grow there, because sunlight is essential to

their growth. At the bottom is accumulating during this period,

too, a large amount of organic matter from the decay of organ-

isms near the surface, and this, under the influence of bacteria,

is transformed into material fitted for food for the diatoms: in

this food material the nitrates are perhaps the most important

When the time of overturning comes, the diatoms or their spores

rise to the surface, accompanied by these dissolved organic ma-

terials, and, under the influence of sunlight, an exceedingly

rapid multiplication takes place. As the food materials are used

up the numbers of diatoms decrease again. Other organisms,

of course, show the efl^ect of the overturning of the water, for

many are directly or indirectly dependent upon the diatoms for

food, and, besides, diatoms are not the only organisms which

can make use of the food materials which are thus brought to

the surface. Diaptormis, Epischura, Limnocalanus and two

species of Cyclops show quite clearly these two periods of rapid

176 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters.

production, although in some of these cases the results are com-

plicated by the fact that the temperature of the surface water

has a direct effect on the reproduction.

The matter of the annual distribution of the organisms of the

plankton is a very interesting question, but is also a very compli-

cated one. As has iust been stated, certain of the diatoms have

a distinct spring and fall maximum, and there are other organ-

isms which, because of their dependence upon the diatoms, have

similar periods of maximum gTowth. But there are other

causes at work which control the growth of individual organ-

isms, so that tlieir optimum periods may come at very different

times of the year.

Generally speaking it is probably true that the largest amount

of plankton occurs in midsummer, although Yung says that the

maximum development of plankton in Lake Leman is in May

or June, and that the minimum is in March and September..

Zacharias states that the maximum period for Lake Plon is

about August 1st. Measurements of a large number of collec-

tions from various lakes in Wisconsin indicate that the maxi-

mum of plankton occurs in these lakes in the latter part of July.

There may, however, be marked exceptions to this general state-

ment. For example, I have found in Green Lake a development

of diatoms in midwinter so enormous as to make the total plank-

ton even greater than in summer. The exact period of maxi-

mum development mav varv from vear to vear, and in different

lakes, because of varying local conditions. The reason for this

July maximum seems to be both because a considerable number

of organisms have their highest development, and because there

is a greater variety of forms at this time than at any other time

of the year. This is undoubtedly because of the peculiarly

favoring conditions of temperature. It is this time of the year

that seems to be especially favorable to the growth of the algai.

The "water-bloom'' may appear in June and remains sometimes

until into September, but it is in July and August that it is

present in the greatest quantity. This summer, on Lake Win-

nebago, it was most abundant during tlie latter half of August.

The minimum of plankton development is in the winter

months, especially in January and February. At no time of

Marsh — The Planhton of Fresh Water Lakes. 177

the year, however, are either plant or animal forms wanting,

and collections made through the ice will give a considerable

variety of kinds, as well as numbers of individuals.

It will be noticed that the period of maximum plankton de-

velopment corresponds to the time of highest temperature of

the water, and that tlie period of minimum development corre-

sponds to the time of lowest temperature, so that we can be cer-

tain that the one important controlling factor in the growth of

plankton is the temperature.

Henscn and his co-laborers who worked out a very elaborate

system of measuring the plankton of the sea claimed that the dis-

tribution of the plankton over wide stretches of the sea was

nearly uniform. Granting this to be true, it evidently is pos-

sible by a series of collections and measurements to compare dif-

ferent parts of tlie ocean in regard to their productiveness in

animal and plant life. This conclusion, that the horizontal

plankton of the sea has a practically uniform distribution, has

been accepted by the majority of scientists, although vigorously

combated bv Hackel.

Apsteiu has applied the sam.e methods to the examination of

lakes, and has concluded from his investigations that the plank-

ton of lakes is uniformly distributed. It is easily seen that there

is very good reason for assuming this to be the case from the

actual conditions under which the plankton exists. The plank-

ton consists of organisms that do not move voluntarily from

place to place, and therefore do not change their positions. They

are dependent upon heat and light for their development, so that

their groui:h is mainly within forty feet of the surface ; conse-

quently a depth exceeding this would not mean any greater pro-

duction of plankton — or in other words, the amount of plankton

depends not upon depth, but upon surface.

This is a most important conclusion, if true, for it gives us

an exact method by ^^iiich we can compare one lake with another

and determine their relative productiveness, or from a series of

collections, determine the absolute annual productiveness of any

body of water. Such determinations would have an important

commercial value, for by them could be estimated the possibil-

ities of fish production in a lake. The method was worked out

12

178 ^yisconsin Academy of Sciences^ Arts^ and Letters,

in detail and very elaborately by Henisen. The collection was-